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Abstract 
 
In this study I discuss G. W. Leibniz's (1646-1716) views on 
rational decision-making from the standpoint of both God 
and man. The Divine decision takes place within creation, as 
God freely chooses the best from an infinite number of 
possible worlds. While God's choice is based on absolutely 
certain knowledge, human decisions on practical matters are 
mostly based on uncertain knowledge. However, in many 
respects they could be regarded as analogous in more 
complicated situations.  
    In addition to giving an overview of the divine 
decision-making and discussing critically the criteria God 
favours in his choice, I provide an account of  Leibniz's 
views on human deliberation, which includes some new 
ideas. One of these concerns is the importance of estimating 
probabilities – in making decisions one estimates both the 
goodness of the act itself and its consequences as far as the 
desired good is concerned. Another idea is related to the 
plurality of goods in complicated decisions and the 
competition this may provoke. Thirdly, heuristic models are 
used to sketch situations under deliberation in order to help 
in making the decision. 
Combining the views of Marcelo Dascal, Jaakko Hintikka 
and Simo Knuuttila, I argue that Leibniz applied two kinds 
of models of rational decision-making to practical 
controversies, often without explicating the details. The 
more simple, traditional pair of scales model is best suited to 
cases in which one has to decide for or against some option, 
or to distribute goods among parties and strive for a 
compromise. What may be of more help in more 
complicated deliberations is the novel vectorial model, 
which is an instance of the general mathematical doctrine of 
the calculus of variations. To illustrate this distinction, I 
discuss some cases in which he apparently applied these 
models in different kinds of situation. These examples 
support the view that the models had a systematic value in 
his theory of practical rationality.  
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Introduction 
 
Perhaps the most well known feature of Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz's (1646-1716) philosophy is his doctrine of God's choosing 
to create this world among an infinite number of all possible 
worlds. Whereas the criteria employed by God in His rational 
choice, and whether or not He was free in it have been discussed 
extensively, human choice or deliberation has received less 
attention. Yet Leibniz discussed ethical issues and the good life in 
numerous memoirs and letters, and the theme is also present in all 
of his larger works. Because these discussions are scattered and 
fragmentary, the general insight into his view of human 
deliberation has remained hazy. 
The aim of this study is to give an overview of Leibniz's views 
on human deliberation and to examine his methods of deciding 
rationally in practical matters. In addition, an account is given of 
the rational choice of God and the criteria He employed. I will 
argue that Leibniz considered rational choice in God and men 
largely analogous despite some serious differences. 
For Leibniz it was of utmost importance that men acted 
rationally. This was an essential feature of the best possible world. 
Although God could, through his infinite understanding, analyse 
the whole history of the world and its inhabitants, men were 
unable to do this. Their only means of obtaining knowledge of the 
intentions of their creator, apart from through theology, was to 
study nature and to develop science.  
Leibniz's goal in his moral philosophy was to persuade men to 
follow God's intentions. Since this is the best of all possible worlds, 
God had His reasons for creating it as it is, and His intentions can 
be observed in nature. When we study nature, we gain pleasure 
from observing His perfections in it, which makes us love Him. 
This love creates in us a pleasure of the mind, which motivates us 
to act in a manner that pleases Him. In other words, acting 
according to the intentions of God gives us joy and appeals to our 
reason.  
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When our moral action follows reason, we act according to 
God's wishes, whether or not we succeed in contributing to the 
general progress of increasing perfection. Experiencing an increase 
in perfection brings about a pleasant sentiment in the moral agent, 
and consistently acting virtuously, in other words acting in a 
manner that pleases God, brings about supreme happiness. Since 
morally acceptable action is also rational action, general well-being 
depends on it. To act morally in the Leibnizian sense is to perfect 
oneself, to practise charity, and to try to increase one's knowledge 
of nature and its creator. 
In his quest to promote universal perfection and a world of 
peace and harmony Leibniz was active in many practical fields, 
including politics, diplomacy, economics, the politics of science 
and church reunification. It was essential for him to develop 
different ways of settling the practical problems that endangered 
this great goal. He was always ready to find something good in 
each opinion, and to find a common ground for different 
viewpoints. For example, he tried to reconcile the ancient and the 
modern in his philosophy.  
Leibniz thought that if all the propositions related to a 
controversy could be analysed into their most simple elements, 
one could simply calculate the right answer. If this analysis were 
performed successfully, the differences between opposing parties 
would simply vanish. In most practical cases, however, one cannot 
do this because complete analysis is not possible. Leibniz's answer 
to the problem was to try to develop a calculus of probabilities that 
could give us probable information about the relations of 
propositions. This probability calculus turned out to be a far more 
difficult task than Leibniz first imagined, which is why he had to 
develop other, “softer” methods to act as a basis for rational 
decision-making in the uncertain situations that are typical of 
human practical rationality.  
In his article “The Balance of Reason” Marcelo Dascal argues 
that, according to Leibniz, in human controversies different 
reasons are balanced against each other as on a pair of scales. In 
this weighing it is not necessary to reach demonstrative certainty – 
one need only to judge whether the reasons weigh more on behalf 
of one or the other option.  
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A different model of human decision-making is discussed by 
Jaakko Hintikka in his article “Was Leibniz's Deity an Akrates?” 
Drawing his inspiration from Nicholas Rescher's interpretation of 
God's criteria for the best of all possible worlds (commonly known 
as the trade-off-theory), he argues that Leibniz developed a new 
general model for rational decisions that helps in making 
complicated decisions. This model, which was related closely to 
his work on the philosophy of nature and mathematics, is a 
heuristic device that helps in finding a rational combination – and 
in an ideal case an optimum – of plural separate inclinations to the 
good. Hintikka's idea is developed further by Simo Knuuttila in his 
article “Old and New in Leibniz's view of Rational Decision”, in 
which he calls it the vectorial model of rational decision. 
I will argue that Leibniz applied both the pair of scales model 
and the vectorial model in his views on human practical action. He 
applied the former, in which different options are weighed against 
each other, in simple for-or-against situations or in cases in which 
one can strive at a compromise by distributing goods equally 
among parties, and the latter in more complicated situations in 
which they are independent and competing against each other. 
My specific interest is directed to the vectorial model for two 
reasons. First, it is relatively unknown although it seems to have 
been a systematic method of evaluating goods in Leibniz's 
practical rationality. Secondly, it is an instance of a larger 
mathematical doctrine of the calculus of variations, which, as I will 
argue following the lines of Nicholas Rescher and some other 
commentators, is also God's preferred way of conceiving of the 
structure of the best of all possible worlds. I will elaborate on the 
model in the light of Leibniz's different writings, and attempt to 
trace instances of its application in his practical writings in order to 
find support for the claim that it had systematic value in his views 
of practical rationality. As far as I know, this task has not been 
accomplished so far.  
The study is divided into three parts. The first Part is devoted 
to the divine choice of the best of all possible worlds. I will begin 
by discussing the choice in general, and God's freedom in His 
choice. Chapter two concerns God's plan to create the best of all 
possible worlds. I will compare the interpretations offered by 
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Nicholas Rescher, David Blumenfeld and Donald Rutherford of the 
criteria God employed in His choice, and will defend Rescher's 
interpretation. Lastly, I will discuss Leibniz's defence of God's 
goodness or the so-called problem of theodicy.  
In Part two I turn to the essentials of human decision-making, 
in other words cognition, reasoning and the theory of probability. 
In Chapter four I consider Leibniz's basic principles of reasoning 
and the innate ideas to which they were related. I then move on to 
his views of cognition and look at his notions of perception and 
especially apperception, which strongly influenced his views on 
rational moral action. The next Chapter presents his views on 
reasoning about contingent truths, which, as I argue, is far more 
demanding than reasoning about necessary truths. The rest of Part 
II concerns the question of probability. Estimating probability in 
contingent matters is a crucial element in Leibniz's practical 
rationality, and for this reason I will dwell on his views on its 
calculation and assessment. I include some case studies illustrating 
how these efforts at dealing with probabilities are applied in 
practical matters. 
The third and the largest part of the study comprises a 
systematic discussion of Leibniz's views on the goals of human 
rational action and deliberation, and of his models of rational 
decision-making. Chapters eight and nine concern the goal of 
ethics and the practical rationality in human action. I consider the 
essential elements of Leibniz's moral philosophy, such as his views 
on love, goodness, justice and virtue. I proceed in Chapter ten to 
discuss deliberation. First I look at Leibniz's influences and then 
discuss his views on deliberation in general. Then I turn to his 
views on the soul and the role of the intellect and the will, which 
leads to a discussion of the passions of the soul and of Leibniz's 
views on the weakness of the will.     
Chapter eleven presents Leibniz's two models of rational 
decision-making and considers some related case studies. I will 
show that the two models are applicable in different kinds of cases 
and that they had a systematic value in his views on practical 
rationality. There is a number of examples to be found in Leibniz's 
practical writings in which he applied the models, often without 
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spelling out the details. I will discuss these examples and show 
how the models are applied in them.   
As the above suggests, I will limit myself to discussing 
Leibniz's views on divine choice and practical rationality. Con-
sequently, I do not mention - or then only in passing - many of the 
main subjects he covered in his philosophy, such as the nature of 
substance or dynamics. These matters, of course, have a bearing on 
practical rationality, but so does almost everything in his 
philosophical thinking. I have tried to keep my discussion concise, 
and this is why I have had to leave many issues untouched. 
My approach in this study could be said to represent the 
context-oriented or exegetical rather than the philosophical 
method of the history of philosophy, as distinguished by Robert 
Sleigh.1 I will discuss Leibniz's views on rational decision-making 
from his standpoint, not that of modern philosophy. Following 
Donald Rutherford's account about his own project in his Leibniz 
and the Rational Order of Nature, I aim to construct a systematic 
interpretation of Leibniz's views on rational decision-making, 
which “takes an author on his own terms and seeks to reconstruct 
a version of his doctrines that would be recognizable to the author 
himself.”2 At the same time, while bringing out the innovations in 
his thought, I will not attempt to hide the numerous shortcomings 
in the texts that make the interpretation difficult.  
Parting company from many recent studies on Leibniz, I do not 
maintain strict chronological order. I will discuss the views he held 
at different time periods, and use examples from both his early and 
his later career, although his most extensive discussions 
concerning decision-making are in his late works such as Nouveaux 
essais and Essais de Theodicée. My main reason for taking this 
approach is that I think Leibniz's views on practical rationality did 
not change substantially after the 1670's. Another reason is the 
nature of my project. Since the material is so scattered and 
sometimes hard to find, I have had to use what was available, 
although keeping in mind the contexts of various views.  
                                                 
1 On the distinction between exegetical and philosophical history, see 
Sleigh, Leibniz and Arnauld, pp. 2-6. 
2 Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, p. 3.  
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   The aim of this study is thus to collect together and spell out 
Leibniz's views on practical rationality, which are often dispersed 
in various discussions of practical matters or in polemics against 
other scholars. I will also bring out the novelty of some of Leibniz's 
ideas, such as the pluralism of values in practical decisions and the 
importance of estimating probabilities in rational decision-making. 
I will also show the distinction between two different kinds of 
decision models (combining two previous interpretations), and 
discuss some case studies to support my claim that these models 
had a systematic value for Leibniz.  
    To complement this original contribution, I give a general 
account of Leibniz's views of human deliberation, which has no 
single predecessor, as far as I know, in the history of Leibniz 
studies. I also offer a critical account of the different interpretations 
concerning the divine “plan” of creating the best world and the 
question of apperception. Given the huge scale of the topic and the 
lack of extensive discussion of Leibniz's practical thought, my aim 
is rather to provide a general account of his views on rational 
decision-making than to make a detailed examination of specific 
arguments or different interpretations of this aspect of his 
thinking.  
As noted at the beginning of this introduction, there are 
surprisingly few commentaries on Leibniz's theory of practical 
rationality, and only a few studies dealing exclusively with his 
moral philosophy. The most extensive of his views on 
jurisprudence and ethics are Gaston Grua's two works, of which La 
Justice humaine selon Leibniz (1956) is more important as far as my 
study goes. Another influential study of Leibniz's ethics is Albert 
Heinekamp's Das Problem des Guten bei Leibniz (1969).  
The one general work on Leibniz's ethics, written in English is 
John Hostler's Leibniz's Moral Philosophy (1975), which has many 
shortcomings. A recent systematic presentation of the importance 
of God's rational choice of the best of possible worlds and the 
ethical implications of this choice is Donald Rutherford's Leibniz 
and the Rational Order of Nature (1995). I also found a recent 
collection of articles, edited by Donald Rutherford and J. A. Cover, 
called Leibniz. Nature and Freedom (2005) helpful. 
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Although all of these works influenced my study, my account 
of Leibniz's models of decision does not owe a great deal to them. 
The most relevant sources, apart from the articles by Dascal, 
Hintikka and Knuuttila mentioned above and Leibniz's own 
writings, were Louis Couturat's La Logique de Leibniz (1901), Jon 
Elster's Leibniz et la formation de l'esprit capitaliste (1975), and Marc 
Parmentier's 1993 article “Concepts juridiques et probabilistes chez 
Leibniz.” I have also profited from numerous other articles dealing 
with Leibniz's practical projects.  
To end this introduction, a few words on the texts and the 
translations are in order. I have used the official Academy edition 
of Leibniz's texts (marked A) whenever possible, but since this is 
nowhere near its completion, I have also used many other editions. 
Of these, the Gerhardt edition (marked G) is the most important. I 
have added a list of abbreviations for these different editions at the 
end of the study.  
I have also used English translations whenever possible. 
However, in many cases (especially Nouveaux essais) I have 
changed the translations in order to give an accurate a picture as 
possible, and have not marked the alterations. The original text is 
given in the notes. I have often included citations in the notes only, 
and in these cases the text is in the original language. I have chosen 
to keep the original texts exactly the same as in the editions (with 
the exception of that in italics), although especially the Gerhardt 
edition includes numerous misspellings and mistakes in the 
French language.  
 
Part I  
 
Divine Choice 
 
 
 
 
 
1. God’s Rational Choice  
 
The ultimate rational decision in Leibniz's philosophy was God's 
choice of the best of all possible worlds.3 God is seen both as a 
necessary being and as the author of the world in the sense that He 
creates the world He finds to be the best of all possible worlds. He 
creates the world and in principle terminates it – the world cannot 
come into existence and cease to exist in any other way.4 
In creation God realises an infinite number of compossible 
substances that have a disposition to exist. Before creation, all 
substances reside only as ideas in the understanding of God.5 All 
possibilities (truths of fact) are true in some possible worlds, but 
                                                 
3 On the history of simultaneous alternative possibilities and alternative 
possible worlds in medieval philosophy, see Kukkonen, Possible Worlds in 
the Tahâfut al-Falâsifa: Al-Ghazâlî on Creation and Contingency and Knuuttila, 
Duns Scotus and the Foundations of Logical Modalities. On the concept of 
“possible world” before Leibniz, see Knebel, Leibniz, Middle Knowledge, and 
the Intricacies of World Design. 
4 La Monadologie, §6.  
5 In a memoir De rerum originatione radicali Leibniz stated that all possibles 
or essences have an exigency to exist, or a “pretension” to existence 
according to their quantity of essence or reality, or according to the degree 
of perfection they contain (G VII, p. 290 & 303). This doctrine is curious, 
because it seems to imply that God is not required to make any choice 
between possibilities. I tend to agree with Nicholas Rescher and David 
Blumenfeld, who hold that the doctrine should be taken only figuratively, 
as a metaphorical description of different degrees of perfection in 
substances. On this topic, see Rescher, Leibniz: An Introduction to his 
Philosophy, pp. 33-34 and Blumenfeld, Leibniz's Theory of the Striving 
Possibles. For a critique of this view, see Shields, Leibniz's Doctrine of the 
Striving Possibles.    
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necessary truths or truths of reason (I will return to this distinction 
in Chapter 4.1.) are true in all of them. Each substance follows its 
individual developmental programme (the individual notion), 
which only God can foresee.        
The reason for the claim that there exists only one single best 
world is to be found in Leibniz's opposition to the liberty of 
indifference. Choice in a state of equilibrium (two or more equally 
worthy objects of choice) entails the liberty of indifference, and it 
cannot be allowed because there has to be some difference or 
advantage that the best world has and others do not. In His 
wisdom God finds this best alternative, which gives Him sufficient 
reason for His choice. Liberty of indifference implies acting 
without reason, because there is no sufficient reason why one is to 
be preferred to the other. In his third letter to Clarke Leibniz wrote: 
“…this is plainly maintaining that God wills something without any 
sufficient reason for His will, against the axiom or the general rule of 
whatever happens. This is falling back into the loose indifference I 
have confuted at large and showed to be absolutely chimerical even in 
creatures and contrary to the wisdom of God, as if He could operate 
without acting by reason.”6 
Immanuel Kant considered some arguments against this doctrine 
in his essay Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus 
(1759).7 According to him, there has to be a possible world beyond 
which there is no better. From this it does not follow that there has 
to be one single ultimately perfect possible world, since if two or 
more possible worlds were equally perfect, neither would be the 
best for they both would have the same degree of goodness.8 Kant 
                                                 
6 “…c'est justement soutenir que Dieu veut quelque chose, sans qu'il y ait 
aucune raison suffisante de sa volonté contre l'Axiome, ou la regle 
generale de tout ce qui arrive. C'est retomber dans l'indifference vague, 
que j'ay amplement refutée et que j'ay montrée chimerique absolument, 
même dans les creatures, et contraire à la sagesse de Dieu, comme s'il 
pouvoit operer sans agir par raison.” G VII, p. 365; L, p. 683.  See also G 
VII, p. 301 and the 2nd letter to Clarke, G VII, p. 356. 
7 Kant's essay was brought to my attention by Professor Olli Koistinen. 
8 Kant, Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-70, p. 72. This is discussed by David 
Blumenfeld in his article Is the Best Possible World Possible?, in which he 
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strove to defend Leibniz's doctrine by assuming that the absolute 
perfection of a thing was to be equated with its degree of reality.9 
According to him, two realities cannot be distinguished from each 
other as such – one could only argue that something is present in 
the one and not in the other. Thus realities differ from each other 
only with respect to magnitude and not with respect to quality. 
From this he concluded that two different worlds could never have 
the same degree of reality and therefore there could not be two 
worlds that were equally good and equally perfect. Thus there is 
only one perfect world.10  
Later Kant offered an alternative solution, which was to regard 
this world as the best because God had judged it to be thus. 
Because God's judgement never errs, it follows that this world is, 
in fact, the best.11 Since God is perfectly good and omniscient, it 
seems natural that He chose to create the best of possible worlds.12 
I will return to the alternative interpretations of the criteria God 
employed in His choice in Chapter 2.  
There are additional problems, which Leibniz more or less 
ignored or that remain ambiguous in his writings. One is this: why 
did God choose to create a world at all? God is, of course, a self-
sufficient entity without any external duties. He did not need to 
create the world in order to be more perfect, since He was already 
the most perfect possible being. He also had no obligation to 
                                                                                                    
argues that Leibniz could not explain consistently why God should realise 
some possible world at all. See also Reichenbach, Must God Create the Best 
Possible World? 
9 In fact, the argument that the degree of reality is equated with absolute 
perfection is taken from Crucius. Kant, Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-70, p. 
72, n. 6. 
10 Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
11 Ibid., p. 75. 
12 This feature of Leibniz's metaphysics is not traditional - Augustine 
thought that God created what He thought was a good world. He created 
for six days and then He rested. The result was a good, but not necessarily 
the best world. Time was created with the world, so this story is only 
metaphorical. Knuuttila, Time and Creation in Augustine, p. 103. On the 
Judeo-Christian tradition, see also Adams, Must God Create The Best? and 
Knebel, Necessitas Moralis Ad Optimum. 
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anyone to create a world.13 However, one would assume that He 
would be more perfect if He created at least some world, for being 
in itself is traditionally thought to be good.14  
The creation took place by God's will. Leibniz argued in Essais 
de Theodicée (1710), §233 that God resolved to create the world 
through the free motion of His goodness.15 In His deliberation 
amongst all possible worlds the good in the best possible world 
persuaded Him to create it. His will was directed to the goodness 
of that world and this inclined Him to choose it from among an 
infinity of possible worlds, but it did not necessitate His choice.  
However, if the objective good dictates God’s decisions, how 
can He choose otherwise? If He cannot, His will is not free. This, 
again, would mean that there was no real contingency in the actual 
world. There is no doubt that Leibniz wished to avoid this kind of 
necessitarianism concerning God's choice, since he stated this on 
numerous connections, usually in the context of his criticism of 
Spinoza. For example, in Essais de Theodicée, §173 he wrote:  
“Spinoza went further: he appears to have explicitly taught a blind 
necessity, having denied to the Author of Things understanding and 
will, and assuming that good and perfection relate to us only, and not 
to Him...he teaches that all things exist through the necessity of the 
                                                 
13 On this question I agree with Robert Merrihew Adams, who argues that 
God has no obligations to the created, because they exist only as possibles 
in His mind and not as actual moral beings. See Adams, Must God Create 
the Best?, p. 319.  
14 On this theme, see Scott MacDonald (ed.) Being and Goodness. David 
Blumenfeld has argued convincingly (referring to Essais de Theodicée, §8) 
that Leibniz's subscription to the principle of perfection as God's criteria 
for His choice led him to hold (against his own argument) that creating 
nothing was a worse alternative for God than creating less than the best of 
all possible worlds, since being is better than non-being. Even if there 
were no best among the possible worlds (or even several equally perfect 
worlds), it would have been better, but not necessary, for God to create 
something (that is, a world with some degree of perfection) rather than 
nothing. Blumenfeld, Is the Best Possible World Possible?, p. 170. 
15 Here Leibniz agreed with Bayle. See G VI, p. 256. 
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Divine nature, without any act of choice by God. We will not waste 
time here in refuting an opinion so bad, and indeed so inexplicable.”16  
It is quite another question whether Leibniz could have avoided 
the problem. This has given rise to an extensive discussion of his 
view of contingency and necessity, of which I cannot give a 
detailed account here. I will only briefly refer to the most well-
known interpretation of God's freedom given by Robert M. Adams 
in his article “Leibniz's Theories of Contingency”. Adams argues 
that Leibniz was both a compatibilist (subscribing to the view that 
one is able to choose freely despite determinism) and a determinist 
(everything in the world is hypothetically necessary), but tried to 
present his views in a non-offensive way in order to escape the 
severe criticism that Spinoza received.17 Adams cites the following 
passage from Leibniz's letter to Wedderkopf from 1671 as an 
indication of his early views:  
“Since God is the most perfect mind, however, it is impossible for Him 
not to be affected by the most perfect harmony, and thus to be 
necessitated to the best [optimum] by the very ideality of 
things...Hence it follows that whatever has happened, is happening, or 
will happen is best and therefore necessary, but...with a necessity that 
takes nothing away from freedom because it takes nothing from the 
will and the use of reason.”18 
                                                 
16 “Spinosa est allé plus loin: il paroit avoir enseigné expressement une 
necessité aveugle, ayant refusé l’entendement et la volonté à l’auteur des 
choses, et s’imaginant que le bien et la perfection n’ont rapport qu’à nous, 
et non pas à luy…il enseigne que toutes les choses existent par la necessité 
de la nature Divine, sans que Dieu fasse aucun choix. Nous ne nous 
amuserons pas icy à refuter un sentiment si mauvais et même si 
inexplicable.” G VI, p. 217; H, p. 234.  
17 See Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist which features a 
reworked version of the article on pages 9-52. However, Adams does not 
think that Leibniz was strictly Spinozistic, as some other scholars have 
done. Ibid., p. 21.   
18 “Cum autem Deus sit mens perfectissima, impossibile est ipsum non affici 
harmonia perfectissima, atque ita ab ipsa rerum idealitate ad optimum 
necessitari...Hinc sequitur, quicquid factum est, fit aut fiet, optimum ac 
proinde necessarium esse, sed ut dixi necessitate nihil libertati adimente, 
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Adams argues that here Leibniz adopted a strongly necessitarian 
position and held that God was necessitated to create the best 
because of His nature. He apparently modified his position later, 
and argued that the actual world, and the things that existed in it, 
were not necessary but contingent, because other worlds were 
possible in which those things did not exist. Because there were 
other possible worlds that were prior to God's choice, the actual 
world was contingent.19 In other words, God had several possible 
worlds to choose from. This argument is expressed in a memoir, 
De libertate et necessitate (1680-84 (?))20, and Essais de Theodicée, §235: 
“God chooses among the possibles, and for that very reason He 
chooses freely and is not compelled; there would be neither choice nor 
freedom if there were but one course possible.”21  
Adams considers this argument to be Leibniz's most successful 
defence of contingency in the actual world. It is related to the 
distinction between hypothetical and metaphysical necessitation. 
The former is the necessity produced by foreknowledge (the 
opposite of which is conceivable but less good), and the latter is 
the true opposite of contingency (the opposite of which is 
inconceivable).22 When God has several options, He is not 
                                                                                                    
quia nec voluntati et rationes usui.” A II, 1, p. 117; Adams, Leibniz: 
Determinist, Theist, Idealist, pp. 10-11. 
19 Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, pp. 12-13. 
20 A VI, 4, pp. 1444-49. 
21 “…Dieu choisit parmy les possibles, et c'est pour cela qu'il choisit 
librement, et qu'il n'est point necessité: il n'y auroit point de choix ny de 
liberté, s'il n'y avoit qu'un seul parti possible.” G VI, pp. 258; H, pp. 272-
73. 
22 “Mais supposé que Dieu la prevoye, il est necessaire…savoir qu'elle 
existe, puisqu'elle a été prevue, car Dieu est infaillible: c'est ce qu'on 
appelle une necessité hypothetique. Mais ce n'est pas de cette necessité 
dont il s'agit icy: c'est une necessité absolue qu'on demande, pour pouvoir 
dire qu'une action est necessaire, qu'elle n'est point contingente, qu'elle 
n'est point l'effect d'un choix libre.” (Essais de Theodicée, §37) G VI, pp. 123-
124. Leibniz also used in some cases the concept of moral necessity which 
usually means the same as hypothetical necessity in the sense that moral 
goodness inclines the will, but does not necessitate it. See Mates, The 
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metaphysically necessitated to choose this world because He can 
always choose some other world that is conceivable, but less good 
than the actual world. 
Thus, Leibniz did not allow God to act from metaphysical 
(blind) necessity, which denied His intelligence and choice, but 
argued that His being hypothetically or morally necessitated to 
choose the best of all possible worlds was related to His wisdom. 
When God acts according to moral necessity, He is motivated by 
good reasons to act as He does. In other words, these reasons 
incline Him without binding him.  
“...even though it is certain that God would always choose the best, 
this does not prevent something less perfect from being and remaining 
possible in itself, even though it will not happen, since it is not 
impossibility but imperfection that causes it to be rejected.”23  
Adams argues that Leibniz was unable to escape the conclusion 
that it was demonstrable, and hence hypothetically necessary, that 
God, as an absolutely perfect being, does what is best.24  
Leibniz understood hypothetical necessity to be a kind of 
freedom. In §288 of Essais de Theodicée he gave three conditions of 
freedom: intelligence (clear knowledge of the object of 
deliberation), spontaneity (the source of the action is within the 
agent)25 and contingency (the exclusion of logical and 
                                                                                                    
Philosophy of Leibniz, p. 121; On the concept moral necessity, see Knebel, 
Wille, Würfel und Wahrscheinlichkeit, p. 127f. 
23 “…quoyque Dieu choisisse tousjours le meilleur asseurement, cela 
n'empeche pas que ce qui est moins parfait ne soit et demeure possible en 
luy même, bien qu'il n'arrivera point, car ce n'est pas son impossibilité, 
mais son imperfection qui le fait rejetter. ” (Discours de metaphysique, §13). 
A VI, 4, p. 1548; AG, p. 46. 
24 Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, pp. 39-40. This question is 
also discussed by Thomas Aquinas in Summa contra gentiles. See 
Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Creation, pp. 131-36. 
25 Spontainety has been understood in various ways as the absence of any 
physical or psychological constraint or passion. Donald Rutherford 
distinguishes two senses of spontainety in Leibniz, both which involve 
freedom of will: 1) monadic spontainety (any substance is self-
determining in the production of all its own states) and 2) agent 
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metaphysical necessity).26 It could be argued in the context of the 
framework discussed above that God through His properties 
(foreknowledge, omnipotence and contingent choice) freely 
chooses the world He creates, although He is hypothetically 
necessitated by the qualities of the best world. This view could be 
questioned, however. If God finds that a certain possible world is 
the best, it seems that He cannot choose some another possible 
world since the choice would violate His nature, in other words 
His wisdom and goodness. Thus it would seem that He was not 
free in His selection after all.  
Adams’ response is to offer another Leibnizian defence of the 
contingency of the actual world, which is that the argument that 
this world is best is contingent.27 Thus, although it may be 
hypothetically necessary that God chose the best, it is not 
necessary that this world is the best possible. Whereas the former 
is a consequence of God's nature, the latter cannot be 
demonstrated by finite analysis and is therefore contingent.28 To 
use a formulation put forward by John Carriero, even if the 
existence of this world is externally necessitated by God (God is 
morally necessitated to choose the best world), it is contingent 
because the world is not internally necessitated (it is not 
necessarily the best of all possible worlds).29 All in all, I think these 
two defences (as presented by Adams) are sufficient to show that 
blind, metaphysical necessity can be avoided in the Leibnizian 
                                                                                                    
spontainety (the agent is active in promoting change in the world). The 
former is related to the general metaphysical structure of the world and 
acts as the metaphysical foundation of freedom, while the latter is related 
to deliberation. Rutherford, Leibniz on Spontainety, p. 161f; see also Murray, 
Spontainety and Freedom in Leibniz and Greenberg, Leibniz Against Molinism.   
26 See G VI, p. 288. 
27 In their reviews of Adams' book, Carriero and Mugnai claim that this 
argument is in fact stronger than the first one of other-worlds-possible-in-
themselves. For a discussion, see Leibniz Society Review 6, pp. 61-126. 
28 Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, pp. 24-27. 
29 Carriero, Review, p. 63. On Carriero's criticism of Adam's views, see p. 
66f. 
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system, although some details, such as the exact nature of infinite 
analysis, are not entirely clear.30 
In his latest article on the topic, “Moral Necessity”, Adams 
argues that moral necessity is essentially connected to final causes 
as opposed to efficient causes in Leibniz's metaphysics, since final 
causes lead to the good. Thus hypothetical necessity applies both 
to God and to human spirits, whose appetitions are related to final 
causes. While God cannot be mistaken in His judgement, men are 
led astray in their deliberations concerning the good because of 
their limited cognitive capability, as will be shown in Parts II and 
III. According to Adams, God's choice of the best of all possible 
worlds was the single most important and most foundational case 
of final causation in the Leibnizian scheme of things. Thus Leibniz 
was able to distinguish himself from Spinoza, who held that there 
were only efficient causes in nature.31  
Adam's interpretation of Leibniz's views on freedom of the will 
in God's choice seems plausible to me. On the subject of human 
freedom I tend to agree with Robert Sleigh, who argues that 
human choices are in principle unpredictable by other created 
beings (although foreseen by God), in other words, they do not 
always follow the greatest apparent good even if they do not err in 
their judgements concerning the good.32 As will be shown in 
Chapter 10.3., men may act akratically, in other words, choose 
wrongly, even though they may recognise the best act to be 
performed in a certain situation. This scenario is, of course, 
impossible for the supremely good divine decision maker, whose 
deliberations do not suffer from this kind of problem. 
 
                                                 
30 See Sleigh, Leibniz and Arnauld, pp. 83-89. I will return to infinite analysis 
in Chapter 5.  
31 Adams, Moral Necessity, p. 187. See also Spinoza, Ethics I, prop. XVI. 
32 Sleigh, Leibniz on Freedom and Necessity, pp. 249-54. There is a vast 
literature on human freedom in Leibniz’s philosophy which I cannot 
discuss here. A good introduction to the topic is Rutherford and Cover 
(eds.), Leibniz. Nature and Freedom.  
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2. Models of Creation  
 
The creation of the world was a gigantic task and only God could 
have done it. His will is inclined by the goodness of the best world, 
which satisfies the principle of sufficient reason He employed in 
His choice.33 Thus the choice between possible worlds was based 
on reason.34 Leibniz was consistently critical of Descartes, who 
thought that God created eternal truths.35  
“The infinity of possibles, however great it may be, is no greater than 
that of the wisdom of God, who knows all possibles…The wisdom of 
God, not content with embracing all the possibles, penetrates them, 
compares them, weighs them one against the other, to estimate their 
degrees of perfection or imperfection, the strong and the weak, the 
good and the evil.…By this means the Divine Wisdom distributes all 
the possibles it had already contemplated separately, into so many 
universal systems, which it further compares the one with the other. 
The result of all these comparisons and reflections is the choice of the 
best from among all these possible systems, which wisdom makes in 
order to satisfy goodness completely; and such is precisely the plan of 
the actual universe.”36 
                                                 
33 According to the principle of sufficient reason, nothing happens without 
a reason for its being so and not otherwise. I will return to this principle in 
Chapter 4. 1.  
34 See La Monadologie, §53-55. Leibniz saw God's choice as a real choice 
between alternatives, whereas Spinoza considered creation simply the 
realisation of possibles. See Spinoza, Ethics I, prop. XVI and Adams, 
Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, p. 21.  
35 See Leibniz, Meditationes sur la notion commune de la justice. 
36 “L’infinité des possibles, quelque grande qu’elle soit, ne l’est pas plus 
que celle de la sagesse de Dieu, qui connoit tous les possibles…La sagesse 
de Dieu, non contente d’embrasser tous les possibles, les penetre, les 
compare, les pese les uns contre les autres, pour en estimer les degrés de 
perfection ou d’imperfection, le fort et le faible, le bien et le mal…par ce 
moyen la Sagesse Divine distribue tous les possibles qu’elle avoit déja 
envisagés à part, en autant de systemes universels, qu’elle compare encor 
entre eux : et le resultant de toutes ces comparaisons et reflexions est le 
choix du meilleur d’entre tous ces systemes possibles, que la sagesse fait 
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The choosing of the best of all possible worlds is an infinitely 
complicated task and Leibniz argued that it was not possible to 
give an exact description of how this was performed in practice. 
He wrote in Discours de metaphysique (1686), §6 that he used certain 
comparisons (including not only descriptions of the structure of 
the best possible world but also some analogies in which he 
presented God as an excellent geometrician) to sketch an imperfect 
likeness of divine wisdom, but he did not claim to explain in this 
way the great mystery upon which the entire universe depended.37 
These comparisons have given rise to various competing 
interpretations concerning the criteria employed in God's choice. 
Before going into these in more detail I will present the most 
complete citations that are relevant to them. One line of argument 
concerns the proportion between the variety of phenomena and 
the simplicity of laws (the variety/simplicity criterion38): 
a) “God has chosen the most perfect world, that is the one that is at the 
same time the simplest in hypotheses and the richest in phenomena, as 
might be a line in geometry whose construction is easy and whose 
properties and effects are extremely admirable and widespread.” 
(Discours de metaphysique, §6)39 
b) “This is the way of obtaining as much variety as possible, but with 
the greatest order possible, that is it is the way of obtaining as much 
perfection as possible.” (La Monadologie, §58)40 
                                                                                                    
pour satisfaire pleinement à la bonté; ce qui est justement le plan de 
l’univers actuel.” G VI, p. 252; H, pp. 267-68. 
37 G IV, pp. 431-32. 
38 The term is from David Blumenfeld. See his Perfection and Happiness in 
the Best Possible World, p. 383. 
39 “ …Dieu a choisi celuy qui est le plus parfait, c’est à dire celuy qui est en 
même temps le plus simple en hypotheses et le plus riche en phenomenes, 
comme pourroit estre une ligne de Geometrie dont la construction seroit 
aisée et les proprietés et effects seroient fort admirables et d’une grande 
étendue.” (G IV, p. 431; AG, p. 39).  
40 “…c’est le moyen d’obtenir autant de varieté qu’il est possible, mais 
avec le plus grande ordre qui se puisse, c’est à dire c’est le moyen 
d’obtenir autant de perfection qu’il se peut.” (G VI, p. 616; AG, p. 220). 
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Another line of argument suggests that the greatest variety of 
phenomena is founded on the simplest laws (the harmony of 
variety and simplicity41): 
c) “God makes most of the things He can and what obliges Him to 
seek simple laws is the need to find a place for as many things as can 
be put together; if He made use of other laws, it would be like trying to 
make a building with round stones, which make us lose more space 
than they occupy.” (A letter to Malebrance, 22. 7. 1679)42 
d) “The necessary being acts in the simplest ways. For among the 
infinite possible ways there are certain simplest ones, but the simplest 
are the ones that offer the most.” (De existentia)43  
There is also at least one place in which Leibniz applied both kinds 
of description at the same time: 
e) “It follows from the supreme perfection of God that He chose the 
best possible plan in producing the universe, a plan in which there is 
the greatest variety together with the greatest order. The most 
carefully used plot of ground, place and time; the greatest effect 
produced by the simplest means; the most power, knowledge, 
happiness and goodness in created things that the universe could 
allow.” (Principes de la Nature et de la Grace, fondés en raison (PNG), 
§10)44  
                                                 
41 The term is from David Blumenfeld. See his Perfection and Happiness in 
the Best Possible World, p. 389. 
42 “…Dieu fait le plus de choses qu'il peut, et ce qui l'oblige à chercher des 
loix simples, c'est à fin de trouver place pour tout autant de choses qu'il est 
possible de placer ensemble; et s'il se servoit d'autres loix, ce seroit comme 
si on vouloit employer des pierres rondes dans un batiment, qui nous 
ostent plus d'espace qu'elles n'occupent.” G I, p. 331; L, p. 211. 
43 “Ens necessarium agere per simplicissima. Nam ex infinis possibilibus 
sunt quaedam simplicissima, sed simplicissima quae plurimum praestant. 
Gr, p. 267, cited and translated in Blumenfeld, Perfection and Happiness in 
the Best Possible World, p. 389. 
44 “Il suit de la Perfection Supreme de Dieu, qu’en produisant l’Univers il 
a choisi le meilleur Plan possible, où il y ait la plus grande varieté, avec le 
plus grand ordre: le terrain, le lieu, le temps, les mieux menagés; le plus 
d'effect produit par les voyes les plus simples; le plus de puissance, le plus 
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Thirdly, Leibniz argued that the best of all possible worlds 
contained the greatest quantity of essence or positive reality.45 As I 
will show, these different kinds of description of its structure are 
prominent in competing interpretations of the formula of the best 
possible world.  
The correct understanding of this issue is vital to this study, 
since Leibniz often argued that men should strive to imitate God in 
their actions within the limits of their cognitive abilities. Despite 
the differences, it is reasonable to suppose that he held that God's 
preferred way of choosing the best was normative to all rational 
decisions, especially as he frequently argued that God and men 
belonged to the same kingdom of grace and formed a society 
together. Acting wisely and pleasing God brought about happiness 
to created beings.46 
In what follows I will first discuss the interpretation of Nicholas 
Rescher, presented in various articles, and consider the criticism of 
it given by David Blumenfeld in his article “Perfection and 
Happiness in the Best Possible Word” (1995), and Donald 
Rutherford in his book Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature 
(1995).  
 
2. 1. Nicholas Rescher's Trade-Off View 
 
The first version of Rescher's interpretation of the divine decision 
model appeared in his book The Philosophy of Leibniz (1967) and in 
an article “Logical Difficulties in Leibniz's Metaphysics” in 1969, 
but my discussion focuses mainly on his second paper on the 
subject, called “Leibniz on Creation and the Evaluation of Possible 
Worlds” (1974), which represents a more mature view and is the 
most well-known representation of his views.47 Rescher takes it as 
                                                                                                    
de connoissance, le plus de bonheur et de bonté dans les creatures, que 
l'Univers en pouvoit admettre. “ G VI, p. 603; AG, p. 210. 
45 “Perfectio autem est quod plus essentiae involvit.” (a fragment 
concerning universal characteristics) G VII, p. 195. 
46 See La Monadologie, §86-90 and Nouveaux Essais I, i, §4. 
47 I have used a revised version of the paper, issued as part of the book 
Leibniz's Metaphysics of Nature. Rescher's latest version is his 1996 paper 
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his task to answer the following question: “What is the criterion 
which God who seeks to actualise the best of all possible worlds 
employs in identifying it? By what criterion of merit does God 
determine whether one possible world is more or less perfect than 
another?”48  
He cites some passages to explicate his views, such as citation a) 
above and Essais de Theodicée, §208 (“The ways of God are those 
most simple and uniform: for He chooses rules that least restrict 
one another. They are also the most productive in relation to the 
simplicity of ways and means.”)49  
Rescher takes as his point of departure the simplicity/variety 
criterion and argues that the best world has an optimal balance 
between variety and order. The world could be simpler in its laws 
(for example, it could consist of only one element, such as iron), 
and there may be more phenomena (species, for example), but this 
optimal balance is the reason why it stands out to God in His 
deliberation.50  
He goes on to investigate the nature of order and variety, 
arguing that the most essential feature of order is not the 
lawfulness of possible worlds as such (a possible world always has 
some kind of order), but the relative simplicity or the economy of 
the laws. As far as variety was concerned, Leibniz distinguished 
between two principal aspects: a) fullness or completeness 
(fecunditas), or comprehensiveness of content, and b) diversity and 
richness, and variation and complexity. One important aspect of 
variety is its infinitude: the variety in the world is not just a matter 
of the number of substances, but also includes the infinite 
multiplicity of the forms or kinds they exemplify.51  
                                                                                                    
“Leibniz On Possible Worlds”, but the basic idea concerning the 
evaluation of the best world remains the same. 
48 Rescher, Leibniz’s Metaphysics of Nature, p. 3. 
49 “Les voyes de Dieu sont les plus simples et les plus uniformes: c’est 
qu’il choisit des regles, qui se limitent le moins les unes les autres. Elles 
sont aussi les plus fecondes par rapport à la simplicité des voyes.” G VI, p. 
241; H, p. 257. 
50 Rescher, Leibniz’s Metaphysics of Nature, p. 4. 
51 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
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Rescher considers the criteria of variety and order to be jointly 
operative and mutually conditioning. It was characteristic of 
Leibniz to think that the idea of combination and balance between 
these factors was in a state of mutual tension or that they were 
conjoint but potentially conflicting yardsticks of perfection. As I 
will show, this opposition of order and variety has proved to be 
unacceptable to Rescher's critics.  
  He illustrates Leibniz's formulation of the best world in 
citation a) above in the following figure:52 
 
In this model the possible worlds are presented along a curve of 
feasible order/variety combinations. The first one (w1) is very 
orderly, but lacks variety, and world3 has variety but lacks order. 
Therefore the best world is world2, which is both orderly and 
includes variety, but neither feature dominates. Rescher argues 
that Leibniz opposed the traditional summum bonum-theories, in 
which perfections are added up, and rather thought that the 
order/variety combination was in this world as large as could be 
realised within the realm of realisability.53 It is for this reason that 
Rescher's theory is commonly called the trade-off-theory. 
The best world represents the optimal combination of criteria, 
in other words, the highest degree of perfection. Perfection in itself 
is not a simple concept, because it is understood as the result of the 
                                                 
52 The source for the figure was Rescher, Leibniz's Metaphysics of Nature, p. 
9. 
53 Ibid., p. 10. 
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multiplication of order and variety (O x V).54 The criteria are in 
dynamic tension with regard to each other, that is, they cannot be 
reduced to each other. There is an infinite number of possible 
combinations between them. In Rescher's economics terminology 
these factors are related not by a fixed exchange ratio, but by 
variable trade-offs with diminishing marginal returns for both 
parameters.55  
Due to this opposition of the factors, the less variety a world 
contains – the more monotonous and homogeneous it is – the 
simpler its laws will be; and the more complex its laws, the greater 
the variety of phenomena required to realise them. Laws that are 
too simple produce monotony and phenomena that are too varied 
produce chaos. Therefore, there is no direct co-operation involved 
between these criteria in the sense that the one produces the 
other.56 Nevertheless, these factors produce the highest degree of 
perfection in the best possible world as an outcome of their 
opposition. 
It would be misleading to suggest that God would primarily 
maximise a single quantity such as essence since this in itself was a 
function of several distinct parameters, specifically variety and 
order.57 Thus the greatest quantity of essence follows from the 
optimum between order and variety.58 Rescher compares this 
process to infinite-comparison processes that are familiar from 
differential calculus and the calculus of variations, a mathematical 
doctrine that is the subject of the next section. He cites the 
                                                 
54 In his latest paper on the issue, “Contingentia mundi”, Rescher 
compares the process with measuring the area of a rectangle as the 
product of its base and its height, where the resultant equivalue curve is a 
hyperbola. The example in Initia et specima, discussed in Chapter 11.3.1. is 
exactly this kind of measurement. Rescher, On Leibniz, n. 23,  p. 66.  
55 Rescher, Leibniz’s Metaphysics of Nature, p. 11. 
56 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
57 Ibid., p. 11. 
58 To follow Gregory Brown's formulation, one could also say that the ratio 
or degree of perfection of a possible world is an outcome of variety and 
order. See Brown, Leibniz's Theodicy and the Confluence of Worldly Goods, p. 
455. 
 
 
 
35
following passage from the 1697 essay De rerum originatione radicali 
to illustrate his interpretation: 
“Hence it is very clearly understood that out of the infinite 
combinations and series of possible things, one exists through which 
the greatest amount of essence or possibility is brought into existence. 
There is always a principle of determination in nature that must be 
sought by maxima or minima; namely, that a maximum effect should 
be achieved with a minimum outlay, so to speak.”59 
Rescher goes on to argue that the main inspiration behind 
Leibniz's views lay in mathematics. “Determining the maximum or 
minimum of that surface-defining equation which represents a 
function of two real variables specifically requires those problem-
solving devices for which the mechanisms of the differential 
calculus was specifically devised.”60  
The same optimum principle produces an additional feature of 
the best world; it is not only perfect as a whole, but also perfect in 
each part. Thus the best possible world includes perfection in 
every detail. Its structure is such that in each of its parts there is an 
optimal balance between order and variety, and it is this that 
provides the ideal solution to the creation problem.  
Rescher's interpretation thus leans heavily on the mathematical 
idea of the calculus of variations. In order to make the trade-off 
model more transparent, I will now take a short excursion down 
this road.   
 
                                                 
59 “Hinc vero manifestissime intelligitur ex infinitis possibilium 
combinationibus seriebusque possibilibus existere eam, per quam 
plurimum essentiae seu possibilitatis perducitur ad existendum. Semper 
scilicet est in rebus principium determinationis quod a Maximo Minimove 
petendum est, ut nempe maximus praestetur effectus, minimo ut sic 
dicam sumtu.” G VII, p. 303; L, p. 487. 
60 Rescher, Leibniz’s Metaphysics of Nature, p. 12. In what follows, I shall use 
the expression “maximum or minimum” to refer to optimum in the sense 
of the trade-off view. I will explain the context in more detail in section 
2.4.2. 
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2. 1. 1. Optimums and Calculus of Variations  
 
Rescher offers a host of analogies in Leibniz's thought that are 
based on a tension between order and variety. Of special interest is 
art. Leibniz saw the harmony of a great work of art as a 
combination of a variety of effects within a structural unity of 
workmanship. The paradigm case is Baroque music and its 
ordered variations, the rhythms and rhymes of poetry, the beat 
and the cadence of dance.61 Other examples of optimal design are 
to be found in architecture, such as the landscape gardening of 
Versailles and Herrenhausen.62 The perfection in these works of art 
imitates universal perfection on a smaller scale and possess a 
mathematical beauty. They represent optimal forms in the sense 
we will discuss in section 2.4.2.63  
The combination of different elements is also important in 
science, justice, statecraft and church politics, in which the 
positions of different parties often have to be reconciled. Scientific 
explanations must succeed at combining a wide variety of 
phenomena within the unifying range of a simple structure of laws 
- a good example would be gravitation.64 Another example is in 
Leibniz's dynamics, according to which the substance is subjected 
to different forces and the result of this conflict between them 
determines the direction the substance takes in its movement from 
one state to another. As will be discussed in Chapter 10.2.1., this is 
also how judgement is formed in the mind – the different 
inclinations towards various goods are contrasted and the final 
judgement is a product of this contrast.  
                                                 
61 Ibid., p. 8. 
62 Brown, Leibniz and Aesthetic, p. 73. 
63 The connection between art and mathematics was established by Plato 
and given an expanded formulation by Augustine and Boethius. 
(Loemker, Struggle for Synthesis, p. 179). For example, music was based on 
a selection of harmonising numbers, and was therefore a miniature model 
of the world in number and measure. 
64 For a discussion, see Gale, Did Leibniz have a Practical Philosophy of 
Science? 
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The idea of optimisation is prominent in various areas of 
Leibniz's thought: metaphysics, the philosophy of the mind, 
aesthetics, practical rationality and justice. It is an instance of a 
larger doctrine of mathematical physics, which has its roots in 
differential calculus. Today the doctrine is known as the calculus 
of variations.  
Isaac Newton first proposed the optimisation problem in Book 
II of his Principia, in which he considered the motion of objects in 
water. In the scholium to Proposition 34 in the third edition he 
described the shape that a surface of revolution moving at a 
constant velocity in the direction of its axis must have if it is to 
offer the least resistance to the motion. He assumed in the solution 
he put to Gregory in 1694 that the resistance of the fluid at any 
point on the surface of the body was proportional to the 
component of the velocity that was normal to the surface.65 He 
thought his solution might be useful in the building of ships, and 
he was right – optimisation problems were to become an essential 
feature not only in ship-building but also in the building of 
submarines and aeroplanes.66 They thus have practical value in the 
creation of new methods for design, manufacture and mechanics, 
and are also relevant in physics and metaphysics.  
Newton's idea and Galileo Galilei's earlier experiments with 
geometrical calculus led Johan Bernouilli in Acta Eruditorum (June 
1696) first to solve and then to propose as a challenge to other 
mathematicians a related problem known as the brachistochrone 
problem. This had already been posed by Galileo in 1630 and 1638, 
but his solution (according to which the optimal curve is the arc of 
a circle) was defective.  
As posed by Bernouilli (“Mechanical Geometrical Problem on 
the Curve of Quickest Descent”), the problem is as follows. Let two 
points A and B be given in a vertical plane. Find the curve that a 
point M, moving on a path AMB, must follow such that, starting 
from A, reaches B in the shortest time under its own gravity. While 
                                                 
65 Kline, Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times, p. 573. For the 
details, see Goldstine, A History of the Calculus of Variations from the 17th 
through the 19th Century, pp. 7-29. 
66 Kline, Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times, p. 574 
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the initial velocity is given, friction and air resistance are 
neglected.67 Thus Bernoulli's problem was to find a minimum 
curve from among an infinity of possible paths that the moving 
point M could take in its motion from point A to point B. He made 
it clear that the straight line AB was not the right answer, since 
although it represented the shortest distance between the points A 
and B, it was not the line that was travelled in the shortest time. 
The solution is shown in the figure below. 
    
The optimal curve is not the straight line (AB) because gravity 
affects the moving point. The solution, called brachistochrone, is 
represented by a cycloid. The result turned out not to be a mere 
single solution to a particular phenomenon but a metaphysical 
general rule, which was later reformulated by Maupertuis as the 
principle of least action.68 The brachistochrone problem was to 
play an important role in mathematical physics, and was the first 
                                                 
67 For a modern formulation of the problem, see Kline, Mathematical 
Thought from Ancient to Modern Times, pp. 574-75. 
68 On the priority of discovering the principle of least action, see Couturat, 
La logique de Leibniz, pp. 577-78. Maupertuis’ idea is related to the optical 
experiments in Ancient science described by Heron of Alexandria in his 
Catoptrics, which applied the principle of shortest path and the least time 
to problems of reflection from concave and convex spherical mirrors. In 
medieval times the idea that nature did nothing in vain was a common 
view. For example, Robert Grosseteste argued that nature always acted in 
the mathematically shortest and the best possible way. Kline, Mathematical 
Thought from Ancient to Modern Times, p. 580. 
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of a series of problems underlying the formulation of the calculus 
of variations. 
The correct solution to the problem posed by Bernouilli was 
found by Newton (anonymously), Leibniz (who called it a 
“splendid problem”), L'Hopital and Jacob Bernouilli. They all 
arrived at the same answer: the brachistochrone was the cycloid.69 
In the 17th century Snell, Fermat and Leibniz, among others found 
support for the basic idea of the calculus of variations in various 
phenomena.70 According to Fermat, light always travelled the path 
that required the least time and his law of refraction eventually 
became known as Snell's law.71 By the end of the century 
mathematicians were persuaded to believe that nature did, in fact, 
try to maximise or minimise some important qualities.  
Euler developed the problem further in 1734 by generalising it 
to minimise quantities other than time and to take into account 
resisting media. He developed a method for variating arbitrarily 
selected coordinates and calculated the variation in the integral. 
Although he did not fully utilise the results of his experiments in 
his 1744 work Methodus Inveniendi Lineas Curvas Maximi Minimive 
Proprietate Gaudentes, he produced simple and elegant formulas 
that could be applied to a large variety of problems.72  
Maupertuis started from Fermat’s principle, but modified it 
significantly. According to him, any changes in nature were such 
as to minimise the action. He gave physical reasons, but was also 
motivated by theological considerations, and tried to show that 
                                                 
69 Ibid., p. 575. For details of the individual solutions, see Goldstine, A 
History of the Calculus of Variations from the 17th through the 19th Century, p. 
30f. 
70 For a detailed discussion of these developments, see Stein and 
Wiechmann, New Insight into the Beginning of Optimization and Variational 
Calculus in the 17th Century.  
71 For a detailed presentation of Fermat's and Snell's role as the 
predecessors of the calculus of variations, see Goldstine, A History of the 
Calculus of Variations from the 17th through the 19th Century. Leibniz gave his 
own account of the history of refraction in Discours de metaphysique, §22. 
72 Kline, Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times, pp. 576-79. On 
Euler's results, see Goldstine, A History of the Calculus of Variations from the 
17th through the 19th Century, pp. 67-107. 
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nature reflected on the perfection of God in being as economical as 
possible. In this he was joined by Euler, who argued that God must 
have constructed the universe in accordance with some such basic 
principle, and that the existence of such a principle evidenced His 
hand.73 The work of Euler and Maupertuis had a direct 
predecessor in Snell, Fermat and Leibniz. 
In his latest paper on the subject, “Contingentia Mundi” 
(2002),74 Nicholas Rescher compares the creation of the best 
possible world to the brachistochrone solution, thus relating the 
trade-off-view directly to the calculus of variations.75 He argues 
that the brachistochrone solution involves the balancing of two 
parameters, namely the average speed of travel and the distance 
travelled, both of which increase by a steeper initial descent. In 
each case a gain on the one side is offset by a loss on the other. In 
the calculus of variations the objective is to find a unique (easiest, 
optimal) path among an infinite number of alternative paths that 
achieves the extremisation (maximisation or minimisation) of some 
specified characteristic (time or distance, for example). An essential 
feature of these kinds of problem is the fact that the solution is an 
optimal combination of competing factors. Rescher's view could be 
seen as a response to this citation from Essais de Theodicée, §8 
(which he does not mention): 
“…even though one should fill all times and all places, it still remains 
true that one might have filled them in innumerable ways, and that 
there is an infinitude of possible worlds among which God must needs 
have chosen the best, since he does nothing without acting in 
accordance with supreme reason.”76 
                                                 
73 Kline, Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times, pp. 581-83. 
74 The paper was originally issued in Studia Leibnitiana 33 (2002), pp. 145-
62. I refer to the unchanged reprint in Rescher's book On Leibniz. 
75 Leroy Loemker formulates the optimisation process as follows: 
“Leibniz's argument rests upon the old discovery that maxima and 
minima involve in their determination the reduction of two equal values 
to a single one. He views this as an instance of the metaphysical principle 
of maximal determination or of the optimum. L, p. 484, n. 6. 
76 “…quand on rempliroit tous les temps et tous les lieux, il demeure 
tousjours vray qu'on les auroit pu remplir d'une infinité de manieres, et 
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According to Rescher's interpretation, the optimal and most 
unique combination of minima (order) or maxima (variety) (where 
these factors lead in opposite directions) is simply the best of all 
possible worlds. “This infinitely complex assessment of the 
cooperative merit that grounds claims upon God's consideration 
for actualization is exactly the sort of process that is at issue in 
those calculations of variations problems.”77   
Rescher has attracted some support in this,78 but he has also 
received significant criticism. I will turn next to a detailed critique 
by David Blumenfeld, which he gives in his article “Perfection and 
Happiness in the Best Possible World” (1995). 
 
2. 2. David Blumenfeld's Maximum View 
 
Blumenfeld finds Rescher's interpretation plausible, but mistaken. 
His main criticism concerns the idea of a trade-off between variety 
and order. The reason given is Leibniz’s frequent references to the 
real world being the richest one and containing the greatest 
conceivable variety of phenomena. Repeating the passages from 
DM, §5 & §6 referred to above, among others, he argues that God 
was not required to trade off variety in His selection of the best of 
all possible worlds and that the best world maximized one quality, 
which was reality or essence.79 Thus the world with the largest 
amount of essence was the best of all possible worlds.80  
However, he agrees with Rescher in that essence, in itself, is not 
independent of variety and order. The extent of the world's 
essence is the same thing as its degree of harmony, and the latter is 
determined by variety and simplicity.81 As harmony and 
perfection come to the same thing, the best of all possible worlds 
                                                                                                    
qu'il y a une infinité de Mondes possibles, dont il faut que Dieu ait choisi 
le meilleur, puisqu'il ne fait rien sans agir suivant la supreme raison.” G 
VI, p. 107; H, p. 128. 
77 Rescher, On Leibniz, p. 52.  
78 See Gale, On What God Chose: Perfection and God's Freedom and Brown, 
Leibniz's Theodicy and the Confluence of Worldly Goods.   
79 Blumenfeld, Perfection and Happiness in the Best World, p. 386.  
80 Ibid., p. 394. 
81 Ibid., p. 395. 
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thus has the greatest degree of perfection (which forms the basis 
for the greatest quantity of essence). 
Blumenfeld also argues against Rescher that the world with the 
most variety has the largest number of individuals, in other words 
the most monads. One problem with this doctrine is Leibniz's lack 
of clarity: he claimed in some passages that the best world has a 
maximum number of phenomenal entities, and in others that it has 
the most monads. Blumenfeld argues that Leibniz held both of 
these views, and that the solution to this apparent paradox is that 
the maximum of phenomenal entities is founded on the maximum 
number of monads.82 Thus his point of departure is the second 
group of citations given above, whereas Leibniz was apparently 
suggesting that richness was founded on the simplicity of the laws.  
Another difficulty with the trade-off view lies in Leibniz's 
doctrine that simplicity is a means to variety, in other words that 
in order to achieve the greatest variety God is required to use the 
most simple laws. Blumenfeld refers to citations c) and d) in the 
beginning of this chapter to support his views. The simplicity of 
laws is productive concerning variety; God should use the most 
simple laws because they will produce the most variety. Moreover, 
maximally simple laws are architectonic, in other words maximally 
productive: the greater the number of maximally simple laws the 
higher the simplicity index of a possible world, and the world with 
the highest simplicity index is a means to the greatest variety. I 
agree with Donald Rutherford that this view is problematic.  
Blumenfeld concludes that the best world contains the most 
diverse phenomena and the most simple laws of nature. Only the 
largest system of maximally efficient (simple and architectonic) 
laws can produce the greatest possible variety, and consequently 
the best world has the largest consistent set of architectonic laws 
together with the greatest conceivable variety.83 This gives rise to 
essence. Thus, “The best possible world = the most harmonious 
one = the one that has the maximum of variety and the maximally 
                                                 
82 Ibid., p. 387. 
83 Ibid., pp. 389-92.  
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simple laws = the one with the most phenomenal individuals and 
the most monads = the one with the most reality or essence.”84 
An additional feature of perfection, namely universal 
observability, arises from the number of universal laws: the more 
there are, the larger the number of possible universal observations. 
According to Blumenfeld, universal laws cover their phenomena in 
a perfectly regular way, and different laws cover different 
phenomena which is why the world with the most universal laws 
will have the greatest variety of phenomena governed in the most 
regular fashion. This regularity, again, is related to harmony, 
which at the same time contributes to the greatest conceivable 
beauty the best world possesses.85   
 
2. 3. Donald Rutherford's Maximum View 
 
In his book Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature Donald 
Rutherford points out some difficulties related to Blumenfeld's 
understanding of the simplicity of laws, although he generally 
agrees with his opposition to the trade-off view and his contention 
that the best world contains a maximum amount of one single 
property, in other words essence.  
According to Rutherford, God is principally moved to 
maximise the metaphysical goodness in the world, or the greatest 
sum of perfections. Hence the production of the greatest variety is 
not necessarily the desired goal, although he also holds that God 
creates the greatest variety of beings. If simplicity were to be 
understood as an algebraic degree, it is hard to see how it could be 
the most productive in terms of variety. Very simple laws could 
arguably be considered less than maximally effective in their 
productivity because they could cover only the most basic cases. If 
simplicity were understood as freedom from exceptions, however, 
it would be easier to understand how the laws could produce 
variety.86  
                                                 
84 Ibid., p. 394. 
85 Ibid.  
86 Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, pp. 27-28.  
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Rutherford argues that the most promising solution to the 
simplicity problem is to be found in the memoir Tentamen 
anagogium (1696), Leibniz's principal text on architectonics in 
which he claimed that God's supreme wisdom inclines Him to 
choose the natural laws that are the “simplest and most 
determined.”87 Simplicity in this sense is thus not related to the 
production of a greater variety of phenomena, while it is clearly 
related to God's wisdom in His choice of the best of all possible 
worlds: it may have more to do with God's preference for greater 
order and the intelligibility of the best world.88 
According to Rutherford, “What simplicity or universality, on 
the one hand, and efficiency or determinateness, on the other, have 
in common is that they represent types of order that are especially 
satisfying to reason: orders in which a single principle suffices to 
account for the widest possible range of cases, or in which an 
outcome is determined through a unique optimising solution.”89 
This optimal order enables God to produce a maximum of 
metaphysical goodness.  
Moreover, the most important of God’s principles in His choice 
is not the variety/simplicity criterion favoured by Rescher and 
Blumenfeld. God is rather an engineer, striving for the optimal 
design of a world in which maximum perfection and variety can 
be realised. Maximum perfection requires an optimal world order 
that enables the co-existence of the greatest possible variety of 
beings and metaphysical goodness.90  
Thus, according to Rutherford, the optimal order is not 
necessarily related to the simplicity of laws. Referring to PNG, §11 
(“God's supreme wisdom has led him…to choose laws of motion 
that are best adjusted and most suitable with respect to abstract or 
metaphysical reasons”),91 he argues that of the laws God selects for 
                                                 
87 See Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, p. 28. Leibniz 
discussed the same theme in DM, §22. 
88 Ibid., p. 28. 
89 Ibid., p. 29. 
90 Ibid., p. 26. 
91 “La Sagesse Supreme de Dieu l'a fait choisir surtout les loix du 
Mouvement les mieux ajustées, et les plus convenables aux raisons 
abstractes ou metaphysiques.” G VI, p. 603; AG, p. 210. 
 
 
 
45
the best of all possible worlds, some may embody a simplicity that 
is productive of greater variety and some may merely produce 
greater order and intelligibility.  
The latter kind of laws best represent God's idea of the best 
natural order. The most important of these laws is the principle of 
continuity, according to which no “gaps” are allowed between the 
states of substances (the “fullness” of the world being maximized). 
Thus changes of time, place or motion are always continuous in 
the sense that they occur through an infinite series of smaller 
gradations.92 Rutherford emphasises the universal connectedness 
of substances, holding that every state of every monad within a 
group is spatiotemporally and causally ordered with respect to 
every state of every other monad in it.93  
As a consequence of God's selection of the principle of 
continuity (“the principle of general order”)94 as the optimal order 
of the world, He is able to create both the greatest variety of beings 
and the greatest total perfection or “quantity of essence.”95 Hence 
the principle of continuity is the principle of optimal order, which 
regulates the creation of substances. “Although there may seem to 
be a tension between wisdom's favouring certain types of order as 
a means to the maximisation of perfection and its favouring order 
as pleasing in itself, Leibniz evidently believes that these two ends 
in general support one another.”96 Thus, in Rutherford’s view the 
amount of essence is not an outcome of the variety/simplicity 
criterion as it is in Rescher and Blumenfeld, but it is rather related 
to the principle of optimal order. 
By observing the principle of continuity in creation, God can 
create the most complete series of beings and the greatest total 
perfection or quantity of essence given that there are no gaps 
between degrees of perfection. In this way the principle of order 
enables the creation of the maximum of compossible beings. Thus, 
                                                 
92 See Nouveaux essais, preface and Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational 
Order of Nature, p. 29. 
93 Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, p. 188. 
94 See G III, p. 51.  
95 Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, pp. 29-30. 
96 Ibid., p. 31. 
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by observing the principle of continuity He is able to create the 
best of all possible worlds.97 Rutherford argues: “The problem of 
creation comes down to a consideration of the best way of “filling” 
a world, whose structure is minimally determined by the orders of 
space and time.”98 
Rutherford compares the creation with a tiling problem 
involving a search for the optimal method of paving a given 
surface. God chooses a world the order of which permits the 
coexistence of the greatest number of compossible monads 
containing the greatest total sum of perfection. The optimal order, 
represented by the principle of continuity, is a necessary condition 
for the harmonious whole. The tiles in this analogy, of course, are 
the monads, which are compared with infinitely divisible 
organisms. From this it follows that there is an infinite amount of 
variety.99 In sum, Rutherford holds that by finding a world with 
the best order God is able to create a maximum number of 
substances that are in a continuous and harmonious relationship 
with each other. This whole contains the greatest quantity of 
essence, which is the foundation of the best of all possible worlds.    
 
2. 4. Optimum or Maximum? 
 
I will now give an evaluation of these three interpretations of 
God's criteria in His choice of the best of all possible worlds. 
Because Leibniz did not offer any conclusive evidence for or 
against any of these interpretations, they are all certainly possible. 
In what follows I will discuss the criticisms made by Blumenfeld 
and Rutherford against the trade-off view, and consider whether 
their interpretations are better alternatives in terms of describing 
God's criteria for the best world. I will first consider Blumenfeld's 
maximisation view and compare it to Rescher's views, since both 
emphasise the centrality of the variety/simplicity criterion in 
God's deliberation. I will then consider Rutherford's version of the 
maximisation view and various specific problems related to it. 
                                                 
97 Ibid., p. 30. 
98 Ibid., p. 189. 
99 Ibid., pp. 201-203. 
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2. 4. 1. Does simplicity produce variety? 
  
The essential difference between Rescher's and Blumenfeld's views 
concerns how order and variety and their relation to each other are 
to be understood. Blumenfeld holds that God creates everything he 
can, in other words, a set of maximally simple laws produces a 
maximum amount of variety, a maximum number of individuals, a 
maximum amount of essence and a maximum amount of 
observability and beauty. Rescher, on the other hand, thinks that 
God creates a set of compossible substances employing a calculus 
that optimises the ratio of variety to order which means that 
neither variety nor order, taken on their own, reach the maximum, 
and it is from this optimum that all the other features of the best 
world derive, representing in their entirety the highest degree of 
perfection among all possible worlds.        
In the light of the existing textual evidence, both views can be 
defended. For example, take DM, §6 (“God has chosen the one that 
is most perfect, in other words the one that is at the same time the 
most simple in hypotheses and the richest in phenomena”). While 
this passage clearly supports the maximisation theory (“most 
simple”-”richest”), it could also be taken as referring to an 
optimum in which the “most simple” (most determined) 
hypotheses are optimised with the greatest possible variety, with 
the result that the combination of these features produces the 
world with the greatest overall perfection.  
According to the trade-off view, when we think of the calculus 
of variations discussed above, the primary feature is an interest in 
extremal functions, and those making the functional attain a 
maximum or minimum value. Thus Leibniz may well have used 
the words most simple and richest in the sense of minimum or 
maximum. Alternatively, he could have used them in a relative 
sense – since the best world contains simple or economic laws and 
an infinity of variety, the optimum does not mean that the best 
world is lacking in order or variety because possible worlds are 
infinite compossible wholes.100 For this same reason, Blumenfeld's 
                                                 
100 For a discussion of Leibniz's views on infinity, see Arthur, Leibniz and 
Cantor on the Actual Infinite. 
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and Rutherford's interpretations, which argue that the goodness, 
beauty and harmony of the best world are essentially founded on 
the idea of the best world having a maximum amount of 
substances, are unsatisfactory.101  
I will now turn to the first argument, which is directly related to 
Leibniz's architectonics and the calculus of variations. According 
to Blumenfeld, the co-operation is caused by architectonic laws, 
which are maximally effective concerning variety. However, it 
remains unclear how exactly the “greatest effect” is “produced by 
the most simple means.” It hardly seems probable that very simple 
laws would be maximally productive.  
As Rutherford argues, it would be more promising to adopt the 
suggestion frequently put forward by Leibniz that scientific laws 
should explain as many phenomena as possible, thereby having a 
high degree of universality. Leibniz seems to have confirmed this 
supposition in Tentamen anagogium, arguing that an architectonic 
law is at its most simple when it is the most determined or easiest. 
This claim, however, is something different from mere simplicity 
in a literal sense as I will show shortly.102  
If we assume that this interpretation of architectonics is 
adequate, we should then consider whether this new under-
standing affects the trade-off/maximum controversy. If we replace 
Blumenfeld's most simple laws with the most determined, will a 
maximum amount of variety follow? It seems unlikely. Leibniz 
gave the following example in Tentamen anagogium: 
“Assume the case that nature were obliged in general to construct a 
triangle and that for this purpose only the perimeter or the sum of the 
                                                 
101 See also Brown, Does the Best of All Possible Worlds Contain the (Absolute) 
Most?, pp. 107-08 
102 See G VII, p. 270. However, I will argue against Rutherford that the 
nature of architectonic laws is connected to final causes rather than to 
universality or continuity. For example, in Essais de Theodicée, §211 Leibniz 
argues: “On m'objectera, qu'un systeme fort uni sera sans irregularités. Je 
reponds, que ce seroit une irregularité d'être trop uni, cela choqueroit les 
regles de l'harmonie.” G VI, p. 244. 
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sides were given, and nothing else; then nature would construct an 
equilateral triangle.”103 
If nature strives for maximal variety, why should it form an 
equilateral triangle, in which all the angles are equal and all the 
sides are equally long? Would it not rather produce one with more 
variety, such as a right-angled triangle with sides of different 
lengths and a distinguishing feature, the right angle. Judging from 
this passage, it looks as if the simplest laws (in the sense of most 
determinate) contribute to regularity rather than to variety.104  
When this new understanding of the simplicity of laws is 
applied to the trade-off view, there seem to be less severe 
problems. Let us suppose we have a collection of the most 
determinate laws combined with variety. Because the trade-off 
theory does not explain variety as literally produced by simple 
laws, the change does not affect it very much. The implication is 
rather that order is optimised with variety, and therefore the fact 
that each possible world includes some kind of order suffices to 
satisfy its requirements in this respect. Laws understood in this 
way are clearly practical in terms of God's suggested optimum.  
Furthermore, if there is no masterplan behind these simple 
laws, what guarantees that the collection of phenomena produced 
is a harmonious whole? Rescher agrees with Catherine Wilson that 
the creation of the best world cannot be a mechanical process, such 
                                                 
103 “Supposons le cas que la nature fut obligée generalement de construire 
un triangle, et que pour cet effect la seule peripherie ou somme de costés 
fut donnée et rien de plus, elle construiroit un triangle equilateral.” G VII, 
p. 278. 
104 In a small fragment De necessitate eligendi optimum (1677?) Leibniz 
argues that the wisest course is to choose the equilateral triangle because 
all points (from which the triangle is formed) are treated in the same way. 
For this reason all such triangles are similar to each other and therefore 
they are the lowest in the hierarchy of triangles: “Ponamus tria puncta 
dari ut ex illis formetur triangulum: ajo sapientem (si nulla sit ratio 
specialis aliter agendi) formaturum inde Triangulum aequilaterum, ita 
enim omnia puncta eodem modo tractantur. Et Triangulorum 
aequilaterum Species est infima, seu omnia triangula aequilatera sunt 
inter se similia.” A VI, 4, pp. 1351-52. 
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as the simple maximisation of all compossible substances.105 The 
process involves such complicated elements and unknown features 
that it surpasses the abilities of any mechanistic process. The 
worlds that are conceived by this method might be possible as 
alternative worlds, but this real world must have been conceived 
by some other method in order to guarantee its uniquely best 
quality.106  
However, even though Blumenfeld's argument does not suffice 
to explain the relationship between simple laws and the variety of 
phenomena, his criticism of the trade-off-theory is valid in some 
respects. He notes that it sufficiently cannot explain the central 
passage of PNG, §10 (citation e) at the beginning of this chapter), 
which explicitly links the simplicity of laws and variety. Even if the 
simplicity of laws is understood from an architectonic perspective, 
it remains problematic how the effect can be produced by the most 
simple means unless they have something to do with other means 
– some kind of co-operation seems to be required. 
Rescher's response was to present the opposition of criteria as a 
special kind of co-operation that allowed conflict, but gave as a 
result something more than the mere sum of the criteria involved. 
They pull in opposite directions, but by multiplying them more is 
achieved than by simply adding them up. God's infinite wisdom is 
shown in the fact that out of various criteria he chooses just these 
to produce the optimum.  
In his latest article on this issue, “Contingentia mundi”, he 
defends his view by explaining that variety is to be seen as 
contributing to order at a higher level, although the two are in 
opposition from the first-order standpoint. While admitting that 
the maximum view is certainly possible, Rescher argues, referring 
to Blumenfeld, that the simple pattern AAAAAAAA…is, in fact, 
not more but less orderly than the more complicated pattern 
                                                 
105 Rescher, On Leibniz, p. 52. For a contrasting view, see Roncaglia, God's 
Evaluation of Possible Worlds and Logical Calculus, p. 86. 
106 Wilson, Plenitude and Compossibility in Leibniz, pp. 12-15. Leibniz wrote 
to Bourguet 3. 4. 1716: “Les idées ou essences sont toutes fondées sur une 
necessité independante de la sagesse, de la convenance et du choix; mais 
les existences en dependent.” G III, p. 592. 
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ABABABAB…, which a greater variety of components makes 
possible. He uses a Händel oratorio as an example: it achieves a 
higher order (more perfection) than a beginner's flute exercise just 
because it includes a wider variety of components.107 He thus 
holds that a harmonious whole requires the interplay of different 
elements in order to reach the highest degree of perfection.  
Rescher's view cannot be supported by any conclusive evidence 
that I know of, since Leibniz confined himself to describing God's 
creation with metaphors (compare DM, §6). However, in my view, 
it is reasonable in terms of understanding God's architectonics, and 
it has indirect textual support from Leibniz's writings on 
metaphysics (Tentamen anagogium, which I will turn to below) and 
from aesthetics, as shown in Chapter 2.1.1. above.  I offer just one 
more example here – Leibniz's letter to Arnauld from 1671, in 
which he describes the evaluation of a good man (beauty) with 
respect to Canon law.  
“Presuming that a man has wisdom of the third degree and power of 
the fourth degree, his total estimation would be twelve and not seven, 
since wisdom be of assistance to power.”108 
According to this example, the optimum between separate factors 
can produce more beauty than mere mechanical addition. 
Although power and wisdom are separate continuous factors, the 
outcome of their opposition is something more than their mere 
combination. Leibniz suggested here that wisdom could be of 
assistance to power, but he does not say that it produces power in 
the literal sense. It is rather the interaction between power and 
wisdom that gives rise to a good man. This suggests that he may 
have considered perfection not as a mere sum of perfections, but 
rather as an optimum arising from a mutual tension between 
separate factors, as in the calculus of variations. 
While PNG, §10 implies that there is a direct connection 
between laws and phenomena, there are a lot citations in which 
                                                 
107 Rescher, On Leibniz, p. 60.  
108 “Fac aliquem esse sapientem vt 3, potentem vt 4: erit tota eius 
aestimatio yt 12, non vt 7, nam quouis potentiae gradu sapientia vti 
potest.” A II, I, p. 174.   
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this connection is left unclear, or presented in a metaphorical 
manner. As Leibniz was apparently reluctant to describe God's 
choice of the best world in detail, I think that the passage cannot be 
judged as the single true indication of his views and I am inclined 
to interpret it as a metaphorical description of the structure of the 
best possible world.  
If we consider the context of PNG, §10, he first claimed that in 
the best world there is the “greatest variety together with the 
greatest order”. If he intended to pursue the point here, why did 
he not repeat the argument in his next phrase, in which he stated 
that variety was an effect of order? Furthermore, in the above 
example of a good man he used a similar kind of metaphorical 
expression to describe an optimum in suggesting that “wisdom be 
of assistance to power”.  
In sum, Blumenfeld's maximisation view suffers seriously from 
an insufficient understanding of Leibnizian architectonics, 
although it has to be noted that Rescher does not discuss it 
sufficiently either. However, the nature of laws is a much more 
prominent element in Blumenfeld's than in Rescher's view 
interpretation. It is for this reason that I find Rescher's trade-off 
view a better interpretation of God's preferred way of choosing 
between possible worlds. I will now compare the trade-off view 
with the maximum theory presented by Donald Rutherford.  
 
2. 4. 2. Architectonics and the Principle of Optimal Order in 
Tentamen Anagogium 
 
It is clear that Rutherford considers the nature of order important, 
for he connects it with the maximisation of essence and rejects the 
simplicity/variety criterion as the most significant in the best 
world. He does not believe that Rescher is able to give sufficient 
grounds for preferring optimisation formula to the maximisation 
formula, and sets out to show that for Leibniz the creation was a 
summum bonum theory that encompassed all perfections. He also 
sees order (in the form of the principle of continuity) as a means to 
variety, although he does not believe that variety is literally 
produced according to the most simple laws. As discussed, it is 
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vital for his theory that the order of the world is optimal, otherwise 
the maximisation of perfection would simply fail.109  
While I agree that the “simplicity” of laws should not be 
understood literally, I still think that Leibniz generally used the 
dichotomy between simple laws and the richness of phenomena to 
describe the structure of the best world. These two criteria occur in 
various forms in many of his writings, and almost always together, 
as a pair.110 On the other hand, he used the principle of continuity 
in the sense of a “principle of general order” on only one occasion 
as far as I know, and that was in the context of his critique of 
Malebranche's view of natural laws.111 He discussed it more 
frequently as a principle of nature that could be interpreted to refer 
to general perfection or harmony, as Gregory Brown has argued.112  
The principle of continuity is usually employed in testing 
hypotheses in natural science. A representative example is to be 
found in Animadversiones in partem generalem Principiorum 
Cartesianorum (1692), art. 53, in which Leibniz used it in refuting 
the Cartesian laws of motion, arguing that the movement resulting 
from them formed an erratic figure and not a continuous line.113 
                                                 
109 Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, pp. 46-47. 
110 See G IV, p. 43 and G VI, p. 238 & p. 603. 
111 See G III, p. 51. 
112 See Brown, Leibniz's Theodicy and the Confluence of Worldly Goods, p. 462. 
Both Brown and Rutherford cite Leibniz's letter to De Volder 24. 3./3. 4. 
1699: “Hoc non fieri docet experientia, sed idem comprobat ratio ordinis 
quae efficit ut quanto res discutiuntur magis, tanto magis intellectui 
satisfiat…” G II, p. 168. Thus Leibniz combined the principle of continuity 
with the intellectual satisfaction received by examining nature. While 
Rutherford considers this to support his theory that the principle of 
continuity is the principle of order in the real world, I agree with Brown 
and see it as referring to perfection or harmony in general. In my view, 
this passage could arguably be seen as referring to the wonders of nature 
that exemplify God's wisdom, although the context is related to 
continuous creation.  
113 “Ex Cartesianis vero regulis non posset duci continua quaedam linea 
eventuum variatorum respondes lineae continuae hypotheseos variantis, 
et prodiret delineatio plane monstrosa et contraria nostro Criterio artic. 45 
seu Legi Continuitatis.” G  IV, p. 384. See also Specimen dynamicum, Part II.  
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He referred to it in Tentamen anagogium: “It serves not merely to 
test, however, but also as a very fruitful principle of discovery, as I 
plan to show some day.”114 Similarly, in DM, §6: “…let us 
assume…that someone jots down a number of points at random on 
a piece of paper, as do those who practice the ridiculous art of 
geomancy. I maintain that it is possible to find a geometric line 
whose notion is constant and uniform, following a certain rule, 
such that the line passes through all the points in the same order in 
which the hand jotted them down.”115  
While it is clear that the principle of continuity is observable in 
the actual world, I do not think there is a convincing reason to 
suppose that it gives rise to optimal order and is therefore the 
ruling principle of creation.116 In my view this is evident in 
Tentamen anagogium, Leibniz's most complete text on 
architectonics. In the first paragraph of the memoir he argued in a 
manner that promises to clarify the issue: “I have shown on several 
occasions that the final analysis of the laws of nature leads us to 
                                                                                                    
On this theme, see Seager, The Principle of Continuity and the Evaluation of 
Theories. 
114 “…elle sert non seulement d'examen, mais encor d'un tres fecond 
principe d'invention, comme j'ay dessein de monstrer un jour.” G VII, p. 
279; L, p. 484. In a letter to Varignon on the subject of the infinitesimal 
calculus and its applications, Leibniz argued that when this universal idea 
is applied to physics and the laws of motion, it could be reduced in part to 
the law of continuity, which long served him as a principle of discovery in 
physics and also as a convenient test to see if certain rules were good. See 
GM IV, p. 106. 
115 “…supposons…que quelcun fasse quantité de points sur le papier à 
tout hazard, comme font ceux qui exercent l'art ridicule de la Geomance. 
Je dis qu'il est possible de trouver une ligne geometrique dont la notion 
soit constante et uniforme suivant une certaine regle; en sorte que cette 
ligne passe par tous ces points, et dans le même ordre que la main les 
avoit marqués.” A VI, 4, pp. 1537-38; AG, p. 39.  
116 According to François Duchesneau, Leibniz regarded the architectonic 
principles as presumptions. See Duchesneau, Leibniz et la méthode de la 
science, p. 261. For another kind of criticism concerning Rutherford's 
interpretation of the optimal order as the ruling principle in creation, see 
Brown, Does the Best of All Possible Worlds Contain the (Absolute) Most?, pp. 
107-08. 
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the most sublime principles of order and perfection, which indicate 
that the universe is the effect of a universal intelligent power.”117  
He soons turned to the method of optimal forms, which 
provides a maximum or a minimum:  
“…the principle of perfection is not limited to the general but descends 
also to the particulars of things and of phenomena…in this respect it 
closely resembles the method of optimal forms, that is to say, of forms 
which provide a maximum or a minimum, as the case may be – a 
method which I have introduced into geometry in addition to the 
ancient method of maximal and minimal quantities. For in these forms 
or figures the optimum is found not only in the whole but also in each 
part, and it would not even suffice in the whole without this.”118   
As noted above, this optimal feature of each part of the world is an 
essential part of Rescher's interpretation. In this connection Leibniz 
referred to the brachistochrone problem thus: “It is in this way that 
the smallest parts of the universe are ruled in accordance with the 
order of greatest perfection; otherwise the whole would not be so 
ruled.”119 Judging by this passage, the optimal order is connected 
to the method of optimal forms, which again is connected to the 
minimum or maximum.  
The determination between minimum or maximum is 
connected to final causes, the value of which Leibniz promised to 
                                                 
117 “J'ay marqué en plusieurs occasions que la derniere resolution des Loix 
de la Nature nous mene à des principes plus sublimes de l'ordre et de la 
perfection, qui marquent que l'univers es l'effect d'une puissance 
intelligente universelle.” G VII, p. 270; L, p. 477. 
118 “…ce principe de la perfection au lieu de se borner seulement au 
general, descend aussi dans la particulier des choses et des 
phenomenes…qu’il en est à peu pres comme dans la Methode de Formis 
Optimis, c’est à dire maximum aut minimum praestantibus, que nous 
avons introduite dans la Geometrie au delà de l’ancienne methode de 
maximis et minimis quantitatibus. Car ce meilleur de ces formes ou 
figures ne s’y trouve pas seulement dans le tout, mais encor dans chaque 
partie, et même il ne seroit pas d’assez dans le tout sans cela.” G VII, p. 
272.  
119 “C'est ainsi que les moindres parties de l'univers sont reglées suivant 
l'ordre de la plus grande perfection; autrement le tout ne le seroit pas.” G 
VII, pp. 272-73; L, p. 478.  
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show in the future in “a general principle of optics that a ray of 
light moves from one point to another along the path found to be 
easiest in relation to the plane surfaces that must serve as the rule 
for other surfaces.”120  
Leibniz was referring to Fermat's law of refraction, according to 
which light always travels the path that requires the least time, and 
argued that another principle was even more important, according 
to which “in the absence of a minimum it is necessary to hold to 
the most determined, which can be the simplest even when it is a 
maximum.”121 This is clearly a reference to laws that are most 
determined, as understood by Rutherford, to give rise to optimal 
order. At the same time it refers to optimisation between minima 
or maxima, which is clear from Leibniz's optical example following 
the above passage.122  
Leibniz began by criticising Descartes, who tried to explain the 
law of refraction in terms of efficient causes or the composition of 
directions in imitation of the reflection of bullets, and then 
proceeded to explain “how it remains always universally true that 
the ray is directed in the most determined or unique path.”123  
 
 
                                                 
120 “…je proposay le principe general d'optique, que le rayon se conduit 
d'un point à l'autre par la voye qui se trouve la plus aisée, à l'egard des 
superficies planes, qui doivent servir de regle aux autres.” G VII, p. 273; L, 
p. 479. 
121 “…qu'au defaut du moindre, il faut se tenir au plus determiné, qui 
pourra estre le plus simple, lors même qu'il est le plus grand.” G VII, p. 
274; L, p. 479.  
122 For additional texts on optics by Leibniz, see Ger, p. 37-108. 
123 “…j'expliqueray maintenant comment il demeure tousjours 
generalement vray, que le rayon se conduit par le chemin le plus 
determiné ou unique…” On criticism of Descartes' optics, see also Carteesi 
explicatio Refractionis, Ger, pp. 57-67. 
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He continued, referring to the above figure: “For given a curve AB, 
concave or convex, and an axis ST to which the ordinates of the 
curve are referred; then it is seen that to each ordinate, such as Q or 
R, there corresponds another one equal to it, its twin, q or r. But 
there is one particular ordinate, EC, which is unique, or the only 
determinate one of its magnitude, and has no twin, since the two 
twins EC and ec coincide in it and make but one. And this EC is the 
greatest ordinate of the concave curve and the smallest of the 
convex curve.”124 Thus there is one unique path, the path of the 
light ray, which can be found by combining the minimum or the 
maximum. For this reason this unique path is the most 
determined.  
Although the analysis had its predecessors in Fermat and Snell, 
Leibniz was the first to seek to systematise the idea in optics and 
apply it to metaphysics. He appeared to think that in a 
metaphysically perfect world the physical system was also perfect, 
                                                 
124 “…soit une courbe AB concave ou convexe, et un Axe ST, dont on mene 
les ordonnées à la courbe, on voit qu'à l'ordonnée comme Q ou R repond 
une autre, qui luy est egale, et comme sa jumelle q ou r. Mais il y a les cas 
d'une ordonnée singuliere EC, qui est la seule determinée ou unique de sa 
grandeur, et n'a point de jumelle, puisque ces deux jumelles EC et ec s'y 
reunissent et ne font qu'une, et cette EC est la plus grande ordonnée sur la 
courbe concave, et la plus petite ordonnée sur la courbe convexe.” G VII, 
p. 275; L, p. 480. The figure is from G VII, p. 275.  
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and this was why the ray of light always found the optimal path. 
This fact also proved that this was the best of all possible worlds.  
From the context in Tentamen it is clear that Leibniz thought 
that the optical example can be used to exemplify natural laws in 
general of the best possible world. The determination between 
minimum (laws) or maximum (phenomena) produces the unique 
solution which is the optimal or best world. At the end of Tentamen 
Leibniz wrote:  
“This principle of nature, that it acts in the most determined ways in 
which we may use, is purely architectonic in fact, yet it never fails to 
be observed…Geometric determinations introduce absolute necessity, 
the contrary of which implies a contradiction, but architectonic 
determinations introduce only a necessity of choice, the contrary of 
which means imperfection.”125 
What is a architectonically the best world provides a 
hypothetically necessary choice for God: Since the best world is 
uniquely the best, he cannot fail to recognize this but He is not 
necessitated to choose it, as discussed earlier in Chapter 1. This is 
an indirect way of saying that what is architectonically the best 
world is also best in every respect since otherwise it would not 
incline God's will. Thus it includes perfections such as universal 
observability, goodness and beauty.126  
                                                 
125 “Ce principe de la nature d'agir par les voyes les plus determinées que 
nous venons d'employer, n'est qu'architectonique en effect, cependant elle 
ne manque jamais de l'observer…Les determinations Geometriques 
importent une necessité absolue, dont le contraire implique contradiction, 
mais les Architectoniques n'importent qu'une necessité de choix, dont le 
contraire importe imperfection.” G VII, p. 278; L, p. 484. 
126 Leibniz connected God's wisdom or the principal of fitness (choice of 
wisdom) to final causes and architectonics thus: “So there is even in the 
algebraic calculus what I call the law of justice, which greatly aids us in 
finding good solutions.” He formulated the law of justice as follows: 
“Things which are contrary to moral principles, we ought also to believe 
we are unable to do.” L, p. 485, n. 13. On the principle of fitness, see PNG, 
§11. On the relationship between final causes and moral laws, see PNG, 
§3. 
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What did Leibniz have to say about the law of continuity? He 
addresses it at the very end of the memoir claiming that the laws of 
motion could not be explained without architectonic grounds. Of 
crucial importance in this respect was the law of continuity, not 
only in terms of testing theories, but also as a fruitful principle of 
discovery. It could thus be classed as an architectonic principle that 
was useful in testing and finding theories. Nowhere in Tentamen, 
however, did he mention it as contributing to optimal order or as a 
main principle of general order.  
On the contrary, he added: “I have also found other very 
beautiful and extended laws of nature, quite different, however, 
from those usually employed, yet always depending on 
architectonic principles.”127 It remains unclear to what he was 
referring here (one would guess he meant laws of dynamics), but it 
would seem odd that the law of continuity was mentioned this 
briefly here if it were to be considered the main principle of 
creation.   
In my view, a more promising approach to the principle of 
continuity in Tentamen is taken by Robert McRae in his book 
Leibniz: Perception, Apperception, and Thought: he regards the law of 
continuity as an architectonic principle that works in conjunction 
with the optimum principle, understood to be the easiest or most 
determined action.128 The most determined action presupposes 
continuity, and at the same time continuity requires the most 
determined action.129 He supports his view with a quotation from 
Tentamen relating to the general rule in optics:  
                                                 
127 “…j'ay trouvé encor d'autres Loix de la nature tres belles et tres 
etendues, et cependant fort differentes de celles qu'on a coustume 
d'employer et tousjours dependantes des Principes architectoniques.” G 
VII, p. 279; L, 484. 
128 See McRae, Leibniz: Perception, Apperception and Thought, pp. 113-114. A 
similar view can be found in Duchesneau, Leibniz et la méthode de la science, 
p. 313 & 377. 
129 According to François Duchesneau, Leibniz often substitutes the 
expression “easiest” with “most determined” in his more technical 
writings. See Duchesneau, Leibniz et la méthode de la science, pp. 263-64. 
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“Order demands that curved lines and surfaces be treated as 
composed of straight lines and planes, and a ray is determined by the 
plane on which it falls, which is considered as forming the curved 
surface at that point. But the same order demands that the effect of the 
greatest ease be obtained in relation to the planes, at least those serving 
as elements to other surfaces, since it cannot also be obtained with 
regard to these surfaces.”130  
Leibniz was apparently suggesting here that there could not be an 
optimum without continuity, nor continuity without an optimum. 
I think it could be said that, although the context in Tentamen 
implies that there are still more architectonic principles besides the 
optimum principle and the principle of continuity, these two are 
explicitly mentioned and for this reason it is reasonable to assume 
that they are the most important.  
It seems to me that this is an adequate interpretation of the 
architectonics in Tentamen. There are also other passages in 
Leibniz's works that support this view. Take DM, §6, for example: 
“…God has chosen the most perfect world, the one that is at the 
same time the simplest in hypotheses and the richest in 
phenomena, as might be a line in geometry the construction of 
which is easy and its properties and effects are wonderful and 
widespread.”131 When the line is the most determined (“the 
construction is easy”) and at the same time covers a continuous 
variety of accidents (“the effects are wonderful and widespread”), 
it is at its most perfect. The most determined construction needs 
continuity, and because the line is the most determined, the 
                                                 
130 “L'ordre veut que les lignes et surfaces courbes soyent traitées comme 
composées de droites et de plans. Et un rayon est determiné par ce plan, 
où il tombe, qu'on considere comme y formant la surface courbe. Mais le 
même ordre veut, que l'effect de la plus grande facilité soit obtenu dans les 
plans au moins qui servent d'elemens aux autres surfaces, ne pouvant pas 
estre obtenu à l'egard d'elles aussi.” G VII, p. 274. 
131 “…Dieu a choisi celuy qui est le plus parfait, c'est-à-dire celuy qui est 
en même temps le plus simple en hypotheses et le plus riche en 
phenomenes: comme pourroit estre une ligne de Geometrie dont la 
construction seroit aisée et les proprietés et effects seroient fort admirables 
et d'une grande étendue.” A VI, 4, p. 1538; AG, p. 39 
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condition is satisfied.132  This does not imply, however, that the 
maximum amount of substances is required.  
According to this reading, order requires determination 
between simple laws and varieties of phenomena. As mentioned, 
Rutherford rejects the dichotomy between order and variety, and 
concentrates on optimal order. In my view, the above discussion 
shows that Leibniz's architectonics was a more complex system of 
different architectonic laws that contributed to both order and 
variety. Therefore I have to conclude that Rutherford's under-
standing of architectonics is also deficient.133 
An optimum between minima or maxima could also be seen as 
a law of continuous series, as George Gale has suggested.134 In the 
case of the best possible world, each substance or individual notion 
follows a continuous law of the series (or “programme”), and the 
whole could also be seen as following a law of the series (which 
consists of all its laws of the series).135 In this sense, the following 
extract (cited by Rutherford) from a letter to Varignon (1702) could 
be considered to support this view: 
“Therefore I think I have good reasons for believing that all the 
different classes of beings whose assemblage forms the universe are, in 
the ideas of God who knows distinctly their essential gradations, only 
like so many coordinates of the same curve.”136  
The implication here is that the principle of continuity is 
necessarily observed in the optimum since God, when 
                                                 
132 See also Belaval, Leibniz critique de Descartes, p. 410 and Essais de 
Theodicée, §213. The idea here is related to the brachystochrone solution.  
133 For Rutherford's views on architectonics, see Rutherford, Leibniz and the 
Rational Order of Nature, pp. 28-29. 
134 Gale, Leibniz On Metaphysical Perfection, Physical Optimality, And Method 
in Physics; or, a Real Tour De Force, p. [8]. See also Rescher, Leibniz. An 
Introduction to his Philosophy, p. 16. 
135 In a letter to Des Bosses Leibniz notes: “Meo judicio, nisi daretur series 
optima, nihil plane crearet Deus quia non potest agere praeter rationem, 
aut praeferre minus perfectum alteri perfectiori.” G II, p. 424. On Leibniz's 
conception of Law-of-the-series, see Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne, 
Substance and Individuation in Leibniz, ch. 6. 
136 Leibniz, Selections, pp. 186-87. 
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contemplating the creation saw the whole law of the series that 
contained all the successive states of the substances. The 
brachistochrone solution is linked to this theme in the following 
passage (cited by Blumenfeld): “Just as there is no line freely 
drawn by hand, however irregular it may seem, which cannot be 
reduced to a rule or definition, likewise the whole series of God's 
actions makes up a certain entirely regular disposition without any 
exception. And … it is the most perfect one possible or the 
simplest, just as of all the lines that can pass through the same 
points, one is the simplest.”137 
However, one is entitled to ask why, if the best world is created 
by determination between maximum or minimum, there are 
supposedly no gaps in the succession of substances? An obvious 
answer lies in the brachistochrone solution itself, an important 
feature of which is the fact that each portion of the optimal path is 
also the fastest route between the two given points. Thus each part 
of the universe is as optimal and continuous as the whole. 
In the light of this hypothesis, analysis of any part of the 
universe reveals that the principle of continuity and the 
determination between order or variety are observed in the 
creation, and once we know this we can expect to find these 
features in natural laws.138 As a keen follower of experiments 
carried out under the microscope, Leibniz could find perfection 
and harmony in the smallest parts of the universe:  
“We also find order and wonders in the smallest whole things when 
we are capable of distinguishing their parts and at the same time of 
seeing the whole, as we do in looking at insects and other small things 
under the microscope. There are thus the strongest reasons for holding 
                                                 
137 Blumenfeld, Perfection and Happiness in the best possible world, pp. 387-88. 
See also Discours de metaphysique, §21. Yvon Belaval argued that architectonic 
laws are most productive because the same operation produces a maximum or a 
minimum, but never an indeterminate result. Belaval, Leibniz critique de 
Descartes, p. 410. 
138 See Tentamen Anagogium, G VII, p. 272 and Essais de Theodicée, §212. This 
principle is also popular in physics today. For a discussion of its modern 
applications, see Gale, Leibniz On Metaphysical Perfection, Physical 
Optimality, And Method in Physics; or, a Real Tour De Force, p. [18-] 
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that the same craftsmanship and harmony would be found in great 
things if we were capable of seeing them as a whole.”139  
Rescher also suggests another kind of answer: all possible worlds 
are maximal in the sense that they are infinite and continuous. 
There cannot be a possible world that contains only a finite 
number of beings. Each one is, to use his term, saturated: once a 
possible world is constituted in conception, there is never any 
possibility of adding further possible substances to its content.140  
I am inclined to accept both of these answers. It seems natural 
that the optimum has to include continuity between the states of 
the substances, since in the opposite case it would be difficult to 
believe that the best world was perfect in terms not only of the 
whole, but also of the parts. It would also seem implausible that 
Leibniz thought God to consider finite sets of beings in his 
deliberation – if we think of the concept “world”, it seems self-
evident that we should think of an infinite collection of substances.  
Gregory Brown describes an interesting thought experiment on 
this subject: suppose we remove one single monad from the real 
world while our perceptions of the other monads remain the same. 
It seems likely that this world, given the infinity of monads in it 
would not lose its spatiotemporal framework or suffer from less 
variety in its phenomena. This may violate the principle of 
continuity, but it does not seem to affect the character of the laws 
of the best possible world in the sense that they are less simple 
than they would be if no monads were removed.141 This argument 
appears to me to be valid. Since the best world consists of optimal 
                                                 
139 “Aussi trouvons-nous l'ordre et le merveilleux dans les moindres 
choses entieres, lorsque nous sommes capables de distinguer en meme 
temps les parties, et d'en visager le tout, comme il paroist en regardent les 
insectes et autres petites choses par le microscope. Donc par plus forte 
raison l'artifice et l'harmonie se trouveroit dans les grandes choses, si nous 
estions capables de les envisages entieres.” M, p. 64; L, p. 565. See also 
Dioptrica, Ger, pp. 98-102. 
140 Rescher, On Leibniz, p. 7.  
141 See Brown, Does the Best of All Possible Worlds Contain the (Absolute) 
Most?, p. 108-10. 
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forms, removing one substance would not cause a collapse in its 
structure. 
 
2. 4. 3. The Tiling Problem in De rerum originatione radicali 
 
Donald Rutherford sees the creation as a simple engineering 
problem, involving the filling in of a given space in the most 
effective way.142 He refers to Leibniz’s basic metaphysical text De 
rerum originatione radicali (1696), in which he likened the creation to 
a tiling problem, requiring the board (of a game) to be filled in 
accordance with certain rules. However, in my view the solution 
presented in the memoir is, in fact, far more sophisticated than 
Rutherford holds. Leibniz started his memoir by emphasising the 
importance of essence:  
“…it is obvious that of the infinite combinations of possibilities and 
possible series, the one that exists is the one through which the most 
essence or possibility is brought into existence.”143  
He continued directly by suggesting a method for finding this best 
alternative:  
“In practical affairs one always follows the decision rule in accordance 
with which one ought to seek the maximum or the minimum; namely, 
one prefers the maximum effect at the minimum cost, so to speak. And 
in this context time, place, or in a word the receptivity or capacity of 
the world, could be taken for the cost of the plot of ground on which 
the most pleasing building possible is to be built…the situation is like 
that in certain games, in which all places on the board are supposed to 
be filled in accordance with certain rules, where at the end, blocked by 
                                                 
142 Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, p. 26. 
143 “Hinc vero manifestissime intelligitur ex infinitis possibilium 
combinationibus seriebusque possibilibus existere eam, per quam 
plurimum essentiae seu possibilitas perducitur ad existendum.” G VII, p. 
303; AG, p. 150.  
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certain spaces, you will be forced to leave more places empty than you 
could have or wanted to.”144  
In Rutherford's view the board is filled according to the principle 
of continuity which leaves no empty places or gaps.145 Disagreeing 
with Rescher, he argues that the citation shows that variety and 
order are not competing factors in the design of the world, and 
that God's choice of the optimal world presupposes order that 
“enables the coexistence of the greatest possible variety of being 
within the confines of a single world.”146 However, Leibniz was 
explicitly connecting the filling of the world to the determination 
between maximum or minimum, and considered space and time to 
be a result of it.147 In fact, he believed this determination, by means 
of divine mathematics, was the decision rule employed by God, as 
the following passage clearly shows: 
“There is, however, a certain procedure through which one can most 
easily fill the board. Thus, if, for example, we suppose that we are 
directed to construct a triangle, without being given any other 
directions, the result is that an equilateral triangle would be drawn; 
and if we suppose that we are to go from one point to another, without 
being directed to use a particular path, the path chosen will be the 
easiest or the shortest one…it follows that there would be as much as 
there possibly can be, given the capacity of time and space (in other 
words, the capacity of the order of possible existence); in a word, it is 
just like tiles laid down so as to contain as many as possible in a given 
area. From this we can already understand in a wondrous way how a 
                                                 
144 “Semper scilicet est in rebus principium determinationis quod a 
Maximo Minimove petendum est, ut nempe maximus praestetur effectus, 
minimo ut sic dicam sumtu. Et hoc loco tempus, locus, aut ut verbo dicam, 
receptivitas vel capacitas mundi haberi potest pro sumtu sive terreno, in 
quo quam commodissime est aedificandum…sese res habet ut in ludis 
quibusdam, cum loca omnia in Tabula sunt replenda secundum certas 
leges, ubi nisi artificio quodam utare, postremo spatiis exclusus iniquis, 
plura cogeris loca relinquere vacua, quam poteras vel volebas.” G VII, pp. 
303-304; AG 150. 
145 See also DM, §5. 
146 Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, p. 26. 
147 The determination principle is also discussed in other contexts in Essais 
de Theodicée, § 212-213 and Nouveaux Essais IV, vii, §15.  
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certain divine Mathematics or Metaphysical Mechanism is used in the 
very origination of things, and how the determination of the maximum 
finds a place.”148 
Here Leibniz was referring explicitly to the brachistochrone 
problem, maintaining that the decision rule leads to the 
optimum.149 Once this had been found, the world is filled as 
effectively as possible. Thus the “determination of the maximum” 
is relative to the optimal rule. From the optimum it follows that a 
continuous series of substances is created and the quantity of 
essence or reality is maximised. The equilateral triangle is an 
example of such a substance in that it represents the optimal forms 
through which the best world is its most harmonious. In my view, 
it is in this sense that the passage from a letter sent to Malebranche 
on June 22, 1679, quoted by Blumenfeld, could be understood: 
“We also have to say that God makes the maximum of things he can, 
and what obligates him to seek simple laws is precisely the necessity of 
finding room for as many things as can be put together: if he made use 
of other laws, it would be like trying to make us lose more space than 
they occupy.”150  
                                                 
148 “Certa autem ratio est per quam repletio maxima facillime obtinetur. 
Uti ergo si ponamus decretum esse ut fiat triangulum, nulla licet alia 
accidenti determinandi ratione, consequens est, aequilaterum prodire; et 
posito tendendum esse a puncto ad punctum, licet nihil ultra iter 
determinat, via eligetur maxime facilis seu brevissima; ita posito semel ens 
praevalere non-enti, seu rationem esse eur aliquid potius extiterit quam 
nihil, sive a possibilitate transeundum esse ad actum, hinc, etsi nihil ultra 
determinetur consequens est, existere quantum plurimum potest pro 
temporis locique (seu ordinis possibilis existendi) capacitate, prorsus 
quemadmodum ita componuntur tessellae ut in proposita area quam 
plurimae capiantur.” G VII, p. 304;  AG 150-51. 
149 Both Tentamen and De rerum were written around the same time as the 
famous competition for the solving of the Brachystochrone problem was 
proclaimed (Leibniz's solution to Bernouilli is dated 16. 7. 1696). See Kline, 
Mathematical Thought From Ancient To Modern Times, p. 575 
150 “Il faut dire aussi que Dieu fait le plus de choses qu'il peut, et ce qui 
l'oblige à chercher de loix simples, c'est à fin de trouver place pour tout 
autant de choses qu'il est possible de placer ensemble; et s'il se servoit 
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This reading is also supported in the following passage from Essais 
de Theodicée, §208: 
“One may, indeed, reduce these two conditions, simplicity and 
productivity, to a single advantage which is to produce as much 
perfection as is possible: thus Father Malebranche's system in this 
point amounts to the same as mine. Even if the effect were assumed to 
be greater, but the process less simple, I think one might say that, 
when all is weighed and counted, the effect itself would be less great, 
taking into account not only the final effect but also the mediate 
effect.”151  
The single advantage mentioned here is the determination 
between minimum or maximum, which produces a unique 
optimum resulting in the highest degree of perfection.  
In sum, I find Rutherford's interpretation problematic although 
it is possible. Two of Leibniz’s important metaphysical texts, 
Tentamen anagogium and De rerum originatione radicali, consistently 
referred to the determination between minimum or maximum as 
the central principle of nature. As I have argued, the principle of 
continuity is secondary to this in the plan for the best world. 
Leibniz's architectonics requires the combination of all of these 
different laws and one can hardly single out just one of them, such 
as the principle of continuity, and hold it to be the principal rule of 
creation. 
Although Leibniz often compared God with an architect, a 
housekeeper, an engineer and even a sculptor,152 I am still inclined 
to agree with Rescher and Gale in considering the creation of the 
                                                                                                    
d'autres loix, ce seroit comme si on vouloit employer des pierres rondes 
dans un batiment, qui nous ostent plus d'espace qu'elles n'occupent.” G I, 
p. 331; L, p. 211.  
151 “On peut même reduire ces deux conditions, la simplicité et la 
fecondité, à un seul avantage, qui est de produire le plus de perfection 
qu'il est possible; et par ce moyen, le systeme du R. P. de Mallebranche en 
cela se reduit au mien. Car si l'effect étoit supposé plus grand, mais les 
voyes moins simples, je crois qu'on pourroit dire, que tout pesé et tout 
compté, l'effect luy même seroit moins grand, en estimant non seulement 
l'effect final, mais aussi l'effect moyen.” G VI, p. 241; H, p. 257. 
152 See Essais de Theodicée, §130. 
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world more as mathematical problem solving than anything 
else.153 Finding the optimal combination of order and variety in 
infinite compossible sets of substances by comparing them with 
each other offers even more convincing proof of the supreme 
wisdom than filling the universe according to the requirements of 
optimal order.154  
My preference is thus for the trade-off-view, according to 
which, of the possible worlds God chooses the one that is optimal 
and has the highest degree of perfection. Since he chooses between 
infinite continuous and compossible wholes, the best world 
necessarily consists of an infinite number of beings and has the 
highest degree of perfection.  
In this reading the quantity of essence refers not to the 
maximum number of beings (which is the foundation of the 
maximisation-view), but to the degree of perfection. Although 
Leibniz did not make this connection entirely clear, I think it is 
implied in De rerum, quoted above. In this respect I agree with 
another influential theorist advocating the trade-off view, Gregory 
Brown, who argues that “the two notions of perfection, viz. 
simplicity of laws in conjunction with richness of phenomena, on 
the one hand, and quantity or degree of essence [of harmonious 
properties], on the other, are not in conflict, but come indeed to the 
same thing.”155  
                                                 
153 See, for example G VII, p. 304 and G VI, p. 107. Leibniz wrote to a 
margin of a short fragment Dialogus (1677) the phrase “Cum DEUS 
calculat et cogitationem exercet, fit mundus.” See G VII, p. 191. In a letter 
to Sophie in 1696 he wrote: ”…Il est bon de considerer que l'ordre et 
l'harmonie sont aussi quelque chose de mathematique, qui consiste en 
certaines proportions.” Gr, p. 379 (cited in Heinekamp, Das Problem des 
Guten bei Leibniz, p. 179). In GM II, p. 258 He wrote: “Ma metaphysique est 
toute mathematique pour ainsi dire ou la pourroit devenir.”  
154 See Gale, On What God Chose, p. 81. 
155 Brown, Compossibility, Harmony, and Perfection in Leibniz, pp. 277-78. See 
also Gale, On What God Chose, pp. 78-79. The following passage seems to 
support this view: “…ut possibilitas est principium Essentiae, ita perfectio 
seu Essentiae gradus (per quem plurima sunt compossibilia) principium 
existentiae.” (De rerum originatione radicali) G VII, p. 304. See also Essais de 
Theodicée, §208.  
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2. 5. Moral Goodness in God's Choice 
 
So far, I have focused mainly on the metaphysical criteria of God's 
choice, but it is also important to consider the significance of moral 
goodness in the best of all possible worlds. Leibniz distinguished 
three kinds of goodness in Essais de Theodicée, §209: 
“…perfection includes not only the moral good and the physical good 
of intelligent creatures, but also the good which is purely 
metaphysical, and also concerns creatures devoid of reason.”156  
Thus the best world, which has the highest degree of perfection, 
should also be metaphysically good, and this involves all 
substances. Furthermore, metaphysical goodness or perfection 
itself includes both moral and physical goodness, and it is 
sometimes even necessary to admit physical and moral evil.157 
Perfection is also defined as positive reality in La Monadologie, §41 
(1714). The amount of reality or essence is inextricably intertwined 
with metaphysical considerations - when the best world is taken as 
a whole, the amount of essence represents its metaphysical 
goodness, which is greatest in the best possible world. As 
mentioned, I agree with Gregory Brown that the highest degree of 
perfection and the greatest amount of essence are, in fact, 
equivalent notions.158  
I will now turn to the role of moral goodness in God's choice. 
Leibniz stated in many connections that the best world should 
contain moral goodness or happiness which is related to wisdom 
and virtue.159 One example is in PNG, §15: 
                                                 
156 “…la perfection comprend non seulement le bien moral et le bien 
physique des Creatures intelligentes, mais encor le bien qui n'est que 
metaphysique, et qui regarde aussi les creatures destituées de raison.” G 
VI, p. 242; H, p. 258. 
157 G VI, p. 242. 
158 “…Dieu est la cause de toutes les perfections, et par consequent de 
toutes les realités, lorsqu'on les considere comme purement positives.” 
(Essais de Theodicée, Abregé de la Controverse reduite à des Arguments en forme) 
G VI, p. 383. 
159 I will discuss these connections in Chapter 9.  
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“…all minds, whether of men or genies, entering into a kind of society 
with God by virtue of reason and eternal truths, are members of the 
City of God, in other words, members of the perfect state, formed and 
governed by the greatest and best of monarchs. Here there is no crime 
without punishment, no good action without proportionate reward, 
and finally, as much virtue and happiness as is possible.160  
The principal reason for human happiness is joy, which follows 
from perceiving perfection or harmonious properties of the world, 
and the source of harmony is God. Thus metaphysical goodness is 
the foundation of human happiness.161  
This additional feature of the best possible world poses further 
challenges to the three interpretations discussed above. If the best 
world is to satisfy the condition of providing happiness for spirits, 
how can this be reconciled with its metaphysical criteria? Does 
metaphysical perfection entail moral goodness?  
As mentioned, these interpretations differ in this regard. 
Whereas Rescher sees moral goodness as a by-product of the 
optimisation between variety and order, Blumenfeld and 
Rutherford relate it to the maximal number of best spirits in the 
world. I will first look at their views in detail and then examine 
some of Leibniz's discussions on the topic.    
Nicholas Rescher attributes the least importance to moral 
goodness in God's decision. He argues that Leibniz made it clear 
that metaphysical considerations were more important than moral 
ones, concluding that this should be understood as Leibniz's 
mature position on the matter even if it clearly represented a 
                                                 
160 “…tous les esprits, soit des hommes, soit des genies, entrant en vertu 
de la Raison et des Verités éternelles sans une espèce de Societé avec Dieu, 
sont des membres de la Cité de Dieu, c'es à dire, du plus parfait état, 
formé et gouverné par le plus grand et le meilleur des Monarques: où il 
n'y a point de crime sans chatiment; point de bonnes actions sans 
recompense proportionnée, et enfin autant de vertu et de bonheur qu'il est 
possible.” G VI, p. 605; AG, p. 212. 
161 I will return to this topic in Chapter 9.2. 
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tension in his philosophy.162 In his latest presentation of his views, 
“Leibniz on possible worlds”, he refers to Essais de Theodicée, §8:  
“…[a]s in mathematics, when there is no maximum nor minimum, in 
short nothing distinguished, everything is done equally, or when that 
is not possible, nothing is done: so it may be said likewise in respect of 
perfect wisdom, which is no less orderly than mathematics, that if 
there were not the best [optimum] among all possible worlds, God 
would not have produced any.”163  
When God chooses to create an optimum, the unique alternative 
among all possible worlds is the best choice in every respect, 
including that of moral goodness. Thus moral (and physical) 
goodness follows from metaphysical goodness. The existence of 
this real world proves that it is the best since otherwise God would 
not necessarily have created anything. It is beyond our cognitive 
abilities to know this absolutely, but we can conclude it from God's 
nature.164 As discussed in the previous chapter, God is 
hypothetically necessitated to choose the best world because it 
appeals to His infinite goodness.  
According to Rescher, an overtly complex world that has less 
order is too difficult to grasp and far too confusing for a finite 
mind. In contrast, a world with a minimum amount of variety and 
maximal order offers too little challenge for intelligent creatures. A 
metaphysically good world affords a comfortable environment for 
intelligent beings.165 The comprehensibility of the best world also 
gives rise to happiness in it. The optimal world is perfect on each 
                                                 
162 Rescher, Logical Difficulties in Leibniz's Metaphysics, p. 184. Rescher 
refers to Abregé de la Controverse reduite à des Argumens en forme (An 
appendix to Essais de Theodicée), II. Objection. G VI, pp. 377-79 
163 “…comme dans les Mathematiques, quand il n'y a point de maximum 
ny de minimum, rien enfin de distingué, tout se fait egalement; ou quand 
cela ne se peut, il ne se fait rien du tout: on peut dire de même en matiere 
de parfaite sagesse, qui n'est pas moins reglée que les Mathematiques, que 
s'il n' y avoit pas le meilleur (optimum) parmy touse les mondes possibles, 
Dieu n'en auroit produit aucun.” G VI, p. 107; H, p. 128. 
164 Rescher, On Leibniz, p. 37. See also DM, §31 and Essais de Theodicée, §10. 
165 Ibid., pp. 58-59. 
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level of existence, and this is why perceiving this whole creates 
happiness in us.166 
David Blumenfeld argues that happiness is an essential feature 
of the best world. In fact, it has to be at its maximum, since Leibniz 
frequently stated that the happiness of human spirits is of utmost 
importance to God.167 Thus, arguing against Rescher Blumenfeld 
holds that Leibniz was both an ontological and a moral optimist. 
He explains the relationship between perfection or harmony in the 
world and happiness as follows: since happiness is the human 
spirit's awareness of harmony, the world with the most harmony 
offers the greatest potential for happiness. From this it could be 
concluded that the world with the greatest perfection also contains 
the largest number of the best human spirits, which are 
compossible with one another since this gives rise to maximal 
harmony. Consequently, the world with the greatest harmony will 
also contain the greatest possible happiness.168  
Donald Rutherford follows Blumenfeld in arguing that, as well 
as maximising metaphysical goodness or perfection, God intends 
to produce as much harmony as possible in the universe. 
However, he differs from Rescher and Blumenfeld in his view that 
perfection is not to be identified with harmony (variety in 
identity), but should be understood as the maximisation of 
metaphysical goodness. He argues that the following, often quoted 
passage from Leibniz's letter to Wolff is not to be understood 
literally: 
“Perfection is the harmony of things, or the state where everything is 
worthy of being observed, in other words, the state of agreement or 
                                                 
166 See DM, §36. 
167 Leibniz's views changed later and in Essais de Theodicée he clearly gave 
up this idea. However, Blumenfeld argues that his later position was 
compatible with his earlier views. Blumenfeld, Perfection and Happiness in 
the Best World, p. 404. 
168 Ibid., pp. 400-402. 
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identity in variety; you can even say that it is the degree of 
contemplability.”169  
According to Rutherford, “although the harmony of a being (or 
better, the harmony of the law-like effects that follow from it) may 
be directly correlated with its degree of perfection (the degree of 
perfection of a being is the ratio between distinct and confused 
perceptions), it would be going too far to see Leibniz as identifying 
these concepts.”170 The reason for this is that harmony does not 
limit itself to the whole; it reaches to all levels of existence. 
Therefore, God realises not only the greatest variety of degrees of 
perfection, but also as much “ornament” as possible in the 
phenomena perceived by these beings.  
Rutherford understands “ornament” here as the multiplicity of 
perceptions produced by substances representing each other. 
Therefore the harmony in the best world arises as a result of the 
mutual expression of substances. Harmony is, in fact, a 
precondition of perfection, since only under the condition of 
maximum harmony can as much perfection as possible be realised 
among enlightened minds.171 
There is no tension between ontological and moral perfection in 
Rutherford's interpretation – the latter arises from the former. Like 
Blumenfeld, he argues that in order to create the greatest total 
perfection, God creates a maximal collection of minds with the 
greatest potential for happiness and virtue. This selection requires 
a world with the most harmony because otherwise the potential in 
its substances would be wasted. Since these best souls require 
perfection in order to gain happiness, it becomes evident that for 
the world to be the best, there cannot be the one without the other. 
The happiness of human spirits contributes to the perfection of the 
world, and is based on their perceiving it.172 
                                                 
169 “Perfectio est harmonia rerum, vel observabilitas universalium, seu 
consensus vel identitas in varietate; posses etiam dicere esse gradum 
considerabilitatis.” GW, p. 172; AG, pp. 233-34. 
170 Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, p. 35. For a contrary 
view, see Brown, Compossibility, Harmony, and Perfection in Leibniz. 
171 Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, pp. 32-35. 
172 Ibid., pp. 48-51. 
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Arguing against Blumenfeld, Rutherford holds that God could 
not maintain the ratio of distinct perceptions to confused ones as 
His sole criterion for choosing a collection of substances, but had to 
take into account the interconnectedness or harmony of a possible 
world and choose the one containing the most perfection as a 
whole. Thus the best world is not a simple collection of best minds, 
but has to include lower monads, given the requirements of 
compossibility.173 The guiding principle in His work is the law of 
continuity, which allows no gaps in the hierarchy of monads and 
takes care that all degrees of perfection are occupied.174 Thus the 
result is a world with maximum perfection (goodness), variety of 
phenomena and monadic harmony (including happiness).175  
 
2. 5. 1. Optimising and Moral Goodness 
 
As I have indicated, I prefer the trade-off-view of Rescher and his 
supporters to Blumenfeld's and Rutherford's maximisation view 
with respect to God's criteria for His choice of the best world. The 
question of moral goodness, however, poses a challenge to the 
trade-off-view since Rescher clearly states that metaphysical 
considerations are more important than moral ones. How, then, 
can the trade-off-view explain the connection between meta-
physical and moral perfection?  
I will defend the trade-off-view by examining some texts on the 
subject and showing that, even if there is no conclusive evidence 
for this interpretation, the claim that moral goodness is a product 
of the optimising solution of God in the creation can be reasonably 
assumed. Of significance in this respect is De rerum originatione 
radicali, in which after presenting the idea of the best world as a 
result of the determination of minima or maxima Leibniz turned to 
moral goodness in it: 
                                                 
173 Ibid., pp. 180-81. 
174 There is one exception and this is the gap between animals and human 
spirits. Ibid., p. 165. For a different view, see Carlin, Leibniz's Great Chain of 
Being.  
175 Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, p. 200. 
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“And lest anyone think that I am here confusing moral perfection or 
goodness with metaphysical perfection or greatness, and grant the 
latter while denying the former, one must realize that it follows from 
what I have said that not only is the world physically (or, if you prefer, 
metaphysically) most perfect, in other words that the series of things 
that has been brought forth is the one in which there is, in actuality, the 
greatest amount of reality, but it also follows that the world is morally 
most perfect, since moral perfection is in reality physical perfection 
with respect to minds. From this it follows that the world is not only 
the most admirable machine, but insofar as it is made up of minds, it is 
also the best republic, the republic through which minds derive the 
greatest possible happiness and joy, in which their physical perfection 
consists. “176  
It is implied here that the metaphysically best world produces joy 
in its inhabitants, and this leads to the greatest conceivable 
happiness. Perceiving the inherent perfection of the best world is 
thus the key to moral goodness. This line of argument is 
represented by the trade-off view, provided that the reality or 
essence maximised is understood to be the highest degree of 
perfection. The same argument could also be applied to David 
Blumenfeld's interpretation if the “greatest amount of reality” is 
understood to be the greatest amount of existence or compossible 
substances.  
Harmony is identified with perfection in both of these 
interpretations. Thus the happiness of spirits is founded on the 
perception of perfection in the best world, which gives rise to 
                                                 
176 “Et ne quis putet perfectionem moralem seu bonitatem cum 
metaphysica perfectione seu magnitudine hic confundi, et hac concessa 
illam neget, sciendum est, sequi ex dictis non tantum quod Mundus sit 
perfectissimus physice, vel si mavis metaphysice, seu quod ea series 
rerum prodierit, in qua quam plurimum realitatis actu praestatur, sed 
etiam quod sit perfectissimus moraliter, quia revera moralis perfectio ipsis 
mentibus physica est. Unde Mundus non tantum est Machina maxime 
admirabilis, sed etiam quatenus constat ex Mentibus, est optima 
Respublica, per quam Mentibus confertur quam plurimum felicitatis seu 
laetitiae, in qua physica earum perfectio consistit.” G VII, p. 306; AG, pp. 
152-53. 
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pleasure.177 In other words, moral and physical goodness are 
founded on metaphysical goodness. I think this view is wholly 
consistent as long as harmony and perfection are identified. It 
would also imply that the best world enables a maximum of 
universal observation and the highest degree of thinkability in that 
these features are also based on harmony.178  
Despite the differences concerning the trade-off character of the 
best world, Rescher would seem to agree with Blumenfeld's 
conclusion that the world with the greatest perfection and 
harmony will also contain the potential for the greatest possible 
happiness.179 However, Blumenfeld's views are related to his 
problematic theory of the relationship between simple laws and 
the greatest number of phenomena, which I have already 
criticised.  
According to Donald Rutherford, however, identifying the 
notions of perfection and harmony is almost certainly too simple in 
that harmony must reach multiple levels.180 It thus requires more 
than perfection. He argues that in order for the world to be 
complete, representation between its substances is needed. The 
mirroring of substances of each other provides the ornament that 
makes up the full content of the best world. For this reason, a 
                                                 
177 I will discuss this in Chapter 9.1.  
178 See Brown, Leibniz’s Theodicy and the Confluence of Worldly Goods, p. 468. 
Laurence Carlin quotes the following passage from Elementa verae pietatis 
(Gr, pp. 12-13) which seems to support this view: “The more relations 
there are in a thinkable object (the aggregate of which is harmony), this 
has more reality, or what is the same, there is perfection in the thought. 
Therefore, it follows that harmony is cogitability, and, of course, to the 
extent that there are cogitable things, perfection.” Carlin, On the Very 
Concept of Harmony in Leibniz, p. 107. Another passage I think favours this 
view occurs in Confessio philosophi, where Leibniz's spokesman says: 
“[Harmonia] consistunt enim in ratione identitas ad diversitatem, est enim 
harmonia unitas in multis, maxima in plurimis; et in speciem turbatis et 
mirabili quadam ratione ex insperato ad summam concinnitatem 
reductis.” A VI, 3, p. 122. 
179 Blumenfeld, Perfection and Happiness in the Best World, p. 402. 
180 Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, p. 32. 
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maximum amount of minds is needed from which results the 
maximal amount of harmony.  
While this interpretation sounds valid in itself, the above 
citation seems to support a more simple system in which the best 
world gives its substances an optimal platform for the greatest 
possible amount of happiness. The representation of spirits is an 
essential feature of the best world, but I cannot see why this 
requires harmony to be distinguished from perfection. I think it is 
reasonable to assume (in the light of the passage from De rerum) 
that harmony reaches each level of existence precisely because it is 
identified with perfection, of which the best world has the highest 
degree. The perception of perfection gives rise to a harmonious 
feeling, which produces joy and eventually happiness in intelligent 
minds, as I will argue in Chapter 9.1. in this study. 
Therefore I think the trade-off view captures well the above 
description from De rerum. The best world is the most harmonious 
and gives rise to the most observability and beauty because it has 
an optimal structure. This structure provides the highest possible 
degree of perfection on each level of existence, which gives rise to 
the most harmonious whole.181 
There seems to be little textual evidence to support Rutherford's 
claims. There are a few passages in which Leibniz stated that 
harmony precedes perfection,182 but he frequently identified them 
both explicitly, or argued that harmony is an effect of the creation 
(in which the highest degree of perfection was produced).183  
                                                 
181 In his commentary on La Monadologie, Rescher distinguishes the 
following levels of harmony, which he sees as having been produced by 
God's optimal choice: a) the voluntaristic harmony of mind-body 
interaction (of will and action); b) the cognitive harmony between 
perception and its focus (of thought and its object); c) The causal harmony 
between the order of efficient and final causation (of physical causality 
and of purpose) and d) The moral harmony of desert and reward (of 
nature and grace). Rescher, G. W. Leibniz's Monadology, p. 289. 
182 One possible canditate (which Rutherford does not mention) is Essais de 
Theodicée, §74, in which Leibniz stated that all that God does is 
harmonious to perfection. See G VI, p. 142.  
183 See G VII, 412; G VII, 74; GW, p. 172. See also Heinekamp, Das Problem 
des Guten bei Leibniz, pp. 166-67.  
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Furthermore, in my view, the “ornament” of the best world is 
the variety of phenomena realised in the creation in the sense 
Rescher refers to as completeness or fullness.184 Variety (in 
conjunction with order) is a feature of the best world that God 
chose to create and it reaches all levels of existence. As mentioned, 
Leibniz argued that each part of the universe is optimal and 
therefore harmonious. The following extract from Von der Weissheit 
illustrates this interconnectedness of the features of the best world: 
“Now unity in plurality is nothing but harmony, and since any 
particular being agrees with one rather than another being, there flows 
from this harmony the order from which beauty arises, and beauty 
awakens love. Thus we see how happiness, pleasure, love, perfection, 
being, power, freedom, harmony, order, and beauty are all tied to each 
other, which is properly appreciated by few.” 185 
The world is harmonious because it represents the highest degree 
of perfection.186 In this respect I agree with Gregory Brown, who 
holds that harmony in a world increases as its perfection ratio 
increases, and decreases as its perfection ratio decreases.187 
In sum, my specific purpose here has been to examine whether 
the trade-off view which I have preferred in other respects, 
                                                 
184 Rescher, Leibniz’s Metaphysics of Nature, pp. 5-6. 
185 “Nun die einigheit in der vielheit ist nichts anders als die 
überinstimmung, und weil eines zu diesem näher stimmet als zu jenem, so 
sliesset daraus die odnung, von welcher alle schönheit hehrkomt, und die 
Schönheit erwecket liebe. Daraus siehet man nun, wie Glückseeligkeit, 
Lust, Liebe, Vollkommenheit, Wesen, Krafft, freiheit, überinstimmung, 
ordnung uns schönheit an einander verbunden, welches von wenigen 
recht angesehen wird.” G VII, p. 87; L, p. 426. 
186 Perfection in this sense stems from eudaimonia, understood in Aristotle's 
second sense (the first sense being theoretical contemplation), as presented 
in Nichomachean Ethics X, 7: eudaimonia is connected to the whole of human 
capacities, which consist of both theoretical and practical reason. Thus 
eudaimonia or flourishing involves both reason and emotions as well as 
virtue. On Aristotle's eudaimonia, see Nagel, Aristotle on Eudaimonia. For a 
discussion of plural values, inspired by Aristotle, see Stocker, Plural and 
Conflicting Values. 
187 Brown, Compossibility, Harmony, and Perfection in Leibniz, p. 275.  
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survives the task of explaining the moral goodness of the best 
world. As the discussion above shows, I think this could be 
granted, even though Leibniz was not very clear in this matter and 
there is no conclusive textual support for this or the competing 
views. Nevertheless, I think it can reasonably be assumed from De 
rerum that Leibniz considered moral happiness to follow from 
metaphysical considerations.   
 
2. 5. 2. Happiness in the Actual World 
 
Leibniz clearly thought that there was most happiness in the best 
world. In the light of our everyday experiences, this claim seems 
patently absurd. The world is full of imperfection, unhappiness 
and suffering. How can this be if God is supposed to choose the 
best possible world, which includes the most moral goodness? I 
will conclude this discussion of God's rational choice by briefly 
considering Leibniz's defence of God's goodness (commonly 
known as the problem of Theodicy).  
In his earlier philosophy Leibniz expressed the belief that the 
spirits were most important to God in His rational choice, a tone 
that is prominent in Discours de metaphysique, §35-36.188 He argued 
that God loved the spirits like His children, whereas His 
relationship with other substances was more like that of a machine 
with its maker.189 Nevertheless, in his later philosophy he saw the 
human happiness diminishing and other considerations increasing 
in importance.  
A good example of this view occurs in the latter part of De 
rerum originatione radicali. After stating that the real world was 
morally the most perfect, he argues that our cognitive capacity is 
so limited that we understand only a small portion of the whole 
universe, and that the whole is even more harmonious when there 
is a certain amount of imperfection in it, just as the most 
sophisticated composers mix dissonance with consonance in their 
                                                 
188 On this theme, see Blumenfeld, Perfection and Happiness in the Best 
Possible Worlds, pp. 400-05. 
189 See, for example, La Monadologie, §64 and §90. 
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works.190 He argues that “pleasure does not derive from 
uniformity, for uniformity brings forth disgust and makes us dull, 
not happy; this very principle is a law of delight.”191 Thus human 
happiness requires the interplay of various elements.  
His most famous and extensive discussion of this matter is, of 
course, in Essais de Theodicée, in which he addresses the following 
questions. How it is possible that there is sin and evil in the world 
when God is supremely good by nature and He freely chooses the 
best of all possible worlds to create?  Why are men not created as 
perfect? Why are there imperfect things and states in the best of all 
possible worlds? 192 
Leibniz approached this problem by showing that it was 
impossible for God to create a totally perfect world.193 The creation 
                                                 
190 G VII, p. 306. 
191 “Haec ipsa est laetitiae lex, ut aequabili tenore voluptas non procedat, 
fastidium enim haec parit et stupentes facit, non gaudentes.” G VII, p. 307; 
AG, p. 153. 
192 Malebranche's theodicy, presented earlier in Traité de la nature et de la 
grâce (1680) influenced Leibniz and his solution. While Malebranche's God 
acted for His own good and preferred values that were worthy of Him, 
Leibniz's God acts to produce the maximum amount of goodness possible, 
and this goodness is also an inherent feature of the world. According to 
Malebranche, the order of nature is determined by exceptionless laws that 
follow from general volitions of God. Creation itself, on the other hand, is 
determined by a particular volition of God (that is, the volition to create 
rather than not to create a world). Since the laws of nature, which are 
sometimes harmful to human beings and are the source of sin, are not a 
particular volition of God, He cannot be held directly responsible for the 
unfortunate occurences of evil in the world. If God were to change the 
general volitions (and natural laws), this world would no longer be 
worthy of His perfection. This solution was obviously not sufficient for 
Leibniz, who insisted that God knew that there were imperfections in the 
world and that He does his best to ease their effects. Rutherford, 
Malebranche’s Theodicy, pp. 168-72. On the relationship between 
Malebranche's and Leibniz's views of theodicy, see Riley, Leibniz's 
Universal Jurisprudence, ch. 3. 
193 Leibniz also dissociated himself from two radical solutions that had 
been given earlier. The Averroists wanted to make God responsible for all 
man's actions and the Socianists denied God's ability to foresee things. 
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was the realisation of a thing in God's understanding and the evil 
lay in just this condition. The concept comprises a set of logically 
coherent entities, the inner properties of which are defined not by 
God Himself, but by their logical compossibility. This leads to the 
evident fact that this world contains some inner imperfections that 
are necessarily realized in creation. Thus the world, although it is 
the best possible, is not necessarily the best for all human spirits at 
the same time.194 Not everything in the best of all possible worlds 
is totally good. 
In his description of divine decision-making, Leibniz 
distinguished between the antecedent and the consequent wills of 
God. The consequent will executes the action and thus is the last 
stage of deliberation, while the antecedent will is a motive for an 
action (an inclination to action). The latter represents a particular 
good and the former looks towards the whole. 
“…consequent will, final and decisive, results from the conflict of all 
the antecedent wills, of those tending towards good, even of those that 
repel evil; and from the concurrence of all these particular wills comes 
the total will…in this sense, too, it may be said that the antecedent will 
is efficacious in a sense and even effective with success.”195  
Because God has to take account of multiple goods, and not only 
human happiness, the world, although the best possible, contains 
human unhappiness. This marks a clear change in Leibniz's views - 
the universe is no longer made only for spirits.   
“Virtue is the noblest quality of created beings, but it is not the only 
good quality of creatures. There are innumerable others that attract the 
inclination of God: from all these inclinations there results the most 
                                                                                                    
Leibniz tried to find a middle way between these two views. See Brown, 
Leibniz, pp.  25-26. 
194 See Essais de Theodicée, §118-119. 
195 “…volonté consequente, finale et decisive, resulte du conflit de toutes 
ces volontés antecedentes, tant de celles qui tendent vers le bien, que de 
celles qui repoussent le mal; et c'est du concours de toutes ces volontés 
particulieres, que vient la volonté totale…en ce sens qu'on peut dire que la 
volonté antecedente est efficace en quelque façon, et même effective avec 
succès.” (Essais de Theodicée, §22). G VI, p. 116; H, p. 137. 
 
 
 
82
possible good, and it turns out that if there were only virtue, if there 
were only rational creatures, there would be less good.”196  
The inhabitants of the best world must understand that one should 
be content with the things as they are and be thankful for this 
marvellous world-order:  
“…the very nature of things implies that this order in the Divine City, 
which we see not yet here on earth, should be an object of our faith, of 
our hope, of our confidence in God. If there are any who think 
otherwise, so much the worse for them, they are malcontents in the 
State of the greatest and the best of all monarchs; and they are wrong 
not to take advantage of the examples he has given them of his 
wisdom and his infinite goodness, whereby He reveals himself as 
being not only wonderful, but also worthy of love beyond all 
things.”197 
There might be a world in which any given misfortune is avoided, 
but it might lack some good in other respects. Leibniz denied that a 
world wholly without sin and suffering is better than this other 
world.198   
                                                 
196 “La vertu est la plus noble qualité des choses creés, mais ce n'est pas la 
seule bonne qualité des Creatures. Il y en a une infinité d'autres qui 
attirent l'inclination de Dieu: de toutes ces inclinations resulte le plus de 
bien qu'il se peut, et il se trouve que s'il n'y avoit que vertu, s'il n'y avoit 
que Creatures raisonnables, il y auroit moins de bien.” (Essais de Theodicée, 
§124) G VI, pp. 178-79; H, p. 198. 
197 “…la nature même des choses porte que cet ordre de la Cité Divine, que 
nous ne voyons pas encor icy bas, soit un objet de nostre foy, de nostre 
esperance, de nostre confiance en Dieu. S'il y en a qui en jugent autrement, 
tant pis pour eux, ce sont des mecontents dans l'etat du plus grand et du 
meilleur de tous les Monarques, et ils ont tort de ne point profiter des 
echantillons qu'il leur a donnés de sa sagesse et de sa bonté infinie, pour se 
faire connoitre non seulement admirable, mais encor aimable au delà de 
toutes choses.” (Essais de Theodicée, §134) G VI, p. 188; H, p. 207.  
198 “Quelque adversaire...repondra peutêtre à la conclusion par un 
argument contraire, en disant que le monde auroit pu être sans le peché et 
sans les souffrances: mais je nie qu'alors il auroit été meilleur. Car il faut 
savoir que tout est lié dans chacun des Mondes possibles…” (Essais de 
Theodicée, §7) G VI, p. 106. 
 
 
 
83
Thus the real world is the best of all possible worlds – it 
contains the highest degree of perfection possible. All other 
options would be worse – thus God did not create an inferior 
world on purpose, although Leibniz seemed to think that a world 
in which He damns the innocent cannot be the best of all possible 
worlds.199  
Leibniz also considered the question whether the world 
increases in perfection over time in An mundus perfectione crescat 
(1694-96) and argued that the world always maintains the same 
degree of perfection. However, he allowed that parts of the world 
can increase in perfection. In other words, men can increase their 
perfection but as this hardly applies to all men at the same time, 
the degree of perfection stays the same in the world at all times.200 
In some later texts Leibniz suggested that the best of all possible 
worlds could increase in perfection. This idea was based on the 
fact that God had created a collection of substances that had the 
potential of developing into a higher state of perfection.201 The best 
world is an ever-changing whole that develops to a full degree of 
perfection gradually. Thus although it may seem to be imperfect in 
parts, this may change in the future: 
 
“Taking the whole sequence of things, the best has no equal; but one 
part of the sequence may be equalled by another part of the same 
sequence. Besides it might be said that the whole sequence of things to 
infinity may be the best possible, although what exists all through the 
universe in each portion of time may not be the best. It might be 
therefore that the universe would become better and better if the 
                                                 
199 Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, p. 22.  
  200 See Gr, p. 95. For an account of this theme, see Phemister, Progress and 
Perfection of World and Individual in Leibniz's Philosophy, 1694-97. 
201 I will discuss this theme more fully in Chapter 9.2. 
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nature of things were such that it was not permitted to reach the best 
all at once.”202 
 
3. A Summary of Part I 
 
The first part of this study was dedicated to divine choice, which 
could be seen as an ideal case and a model of rational decision. I 
showed in Chapter 1 that God's choice of creating one amongst an 
infinite number of possible worlds was a hypothetically necessary 
act. The goodness of the best world inclines God's will, but does 
not necessitate it. His choice is based on His infinite understanding 
which takes into account the whole history of each possible world, 
in other words, all the states of all substances. After comparing an 
infinite number of compossible wholes or possible worlds, He 
chose and created the one that is the real world.  
The extremely complex choice of the best of all possible worlds 
is God's alone. Naturally one is curious about His criteria, 
especially as Leibniz emphasised in many connections that men 
are supposed to imitate the supremely good and all-knowing God 
in their actions as far as possible. Although he does not discuss the 
process of God's choice in detail, he mentions some selection 
criteria, the most common of which is order in combination with 
variety. He is not very clear, however, in how exactly these are 
combined in the best world. This has given rise to competing 
interpretations, which I discussed in Chapter 2.  
Nicholas Rescher supports the trade-off view, according to 
which order and variety are in tension and the best world is a 
trade-off between them. According to David Blumenfeld's 
interpretation, a maximum number of maximally simple laws 
produce a maximum number of phenomena, and this gives rise to 
                                                 
202 “Prenant toute la suite des choses, le meilleur n'a point d'egal; mais une 
partie de la suite peut être egalée par une autre partie de la même suite. 
Outre qu'on pourroit dire que toute la suite des choses à l'infini peut être 
la meilleure qui soit possible, quoyque ce qui existe par tout l'universe 
dans chaque partie du temps ne soit pas le meilleur. Il se pourroit donc 
que l'univers allât tousjours de mieux en mieux, si telle étoit la nature des 
choses, qu'il ne fût point permis d'atteindre au meilleur d'un seul coup.” 
(Essais de Theodicée, §202) G VI, p. 237; H, pp. 253-54.  
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the best world. Thirdly, Donald Rutheford argues that by creating 
optimal order God finds a place for a harmonious maximal 
collection of substances in which metaphysical goodness is 
maximised.  
I find Nicholas Rescher's trade-off view the most adequate 
explanation of the criteria God employs in creating the best world. 
I have argued at length that, while the rival interpretations of 
David Blumenfeld and Donald Rutherford are certainly plausible, 
they suffer from insufficient understanding of Leibniz's 
architectonics, which was at the heart of the problem: architectonic 
considerations played a central role in his important metaphysical 
writings from the end of 1690s, Tentamen anagogium and De rerum 
originatione radicali, both of which specifically discuss final causes 
in nature and the decision rule used by God in His choice of the 
best world.  
Thus I think Leibniz's position was that the best world was a 
unique optimum determined by minima (laws) or maxima 
(phenomena). The architectonic determination between minima or 
maxima (an application of the mathematical doctrine known today 
as the calculus of variations) produces a continuous whole in 
which each part of the universe is optimal. The German 
astrophysicist C. F. von Weizsäcker expressed the idea as follows: 
“And the perfection of the world in which variational principles 
hold, consists in the fact that it unites the greatest richness in 
phenomena by a law as simple, and as transparent for the mind as 
possible; It consists in the fact that such a world possesses the 
greatest intellectual beauty.”203 This kind of world, it seems to me, 
is what Leibniz described of length in Essais de Theodicée: an 
optimum that best illustrates God's wisdom and goodness.  
In my view, the trade-off view captures Leibniz's architectonics 
well, and is supported by textual evidence, not only in the two 
memoirs mentioned above, but also in other sources discussed in 
Chapter 2. The most problematic passage in this regard is PNG, 
§10, in which he claims that the phenomena is produced by the 
                                                 
203 Quoted in Gale, Leibniz and Metaphysical Perfection, Physical Optimality, 
and Method in Physics; or, a Real tour de force, p. [21]. 
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most simple means. I have argued, however, that this could be 
understood metaphorically.  
A further difficulty with the trade-off-view lies in Leibniz's 
insistence that the best world also includes the most moral 
goodness. Rescher holds that this moral goodness is a consequence 
of metaphysical determination and a feature of the optimal 
character of the best world. In the light of De rerum originatione 
radicali I think this view could be considered reasonable.
 
 
Part II 
 
 
Human Cognition, Reasoning 
 
 and the Theory of Probability 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Human Reasoning and Cognition 
 
This second part, which is meant to present the necessary 
background information of Leibniz's theory of human deliberation, 
concerns mainly human reasoning and cognition, both of which 
are related to the intellect of the human soul. It is essential to keep 
in mind here that Leibniz was, in many respects, a follower of the 
scholastic thought of Thomas Aquinas, who considered the 
intellect to be above the will in the soul. The rationality of human 
decisions is to be found in the acts of the intellect rather than in the 
operations of the will (I will return to this theme in Chapter 
10.2.1.).  
Every judgement of the intellect involves two mental 
components: cognition and reasoning. Cognition, in general, is the 
substance perceiving the world, namely other substances and their 
creator, God, in a more or less confused manner.204 Each substance 
or monad represents (mirrors, expresses) the whole universe from 
                                                 
204 “Car l'ame est un petit monde où les idées distinctes sont une 
representation de Dieu et où les confuses sont une representation de 
l'univers.” (Nouveaux essais, II, 1, §1) A VI, 6, p. 109. “Sed perceptio nihil 
aliud est, quam illa ipsa repraesentatio variationis externae in interna.” (a 
fragement concerning the souls of animals) G VII, pp. 329-30.  
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its unique perspective, and this representation is the “raw” 
material for human cognition.205  
Reasoning entails the linking together of truths by processing 
the material we perceive with the help of accepted rules of 
operation or transformation, in other words, of logical principles 
which are based on innate ideas.206 I will first discuss these 
principles and then proceed to consider cognition or perception in 
general.  
 
4. 1. Truths of Reason vs. Truths of Fact 
 
Leibniz repeated the essential starting-point of his theory of 
reasoning in La Monadologie, §33:  
“There are also two kinds of truths, truths of reasoning and truths of 
fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary, and their opposite is 
impossible. Truths of fact are contingent, and their opposite is possible. 
When a truth is necessary, we can find the reason for it by analysis, 
breaking it down into simple ideas and truths until we reach the 
primitive.”207   
                                                 
205 “…non seulement l'ordre de l'univers entier est le plus parfait quie se 
puisse, mais aussi que chaque miroir vivant representant l'univers suivant 
son point de veue...” (PNG, §12). G VI, p. 603. 
206 “Omnis raticinatio nostra nihil aliud est quam characterum connexio et 
substitutio, sive illi characteres sint verba sive notae, sive denique 
imagines.” G VII, p. 31; “Omnis humana raticinatio signis quibusdam sive 
characteribus perficitur.” G VII, p. 204. See also Essais de Theodicée, Discours 
preliminaire de la conformite de la foy avec la raison, §1 (G VI, p. 49), in which 
Leibniz argued that reasoning consists of the linking together of truths. I 
am grateful to Prof. Donald Rutherford for this reference. 
207 “Il y a aussi deux sortes de Verités, celles de Raisonnement et celles de 
Fait. Les Verités de Raisonnement sont necessaires et leur opposé est 
impossible, et celles de Fait sont contingentes et leur opposé est possible. 
Quand une verité est necessaire, on en peut trouver la Raison par 
l'Analyse, la resolvant en idées et en verités plus simples, jusqu'à ce qu'on 
vienne aux primitives.” (G VI, p. 612;  L, p. 646.) Leibniz distinguished 
these two kinds of truths on many other occasions, for instance in Essais de 
Theodicée (§170, §282, §367, among others), De contingentia (Gr, p. 303), 
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The truths of reasoning (also known as truths of reason, or 
necessary truths) can, in principle, be demonstrated by finite (or, 
human) analysis or reasoning. The negation of a necessary truth is 
impossible, in other words, a contradiction. The analysis of truths 
of reason proceeds by replacing definable terms with their 
definitions until a self-repetitive identity (tautology) is found.208  
“...it is clear that demonstration is a chain of definitions. For in the 
demonstration of any proposition, nothing is used but definitions, 
axioms (in which I include postulates here), theorems that have been 
demonstrated previously, and experiments. Since the theorems, again, 
must themselves all be demonstrated…it follows that all truths can be 
resolved into definitions, identical propositions and experiments - 
though purely intelligible truths do not need observations. After the 
analysis has been completed, it will become manifest that the chain of 
demonstration begins with identical propositions or experiments and 
ends in a conclusion, but that the beginning is connected with the 
conclusion through intervening definitions. In this sense I said that a 
demonstration is a chain of definitions.”209  
                                                                                                    
Nouveaux Essais, preface (A VI, 6, pp. 50-51), in a letter to Bourguet (G III, 
p. 550) and in Remarques sur le Livre de l'origine du mal, publié depuis peu en 
Angleterre (an appendix to Essais de Theodicée) (G VI, p. 404). 
208Leibniz usually gave the rules of mathematics or geometry as examples 
of these kinds of truths. For an example of the latter, see Nouveaux Essais, 
IV, xi, §14 (A VI, 6, pp. 446-447).   
209 “Hinc patet, Demonstrationem esse catenam definitionum. Nam in 
demonstratione alicujus propositionis non adhibentur nisi definitiones, 
axiomata (ad quae hoc loco postulata reduco), theoremata jam 
demonstrata et experimenta. Cumque theoremata rursus demonstrata esse 
debeant…patet denique omnes veritates resolvi in definitiones, 
propositiones identicas et experimenta (quanquam veritates pure 
intelligibiles experimentis non indigeant) et perfecta resolutione facta 
apparere, quod catena demonstrandi ab identicis propositionibus vel 
experimentis incipiat, in conclusionem desinat, definitionum autem 
interventu principia conclusioni connectantur, atque hoc sensu dixeram 
Demonstrationem esse catenam definitionum.” (A letter to Herman 
Conrig, 1678) G I, p. 194; L, p. 187.   
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Of the truths of reason Leibniz mentioned those of logic, arithmetic 
and geometry, such as “A=A”.210 He also accepted some general 
propositions of metaphysics and ethics that are grounded on our 
innate notions and do not require sense perceptions.211 Perhaps the 
most important of these is the moral instinct of pursuing joy and 
avoiding sorrow, and the Cogito argument made famous by 
Descartes.212 I will return to these notions in the next section. 
Related to the analysis is Leibniz's principle of the identity of 
indiscernibles, according to which if two substances have exactly 
the same degree of distinctness and the same properties, they are 
the same substance. This is a central principle in Leibniz's 
metaphysics, according to which each substance has its unique 
complete individual notion, but also in human reasoning 
concerning the truths of reason, in which it acts as a method of 
individuation. 
Perhaps the most important principle, however, is praedicatum 
inest subjecto, which means that the predicate is always included in 
the subject.213 Human analysis proceeds in a finite number of steps 
by demonstrating that the concept of the predicate is included in 
that of the subject. To use Leibniz's own example, if we say that 
“Every pious man is happy”, the connection between the concepts 
of the pious man and of the happy man is such that anyone who 
                                                 
210 Leibniz usually referred to “identicals”, but this term is a synonym for 
“tautology”, since the identicals repeat the same thing without giving any 
new information. Parkinson, Logic and Reality in Leibniz's Metaphysics, p. 
57.  
211 “La Logique encore avec la Metaphysique et la Morale, dont l'une 
forme la Theologie et l'autre la Jurisprudence, naturelles toutes deux, sont 
pleines de telles vérites; et par consequent leur preuve ne peut venir, que 
des principes internes, qu'on appelle innés.” (Nouveaux essais, preface) A 
VI, 6, p. 50; RB, p. 50. See also Kauppi, Über die Leibnizsche Logik, p. 54.  
212 See Remarques sur le livre de l'origine du mal, publié depuis peu en 
Angleterre, an appendix to Essais de Theodicée, G VI, p. 404. For a 
comparative account of innate ideas in Leibniz and Descartes, see McRae, 
Innate Ideas. 
213 See, for example, a letter to Arnauld 14. 7. 1686, in which Leibniz stated 
his principle explicitly. G II, p. 56. 
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understands perfectly the concept of the pious man can 
understand that it involves the concept of the happy man.214 
While the analysis of truths of reasoning proceeds by finite 
steps, the analysis of contingent truths (truths of fact) is a more 
difficult task: truths of fact require infinite analysis and are thus 
not within human reach. Contingent truths can be known with 
certainty only through infinite divine understanding. For humans, 
knowledge of truths of fact is more or less uncertain - we can only 
achieve probable knowledge of them. For example, if we say 
“snow is white”, we cannot demonstrate this in finite analysis. 
Leibniz stated in his fragment De libertate, contingentia et serie 
causarum, providentia:  
“In contingent truths, however, though the predicate inheres in the 
subject, we can never demonstrate this, nor can the proposition ever be 
reduced to an equation or an identity, but the analysis proceeds to 
infinity, only God being able to see, not the end of the analysis indeed 
since there is no end, but the nexus of terms or the inclusion of the 
predicate in the subject, since he sees everything that is in the 
series.”215 
The difference between the two kinds of truths is easy to 
comprehend when the point of view is transferred to that of God: 
the truths of reason pertain to every possible world whereas the 
truths of fact pertain to only one. Leibniz thought that the region of 
truths of reason was in the understanding of God, and that God 
could not create anything outside of the realm of the possible, such 
as a round triangle.216 In this respect his world-view was very 
                                                 
214 See Elementa Calculi, O, p. 51. 
215 “Sed in veritatibus contingentibus, etsi praedicatum insit subjecto, 
nunquam tamen de eo potest demonstrari, neque unquam ad 
aequationem seu identitatem revocari potest propositio, sed resolutio 
procedit in infinitum; Deo solo vidente non quidem finem resolutionis qui 
nullus est, sed tamen connexionem terminorum, seu involutionem 
praedicati in subjecto, quia ipse videt quidquid seriei inest...” A VI, 4, p. 
1656; L, p. 265. 
216 See La Monadologie, §43. 
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different from Descartes' extreme voluntarism, which postulated 
that all truths depend on God's will.217  
Of truths of fact Leibniz discussed facts in general, in other 
words, empirical knowledge and historical facts (his favourite 
example was Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon). Their root is in the 
creation, when God chose which possibilities were realisable and 
set all substances in their pre-established harmony.   
God's choice of the best of all possible worlds was founded on 
the principle of sufficient reason, which states that nothing 
happens without a reason why it should be so and not 
otherwise.218 As mentioned, the sufficient reason for God's choice 
in the creation was the fact that there is one single best world. 
Leibniz apparently thought the principle of sufficient reason was 
self-evident, and used it in different ways in different contexts: this 
gave his contemporaries, such as Clarke, some problems.219  
In metaphysics divine analysis reaches all states of each 
substance. God can foresee everything that happens to a single 
substance, both in the past and in the future, through the concept 
of complete individual notion, as Leibniz explained in his famous 
example of King Alexander the Great: 
“God, seeing Alexander's individual notion or haecceity, sees in it at the 
same time the basis and reason for all the predicates that can be said 
truly of him, for example that he vanquished Darius and Porus; he 
even knows a priori (and not by experience) whether he died a natural 
                                                 
217 See Alanen, Descartes's Concept of Mind, p. 37f. 
218 On the history of the principle before Leibniz, see Wiggins, Sufficient 
reason: a principle in diverse guises, both ancient and modern. 
219 R. J. Sleigh formulates the different versions as follows: 1) For any fact 
(or event or entity) e that obtains (or exists), there is some reason why it 
obtains (or exists) and is not otherwise (quasi-causal principle) 2) For any 
proposition p, if p is true, then there is a sufficient reason why p is true 
(principle concerning truth conditions). Sleigh, Leibniz on the Two Great 
Principles of All Our Reasonings, p. 35. For different versions of the principle 
of sufficient reason, see also Frankel, From a Metaphysical Point of View: 
Leibniz and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. On Clarke’s difficulties in 
understanding the principle, see Vailati, Leibniz and Clarke, pp. 123-24. 
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death or was poisoned, something we can know only through 
history.”220 
Men can know about these kinds of contingent facts only through 
experience, since there is no way they can analyse contingent 
truths completely. However, Leibniz argued that we can develop 
our understanding, and even approach God's infinite under-
standing although we can never reach it: it is simply impossible for 
finite beings.  
 
4. 2. Innate Ideas  
 
The distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact is also 
vital in Leibniz's innatism. Truths of reason are needed in order for 
men to acquire reliable knowledge.221 These truths, or innate ideas 
as he also called them, are born with us and are in our minds 
although we do not always use them or are aware of them. They 
are in our minds as dispositions or habits.222  By way of analogy 
Leibniz mentioned a block of marble in which there are veins that 
have the shape of Hercules rather than other shapes, and in this 
sense it could be said that Hercules is innate in the marble.223  
Through innate truths we perform adequate reasoning and find 
the basis for mathematics, logic and ethics. 
                                                 
220 “…Dieu voyant la notion individuelle ou hecceité d'Alexandre, y voit 
en même temps le fondement et la raison de tous les predicats qui se 
peuvent dire de luy veritablement, comme par exemple qu'il vaincroit 
Darius et Porus, jusqu'à y connoistre à priori (et non par experience) s'il 
est mort d'une mort naturelle ou par poison, ce que nous ne pouvons 
sçavoir que par l'histoire.” (Discours de metaphysique, §8) A VI, 4, pp. 1540-
41; AG, p. 41. 
221 “…j’ai toujours eté comme je suis encore pour l’idée innée de Dieu, que 
M. des Cartes a soutenuë, et par consequent pour d’autres idées innées, et 
qui ne nous sauroient venir des sens.” (Nouveaux essais  I, 1, §1) A VI, 6, p. 
74. Leibniz argued here against Locke's notion of tabula rasa. 
222 “...les idées et les verités nous sont innées, comme des inclinations, des 
dispositions, des habitudes ou des virtualités naturelles…” (Nouveaux 
essais, preface) A VI, 6, p. 50.  
223 See Nouveaux essais, preface, A VI, 6, p. 52. 
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“…there is a light that is born with us. For since the senses and 
induction can never teach us truths that are fully universal or 
absolutely necessary, but only what is and what is found in particular 
examples, and since we are privileged above the beasts – it follows that 
we have drawn these truths in part from what is within us. Thus one 
can lead a child to them by simple questions in the Socratic 
manner…”224  
Our mind is the source of truths of reason and we cannot draw 
them from experience. The information that comes from it is 
simply better with respect to the degree of clarity and distinctness 
than the information that comes from the senses (NE I, i, §10). “The 
light of nature, as it is called, involves distinct knowledge.”225  
The innate principle of pursuing joy and avoiding sorrow, on 
the other hand, is known by instinct, which is a disposition to do 
good and to love other human beings.226 This somewhat obscure 
doctrine has received surprisingly little attention among Leibniz-
scholars. It is an innate principle, but it is not a truth of reason in 
the sense that it can be reached by finite analysis since it is based 
on inner experience and confused cognition. In itself it could be 
compared with animal instincts, since animals strive for the good 
                                                 
224 “…il y a une Lumiere née avec nous. Car puisque les sens et les 
inductions ne nous sauroient jamais apprendre des verités tout à fait 
universelles, ny ce qui est absolument necessaire, mais seulement ce qui 
est, et ce qui se trouve dans des exemples particuliers, et puisque nous 
connoissons cependant des verités necessaires et universelles des sciences, 
en quoy nous sommes privilegiés au dessus des bestes: il s'ensuit que nous 
avons tiré ces verités en partie de ce qui est en nous. Ainsi peut-on y 
mener un enfant par des simples interrogations à la maniere de Socrate…” 
(Lettre touchant ce qui est independant des Sens et de la Matiere) G VI, pp. 505-
506; L, p. 551. Leibniz was referring here to Plato's Meno, 82b-. 
225 “…ce qu'on appelle la lumiere naturelle suppose une connoissance 
distincte…” (Nouveaux essais I, i, §21) A VI, 6, p. 84; RB, p. 84.  
226 Some principles of jurisprudence or undemonstrated non-identical 
axioms of geometry are also reached by instinct. McRae, Leibniz: 
Perception, Apperception and Thought, p. 120. 
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that is suitable for them.227 In what follows I will refer to the innate 
principle as moral instinct.  
Leibniz held that this could act as a basis for scientific 
demonstration, so that robbers, pirates and bandits would be 
compelled to observe its dictates.228 His reasoning was that the 
increase in universal perfection produced pleasure and decreased 
pain. When the intellect finds that a proposed course of action 
seems to produce joy in the form of pleasure of the mind, the 
moral instinct recommends it.229 Similarly, when we feel pain our 
moral instinct tells us in the form of mental pain that the deed we 
are about to do is to be avoided. I will return to this theme in 
Chapter 10 of this study. 
 
4. 3. The Theory of Cognition 
 
While innate ideas act as the principles of reasoning, cognition 
provides the raw material for understanding. The theory of 
cognition is a key ingredient in Leibniz's philosophy, but his views 
on the concept are scattered throughout the work he produced 
during his career.230 He generally discussed cognition with regard 
to substances in a metaphysical or scientific context, and although 
the basic setting remained the same, he introduced important new 
features in his later work. 
                                                 
227 “Il semble que tout le monde entend par l'instinct, une inclination d'un 
animal à ce qui lui est convenable, sans qu'il en conçoive pour cela la 
raison.” (Nouveaux essais III, xi, §8) A VI, 6, p. 351. 
228 “Aussi voyons nous qu'elle enseigne des verités si evidentes, que les 
larrons, les pirates et les bandits sont forcés de les observer entre eux.” 
(Nouveaux essais I, ii, §1) A VI, 6, p. 89. Leibniz was referring here to the 
principles of justice. 
229 “…tout sentiment est la perception d'une verité, et que le sentiment 
naturel l'est d'une verité innée, mais bien souvent confuse, comme sont les 
experiences des sens externes…” (Nouveaux essais I, ii, §10) A VI, 6, p. 94.   
230 McRae, Leibniz: Perception, Apperception, and Thought, p. 3. Leibniz 
himself, of course, did not profess to write anything about epistemology 
or the theory of knowledge, since the discipline was not established until 
the 19th century. For a discussion, see Schepers, Non alter, sed etiam 
Leibnitinius, p. 122. 
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Leibniz distinguished three principal cognitive terms, namely 
“perception”, “apperception” and “thought.” He discussed 
perceptions in Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis (1684), which 
was his most important epistemological work. Perceptions are the 
monad's inner states that represent the external world. In addition, 
perception refers to the mental operation of perceiving, and thus 
perceptions are representations and characteristics of each monad, 
however obscure or confused they may be. For him, representation 
was cognition in general - representations were information for 
monads.  
In Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain (published in 1765, 
first draft written in 1704) Leibniz distinguished perception from 
apperception which he described as the reflexive perception of the 
inner states of the monad. While we experience a multitude of 
perceptions at the same time, we do not have apperceptions all the 
time.231 There is also thought, which is knowledge of the truths of 
both reason and fact, and is only accessible to spirits and not to 
animal souls. Leibniz's later works, La Monadologie and Principes de 
la nature et de la grâce, fondés en raison (1714), include further 
discussion of the features of apperception and the differences 
between human and animal cognition. 
 
4. 3. 1. The Theory of Cognition in Meditationes de cognitione, 
veritate et ideis   
 
The memoir Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis appeared in 
Acta eruditorum in November 1684, and is commonly regarded as 
Leibniz's first mature philosophical publication. It was meant, on 
the one hand, to address the discussion between Antoine Arnauld 
and Nicholas Malebranche, the two most famous Cartesians at that 
time, and to clarify Descartes' theory of ideas on the other. Leibniz 
combined the views of Descartes and Spinoza and gave their terms 
new meanings. The memoir opens with a classification of different 
kinds of cognition:  
                                                 
231 See Nouveaux essais II, xix, §4.  
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“…cognition is either obscure or clear, and again, clear cognition is 
either confused or distinct, and distinct cognition either inadequate or 
adequate, and adequate cognition either symbolic or intuitive: and 
indeed, if cognition were, at the same time, both adequate and 
intuitive, it would be absolutely perfect.”232 
This classification could be illustrated as follows:  
 
Our perception is obscure when we cannot properly recognise the 
object in question and may confuse it with some other similar 
object. Our perception is clear when we can identify the object in 
question without any doubt. There are two kinds of clear 
perception: we have a confused (clear) perception, for example, 
when we try to describe a certain taste or shade to someone but do 
not succeed – the other person has to experience the thing in 
question himself or herself.  
Distinct (clear) perception is advanced cognition. It concerns 
perceptible quantities such as numbers, shapes and magnitudes, 
which can be analysed and empirically tested. It is usually possible 
to give nominal definitions to these kinds of objects of knowledge, 
                                                 
232 “…cognitio vel obscura vel clara; et clara rursus vel confusa vel 
distincta; et distincta vel inadaequta vel adaequata, item vel symbolica vel 
intuitiva: et quidem si simul adaequata et intuitiva sit, perfectissima est.” 
A VI, 4, pp. 585-86; L, p. 291. 
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and these definitions enumerate the sufficient marks that 
distinguish the object from other objects.233  
Objects thus defined may include properties that are perceived 
distinctly, but inadequately. The result is inadequate (distinct) 
perception. When all the properties of the object are distinctly 
known, or an analysis has been carried through, adequate 
(distinct) perception has been reached. Leibniz found no good 
example of this provided by human thought, although knowledge 
of numbers (mathematics) certainly approached it.234 He further 
divided adequate perception into two classes, symbolic and 
intuitive cognition, describing the former as follows: 
“…we do not usually grasp the entire nature of a thing all at once, 
especially in a more lengthy analysis, but in place of the things 
themselves we make use of signs, whose explicit explanations we 
usually omit for the sake of brevity, knowing or believing that we have 
the ability to produce it at will.”235  
Leibniz took as an example a polygon with a thousand equal sides. 
When we think of such a polygon we do not usually carry through 
an analysis in every detail, but, as it were, pass over or bracket the 
properties that can be replaced with symbols or signs. He called 
this cognition (often applied in algebra or arithmetic) symbolic or 
blind (adequate) thinking: we usually have blind thoughts about 
composite concepts. While blind thinking is a species of adequate 
thinking, the analysis is not necessarily extended as far as simple 
concepts.  
Blind thinking can be very useful in a difficult analysis. For 
example, if we are asked to prove the proposition “Every man is 
                                                 
233 A VI, 4, p. 586-87. Leibniz's view of nominal definitions differed from 
the one employed in the modern philosophy of science, in which they are 
usually regarded as agreements on the use of some specific word. As an 
example he mentioned the assayer's notion of gold (A VI, 4, p. 587). 
234 Ibid. 
235 “Plerumque autem, praesertim in Analysi longiore, non totam simul 
naturam rei intuemur, sed rerum loco signis utimur, quorum 
explicationem in praesenti aliqua cogitatione compendii causa solemus 
praetermittere, scientes aut credentes nos eam habere in potestate.” A VI, 
4, p. 587; L, p. 292. 
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rational” and we reduce it to “Every rational animal is rational”, 
we have done what is required, even though the concepts 
“rational” and “animal” could be analysed further.236 Thus we can 
use “blind thoughts” (cogitationes caecae) as logical symbols or 
signs, which are, as it were, shorthand for the distinct perceptions 
we have. In long chains of reasoning they might replace an effort 
of the imagination that would require an extremely long time.237 
This method has often been considered the precursor of symbolic 
logic.238 However, the “blind”, unanalysed elements may 
sometimes lead us into making wrong judgements, and may 
include uncertainties of which we are not fully aware.239 That 
which looks clear and distinct to a diligent person, for example, 
may in fact be sometimes confused and obscure.  
If we are able to reach all the components of a complex notion 
we have acquired intuitive cognition, the most essential feature of 
which is that the full content of all the terms involved are 
completely present in the process of cognition. It is at the same 
time a direct view of the matter at hand, and of something that 
cannot be analysed any further. It is thus more adequate than 
cognition, which is reached by blind thoughts. While the latter 
includes symbolic “substitutes”, intuitive cognition requires all the 
components of the object of knowledge to be acquired by adequate 
                                                 
236 P, p. xxix. 
237 Maat, Philosophical Languages in the Seventeenth Century: Dalgarno, 
Wilkins, Leibniz, p. 307. 
238 See Peckhaus, Logik, Mathesis universalis und allgemeine Wissenschaft, p. 
63 and Dascal, La sémiologie de Leibniz. 
239 A VI, 4, pp. 587-88. As an example Leibniz took the notion of the 
highest speed. As we cannot think of the highest possible speed, we 
cannot likewise form an idea of the most perfect being, that is, God, 
although we can be sure of the possibility of that kind of being. However, 
while the notion of the highest speed is absurd, the notion of the most 
perfect being is not, although we cannot construct our arguments on it. In 
Meditationes Leibniz referred to Anselm's demonstration of the existence of 
God, which Thomas Aquinas rejected. See A VI, 4, p. 589. However, in 
other writings he discussed other kinds of ontological arguments on 
behalf of God's existence, which I cannot discuss here. For a relevant 
discussion, see Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, p. 135f. 
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perception at the same time. Perfect cognition is a vision through 
analysis, which enables all the truths of reason and of fact, and the 
relations between them, to be seen instantly at a glance.240 While 
perfect cognition is possible only for God, even intuitive cognition 
seems to be a rare exception amongst men.241 
 
4. 3. 2. Minute Perceptions  
 
At the end of the Meditationes Leibniz introduced his petites 
perceptions, minute perceptions that do not rise above the threshold 
of consciousness, but which nevertheless affect our judgement and 
behaviour. These “little” perceptions are either too minute and too 
numerous, or else too unvarying to be distinctive on their own, but 
when they are combined with others they make themselves known 
within the whole, at least confusedly. They are perceived as clear, 
but confused. 
However, these minute perceptions may also help in 
distinguishing an object from others, and allow us to distinguish 
qualities such as colour or taste.242 They may be confused in 
themselves, but as a whole they may be vivid, thus capturing the 
attention of the soul.  
“...when we perceive colours or odours, we are having nothing but a 
perception of figures and motions so complex and minute that our 
mind in its present state is incapable of observing each distinctly and 
therefore fails to notice that its perception is compounded of single 
perceptions of exceedingly small figures and motions. So when we mix 
                                                 
240 The idea of intuition is similar to that expressed by Duns Scotus, who 
took it to be an act of simple awareness in which some object is grasped 
holistically (simul totum) as present. See Wolter, The Philosophical Theology 
of John Duns Scotus, p. 98f. In Nouveaux Essais IV, xvii, §13 Leibniz argued 
that there are instances, in which vision is better than reason. A VI, 6, p. 
488. 
241 See A VI, 4, p. 1568. 
242 In Nouveaux essais Leibniz commented on Locke's primary and 
secondary qualities and, not surprisingly, considered secondary qualities 
to be confused whereas primary qualities are perceived distinctly. NE II, 
viii, §10. See A VI, 6, p. 130. As far as I know, Leibniz did not make the 
distinction elsewhere. 
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yellow and blue powders and perceive a green colour, we are in fact 
sensing nothing but yellow and blue thoroughly mixed; but we do not 
notice this and so assume some new nature instead.”243  
Our minute perceptions represent degrees of shades, and when 
they are sufficiently mixed we perceive the mixture as green. Thus 
colours are perceived confusedly, and this is why it is so difficult 
to explain to others the subjective experience of the colour green.244 
Leibniz assigned new tasks to minute perceptions in the preface 
to Nouveaux essais: they are important in forming the intermediate 
steps between different-level perceptions in that they ensure that 
the soul always perceives.245 Even when we have no clear and 
distinct perceptions, we always have minute perceptions. It is 
these little perceptions that ensure that the soul always thinks, 
even in sleep.246 As a result, personal identity is maintained and it 
will not fade even after the body has been destroyed: 
                                                 
243 “Caeterum cum colores aut odores percipimus, utique nullam aliam 
habemus quam figurarum, et motuum perceptionem, sed tam 
multiplicium et exiguorum, ut mens nostra singulis distincte 
considerandis in hoc praesenti suo statu non sufficiat, et proindre non 
animadvertat perceptionem suam ex solis figurarum et motuum 
minitissimorum perceptionibus compositam esse, quemadmodum 
confusis flavi et caerulei pulvisculis viridem colorem percipiendo, nil nisi 
flavum et caeruleum minutissime mixta sentimus, licet non 
animadvertentes et potius novum aliquod ens nobis fingentes.” 
(Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis) A VI, 4, p. 592; L, p. 294.   
244 Leibniz continued his discussion in Nouveaux essais III, iv, §15 as 
follows: “Il y a pourtant quelque difficulté sur les idées qui ne sont 
simples qu'à nostre egard. Par exemple il seroit difficile de marquer 
precisement les bornes du bleu et du verd, et en general de discerner les 
couleurs fort approchantes, au lieu que nous pouvons avoir des notions 
precises des termes dont on se sert en arithmetique et en Geometrie.” A 
VI, 6, p. 298. He related shades of colour to the variation of light. 
245 Nouveaux essais contained Leibniz's most extensive discussion of minute 
perceptions. See also La Monadologie, §14.  
246 “D'aillieurs on ne dort jamais si profondement, qu'on n'ait quelque 
sentiment foible et confus; et on ne seroit jamais eveillé par le plus grand 
bruit du monde, si on n'avoit quelque perception de son commencement, 
qui est petit...” (Nouveaux essais, preface) A VI, 6, p. 54. 
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“The insensible perceptions also indicate and constitute the same 
individual, who is characterized by the vestiges or expressions that the 
perceptions preserve from the individual's former states, thereby 
connecting these with his present state…death can only be a sleep, and 
not a lasting one at that: the perceptions merely cease to be sufficiently 
distinct.”247  
There are also other metaphysical tasks reserved for minute 
perceptions. By forming a bridge between different-level percep-
tions they constitute universal harmony and secure parallelism 
between mind and body:  
“It is also through insensible perceptions that I account for that 
marvellous pre-established harmony between the soul and the body, 
and indeed amongst all the monads or simple substances which takes 
the place of an untenable influence of one on another…”248  
The principle of the identity of indiscernibles is also related to 
minute perceptions, since the difference between two objects of 
analysis may be one of degree.249 For example, we might 
distinguish two similar-looking liquids just by a slight difference 
in taste, and this difference is based on minute perceptions. The 
same applies to cases of indifference or equilibrium. In deliberation 
                                                 
247 “Ces perceptions insensibles marquent encore et constituent le même 
individu, qui est caracterisé par les traces, qu'elles conservent des estats 
précedens de cet individu, en faisant la connexion avec son estat 
present…la mort ne sauroit estre qu'un sommeil, et même ne sauroit en 
demeurer un, les perceptions cessant seulement à être assez 
distinguées…” (Nouveaux essais, preface) A VI, 6, p. 55; RB, p. 55.  
248 “C'est aussi par les perceptions insensibles que j'explique cette 
admirable harmonie préestablie de l'ame et du corps, et même de toutes 
les Monades ou substances simples qui supplée à l'influence insoutenable 
des uns sur les autres….” (Nouveaux essais, preface) A VI, 6, p. 55; RB, p. 
55.  
249 “En un mot les perceptions insensibles sont d'un aussi grand usage 
dans la Pneumatique, que les corpuscules dans la physique; et il est 
ègalement déraisonnable de rejetter les uns et les autres, sous pretexte 
qu'elles sont hors de la portée de nos sens.” (Nouveaux essais, preface) A 
VI, 6, p. 56. 
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there is always something that affects the judgement and makes us 
choose between the options.  
“…these minute perceptions, which determine our behaviour in many 
situations without our thinking of them, and which deceive the 
unsophisticated with an appearance of indifference of equilibrium – as 
if it made no difference to us, for instance, whether we turned left or 
right.”250 
As mentioned above, we perceive the mixture of yellow and blue 
as green. There are many similar cases in which our cognition 
makes mistakes. In Nouveaux essais Leibniz presented an example 
of a cogwheel. When the wheel is rotating swiftly it produces an 
artificial transparency – its teeth disappear and an imaginary 
transparent ring appears in their place. We cannot distinguish the 
teeth until the rotation slows down. The situation is similar with 
colours, smells, tastes, surfaces and other sensory images or 
qualities, of which we have clear but not distinct perceptions and 
ideas.251 However, as in the case of the cogwheel, minute 
perceptions combined can capture the attention of the mind in the 
form of clear but confused perceptions. Leibniz described this 
phenomenon in his famous example of the sea: 
“...I am accustomed to using the example of the roar or sound of the 
sea, which impresses itself on us when we are standing on the shore. 
                                                 
250 “…ces petites perceptions qui nous déterminent en bien des recontres 
sans qu'on y pense, et qui trompent le vulgaire par l'apparence d'une 
indifference d'équilibre, comme si nous estions indifferens de tourner par 
example à droite ou à gauche.  (Nouveaux essais, preface) A VI, 6, p. 56.  
251 See NE IV, vi, §7, A VI, 6, pp. 404-405. I agree with Stephen M. Puryear, 
who argues that Leibniz understood confused perceptions and confused 
ideas in a similar manner, that we can understand the whole, but our 
conception of its ingredients is confused. See Puryear, Was Leibniz 
Confused About Confusion?, pp. 102-111. Compare also Leibniz's account in 
Lettre touchant ce quie est independent des Sens et de la Matiere: “…on a 
coustume de dire que les notions de ces qualitiés sont claires, car elles 
servent à les reconnoistre; mais que ces mêmes notions ne sont point 
distinctes, parce qu'on ne sauroit distinguer ny developper ce qu'elles 
comprennent. C'est un je ne say quoy, dont on s'apperçoit, mais dont on 
ne sauroit rendre compte.” G VI, p. 500.  
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To hear this sound as we do, we must hear the parts that make up this 
whole, that is, the noise of each wave, although each of these little 
noises makes itself known only when combined confusedly with all 
the others, and would not be noticed if the wave making it were by 
itself. We must be affected slightly by the motion of this wave, and 
have some perception of each of these noises, however faint they may 
be; otherwise there would be no perception of a hundred thousand 
waves, since a hundred thousand nothings cannot make some-
thing.”252  
In this way a mass of minute perceptions may capture our 
attention and leave a single clear and distinct perception in the 
shade. These combinations of minute perceptions constitute 
passions, which are perceived as temporary inclinations, that is, as 
sentiments of pleasure or pain. Thus the minute perceptions are 
also related to the moral instinct. As I will show in Chaper 9.1., 
when confused, minute perceptions produce (with the help of the 
imagination) the sentiment of an increase in perfection or harmony 
in relation to some proposed course of action in deliberation, the 
moral instinct guides the soul to strive for that goal because it 
produces joy.  
However, these perceptions can also lead us astray and our 
judgement may be tricked by them. They may affect our 
judgement in the form of inclinations or appetitions, which bring 
in apparent, sensual goods. They are necessarily present in each 
rational choice, and in combination may outweigh or overcome 
other inclinations consisting of clear and distinct perceptions 
                                                 
252 “…j'ay coutume de me servir de l'exemple du mugissement ou du bruit 
de la mer dont on est frappé quand on est au rivage. Pour entendre ce 
bruit, comme l'on fait, il faut bien qu'on entende les parties, qui composent 
ce tout, c'est-à-dire le bruit de chaque vague, quoyque chacun de ces petits 
bruits ne se fasse connoître que dans l'assemblage confus de tous les 
autres ensemble, et qu'il ne se remarqueroit pas si cette vague, qui le fait, 
estoit seule. Car il faut qu'on en soit affecté un peu par le mouvement de 
cette vague, et qu'on ait quelque perception de chacun de ces bruits, 
quelques petits qu'ils soyent; autrement on n'auroit pas celle de cent mille 
vagues, puisque cent mille riens ne sauroient faire quelque chose.” 
(Nouveaux essais, preface) A VI, 6, p. 54; RB, p. 54. See also Discours de 
Metaphysique, §33.  
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which bring in real goods. If the judgement is not developed 
enough, it may choose these apparent goods instead of the real 
goods, in some case even against its better knowledge. Thus 
minute perceptions play an essential role in human rational 
deliberation. By developing his or her understanding a rational 
moral agent can decrease their effect in his or her deliberations. I 
will return to this theme in detail in Chapter 10.3. 
 
4. 3. 3. Apperception, Attention, Memory and Imagination  
 
In his Nouveaux essais Leibniz introduced a new concept, 
apperception,253 which is given a number of tasks. He did not 
define it explicitly, but discusses it in greater detail in Principes de la 
nature et de la grace, fondés en raison, paragraph four:  
“It is well to distinguish between perception, which is the inner state of 
the monad representing external things, and apperception, which is 
consciousness, or the reflective knowledge of this inner state, and 
which is not given to all souls, nor at all times to the same soul.”254  
and La Monadologie, section 14:  
                                                 
253 One terminological note concerning Leibniz's notion of apperception 
needs to be made. In Leibniz's French to perceive is “percevoir”, and to be 
aware of is “s'apercevoir de”. The noun for the former is “perception”, 
while for the latter Leibniz coined “apperception”. (RB, p. xlix). Remnant 
and Bennett in general translate “apperception” by awareness and 
“s'appercevoir de” into be aware of something, which is somewhat 
misleading in tracing Leibniz's views of reflection, since the considered 
apperception is a technical term (related to innate ideas as I will show), 
while being aware seems to be a general term for noticing something, in 
other words, attention. (See also G. MacDonald Ross’s article Remnant and 
Bennett’s “New Essays”: A Reply for criticisms).  I have used the terms 
“apperception” and “has apperception of” in the modified translations of 
Remnant's and Bennett's New Essays on Human Understanding. 
254 “…il est bon de faire distinction entre la Perception, qui est l’etat 
interieur de la Monade representant les choses externes, et l’Apperception 
qui est la Conscience, ou la connoisance reflexive de cet état interieur, 
laquelle n’est point donnée à toutes les Ames, ny tousjours à la même 
Ame.” G VI, p. 600; AG, p. 208. 
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“The passing state, which involves and represents a multitude in the 
unity or in the simple substance, is nothing other than what one calls 
perception, which should be distinguished from apperception and 
consciousness.” 255 
There are two different notions here: the first is consciousness 
[conscience] and the second is apperception [apperception], which is 
defined in PNG, §4 as reflexive knowledge of the monad's inner 
state. Furthermore, in PNG, §5, Leibniz referred to reflective acts 
that are capable of considering what is called “I.”256 He identified 
apperception with consciousness in the former citation, while in 
the latter it seems to be separate from it. He also argued in PNG, §4 
that apperception is not accessible to all souls, and that it is not 
constant in the same soul.257 
Leibniz usually linked apperception with the notion of “I”, or 
the self. In La Monadologie, §30, for example, he stated: “It is also 
through the knowledge of necessary truths and through their 
abstractions that we rise to reflective acts, which enable us to think 
of that which is called “I”, and to consider that this or that is in 
us.”258 Thus it would seem that apperception requires knowledge 
of innate ideas. 
Because of Leibniz's lack of clarity on this issue there are 
various interpretations of the exact meaning of apperception and 
                                                 
255 “L’etat passager qui enveloppe et represente une multitude dans 
l’unité, ou dans la substance simple, n’est autre chose que ce qu’on appelle 
la Perception, qu’on doit bien distinguer de l’apperception et de la 
conscience…” G VI, p. 609; AG, p. 214. 
256 “Ces Ames sont capables de faire des Actes reflexifs, et de considerer ce 
qu'on appelle Moy, Substance, Ame, Esprit, en un mot, les choses et les 
verités immaterielles. Et c'est qui nous rend susceptibles des Sciences ou 
des connoissances demonstratives.” G VI, p. 601. 
257 See also Nouveaux essais II, xix, §4: “Nous ne sommes jamais sans 
perceptions, mais il est necessaire que nous soyons souvent sans 
apperceptions, savoir lors qu'il n'y a point des perceptions distinguées.” A 
VI, 6, p. 162. 
258 “C’est aussi par la connoissance des verités necessaires et par leur 
abstractions, que nous sommes élevés aux Actes reflexifs, qui nous font 
penser à ce qui s’appelle Moy, et à considerer que cecy ou cela est en 
Nous…” G VI, p. 612; AG, p. 217. 
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consciousness. The topic is huge and I cannot give a complete 
account of it here, but I will take a brief critical look at these 
different interpretations and argue for an intermediate position, 
which was inspired by Émilienne Naërt. I will also discuss the 
mental operation of imagination, which plays an important role in 
Leibniz's views of practical rationality. 
According to Robert McRae, “Leibniz's position is that when 
the perception is sufficiently distinct I become aware that I am 
perceiving (expressing) the object…Thus the ego is inseparably 
involved in what we are directly aware of.” An essential condition 
of a perception coming to consciousness is that it is attended to, 
and this cannot concern minute perceptions.259 
These views have been criticised by Nicholas Jolley, who holds 
that apperception means consciousness in general and not 
necessarily reflective knowledge, which is directed to the “I” and 
its passing states.260 According to Jolley, there seems to be some 
awareness in minute perceptions. This would mean that 
apperception could concern confused perceptions, which may not 
necessarily be reflexive, whereas McRae's position requires clear 
and distinct perceptions in order to enable reflexive cognition. 
Jolley also criticises McRae for the “unleibnizian” view of 
supposing a stark contrast between perception and 
apperception.261  
Jolley's views are supported by Mark Kulstad, who suggests 
two different kinds of apperception, the external and the inner. In 
his detailed account he distinguishes between general 
consciousness (minimal apperception, which would also include 
unconscious apperceptions or awareness in minute perceptions) 
and reflexive apperceptions (full apperception involving clear and 
distinct ideas), which is self-consciousness.262 
Before proceeding to evaluate these interpretations I will 
consider some further cognitive operations related to apperception 
in Leibniz's writings: attention, sensation and imagination.  
                                                 
259 McRae, Leibniz, Perception, Apperception and Thought, pp. 26 & 30. 
260 Jolley, Leibniz and Locke, p. 109. 
261 Ibid. 
262 Kulstad, Leibniz on Apperception, Consciousness, and Reflection, p. 144.  
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Leibniz held that attention was awareness or reflection in 
general: “Attention is nothing but reflection.”263 One might think 
that he was referring to apperception, but he argued in Nouveaux 
essais I, i, §25 that, in fact, it presupposes attention and order.264 
Order evidently refers to the role played by innate ideas.265 He also 
postulated that attention is the means by which something is 
noticed – it concerns perceptions that are heightened or “stand 
out.” Depending on the intellectual abilities of the person, 
attention prefers clear and distinct ideas to confused perceptions of 
the senses because they are, by definition, distinguishable from 
other perceptions and thus, in a sense, heightened.266 Memory is 
essential for attention:267  
“Memory is needed for attention: when we are not alerted, so to speak, 
to pay heed to certain of our own present perceptions, we allow them 
to slip by unconsidered and even unnoticed. But if someone alerts us 
to them straight away, and makes us take note, for instance, of some 
                                                 
263 “…attentio nihil aliud quam reflexio.” (De vi persuadendi. De somnio et 
vigilia) A VI, 2, p. 276; L. p. 113. See also Nouveaux essais, preface (A VI, 6, 
p. 51), where Leibniz said: “…la reflexion n'est autre chose qu'une 
attention à ce qui est en nous…” and Animadversiones in partem generalem 
Principiorum Cartesianorum, G IV, pp. 361-62. See also Kulstad, Leibniz: 
Apperception, Consciousness and Reflection, p. 39. It is generally agreed that 
Leibniz used the terms consciousness and reflection interchangeably. 
Ibid., p. 57. Naert distinguished between different species of attention – 
which is unnecessary in my view if attention is understood as general 
reflection. See Naert, Mémoire et conscience de soi selon Leibniz, pp. 82-83.   
264 “L'apperception de ce qui est en nous depend d'une attention et d'un 
ordre.” A VI, 6, p. 86. 
265 See Kulstad, Leibniz: Apperception, Consciousness and Reflection, p. 143. 
266 “Nous avons de l'Attention aux objets que nous distinguons et 
preferons aux autres.” (Nouveaux Essais II, xix, §1) A VI, 6, p. 161. See also 
NE II, i, §14, preface (A VI, 6, p. 54) and I, ii, §20 and  Naert, Mémoire et 
conscience de soi selon Leibniz, p. 77. McRae holds that noticing is 
apperception itself which distinguishes minds from animal souls. McRae, 
Leibniz, Perception, Apperception and Thought, p. 30. In the light of these 
passages, this view seems dubious. On the definition of clear and distinct 
perceptions, see A VI, 4, pp. 586-87. 
267 For a detailed discussion of memory, see McRae, Leibniz: Perception, 
Apperception, and Thought, p. 43f.  
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noise which we have just heard, then we remember it and have 
apperception of just having had some sense of it.”268   
In the light of the above passage it seems that memory precedes 
attention, and that apperception is founded on these previous 
mental operations. Let us suppose, for example, that I am on my 
way to work and I am travelling by bus. I hear a melody while 
sitting on the bus reading a magazine. My attention is suddenly 
captured by the notion that I have heard the song previously. The 
fact that my attention is fixed on the melody presupposes that I 
have a previous memory of it and of the song of which it is part. I 
start to take notice of the music coming from the radio of the bus 
driver, and as I reflect on the melody and wonder which song it is 
from and where I have heard it before, apperception takes place. 
Assuming this to be a correct description of apperception, the 
order of mental operations in the process is as follows: 
 
1) sensation (perception with memory269) 
2) attention (reflection in general, requires memory270) 
3) apperception (self-conscious reflection, requires attention 
and order (innate ideas)) 271 
 
                                                 
268 “Toute attention demande de la mémoire, et quand nous ne sommes 
point avertis pour ainsi dire, de prendre garde à quelques unes de nos 
propres perceptions présentes, nous les laissons passer sans reflexion, et 
même sans les remarquer. Mais si quelcu'un nous en avertit incontinent, et 
nous fait remarquer par exemple quelque bruit qu’on vient d’entendre, 
nous nous en souvenons, et nous nous appercevons d’en avoir eû tantôt 
quelque sentiment.” (Nouveaux essais, preface) A VI, 6, p. 54; RB, p. 54. 
269 See G VI, p. 600 & 610. 
270 Marc Bobro makes a distinction between non-reflexive and reflexive 
memory (Leibniz termed the former réminiscience and for latter souvenir). 
The latter kind of memory includes the awareness that a certain memory 
is my memory, which the former kind of memory does not. See Bobro, Self 
and Substance in Leibniz, p. 23. It seems to me that the latter kind of 
memory is related to attention while the former kind is only related to 
sensation. 
271 NE I, i, §25 
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As mentioned above, attention is defined as reflection in general. 
However, in the preface to Nouveaux essais Leibniz stated that 
attention concerns “that what is in us.”272 Kulstad takes this to be 
evidence that it does not concern external images, and therefore 
noticing images would not count as reflection.273 He argues that 
attention cannot concern mental images since reflection concerns 
only the soul and its affections. It is therefore to be understood in 
an image-excluding sense: external objects come to the soul in 
sensation and therefore they cannot be “in us.”274  
While it is clear that external objects are perceived through 
sensation, I believe that sensation and attention are closely related, 
and that there is a case for claiming that attention is related to 
mental images and reflection.   
In Nouveaux essais II, xix, §1 Leibniz defined sensation as a state 
in which one is aware of an outer object. In other places, however, 
he defined it as perception with memory.275 Assuming the latter is 
the usual meaning, the distinction between sensation and attention 
appears to be the following: while sensation concerns all outer 
objects, attention is limited to perceived objects and it concerns 
only some of those (heightened ones). For example, when attention 
is focused consistently, it is learning or study.276 In the preface to 
Nouveaux essais Leibniz argued that attention serves to bring into 
our minds previous perceived events:  
“It would indeed be wrong to think that we can easily read these 
eternal laws of reason in the soul, as the Praetor's edict can be read on 
                                                 
272 See A VI, 6, p. 51. 
273 Kulstad, Leibniz: Apperception, Consciousness and Reflection, p. 126. 
274 Ibid. p. 122f. 
275 See PNG, §4 and in La Monadologie, §19. G VI, p. 600 & 610.  
276 “…c'est sensation lorsqu'on s'apperçoit d'une objet externe…Nous 
avons de l'Attention aux objets que nous distinguons et preferons aux 
autres. L'attention continuant dans l'esprit, soit que l'objet externe 
continue ou non, et même soit qu'il s'y trouve ou non, c'est consideration; 
la quelle tendant à la connoissance sans rapport à l'action, sera 
contemplation. L'attention dont le but est d'apprendre (c'est à dire 
d'acquerir des connoissances pour les garder) c'est Etude.” (Nouveaux 
essais II, xix, §1) A VI, 6, p. 161. 
 
 
 
111
his notice-board, without effort or inquiry; but it is enough that they 
can be discovered within us by dint of attention: the senses give the 
occasion, and the results of experiments also serve to corroborate 
reason, somewhat as checks in arithmetic help us to avoid errors in 
calculation in long chains of reasoning.”277  
What exactly, then, are these objects of attention? It seems that they 
are not limited exclusively to clear and distinct ideas. A little later 
in the preface Leibniz stated: “This is how ideas and truths are 
innate in us – as inclinations, dispositions, tendencies, or natural 
potentialities, and not as actualities; although these potentialities 
are always accompanied by certain actualities, often insensible 
ones which correspond to them.”278  
This would imply that sensation is related to attention in the 
sense that perceived external objects may correspond to our innate 
ideas. The “certain actualities” that correspond to our “natural 
potentialities” would seem to act as motifs for our actions. How, 
then, is this correspondence to be understood? I think the answer 
is to be found in Lettre touchant ce quie est independent des Sens et de 
la Matiere (1702), in which Leibniz wrote: 
“Since therefore our soul compares the numbers and the shapes of 
colours, for example, with the numbers and shapes discovered by 
touch, there must be an internal sense where the perceptions of these 
different external senses are found united. This is called the 
imagination, which comprises at once the concepts of particular senses, 
                                                 
277 “Il est vray qu'il ne faut point s'imaginer, qu'on puisse lire dans l'ame 
ces éternelles loix de la raison à livre ouvert, comme l'Edit du Preteur se lit 
sur son album, sans peine et sans recherche; mais c'est assez qu'on les 
puisse decouvrir en nous à force d'attention; à quoy les occasions sont 
fournies par les sens, et le succés des experiences sert encore de 
confirmation à la raison, à peu prés comme les épreuves servent dans 
l'arithmetique pour mieux éviter l'erreur du calcul quand le raisonnement 
est long.” (Nouveaux essais, preface) A VI, 6, p. 50; RB, p. 50.  
278 “C'est ainsi que les idées et les verités nous sont innées, comme des 
inclinations, des dispositions, des habitudes ou des virtualités naturelles, 
et non pas comme des actions; quoyque ces virtualitez soyent tousjours 
accompagnées de quelques actions souvent insensibles, qui y repondent.” 
(Nouveaux essais, preface) A VI, 6, p. 52; RB, p. 52. 
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which are clear but confused, and the concepts of the common sense, 
which are clear and distinct.”279  
Internal sense or imagination (which is not mentioned by either 
Kulstad, McRae or Jolley280) links together clear but confused 
perceptions with the common concepts.281 The perceptions 
received from sensation are to be distinguished from the concepts 
of the common sense, and can be united only through the 
imagination. Whereas the former are at best clear and confused, 
the latter are clear as well as distinct. In Nouveaux essais IV, ii, §14 
Leibniz stated: “And the linking of phenomena, which warrants 
the truths of fact about sensible things outside us, is itself verified 
by means of truths of reason, just as optical appearances are 
explained by geometry.”282   
In addition, there are the ideas of pure understanding, which 
are out of reach of the imagination: 
“There are…also objects of another nature, which are not at all 
included in what we have observed in the objects of either the 
particular senses or the common sense, and which consequently are 
also not to be considered objects of the imagination. Besides what is 
sensible and imaginable, therefore, there is that which is only intelligible, 
                                                 
279 “Comme donc nostre ame compare (par example) les nombres et les 
figures qui sont dans les couleurs, avec les nombres et les figures qui se 
trouvent par l'attouchement, il faut bien qu'il y ait un sens interne, où les 
perceptions de ces differens sens externes se trouvent reunies. C'est ce 
qu'on appelle l'imagination, laquelle comprend à la fois les notions des 
sens particuliers, qui sont claires mais confuses, et les notions du sens 
commun, qui sont claires et distinctes.” G VI, p. 501; L, p. 548. See also 
Nouveaux essais II, xxix, §14. 
280 McRae discusses imagination in his later article The Theory of Knowledge, 
but he does not make any significant changes to his former view 
concerning apperception. McRae, The Theory of Knowledge, p. 181. 
281 Leibniz's conception of imagination was apparently traditional, as 
presented in Aristotle's De Anima, book III, ch. 3. In a memoir De affectibus 
he referred to it as simple understanding. A VI, 4, p. 1411. 
282 “Et la liaison des phenomenes, qui garantit les verités de fait à l'egard 
des choses sensibles hors de nous, se verifie par le moyen des verités de 
raison; comme les apparences de l'optique s'eclaircissent par la 
Geometrie.” A VI, 6, pp. 374-75; RB, pp. 374-75.  
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since it is the object of the understanding alone. And such is the object 
of my thought when I think of myself.”283 
Thus Leibniz made a strict distinction between sense, imagination 
and memory on the one hand, and pure understanding on the 
other.284 Imaginable ideas are clear but confused perceptions that 
correspond to our innate ideas or principles. When some clear but 
confused sensation (such as the perception of harmony in a great 
work of art) grasps our attention, it corresponds to our innate ideas 
(a harmonious feeling is created and the moral instinct is aroused, 
which produces joy).285 Self-consciousness, on the other hand, 
requires the ideas of pure understanding, in other words, clear and 
distinct ideas. 
The objects of attention may be both clear and distinct ideas, 
and clear but confused ideas that correspond to some of our innate 
ideas through the imagination. The latter originate as mental 
images, which are refined into feelings that motivate us to act in a 
certain manner (for example, the feeling of perfection motivates us 
to act for the common good).  
Feelings may also be harmful. If our understanding is not 
sufficiently developed (so that we cannot distinguish between real 
and apparent goods), our attention may be captured by harmful 
mental images (often related to our previous experiences) and, we 
may be misled into acting badly. We may think that the good in 
sensation contributes to our happiness, although it is harmful to it. 
Thus the imagination may both promote and harm our moral 
conduct. Leibniz described this kind of situation in Nouveaux essais 
II, xxi, §12: 
                                                 
283 “Il y a … encor des objets d'une autre nature, qui ne sont point du tout 
compris dans ce qu'on remarque dans les objets des sens en particulier ou 
en commun, et qui par consequent ne soint point non plus des objets de 
l'imagination. Ainsi outre le sensible et l'imaginable, il y a ce qui n'est 
qu'intelligible, comme estant l'objet du seul entendement, et tel est l'objet 
du seul entendement, et el est l'objet de ma pensée, quand je pense à moy 
même.” G VI, p. 501; L, pp. 548-49 
284 See Hatfield, The Cognitive Faculties, pp. 977-80. 
285 I will return to this topic in Chapter 9.1. 
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“Involuntary thoughts come to us partly from without, through 
objects' affecting our senses, and partly from within, as a result of the 
(often undetectable) traces left behind by earlier perceptions, which 
continue to operate and mingle with new ones. We are passive in this 
respect; and even when we are awake we are visited by images – 
which I take to include representations not only of shapes but also of 
sounds and other sensible qualities – which come to us unbidden, as in 
dreams. In German they are called fliegende Gedanken, meaning “flying 
thoughts”; they are not within our power, and they are sometimes full 
of irrationalities that provide upright people with moments of moral 
unease, and provide much work for casuists and directors of 
conscience…But our mind, on becoming aware of some image 
occurring in it, can say Stop! And bring it to a halt, so to speak.”286  
As I will argue in Chapter 10.3., we can develop our under-
standing and learn to focus on clear and distinct ideas. Even 
though we are passive with respect to mental images, we can 
guide our attention at will. While sensation and attention are 
closely related, only the latter is controlled by the moral agent. 
While attention is reflection in general, the reflection of 
ourselves requires something more than sensation and attention:  
“This thought of myself, who perceives sensible objects, and of my 
own action which results from it, adds something to the objects of 
sense. To think of some colour and to consider that I think of it – 
these two thoughts are very different, just as much as colour itself 
                                                 
286 “…il nous vient des pensées involontaires, en partie de dehors par les 
objets qui frappent nos sens, et en partie au dedans, à cause des 
impressions (souvent insensibles) qui restent des perceptions précedentes, 
qui continuent leur action et qui se mêlent avec ce qui vient de nouveau. 
Nous sommes passifs à cet égard, et meme quand on veille, des images 
(sous les quelles je comprends non seulement des representations des 
figures mais encor celles des sons et d'autres qualités sensibles) nous 
viennent comme dans les songes, sans estre appellées. La langue 
Allemande les appelle Fliegende gedancken, comme qui diroit des pensées 
volantes, qui ne sont pas en nostre pouvoir, et où il y a quelques fois bien 
des absurdités qui donnent des scrupules aux gens de bien et de l'exercise 
aux casuistes et directeurs des consciences…Mais nostre esprit 
s'appercevant de quelque image qui luy revient, peut dire: halte là, et 
l'arrester pour ainsi dire.” A VI, 6, p. 177; RB, p. 177. 
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differs from the ego who thinks of it. And since I conceive that 
there are other beings who also have the right to say “I”, or for 
whom this can be said, it is by this that I conceive of what is called 
substance in general. It is the consideration of myself, also, which 
provides me with other concepts in metaphysics, such as those of 
cause, effect, action and similarity, and even with those of logic and 
ethics. Thus it may be said that there is nothing in the 
understanding that has not come from the senses, except the 
understanding itself, or the one who understands.”287 
Thus self-consciousness is in the realm of pure understanding. 
While attention is a pre-condition of apperception, it cannot be 
apperception itself since it does not include self-consciousness. 
Although attention may be directed to some colour, it does not 
presuppose that the self is considering the colour. Apperception or 
self-consciousness proper requires the ideas of pure understanding 
that give rise to moral identity, which I will discuss in the next 
section.  
As mentioned, attention may be captured by both clear and 
distinct ideas as well as by mental images that arise out of 
sensations through the imagination. It seems to me that 
apperception selects its objects from among the material which 
attention has picked up. Since apperception is said to require 
attention and order, it looks like it is not directly connected to 
sensation. On this hypothesis, the distinction between 
apperception and consciousness in La Monadologie, §14 and PNG, 
                                                 
287 “Cette pensée de moy, qui m'apperçois des objets sensibles, et de ma 
propre action qui en resulte, adjoute quelque chose aux objets des sens. 
Penser à quelque couleur et considerer qu'on y pense, ce sont deux 
pensées tres differentes, autant que la couleur même differe de moy qui y 
pense. Et comme je conçois que d'autres Estres peuvent aussi avoir le droit 
de dire moy, ou qu'on pourroit le dire pour eux, c'est par là que je conçois 
ce qu'on appelle la substance en general, et c'est aussi la consideration de 
moy même, qui me fournit d'autres notions de metaphysique, comme de 
cause, effect, action, similitude etc., et même celles de la Logique et de la 
Morale. Ainsi on peut dire qu'il n'y a rien dans l'entendement, qui ne soit 
venu des sens, excepté l'entendement même, ou celuy qui entend.” G VI, 
p. 502; L, p. 549. 
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§4 may be understood as referring to the distinction between 
apperception and attention. 
While I agree with McRae against the views of Jolley and 
Kulstad, I think Jolley is right in his claim that “It is difficult to find 
in Leibniz a clear picture of the relationship between consciousness 
and reflexive consciousness, and this may be a weakness in his 
philosophy of mind, which he shared with Descartes.”288 It is true 
that Leibniz did not offer one single clear indication of his views 
on this matter, but I believe that the reconstruction (the hierarchy 
of sensation, attention and apperception) I suggested above may 
provide the missing link Jolley is looking for.  
 
4. 3. 4. Moral Identity and the Problem of Apperception in 
Animals    
 
Apperception is also related to personal identity, which Leibniz 
discussed in the context of his criticism of Locke.289 According to 
Locke, a later person is the same as an earlier one just because the 
former is conscious of some thought or action of the latter.290 Thus 
recollection is the basis of personal identity.  
Leibniz, however, considered personal identity to be based on 
the individual notion, which incorporates the history of the 
monad. As the example of Alexander showed, the individual 
notion includes traces of everything that has happened to him or 
her, and marks of everything that will happen in the future.291 
Only God, however, can completely conceive of this history.292 
This forms the a priori level of personal identity. The a posteriori 
level, the level of the consciousness of human beings, is explained 
in Nouveaux essais through the theory of minute perceptions that 
                                                 
288 Jolley, Leibniz and Locke, p. 109. 
289 On moral identity, see Scheffler, Leibniz on Personal Identity and Moral 
Personality. 
290 Locke, Essay on Human Understanding II, xxvii, §9, p. 335 
291 The notion of ideas persisting in the memory is similar to Descartes’ 
theory of memory traces, which is discussed in a letter to Mersenne 
written on 18. 3. 1630 (AT I, pp. 133-34). 
292 See Discours de metaphysique, §8. 
 
 
 
117
express the former states of the individual. In human experience, 
when there is no explicit memory of a past event, these minute 
perceptions may bring to mind some images of it, thus refreshing 
the memory and capturing the attention. For example, we might 
remember some smell or noise even though we cannot connect it 
to the actual events.293 While these may wake up the attention as I 
have argued above, the real identity of the soul is constituted 
independently on the a-posteriori level of the complete individual 
notion.294  
The moral identity of a spirit has to be seen against Leibniz’s 
grading of monads on the scale of beings.295 At the lowest level are 
bare entelechies, living things endowed with perception; above 
them are animal souls, endowed with perception and the capacity 
for sensation; and, finally, there are minds, which are capable of 
perception and sensation, but also of apperception, thought and 
reasoning. These higher monads are the most valuable, since they 
have not only physical, but also moral identity.296 Moral identity 
                                                 
293 (Nouveaux essais, II, xxvii, §6 & 8).”Un Estre immateriel ou un Esprit ne 
peut estre depouillé de toute perception de son existence passée. Il luy 
reste des impressions de tout ce qui luy est autrefois arrivé, et il a même 
des présentimens de tout ce qui luy arrivera : mais ces sentimens sont le 
plus souvent trop petits pour pouvoir estre distinguez, et pour qu’on s’en 
apperçoive, quoyqu’ils puissent peutestre se developper un jour. Cette 
continuation et liaison de perceptions fait le même individu reellement, 
mais les apperceptions (c’est à dire lorsqu’on s’apperçoit des sentimens 
passés) prouvent encore une identité morale, et font paroistre l’identité 
reelle. (Nouveaux essais II, xxvii, §14) A VI, 6, p. 239; RB, p. 239.  
294 On the distinction between these two levels, see Thiel, Personal Identity, 
pp. 899-900. 
295 See McRae, Leibniz: Perception, Apperception and Thought, p. 27. 
296 “Je suis aussi de cette opinion, que la consciosité ou le sentiment du 
moi prouve une identité morale ou personelle. Et c'est en cela que je 
distingue l'incessabilité de l'ame d'un béte de l'immortalité de l'ame de 
l'homme: l'une et l'autre garde l'identité physique et reelle, mais quant à 
l'homme, il est conforme aux regles de la divine providence, que l'ame 
garde encore l'identité morale et qui nous est apparente à nous mêmes, 
pour constituer la même personne, capable par consequent de sentir les 
chatimens et les recompenses.” (Nouveaux essais, II, xxvii, §9). A VI, 6, p. 
236.   
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(which is founded on intelligible ideas and includes both self-
consciousness and memory) renders them capable of choosing 
rationally and acting virtuously, in other words, they are able to 
distinguish good goals from bad ones, and to reflect 
predominantly on clear and distinct ideas. Thus they are able to 
enter the kingdom of the spirits, where they are the subjects of 
God, whose relation to them is like that of a father to his 
children.297 
Jolley's and Kulstad's account of apperception would grant 
awareness to minute perceptions, and thus would in principle also 
grant reflexive cognition to animal souls. While Jolley does not 
discuss this possibility, Kulstad dedicates a large portion of his 
book to the subject. In his view, animals may have minimal 
apperceptions, that is they may have limited awareness, which 
does not presuppose clear and distinct perceptions.298  
Although Kulstad was able to find some passages from 
Leibniz's later works that could be interpreted as supporting this 
view, I think this could be put down to carelessness in Leibniz's 
formulations rather than to a change in his thinking. In most of his 
writings he made it clear that apperception is not accessible to 
animals – as in this example from Discours de Metaphysique, §34:  
“...the principal difference is that they [animals] do not know what 
they are nor what they do, and consequently, since they do not reflect 
on themselves, they cannot discover the truths. It is also because they 
lack reflection about themselves that they have no moral qualities...”299 
                                                 
297 See La Monadologie, §84 and Leibniz's letter to Arnauld from 9. 10. 1687: 
“…c'est cette societé ou Republique generale des Esprits sous ce souverain 
Monarque, qui est la plus noble partie de l'univers, composée d'autant de 
petits Dieux sous ce grand Dieu.” G II, p. 125. See also Discours de 
metaphysique, §12. For a discussion of the relationship between God and 
men in Leibniz, see Craig, The Mind of God and the Works of Men, p. 51f. 
298 Kulstad, Leibniz on Apperception, Consciousness, and Reflection, pp. 170-72. 
299 “…la principale difference est, qu'elles ne connoisent pas ce qu'elles 
sont, ny ce qu'elles font, et par consequent ne pouvant faire des reflexions, 
elles ne sçauroient decouvrir des verités. C'est aussi faute de reflexion sur 
elles mêmes, qu'elles n'ont point de qualité morale…” A VI, 4, p. 1583; AG, 
p. 65 
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It seems clear that Leibniz was referring here to the distinction 
between sensible, imaginable (which he also described as both 
sensible and intelligible300) and merely intelligible ideas. Animals 
may have sensations, but the level of self-reflection is independent 
of sensible ideas, and for this reason it is inaccessible to animals. In 
his preface to Nouveaux essais he called them empirics, in contrast 
to men who are able to engage in reasoning.301 
“But true reasoning depends on necessary or eternal truths, much as 
those of logic, numbers and geometry, which bring about an 
indubitable connection of ideas and unavoidable consequences. 
Animals in which these consequences are not noticed are called beasts; 
but those who know these necessary truths are those that are properly 
called rational animals, and their souls are called minds. These souls 
are capable of performing reflective acts, and capable of considering 
what is called “I”, substance, soul, mind – in brief, immaterial things 
and immaterial truths. And that is what make us capable of the 
sciences or of demonstrative knowledge “302    
Thus animals cannot have apperceptions, at least in the 
demanding sense. Where does this leave Kulstad's minimal 
apperceptions, then? According to him, minimal apperceptions in 
animals are similar to Locke's concept of sensation, in other words, 
being aware of an outer object.303 He argued that simple 
apperceptions do not need reasoning in the sense of deduction or 
                                                 
300 See G VI, p. 502. 
301 See A VI, 6, pp. 49-50. 
302 “Mais le raisonnement veritable depend des verités necessaires ou 
éternelles, comme sont celles de la Logique, des Nombres, de la Geometrie 
qui font la connexion indubitable des idées, et les consequences 
immanquables. Les animaux, où ces consequences ne se remarquent point, 
sont appelès Bêtes; mais ceux qui connoissent ces verités necessaires, sont 
proprement ceux qu’on appelle Animaux Raisonnables, et leur ames sont 
appallées Esprits. Ces Ames sont capables de faire des Actes reflexifs, et 
de considerer ce qu’on appelle Moy, Substance, Ame, Esprit, en un mot, 
ces choses et les verités immaterielles. Et c’est ce qui nous rend 
susceptibles des Sciences ou des connoissances demonstratives. (Principes 
de la nature et de la grace,  fondés en raison, par. 5) G VI, pp. 600-01; AG, p. 
209.  
303 See Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II, i, 3. 
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composition, and his claim is thus that sensation could be 
understood as identical to (minimal) apperception.304  
I doubt it. As already mentioned, Leibniz often defined the 
notion of sensation as perception together with memory. 
Furthermore, it concerns outer objects in general, and attention 
concerns certain perceptions that are heightened. Even minimal 
apperceptions as Kulstad refers to them seem to require more than 
the mere sensation of everything external to the animal soul, in 
other words, a heightened sensation.  
Leibniz also postulated that apperception required attention 
and order. It is clear that sensation, when understood as 
perception from memory, does not include order in the sense that 
reason is used to order thoughts. However, as sensation is closely 
linked with memory in animal souls, I think it could be assumed 
that some kind of mental operation resembling attention in 
humans is possible for animals, although Leibniz did not explicitly 
discuss this. In my view, attention is a less misguided term for 
animals than apperception, which Leibniz related directly only to 
human cognition. 
Leibniz often used the example of a stick that is noticed and 
feared by a dog because it remembers that it has been beaten with 
it before.305 I believe this kind of noticing could be called attending 
– it requires perception and memory, in other words, sensation. 
The noticing, however, is clearly not reflexive knowledge in a self-
conscious sense, but is more of a pseudo-reasoning or reacting to a 
past experience, as Leibniz noted in Nouveaux essais.306  
In fact, he attributed this kind of behaviour to imagination in La 
Monadologie, §27. Imagination in animals is naturally different from 
human imagination since animals have no innate ideas: their 
imagination is more like linking together of confused sensations.307 
When a former experience is linked with a present sensation, the 
animal might attend and react to it. Attending to it does not rise to 
                                                 
304 Kulstad, Leibniz on Apperception, Consciousness, and Reflection, p. 162. 
305 See, for example, La Monadologie, §26-27. 
306 See preface (A VI, 6, p. 51), in which Leibniz called it a shadow of 
reasoning. 
307 See Nouveaux essais II, xi, §11. 
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the level of apperception, however, because animals lack moral 
identity. 
For these reasons I find it hard to believe that sensation is 
linked directly to apperception, even in the less demanding sense. I 
consider it more feasible to assume that animals are capable of 
attention in the sense of general reflection. However, Kulstad cites 
the following persuasive passage from Nouveaux essais II, xxi, §5, in 
which Leibniz stated: 
“Beasts have no understanding…although they have the faculty for 
apperceiving [s'appercevoir] the more conspicuous and outstanding 
impressions – as when a wild boar is aware of someone who is 
shouting at it, and goes straight at that person, having previously had 
only a bare perception of him, a confused one like its perceptions of all 
the objects that stand before its eyes and reflect light-rays into the 
crystalline lens.”308  
I suggest that this passage could be taken to refer to attention in 
the sense explained above. When the man shouts at the boar the 
event stands out to it because the sensation is linked through its 
imagination to a former sensation that it remembers. It is for this 
reason that the boar attends to the shouting person. Although 
Leibniz used the term “faculty of apperceiving”, from his 
description of the event it seems to me that the boar was closer to 
attending something than actually apperceiving it, in other words, 
a state of being conscious of perceiving it.309  
Kulstad, however, argues that it is not easy to see how a 
perception could be distinct enough so as to attract memory and 
attention (as seems to be the case with sensation) without it being 
                                                 
308 “…les bestes n'ont point d'entendement…quoyque elles ayent la faculté 
de s'apercevoir des impressions plus remarquables et plus distinguées, 
comme le sanglier s'apercevoir des impressions plus remarquables et plus 
distinguées, comme le sanglier s'apperçoit d'une personne qui luy crie, et 
va droit à cette personne, dont il n'avoit eu déjà auparavant qu'une 
perception nue, mais confuse comme de tous les autres objets, qui 
tomboient sous ses yeux, et dont les rayons frappoient son crystallin.” A 
VI, 6, p. 173; RB, p. 173.   
309 In this I agree with Émilienne Naert. See Naert, Mémoire et conscience de 
soi selon Leibniz, p. 78. 
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correct to say that a second-level, reflective activity had taken 
place.310 He is right, but I think it is quite consistent to hold that the 
confused perceptions of an animal are linked through the (animal) 
imagination, and in this case the second-level activity is not 
required.  
In sum, I consider apperception to be more than merely being 
aware of something. It is related to innate ideas, and in this way to 
moral identity. It distinguishes men from animals, since it is only 
possible for the former. 
 
5. An Analysis of Contingent Truths  
 
Although human cognition is clearly superior to animal cognition, 
we are unable to analyse all the contingent facts in the world. This 
requires the infinite analysis of propositions into the axioms or 
truths of reason, which is only possible for God. As Leibniz stated 
in De Synthesi et Analysi universali seu Arte inveniendi et judicandi 
(1679?): “God understands everything a priori and through eternal 
truths, since he does not need experience and knows all things 
adequately, whereas we know hardly anything adequately, few 
things a priori, and most things through experience...”311  
                                                 
310 Kulstad, Leibniz on Apperception, Consciousness, and Reflection, p. 41. 
311 “Quo modo omnia inteliguntur a DEO a priori et per modum aeternae 
veritatis, quia ipsi experimento non indiget, et quidem ab illo omnia 
adaequate, a nobis vix ulla adaequate, pauca a priori, pleraque 
experimento cognoscuntur...” (De Synthesi et Analysi universali seu Arte 
inveniendi et judicandi) G VII, p. 296, L, p. 232. Almost ten years later the 
tone is similar: “Quaeritur an experimenta resolvi possint in alia 
experimenta in infinitum, et omissa mentione experimentorum an 
possibile sit <quandam probationem esse talem ut comperiatur > 
propositionis probationem <semper> praesupponere probationem alterius 
propositionis, quae non sit axioma nec definitio, adeoque rursus indigeat 
probatione. Unde et necesse est terminos quosdam incomplexos continuè 
ita resolvi posse, ut nunquam deveniatur ad per se conceptos. Alioqui 
resolutione absoluta apparebit utrum coincidentia virtualis fiat formalis 
seu expressa sive an res redeat ad identicam.” (Generales inquisitiones de 
analysi notionum et veritatum, 1686) O, p. 373; P, p. 63.   
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Nevertheless, man must develop a way to find as certain 
knowledge as possible in order to make as good decisions as 
possible. This is needed in all human action: the law, politics, 
ethics, canon law, medicine, economics, science and so on. 
According to Leibniz's vision, the increasing degree of certainty of 
knowledge leads us closer to God, whose creations we are in a 
better position to understand. The more we know about God's 
work, the more we honour and love Him. Moreover, by achieving 
more certain knowledge we can promote the process of increasing 
perfection, which is for the good of all and produces pleasure for 
those of us who promote it.312  
In order to do that, we must try to develop our reasoning. Since 
our understanding does not penetrate complete individual notions 
of substances, we have to build our knowledge mostly on 
experience. Leibniz discussed the problems of human reasoning in 
his preface to the Italian humanist Marius Nizolius' 1533 work 
Anti-Barbarus, seu de veris principiis et vera ratione philosophandi 
contra pseudophilosophos (1670). He rejected simple enumerative 
induction, since it would not increase our knowledge: one cannot 
experience everything – there always remain innumerable, 
individual cases that contradict the universal proposition.313 We 
may observe a thousand similar cases, but the next case could be 
an exception to the rule. 
Leibniz developed his methods of reasoning in natural sciences 
in his Praefatio ad libellum elementorum physicae (1678-79). He 
recommended the drawing up of an inventory of experiments to 
make it possible by a process of combinatorics to combine the 
                                                 
312 On Leibniz's pansophism, see Manuel & Manuel, Utopian Thought In 
The Western World, ch 15. 
313 “Nam nunquam constitui possunt ea ratione propositiones perfecte 
universales, quia inductione nunquam certus es, omnia individua a te 
tentate esse, sed semper intra hanc propositionem subsistes, omnia illa 
quae expertus sum sunt talia; cum vero non possit esse ulla ratio 
universalis, semper manebit possibile, innumera quae tu non sis expertus, 
esse diversa.” (Marii Nizolii de Veris Principiis…) G IV, p. 161. 
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results of these experiments for useful application through simple 
reflection.314 I will return to the notion of combinatorics below.  
Another method of analysing the results of experiments is to 
use geometric analysis or calculus, but this involves a long chain of 
reasoning and thus requires a lot of thought. This a priori method 
shows that some structure of nature is derived from the known 
nature of God, thus we can explain sensible things. This form of 
reasoning is extremely difficult and is meant for superior minds.315  
The main task of the analysis of contingent truths is to show 
that in all true propositions the concept of the predicate is included 
in that of the subject. The analysis is thus similar to that of 
necessary truths, except that it is infinite. Some time around 1686 
Leibniz came to the conclusion that this analysis was only possible 
for an infinite mind that was God: He sees the predicates of each 
complete individual notion and, through them, can see all the 
states of all substances.316 We can achive only probable knowledge 
of these truths.   
“A true contingent proposition cannot be reduced to identical 
propositions, but is proved by showing that if the analysis is continued 
further and further, it constantly approaches identical propositions, 
but never reaches them. It is God alone, who grasps the entire infinite 
in His mind, who knows all contingent truths with certainty.”317    
A less demanding method of analysis, as Leibniz argued in 
Praefatio, is conjectural a priori reasoning, which “proceeds by 
hypotheses, assuming certain causes, perhaps, without proof, and 
showing that things that happen now would follow from these 
                                                 
314 A VI, 4, pp. 1997-98. Leibniz mentioned as examples mortar 
(gunpowder) and the chronometer (the application of the equality of 
pendulum vibrations). 
315 A VI, 4, p. 1999.   
316 Parkinson, Philosophy and Logic, pp. 203-204. 
317 (134) “Propositio vera contingens non potest reduci ad identicas, 
probatur tamen, ostendendo continuata magis magisque resolutione, 
accedi quidem perpetuo ad identicas, nunquam tamen ad eas perveniri. 
Unde solius Dei est, qui totum infinitum Mente complectitur nosse 
certitudinem omnium contingentium veritatum” (Generales inquisitiones de 
analysi notionum et veritatum, 1686) A VI, 4, p. 776; P, p. 77.  
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assumptions.”318 The simpler the explanation is and the more 
phenomena it explains the more probable it is. The certainty of this 
kind of explanation is not absolute, and it should be taken only as 
probable. However, it is sufficient for everyday use, for “some 
hypotheses can satisfy so many phenomena, and so easily that they 
can be taken for certain. Among other hypotheses, those to be 
chosen are the more simple; these are to be presented, in the 
interim, in place of true causes.”319 We can build our knowledge on 
this foundation provided that we make a distinction between the 
certain and the probable, and replace hypotheses with better ones 
as they emerge.320 The bottom line, however, is that there seems to 
be no way for humans to demonstrate contingent facts – it requires 
God's infinite understanding.  
Leibniz also discussed conjectural reasoning a posteriori, basing 
his arguments mostly on analogies and dealing with the results of 
experiments. He warned against the careless use of analogies, 
which could lead to grave mistakes. Rightly used, however, they 
prove very useful in inductions.321   
                                                 
318 “Methodus conjecturalis a priori procedit per Hypotheses, assumendo 
quasdam causas licet sine ulla probatione, atque ostendendo quod ex illis 
positis ea quae nunc contingunt, sint eventura.” A VI, 4, p. 1999; L, p. 283. 
The concept conjectural (conjectura), which is used systematically in 
Praefatio ad libellum elementorum physicae, appears frequently both in 
Leibniz's jurisprudential texts and also in more philosophical ones (see 
index to the Akademie edition at http://www.bbaw.de/bbaw/Forschung/ 
Forschungsprojekte/leibniz_potsdam/bilder/sachregister.pdf). Thus it 
cannot be limited to the reasoning of natural philosophy. Given the text 
was meant as a part of Leibniz's grand project of Catholic demonstrations (A 
VI, 1, p. 494), it could be seen to represent a systematic presentation of his 
views on reasoning.   
319 “Hypotheses aliquae tam multis phaenomenis et tam facile satisfacere 
possunt, ut haberi queant pro certis. Ex aliis eligendae sunt simpliciores et 
interim adhibendae loco verarum causarum.” A VI, 4, p. 1999; L. p. 283. As 
shown in Chapter 2.4.2., the term simple laws should not be taken literally 
– it refers to most determinate laws in an architectonic sense.  
320 Ibid. 
321 Ibid., pp. 2000-2001. However, as Stuart Brown points out, conjectural 
reasoning a priori is, in fact, reasoning a posteriori, since it assumes causes 
that are based on experience. Thus reasoning by experience can lead to the 
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Marcelo Dascal introduces a new concept in Leibniz, “soft 
reason” (Blandior ratio), which has recently provoked a lot of 
discussion.322 According to Dascal, this weaker form of reasoning, 
which incorporates forgiveness and persuasiveness, is typical in 
humans.323 He argued that the Leibnizian or “hard” ideal of 
science has to be complemented by other means, which are not as 
certain but can help us in our everyday activities, and mentions 
observation, experience, approximation, hypothetical generalisa-
tion and probability as examples.324 These methods of soft rea-
soning help us to find a way through the jungle of contingent 
truths. Thus Dascal holds that applying soft reason is common in 
Leibniz's views on practical rationality. 
According to Dascal, “hard” and “soft” reason are both needed. 
When we are unable to apply the “hard” variety, we have to find a 
                                                                                                    
same truth as a priori reasoning. See Brown, Ex pluribus unum: Reason, 
Experience and Revelation as Alternative Sources of Truth for Leibniz, pp. 112 & 
117.  
322 See, for example, Dascal's and Heinrich Scheper's discussion in the 
Leibniz Review 14. 
323 Dascal, Nihil sine ratione → Blandior ratio, p. 276. The term blandior 
(forgiving) is used in O, p. 34, in connection with mathematical reasoning. 
Leibniz did not use it as a technical term in his writings. Heinrich Schepers 
argues convincingly that the expression blandior refers to the manner of 
argumentation, and that Leibniz was advising mathematicians to present 
their results in more agreeable manner. See Schepers, Non alter, sed etiam 
Leibnitinius, pp. 131-32. In a recent conference Leibniz: What Kind of 
Rationality (Tel Aviv & Jerusalem, 30. 6. – 2. 6. 2005) Schepers argued in 
his paper “A Plea for Leibniz's “Radical Rationality” (forthcoming) that he 
used “softer” methods in order to communicate his ideas to his 
contemporaries. While this may be true, it is also evident, as I will show in 
Part III of this study, that the “softer” ways of reasoning are usually only 
implicit in his writings while the demand for rigid reasoning is frequently 
voiced. This seems to confirm the hypothesis that Leibniz used the 
“softer” kind as provisionary methods when rigid reasoning was not 
possible. Moreover, I do not agree with Schepers claim that “soft” 
reasoning is comparable to the methods of the empiricists – when we 
think of estimating the consequences of a given act, for example, the 
estimation is only partly founded on experience. 
324 Dascal, Nihil sine ratione → Blandior ratio, p. 278. 
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less demanding alternative and try to reach some moral certainty 
that works as a kind of presumptive, provisional truth.325 To my 
mind, “soft” reasoning is similar to Leibniz's conjectural reasoning, 
discussed above. Be that as it may, I think Dascal is right in 
arguing that there were two sides to Leibniz's reason, whether they 
are called “hard” and “soft”, or “demonstrative” and “conjec-
tural”, or something else.  
However, I think Heinrich Schepers is also right in arguing that 
these two kinds of reasoning are applicable to different kinds of 
cases. While demonstrative reasoning has to do with truths of 
reason, soft reasoning is related to truths of fact, and is to be 
applied in cases involving contingent truths and empirical 
knowledge.326 Dascal appears to allow this: “soft” rationality is to 
be used in situations – both theoretical and practical – in which 
uncertainty and imprecision are the rule.327  
Like Dascal, I believe that these two different forms of 
reasoning work side by side. “Soft” reason replaces “hard” reason 
when the latter is unable to function. Living up to his famous 
metaphor of God as an architect who finds a suitable solution for 
each construction, Leibniz applied suitable reasoning to the 
problems he encountered.328  
Practical and moral deliberations are paradigm cases of soft 
reasoning, as I will show in Chapters 8-10. Many deliberations 
defy estimation even in terms of probabilities. In these cases we 
have to content ourselves with the argument that one option is 
(after careful consideration) more defensible or reasonable or 
acceptable or probable than another – it could then be regarded as 
                                                 
325 For a discussion of soft reason, see Dascal, Nihil sine ratione → Blandior 
ratio.  
326 Schepers, Non alter, sed etiam Leibnitinius, p. 125. The discussion in 
Praefatio ad libellum elementorum physicae, in which the term conjectural is 
used, is clearly related to empirical facts. 
327 Dascal, Dialectics in the 'hard vs. 'soft' rationality debate, a talk given in 
Leibniz, What Kind of Rationalist?, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, 30. 5. – 2. 6. 
2005 (forthcoming).  
328 On God as an architect, see La Monadologie, §87 and Discours de 
metaphysique, §3.  
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a morally certain assumption (presumption), which gives a 
sufficient reason to choose it over some other option.329 
The concept of moral certainty was also used by Descartes, 
who, although generally critical of probability discussions and 
especially those instigated by the casuists, discusses it at the end of 
Principia philosophiae (§205): 330 
“It would be disingenuous, however, not to point out that some things 
are considered as morally certain, in other words, as having sufficient 
certainty for application to ordinary life, even though they may be 
uncertain in relation to the absolute power of God.”331  
Although Leibniz also developed this kind of “softer” reasoning, 
he never wavered in his ideal of establishing a scientia generalis that 
would enable us to apply “hard” reasoning to everything, in other 
words, to attain demonstrative knowledge. This would include not 
only theoretical sciences, but also moral and political deliberations. 
Once we have more reliable information available for “hard” 
reasoning we should base our judgement on firmer grounds. In 
order to reach demonstrative certainty we must show that the 
                                                 
329 “…plusieurs argumens probables joints ensemble font quelque fois une 
certitude morale, et quelques fois non.” (a letter to Burnett 1. 2. 1697, G III, 
p. 194). The concept of moral certainty, meaning a high degree of 
probability, was first introduced by Jean Gerson around 1400, and it 
means a very high but not complete degree of persuasion. Gerson was 
apparently referring to Aristotle's remark that ethics was less certain than 
mathematics. Franklin, The Science Of Conjecture, p. 69. 
330 However, in his strict analysis Leibniz was more demanding than 
Descartes: “Analytica seu ars juricandi, mihi quidem videtur duabus ferè 
regulis tota absolvi : 1) ut nulla vox admittatur, nisi explicata. 2) ut nulla 
propositio, nisi probata. Quas arbitror longè absolutiores esse, quàm 
quatuor illas Cartesianas in Prima Philosophia, quarum primaria est, 
quicquiod claré distinctèque percipio, illud est verum quae infinitis modis 
fallit.” (Nova methodus discendae docendaeque jurisprudentiae). A VI, 1, pp. 
279-80; L, p. 88. On Descartes' views on probability, see Franklin, The 
Science of Conjecture, pp. 218-222. 
331 “Sed tamen, ne qua hic veritati fraus fiat, considerandum est quaedam 
esse quae habentur certa moraliter, hoc est, quantum sufficit ad usum 
vitae, quamvis si ad absolutam Dei potentiam referantur, sunt incerta.” 
AT IX, p. 327; CSM, p. 290.  
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relations between truths of fact are probable in the demanding 
sense. With his schemes for a probability calculus Leibniz had high 
hopes that soon proved to be unfounded, as I will show in the next 
chapter.  
In addition to observable entities, Leibniz also allowed for 
entities that did not exist, “fictions” as he called them. He wrote in 
a letter to Conti concerning criticisms of Newton's metaphysics 
that when the data happened to be insufficient, it was permissible 
to imagine hypotheses (including these fictitious entities), to wait 
until experiments brought out new data and until the “crucial” 
experiment clarified the choice of hypothesis.332 This kind of 
hypothetical reasoning is comparable to Leibniz's use of 
jurisprudential fictions, which are rhetorical devices comparable to 
presumptions.333  
Thus Leibniz's scientific reasoning seems to apply what is 
known nowadays as the hypothetico-deductive method.334 
Through new experiments and observations we can develop better 
scientific theories that are more probable than the old ones. 
Whether they are true we will never know, but a standard of moral 
certainty is achieved.335 Leibniz seemed to be confident that human 
knowledge would get very near to divine perfect knowledge 
without ever reaching it. 
                                                 
332 Cited in Koyré and Cohen, Newton & Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, p. 
78. 
333 For a discussion of fictions in jurisprudence, see Parmentier, Concepts 
juridiques et probabilistes chez Leibniz, p. 460f. 
334 See Rescher, Leibniz's Metaphysics of Nature, p. 26 and Gale, Is Leibniz 
Really a Rationalist?, p. 399. 
335 “C'est pour cela que les Geometres ont tousjours jugé ce qui ne se 
prouve que par induction ou par les exemples en Geometrie ou en 
Arithmetique, n'est jamais parfaitement prouvé…Cependant quand on 
l'auroit experimenté cent mille fois, en continuant le calcul bien loin, on 
peut bien juger raisonnablement que cela reussira tousjours; mais on n'en 
a point pour cela de certitude absolue, à moins qu'on n'en apprenne la 
raison demonstrative, que les Mathematiciens ont trouvée il y a 
longtemps.” (Lettre touchant ce qui est independent des Sens et de la Matiere à 
Sophie Charlotte). G VI, p. 504-05; L, p. 550. 
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As shown, Leibniz's main criticism of induction was based on 
the fact that it did not promote new knowledge. He thus 
developed the art of combinations, as he called it, in his 
dissertation De Arte Combinatoria (1666), which works by 
combining simple terms or results of experiments. The concepts 
are analysed down to their most simple parts and thus the 
“alphabet of human thought” is established. It is through this that 
we can combine everything we need.336 Leibniz's inference from 
these simple terms showed traces of Aristotelian syllogism, but he 
considered it insufficient.337  
                                                 
336 “In Philosophia habe ich ein mittel funden, dasjenige was Cartesius 
und andere per Algebram et Analysin in Aritmetica et Geometria gethan, 
in allen scientien zuwege zu bringen per Artem Combinatoriam, welche 
Lullius und P. Kircher zwar excolirt, den weiten aber in solche deren 
intima nicht gesehen. Dadurch alle Notiones compositae der ganzen welt 
in wenig simplices als deren Alphabet reduciret, und aus solches 
alphabets combination wiederumb alle Dinge, samt ihren theorematibus, 
und was nur von ihnen zu inventieren müglich, ordinata methodo, mit 
der zeit zu finden, ein weg gebahnet wird. Welche invention, dasern sie 
wils Gott zu werd gerichtet, als mater aller inventionen von mir vor das 
importanteste gehalten wird, ob sie gleich das ansehen noch zur zeit nicht 
haben mag. Ich habe dadurch alles was erzehlet werde soll, gefunden und 
hoffe noch ein mehrers zu wege zu bringen.” (Leibniz to Duke Johann 
Friedrich, date unknown) G I, pp. 57-58. In a letter to Conrig (several years 
later), he wrote: “Multa in his rebus habeo pulchra quae speciminibus 
etiam elegantibus illustrare possem si satis otii esset.” (A letter to Herman 
Conrig, 1678). G I, p. 195; L, pp. 187-8. 
337 “Zwar ist diese arbeit des Aristotelis nur ein anfang und gleichsam das 
ABC, wie es dann andere mehr zusammengefäste und schwehrere formen 
gibt die man alsdann erst brauchen tan, wenn man mit hilff dieser ersten 
und leichten formen festgestellt…” (A letter to Gabriel Wagner, date 
unknown), G VII, p. 519. In syllogistics Leibniz used 24 moods (four 
figures of syllogism, each with six moods) instead of the traditional 14 
moods. Kneale & Kneale, The Development of Logic, pp. 322 & 326; 
Burkhardt, Logik und Semiotik in der Philosophie von Leibniz, p. 51. 
Sometimes Leibniz also tried to combine numerical values with it, see 
Regulae ex quibus de bonitate consequentiarum formisque et modis 
syllogismorum <categoricorum> judicari potest, per numeros (April, 1679) in O, 
p. 77. 
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The synthesis in De Arte Combinatoria proceeds as follows: each 
composed term is a combination of simple terms that are 
represented by corresponding numbers or signs, which at the same 
time express their definitions.338 Analogous to this is the 
arithmetical process of decomposing of given numbers.339 Leibniz's 
system offered a way of finding all the possible logical predicates 
in the subject since they could easily be identified through the 
definition of signs or numbers. The only problem is that in order to 
compose combinations of simple terms, we must find the 
predicates: we must analyse the proposition in question into truths 
of reason, i.e. identicals.  
It was for this purpose that Leibniz tried to develop a new 
logic, which he called logica inventiva, the logic of discovery.340 The 
idea first appears in De arte combinatoria and is a leading motif in 
his later writings on logic.341 Sometimes he also called this new 
logic ars inveniendi, the art of invention. The synthesis is 
complemented with different tools of invention such as maps, 
schemes, models, examples and imagination. The goal of the logic 
of discovery is to combine all the knowledge in the world and to 
produce new knowledge for the common benefit of mankind and 
God's glory. The practical goal is to find all true propositions in 
which a given concept is included as either subject or predicate. If 
                                                 
338 Couturat, La logique de Leibniz, p. 40. For a detailed study of Leibniz's 
combinatorics, see Burkhardt, Logik und Semiotik in der Philosophie von 
Leibniz. 
339 For example, the number 210 can be expressed as 42 x 5, 6 x 35, 14 x 15 
and so on. When these components are decomposed, we get 2 x 3 x 5 x 7. 
Thus we have 2, 3, 5, 7. In De Arte Combinatoria the synthesis proceeds as 
follows: the numbers are combined together as: 2,3, 2,5, 2, 7, 3,5, 3,7, 5,7., 
then  2,3,5, 2,3,7 2,5,7, 3,5,7. Finally, we get to 2,3,5,7, which is 210. 
340 According to Hacking, Leibniz anticipated this inductive logic, which 
was developed in the 1920's by J. M. Keynes, Harald Jeffreys and Rudolf 
Carnap. Hacking, The Emergence of Probability, p. 134. 
341 For example, Plus ultra - Initia et Specimina Scientiae novae Generalis, 
written under the pseudonym Guilelmi Pacidii, G VII, p. 43f or De la sagesse, 
in which Leibniz gave ten maxims for ars inveniendi, G VII, p. 82f.  
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the subject is given the task is to find all the predicates, and if the 
predicate is given it is to find all the possible subjects.342  
Logica inventiva or ars inveniendi, combined with the art of 
demonstration (ars demonstrandi), which is based on syllogistics as 
described above, forms the scientia generalia, the general science 
that will reveal to us the secrets of nature.343 This general science 
would be developed into a deductive encyclopaedia with the co-
operation of scientists.344 Its instrument comprises characteristica 
universalis, universal characteristics that are essentially a result of 
the analysis of human knowledge in primal terms.345 Thus we find 
that scientia generalis uses both analysis and synthesis. In fact, as 
Leibniz himself observed on one occasion, it is equivalent to 
logic.346   
Leibniz's optimism in this regard shows in the fact that, 
although he understood that the perceptions of the spirits were 
often confused and could not reach higher levels, he thought – at 
least before 1686 - that the primary concepts could eventually be 
found and by this means general science would serve as the 
ultimate guide for rational decision-making. In controversial cases 
the opponents could simply calculate the right answer by 
weighing up clearly defined reasons.347 
                                                 
342 Of the Art of Invention, see Van Peursen, Ars inveniendi bei Leibniz. 
343 Kauppi, Über die Leibnizsche Logik, p. 15. 
344 On the encyclopaedia, see Couturat, La logique de Leibniz, p. 119f. 
345 See Peckhaus, Logik, Mathesis universalis und allgemeine Wissenschaft,  p. 
31f. 
346 O, p. 556. See also Kauppi, Über die Leibnizsche Logik, p. 28. 
347 “Modum ergo tradere aggredior, quo semper homines ratiocinationes 
suas in omni argumento ad calculi formam exhibere controversiasque 
omnes finire possunt, ut non jam clamoribus rem agere necesse sit, sed 
alter alteri dicere possit: calculemus.” (Guilielmi Pacidii initia et specimina 
Scientiae generalis) G VII, p. 125. For an example of Leibniz's drafts on this 
kind of calculating, see Calculus consequentiarum in O, pp. 84-89.  In a 
memoir De numeris characteristicis ad linguam universalem constituendam 
Leibniz argued that once the arguments are reduced to numbers the 
reasons can be weighed as if by a kind of statistics.” (A VI, 4, 269). Thus it 
would seem that calculating reasons is a kind of weighing between them, 
albeit in an exact, quantative manner. See Milkov, A New Interpretation of 
Leibniz's Concept of characteristica universalis, p. 607. See also Chapter 11. 2.   
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Leibniz soon realized that his vision was too optimistic. The 
project of general science encountered the same problem as the 
related project of the universal language: the work would require 
the analysis of all contingent truths into simple concepts, which 
proved to be too enormous a task for one man. He planned to 
leave it to a host of scientists in co-operation with scientific 
academies. However, a complete analysis would require scientia 
generalis – this fact had been observed by Descartes in a letter to 
Mersenne in 1629.348 Leibniz wrote in the margin of his copy of 
Descartes’correspondence, beside this letter, as follows:  
“...although this language depends on the right philosophy, it does not 
depend on its perfection. In other words, this language can be 
established although the philosophy is not perfect: and as much as 
human science is believable, this language is also believable. “349 
Leibniz's optimism concerning both the perfection of general 
science and notion of a universal language proved to be ill-
founded. As the case studies on calculating and assessing 
probability described in the next chapter and those on human 
rational decisions in the third part of the study show, it is clear that 
in most practical cases decisions have to be made under 
uncertainty. 
 
6. The Theory of Probability 
 
As I have shown, Leibniz was keen to find new ways of dealing 
with contingent truths: since our understanding is finite, it would 
be of extreme importance to develop methods for calculating or at 
least estimating degrees of probability which is often defined as a 
branch of mathematics that measures the likehood that an event 
will occur. In 1679 he wrote to Johann Friedrich:  
                                                 
348 AT I, p. 78-82.  
349 “...quoyque cette langue depende de la vraye philosophie, elle ne 
depend pas de sa perfection. C'est à dire cette langue peur estre établie, 
quoyque la philosophie ne soit pas parfaite: et à mesure que la science des 
hommes croistra, cette langue croistra aussi.” O, p. 28. 
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“…a new logic is needed in order to know degrees of probability, since 
this is necessary in judging the proofs in matters of fact and morals, 
where there are unusually good reasons on both sides and we are 
concerned only to know on which side to tip the scales. But the art of 
weighing probabilities is not yet explained at all, although it would be 
of great importance in matters of justice and even in the management 
of business.”350 
Estimating probability became an important part of Leibniz's 
theory of rational decision-making, and it could be regarded as an 
original feature in his views on deliberation. The probability or 
“new logic” he was referring to was developed within 
jurisprudence, but it could serve many other sciences, as he argued 
in a letter to Burnett:  
“…practical philosophy is founded on the true Argument or Dialectics 
– that is to say, on the art of estimating degrees of proof, which has not 
yet been found among authors who are Logicians and of which only 
the Jurists have given examples that are not to be despised and that 
could serve as the start of a science of proofs, suitable for verifying 
historical facts and for giving the meaning of texts.”351  
The theory of probability was a major project for Leibniz 
throughout his life. His most extensive discussion of the subject 
                                                 
350 “…il faut une nouvelle logique, pour connoistre les degrés de la 
probabilité, puisque cela est necessaire pour juger des preuves en matieres 
de fait, et de morale, ou il y a ordinairement des bonnes raisons de part et 
d’autre, et il ne s’agit que de sçavoir de quel costé doit pancher la balance. 
Maist l’art de peser les probabilités ne se trouve encor expliquée nulle 
part, quoyqu’elle soit de grande importance en matiere de droit, et mêmes 
pour le maniment les affaires.” A II, 1, p. 489. 
351 “…la Philosophie pratique est fondée sur la veritable Topique ou 
Dialectique, c'est à dire, sur l'art d'estimer les degrés des probations qui ne 
se trouve pas encor dans les auteurs Logiciens, mais dont les seuls 
Jurisconsultes ont donné des echantillons qui ne sont pas à mepriser, et 
peuvent servir de commencement pour former la science des preuves, 
propre à verifier les faits historiques, et pour donner le sens des textes.” 
(Letter to Burnett 1. 11. 1697) G III, pp. 193-94; Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, 
Theist, Idealist, p. 199.    
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occurs in his late work Nouveaux essais, in which he lamented the 
continuing lack of a proper logic of probability: 
“I maintain that the study of the degrees of probability would be very 
valuable and is still lacking, and this is a serious shortcoming in our 
treatises on logic.”352 
6. 1.  Classic Probability Theory 
 
In his well-known book, The Emergence of Probability, Ian Hacking 
argues that the birth of “modern probability”, often labelled 
“classical probability”, took place in the middle of the 17th 
century, around 1660, and that it could be divided into two classes: 
353  
 
1) statistical probability, which concerns the stochastic laws of 
chance processes, and 
2) epistemological probability, which is dedicated to assessing 
reasonable degrees of belief in propositions that are 
independent of statistical calculation  
 
The latter kind, known in medieval times as opinion or belief, 
merged with the former, aleatory probability and the combination 
of these two is the concept we nowadays recognise as probability.  
Statistical probability has to do with different ways of 
measuring, assessing and calculating frequencies and statistical 
                                                 
352 “…je tiens que la recherche des degrés de probabilité, seroit trés 
importante, et nous manque encor, et c'est un grand defaut de nos 
Logiques.” (Nouveaux essais IV, ii, §14) A VI, 6, p. 372; RB, p. 372. 
353 Hacking, The Emergence of Probability, pp. 11-12. As reasons Hacking 
mentions Huyguens' first textbook (De rationis in ludo alea, 1657), Pascal's 
wager summarised in 1662 at the end of L'Art de penser (The Port-Royal 
Logic), Leibniz's De arte combinatoria, Jan de Witt's and John Wilkins' 
experiments on annuities and John Graunt's statistical inferences from 
mortality records. Sven Knebel has argued that the development of 
probability was the third main trend of the “mathematical revolution” of 
the 17th century, the other two being classical mechanics and the calculus. 
Knebel, Wille, Würfel und Wahrscheinlichkeit, p. 41. 
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occurrences (for example, throwing a dice). It was used in aleatory 
contracts, insurance, and demographics by Graunt, and for 
calculating annuities for financing public business.354   
Epistemological probability was related to assessing the 
degrees of belief in legal questions and moral decisions under 
uncertainty, for example. It was connected with the theme of 
rational decision-making under uncertainty, which was the 
starting-point for discussions of probability in late medieval 
theology. The theory was viewed as a method of reaching good 
decisions, working as a “reasonable calculus.”355  
Hacking identifies these two different kinds of probability 
according to the nature of the evidence used. Taking a distinction 
drawn in Arnauld's and Nicole's L'Art de Penser, or Port-Royal 
logic, he suggested that aleatory probability was based on internal 
evidence (circonstances intérieures) concerning the things in 
question, whereas external evidence (circonstances extérieures), 
typical of epistemological probability, was based on the testimony 
or opinion of authorities.356 The former was developed in the 16th 
century by representatives of the “low” sciences such as 
Paracelsus. By low science he referred to empirical sciences such as 
alchemy, astrology, geography and physiology.357 
Hacking's claim concerning the birth of classical probability has 
provoked a lot of criticism. Initially it was said that the distinction 
between “old” epistemic probability and “new” statistical 
probability was a simplification since there were many other kinds. 
According to Lorraine Daston, the classical interpretation is a 
combination of no less than four distinct intellectual traditions: 358 
 
                                                 
354 Ibid., pp. 11-12. See also Franklin, The Science of Conjecture, ch. 10 and 
Daston, Probability and Evidence, p. 1109. 
355 Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment, p. xi. 
356 Hacking, The Emergence of Probability, p. 39. 
357 Ibid., ch. 4. 
358 Daston, Probability and Evidence, p. 1110. See also Daston, Classical 
Probability in the Enlightenment, pp. 11-12. On the concept of verisimilitude 
in ancient thought, see Niiniluoto, Scepticism, Fallibilism, and Verisimilitude 
and Franklin, The Science of Conjecture, p. 102f.   
 
 
 
137
1) The Ancient tradition of rhetoric (Aristotle, Cicero, and 
various Arabic and Latin commentators)  
2) Thomas Aquinas' discussion of the probability of authority, 
which influenced theological discussion  
3) Conceptions of fortune in medieval times  
4) The hierarchy of proofs developed by Roman and Canon 
jurists  
 
Evidence collected by Daniel Garber and Sandy Zabell from 
medieval handbooks of law and rhetoric shows that the idea of 
internal evidence was established in rhetoric and jurisprudence 
after the 12th century.359 Later scholars, such as Franklin and 
Knebel,360 expanded the criticism of Hacking's views by looking at 
ancient and medieval texts concerning legal and economic cases 
involving risk estimation in business ventures. Such calculations 
were already in use in the granting of ancient Athenian high-
interest maritime loans for ship voyages, repayable only if the ship 
arrived safely.361 In the 13th century Peter Olivi based his 
discussion of lucrative business ventures on the concept of 
probable presumption (a supposition that stands unless contrary 
proof appears) in relation to comparison between the extent of 
various risks. He, and later Scotus and Buridan, tried to estimate at 
what risk it was reasonable to start a business, in other words, they 
tried to estimate the probable profit from such ventures.362   
By the end of the 14th century insurance contracts had become 
common in Italian maritime business, which involved lots of 
                                                 
359 See Garber and Zabell, On the Emergence of Probability; See also Daston, 
Classical Probability in the Enlightenment, pp. 12-13. 
360 See Franklin, The Science of Conjecture and Knebel, Wille, Würfel und 
Wahrscheinlichkeit. 
361 Franklin, The Science of Conjecture, p. 259. Franklin also suggests that 
Roman law incorporated  statistical calculations of life expectancy. Ibid., p. 
260. 
362 The works in question are Olivi, De emptionibus et venditionibus, de 
usuris, de restitutionibus, Duns Scotus, IV Sententiarum, dist. 15 and John 
Buridan, Quaestiones et dubia in Aristotelis politica I, q. 13, discussed in 
Franklin, The Science of Conjecture, pp. 267-69. 
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potential dangers.363 In the 16th and 17th centuries jurists (including 
Hugo Grotius, François Grimaudet, Estienne De La Roche, Pierre 
Forcadel, Simon Stevin and Thomas Masterson) hoped to override 
church proscriptions against usury by equating interest reaped on 
investments in a merchant-shipping expedition, for example, with 
legitimate earnings from work done or services rendered. 
Investors, acting as insurers, deserved a share of the profit for 
having shared the risks, and the profit of each partner in the 
expedition should be proportional to his investment.364 Thus a 
method for calculating and estimating these sums was needed. 
Aleatory contracts, based on internal evidence, were an established 
category in civil law by the 16th century.365 
Another kind of aleatory contract was related to the lack of 
public funding. In medieval times the practice of selling annuities 
(one paid a sum of money and received a stated annual income) 
became common, and lotteries were arranged from the 15th century 
due to the general lack of money.366 A special form of annuity was 
life annuity, which was a form of insurance and was very popular. 
For example, German towns in the 13th century sold life annuities 
regularly, and the Church was also involved in this kind of money-
raising: this caused a lot of criticism, since the practice involved an 
element of betting on the seller's estimate of the death of the 
purchaser.367 However, there seems to be no evidence that rates 
were computed on the basis of mortality statistics, although their 
                                                 
363 Insurance was also convenient with relation to canon law, since it was 
not considered to be a loan that was prohibited. On the practice of 
insurance, see Franklin, The Science of Conjecture, pp. 276-77 and Daston, 
Classical Probability in the Enlightenment, pp. 117-20. See also Knebel, Wille, 
Würfel und Wahrscheinlichlkeit, pp. 107-09 on Caramuel's views on 
estimating commercial risks. 
364 See Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment, p. 20. 
365 Ibid., p. 19. 
366 On lotteries, see Ibid., pp. 141-63. 
367 For examples of selling annuities and criticism of the church, see 
Franklin, The Science of Conjecture, pp. 269-72 and Daston, Classical 
Probability in the Enlightenment, pp. 122-23.  
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calculation was discussed in many treatises authors by such as 
Baldus and Du Moulin.368  
In 1671 Jan De Witt applied Huygens' idea of expectation to life 
annuities in his Waerdye vab Lyf-Renten (Treatise on Life Annuities), 
which was one of the first works to apply the idea of mathematical 
probability to something other than games of chance.369 His work 
(although based on a hypothetical mortality table), along with 
Hudde's tables of mortality (based on life annuities sold in 
Amsterdam in 1586-90), John Graunt's Natural and Political 
Observations Mentioned In A Following Index and Made Upon the Bills 
of Mortality (1662), and Edmund Halley's An Estimate on the Degrees 
of Mortality of Mankind, Drawn From Curious Tables of the Birth and 
Funerals at the City of Breslaw… (published in Philosophical Trans-
actions, 1693) all paved the way for a new kind of demographics in 
which mathematical probability was applied to empirically 
collected statistics.370  
Just as jurists argued that profits should be shared in 
proportion to the risks and sums involved, the situation in games 
of chance was similar. A fair game should be based on the equality 
of expectations, so if a game was interrupted the players should 
gain the amount of money they were entitled to. Writings on 
games of chance, such as Luca Pacioli's Summa de Arithmetica and 
Gerolamo Cardano's Practica Arithmetica and De Ludo Aleae at the 
end of the 15th and the mid-16th century preceded the famous 
correspondence between Fermat and Pascal in 1654 (published in 
1679) and Huyguens' De ratiociniis in ludo aleae (1657), which for the 
first time laid down explicit rules for calculating probabilities. 
These works were adapted by De Witt and Leibniz, among others, 
                                                 
368 See Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment, p. 27 and Franklin, 
The Ancient Legal Sources of Seventeenth-Century Probability, p. 129. On the 
practical assessment of life annuity in medieval times, see Daston, Classical 
Probability in the Enlightenment, pp. 122-25. 
369 See Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment, pp. 27-28.  
370 For a short summary of De Witt's work, see Franklin, The Ancient Legal 
Sources of Seventeenth-Century Probability, p. 132. On the history of 
demographics, see Sheynin, Early History of the Theory of Probability, pp. 
216-230 and Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment, p. 128f. 
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and led to the first major treatise on the subject, Jakob Bernouilli's 
Ars Conjectandi (1713).371  
All these developments are incorporated into Hacking's 
statistical probability which employs internal evidence based on 
conjecture. However, there are also traces of it in “epistemological” 
probability, or probability based on external evidence.  
The epistemological practice of estimating probabilities, 
commonly known as casuistry in medieval and early modern 
times, was a question of the opinion of (Church) authorities rather 
than measurement. According to Thomas Aquinas, the premise of 
dialectical reasoning was necessarily either the most plausible or 
credible opinions (maxime opinabilia), or probable opinions 
(probabilia). These were opinions that were accepted by most 
people, or by the majority of the wise, or by the most distinguished 
of them.372  Thus probability with reference to an opinion meant its 
approvability by qualified people.  
According to Aquinas, we must follow the opinions of those 
who have arrived with more certainty at the truth. Ilkka Kantola 
has argued that Aquinas' statement implied statistical probability 
based on internal evidence. We should not follow the opinions of 
ordinary people, or even of common philosophers, but should 
heed the most able theologians since their thinking might have 
been influenced by truth itself.373  
In late medieval times two schools of moral theology emerged 
that disagreed on how one should judge the probability of the 
proposed act in relation to the authorities. 
According to probabilism, which was established by the 
Dominican father Bartholome de Medina in his work Expositiones 
in primam secundae Divi Thomae in 1577, a probable opinion is 
enough – it is a morally safe choice even though there may be 
another, more approved opinion. Choosing a probable opinion is 
“to be on the safe side.” It is not necessary to continue the 
                                                 
371 For a summary of these, see Franklin, The Science of Conjecture, 306-17 
and Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment, pp. 24-26 & 38-40. 
372 Kantola, Probability and Moral Uncertainty in Late Medieval and Early 
Modern Times, p. 28. 
373 Ibid., p. 29. 
 
 
 
141
deliberation or to strive to find a better opinion after having such 
an opinion – choosing it suffices to render our moral conduct 
acceptable.374 
Probabilism was attacked severely by proponents of 
probabiliorism.375 Thyrsus Gonzales, the general of the Jesuits, 
argued that the term “probability” should be interpreted more 
clearly. He took it to mean the approvability of a proposition by 
prudent assent. Thus the choice is between options the agent finds 
subjectively probable, in other words, more true than their 
negations. This is not enough, however, since the proposition 
should also be considered approvable by authorities - it should 
also have some objective probability.  
Gonzales referred to Aristotle's Topics, arguing that “the bigger 
number of fathers and the more notable the fathers who support 
an opinion, the more probable it is considered to be” and “the 
sentence supported by fewer notable authors…is commonly 
thought to be less probable.”376 Thus mere probability will not do 
in probabiliorism: one should choose the option that is most 
widely accepted by qualified authorities.  
This also means that the more experts who find the 
recommended proposition true and acceptable, the more 
objectively probable and acceptable it is, since it is improbable that 
they all err on the question.377 If we have seven qualified experts 
and they all argue that option x is better than y, and two experts 
who all argue that y is better than x, it is more probable that the 
                                                 
374 Kantola, Probability and Moral Uncertainty in Late Medieval and Early 
Modern Times, p. 130. Suarez also accepts this view, since according to him, 
it would be unfair to require everyone to compare probabilities – it is 
sufficient that one knows which opinions are probable and which are not. 
Ibid., p. 137. On probabilism after Medina, see Schüssler, Moral im Zweifel, 
158f. 
375 The most famous work representing probabiliorism is Thyrsus 
Gonzales' Fundamentum theologiae moralis (1694). 
376 Gonzales, Fundamentum theologiae moralis, Diss. I 27. The quotations are 
from Kantola, Probability and Moral Uncertainty in Late Medieval and Early 
Modern Times, p. 150. 
377 Kantola, Probability and Moral Uncertainty in Late Medieval and Early 
Modern Times, p. 151. 
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seven experts are right: two can make a mistake more easily than 
seven. Thus probabiliorism changes the idea of probability from 
the judgement of external evidence (opinio) to the judgement of 
internal evidence (the “statistical” comparison of opinions).   
To conclude, some of casuist views on probability were not 
based only on external evidence, as Hacking holds. Probabiliorism 
includes the idea that the objective risk of error with regard to an 
opinion depends on how widely that opinion is accepted by 
qualified authorities and experts.378 Understood in this manner, the 
concept of probability includes a statistical component resting on 
internal evidence. 
 
6. 2. Leibniz's Views on Probability 
 
Leibniz was well aware of these discussions. He was striving for a 
demonstrable probability calculus that could ultimately be used as 
a basis for resolving controversies.379 He thought that a generalised 
theory of games could be the foundation for this calculus. 
He wrote in his short memoir Ut jus Romanum in artem…that 
there was a need for mathematics of jurisprudence, in which it was 
a question of establishing examples of measures, weights and the 
notation of duration.380 This would be a new kind of topics, 
different from Aristotle’s.381  
“I have said more than once that we need a new kind of logic, 
concerned with degrees of probability, since Aristotle in his Topics 
could not have been further from it: he was content to set out certain 
familiar rules, arranged according to the commonplaces-rules, which 
may be useful in some contexts where a discourse has to be developed 
and given some likehood – without taking the trouble to provide us 
with the balances that are needed to weigh likehoods and to arrive at 
                                                 
378 Ibid., p. 31. 
379 According to Hacking, Leibniz was the first to try to axiomatise 
probability as a pure inferential science. Hacking, The Emergence of 
Probability, p. 58. 
380 Leibniz, Le Droit de la raison, pp. 211-212. 
381 On Leibniz's reaction to Aristotle's Topics, see Olaso, Leibniz et l'art de 
disputer, p. 209f. 
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sound judgements regarding them. Anyone wanting to deal with this 
question would do well to pursue the investigation of games of 
chance...”382 
This calculus requires the analysis of proofs. Leibniz insisted that 
proofs had to be analysed thoroughly and scientifically, and that 
the same requirements had to be applied to cases of probability as 
to natural science. When forming a judgement, one should strive 
for the greatest probability, and not only for some inductive or 
moral certainty that would work in most cases (ut in pluribus, the 
famous medieval phrase).383 Thus Leibniz's idea of a probability 
calculus was a kind of a priori method of deciding in uncertain 
practical situations. It would be a general theory of rational 
decision-making under uncertainty:  
“It is true that this part of useful logic has not yet been found, but it 
will be of marvellous use in practical matters when it is a question of 
presumptions, indices and conjectures, in order to know the degrees of 
probability when there are a number of apparent reasons in favour of 
one or the other in some important deliberation. Thus when there are 
not enough given conditions to demonstrate certainty, the subject 
being merely probable, one can always give at least demonstrations 
concerning the probability itself.”384  
                                                 
382 “J'ay dit plus d'une fois qu'il faudroit une nouvelle espece de Logique 
qui traiteroit des degrés de probabilité, puis qu'Aristotle dans ses Topiques 
n'a rien moins fait que cela, et s'est contenté de mettre en quelque ordre 
certaines regles populaires distribuées selon les lieux communs, qui 
peuvent servir dans quelque occasion où il s'agit d'amplifier le discours et 
de luy donner quelque apparence, sans ce mettre en peine de nous donner 
une balance necessaire pour peser les apparances et pour former là dessus 
un jugement solide. Il seroit bon que celuy qui voudrait traiter cette 
matiere, poursuivit l'examen des jeux de hazard…” (Nouveaux Essais IV, 
xvi, §9) A VI, 6, p. 466; RB, p. 466. 
383 On medieval conceptions of this kind of psychological certainty, see 
Kantola, Probability and Moral Uncertainty in Late Medieval and Early Modern 
Times, pp. 48-49. 
384 “Il est vray que cette partie de la Logique utile ne se trouve encor nulle 
part, mais elle seroit d'un merveilleux usage dans la practique, lorsqu'il 
s'agit des presomtions, des indices et des conjectures, pour connoistre les 
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Probability calculus proved to be much more difficult to form than 
Leibniz had though, however.385 Nevertheless, he never seemed to 
lose hope for the success of this project, and planned to work on it 
whenever other pressing matters allowed him the time.386 
In the absence of a probability calculus one has to settle for 
merely estimating probabilities without calculating them precisely. 
If we can successfully argue that one solution is more probable 
than another, we have a useful method for resolving practical 
difficulties and controversies. This was vital on the legal questions 
that were a common starting point for probabilistic discussion in 
Leibniz's time. Jurisprudence served as a model for deliberating 
about contingencies since legal theories of evidence supplied 
probabilists with a model for ordered and even roughly quantified 
degrees of subjective probability.387 Other practical sciences were 
also able to benefit from assessing probabilities: 
“I will not exclude medicine itself or other conjectural sciences in 
trying to develop a calculus of hazard and the estimation of 
probability. This domain requires a characteristic of a new kind and 
laborious preparations.”388  
In what follows I will look at these different ways of calculating or 
estimating probability, and analyse some case studies that Leibniz 
discussed in different memoirs concerning practical matters. I will 
                                                                                                    
degrés de la probabilité, quand il y a quantité de raisons apparentes de 
part et d'autre dans quelque deliberation d'importance. Ainsi lorsqu'on n'a 
pas assez de conditions données pour demonstrer la certitude, la matiere 
n'estant que probable, on peut tousjours donner au moins de 
demonstrations touchant la probabilité même.” (Préceptes pour avancer les 
sciences) G VII, p. 167. 
385 Leibniz, L'estime des apparences, p. 7. 
386 See Leibniz's letter to Burnett 1. 11. 1697. G III, p. 194. 
387 Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment, p. 14. 
388 “Je n'exclus ni la médecine elle-même ni les autres sciences 
conjecturales faisant intervenir une sorte de calcul des hasards et 
d'estimation de la probabilité, mais en ce domaine il est besoin d'une 
caractéristique d'un nouveau genre et de laborieux préliminaires.” 
(Geometriae utilitas medicina mentis) A VI, 3, p. 451, cited in Parmentier, 
Concepts juridiques et probabilistes chez Leibniz, p. 449, n. 35. 
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first consider his attempts at calculating demonstrative probability, 
and then take some cases in which the probability can only be 
estimated. 
 
6. 2. 1.  Calculating Probability 
 
Leibniz was interested in statistical and economic models and 
wrote countless memoirs on these subjects. His most influential 
memoir on statistical probability was De incerti aestimatione from 
1678, in which he developed a system to estimate probabilities of 
parts in relation to a definite goal.389 The problem is connected to 
games and the question of justly dividing the stake when two 
players have to break off a set of prearranged games.390  
As an axiom he stated: “If players do similar things in such a 
way that no distinction can be drawn between them, with the sole 
exception of the outcome, there is the same proportion of hope and 
fear.”391 Hope is the expectation of possessing and fear is the 
expectation of losing, an axiom that allows for the introduction of 
mathematical symmetry.392 Probability is defined as a degree of 
possibility in a logical sense, thus Leibniz's views were in line with 
                                                 
389 According to Wolfgang David Cirilo de Melo and James Cussens, the 
memoir includes the first appearance of the definition of probability in 
terms of equally possible cases, the central argument being that 
probability is the degree of possibility. De Melo & Cussens, Leibniz on 
Estimating the Uncertain, pp. 31-32. 
390 Leibniz also wrote of many individual games, such as Bassette, Hombre 
and Solitaire. For the texts of these games, see Leibniz, L'Estime Des 
Apparences.   
391 “Si ludentes similia agunt ita ut nullum discrimen inter ipsos assignari 
possit, nisi quod in solo eventu consistat eadem spei metusque ratio est.” 
A VI, 4, p. 92; Leibniz, On Estimating The Uncertain, p. 43.   
392 “Probabilitas est gradus possibilitatis. Spes est probabilitas habendi. 
Metus est probabilitas amittendi. Aestimatio rei tanta est, quantum est jus 
cujusque in rem.” A VI, 4, p. 94. For a more extensive presentation of 
Leibniz’s views of games in De incerti aestimatione, see Biermann and Faak, 
G. W. Leibniz’ “De incerti aestimatione”, pp. 46-47. For an example of 
calculating the likehood of winning or losing, see also Nouveaux essais IV, 
xvi, §9. 
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those of Huygens, Pascal, Fermat and Arnauld.393 However, 
Leibniz's solution did not represent any significant advance over 
Huyguens' classic work, which he had probably read. Despite this, 
it had one significant merit: while Huygens assumed that games of 
chance were fair and was merely interested in the mathematical 
consequences of different positions in the game, Leibniz was 
especially concerned about its fairness. Thus his point of departure 
was legal while Huygens' was mathematical.394  
One should estimate each player's fair share of the whole stake 
(hopes of winning), and these shares are regarded as the rights of 
the players. This rule is a combination of addition and 
multiplication: one must multiply each eventual gain by its 
probability and then form a sum of all the consequences in order to 
arrive at a player's total profit:  
“If among all possible outcomes some yield the value A, others the 
value B, and the rest the value C, then the total expectation (spes) will 
be the sum of the several values multiplied by the number of possible 
outcomes that yield them, divided by the number of all possible 
outcomes. Thus if the number of outcomes that can yield the value A is 
a, the number of outcomes that can yield the result B is b, and the 
number of outcomes that can yield the result C is c, and the number of 
all possible outcomes is n, then the expectation will be  
                                                 
393 See On Estimating The Uncertain, p. 45. On expectations, see Daston, 
Classical Probability in the Enlightenment, pp. 18-25. Franklin argues that this 
is the first occurrence of the modern way of thinking of probability as a 
ratio of “favourable” outcomes to all outcomes. See Franklin, The Ancient 
Legal Sources of Seventeeth-Century Probability, p. 141.  
394 See De Melo & Cussens, Leibniz on Estimating the Uncertain, p. 32. 
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s =     aA + bB + cC 
         -------------------.”395 
                    n 
 
In another place Leibniz formulated the principle in a slightly 
different way: 
“To put it in a general way, if the various successful outcomes can be 
kept separate in an activity, the estimated value of my hope will be the 
sum of possible successes collected from all outcomes, divided by the 
number of outcomes. And in the same way, if the various negative 
outcomes can be kept separate in a transaction, the estimated value of 
my fear will be the sum of possible losses collected from the various 
cases, divided by the number of outcomes or cases.”396 
Thus a/n is the probability of realising the value A, b/n is the 
value of realising the value B, and c/n is the value of realising the 
value C. An example from the insurance business would be a case 
in which the probability of a ship's sinking in a storm during a 
certain voyage was one in a hundred, with the loss standing at 
10,000 ducats on the outbound voyage and 40,000 ducats on the 
return voyage. The overall effective magnitude of this misfortune 
                                                 
395 “Si ex omnibus eventibus aliquot dent rem A, aliquot alii rem B, et 
reliqui rem C, erit spes tota aggregatum ex rebus singulis in numerum 
eventuum possibilium omnium. Ut si numerus eventuum qui dare 
possunt rem A sit a, numerus eventuum qui dare possunt rem B sir b, et 
numerus eventuum qui dare possunt rem C sit c, et numerus omnium 
eventuum sit n, erit spes s aequ  
aA + bB + cC 
-----------------.  “                                                                                                                                                       
n 
Biermann and Faak, G. W. Leibniz’ “De incerti aestimatione”, pp. 46-47, 
translated in Leibniz, On Estimating The Uncertain, pp. 47-48.  
396 “Generaliter si diversos eventus utiles disjunctim habere possit 
negotium, spei aestimatio erit summa utilitatum possibilium ex omnibus 
eventibus collectarum, divisa per numerum eventuum. Et [eodem] modo 
si diversos eventus damnosos disjunctim habere possit negotium metus 
aestimatio erit summa damnorum possibilium ex diversis casibus 
[collectorum], divisa per numerum eventuum seu casuum.” A VI, 4, p. 93; 
Leibniz, On Estimating The Uncertain, p. 45. 
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of losing the ship in a storm would be appraised at (.01 x 1/2) x 
10,000 (1/100x1/2x10,000=50) + (.01 x 1/2) x 40,000 
(1/100x1/2x40,000=200), which would amount to 250 ducats. The 
sum would represent a reasonable measure of the magnitude of 
the loss in question, and would provide a quantity guide in 
estimating the cost of insurance.397  
Leibniz also wrote many memoirs on economics issues in 
which he often applied his new ideas of probability. One of his 
major themes in this context was life expectation, which as already 
mentioned had its roots in medieval practices of selling life 
annuities. Leibniz considered life annuities to be a form of loan 
that was well suited to commercial and industrial business. 398   
Life annuity works as follows. A person agrees to invest a 
certain amount in a business (in medieval and early modern times 
these businesses were typically related to a city or a state), in 
exchange for which the company or state agrees to pay a fixed 
amount every year until the investor dies. When this happens, the 
payments cease and the company keeps the balance of the 
investment if anything remains. Thus the factors to be taken into 
account by the company when calculating life annuity are the 
amount of money to be earned from the business and the expected 
length of life of the investor.399  
Leibniz considered different methods for calculating annuities 
in a memoir called Loss und Leibrenten from 1680 (A IV, 3, pp. 432-
35). One of these involved calculating average life expectancy by 
considering the annuities received in each age group.  
He argues that of a group of 60 people receiving annuties, ten 
will live to the age of 10 (the mean being five years), eight to the 
age of 20, eighteen to 30, eighteen to 50, three to 60, two to 70 and 
one to the age of 80. The sum of total annuities could be calculated 
by multiplying the mean of each age group by the number of 
                                                 
397 The example is from Rescher, Leibniz, Keynes, and the Rabbis on a Problem 
of Distributive Justice, pp. 342-43.  
398 For relevant texts, see Leibniz, L'estime des apparences. See also 
Rohrbasser & Veron, Leibniz et la mortalité. 
399 On life annuities from medieval times onwards, see Franklin, The 
Science of Conjecture, p. 269f. 
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deaths in that group. This would show the total annuities received 
in each age group of 10 years.400 These calculations are 
summarised in the following table401  
 
Age Mean Mortality Received 
annuities 
1-10 5 10/60 10 x 5= 50 
10-20 15 8/60 8 x 15 = 120 
20-30 25 18/60 18 x 25 = 450 
30-50 40 18/60 18 x 40 = 720 
50-60 55 3/60 3 x 55 = 165 
60-70 65 2/60 2 x 65 = 130 
70-80 75 1/60 1 x 75 = 75 
 
It is clear from the table that the largest amount of annuity is 
received in the age group 30-50 years (the mean being 40 years). 
Another task Leibniz set for himself was as follows: 
“Now we could ask if all of these die suddenly and for this reason 
receive an even amount of annuity, at which age will they die.”402 
The average life expectancy is calculated as the sum of annuities, 
1710, divided by the number of people (60), which results in 28.5 
years. This result is strange, since as noted, the largest amount of 
annuity was received at around the age of 40. According to Marc 
Parmentier, the mistake in Leibniz's calculation was due to the 
supposition that the annuity was set at birth, which was contrary 
to practice. This goes to show that it was more of a thought 
experiment than a serious proposition – in fact, Parmentier 
                                                 
400 A IV, 3, p. 434. 
401 I have combined the formulations of Marc Parmentier and J. – M. 
Rohrbasser & J. Verón in this table. See Leibniz, L'estime des apparences, p. 
325, n. 39 and Rohrbasser & Veron, Leibniz et la mortalité, p. 36. 
402 “Fragts sichs nun[,] wenn sie alle zugleich gestorben weren, und doch 
ebenso viel leibrenten bekommen hätten[,] in welchem jahre sie werden 
gestorben seyn.” A IV, 3, p. 434. 
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thought it was meant merely to illustrate the different uses of such 
a calculus.403 
Another of Leibniz's memoirs, Lebenserwartung I (A VI, 3, p. 
449-52, in Latin, without a title), is more promising. Here he 
discussed the average life expectancy in a group of eighty people, 
and presumes, following Hudde, that the maximal age men could 
reach in most cases was 80 years.404 He calculated this figure by 
giving the value zero to a child aged one year, one to a two-year 
old and so on, the maximal value thus being 79, which was given 
to a eighty-year-old. The calculation goes as follows:405 
 
0 + 1 + 2 + 3…+79  =  3160   = 39.5 years 
             80                       80 
The life expectancy of a new-born child in its first year of life was 
thus 39.5 years, reduced every year that passed. Similarly, if the 
child reached the age of ten (when the most dangerous phase of 
childhood illnesses had passed), the expected remaining lifetime 
was as high as 
 
0+1+2+3…+70 = 2485  = 35 years. 
              71            71 
 
6. 2. 2. Estimating Probability 
 
When there is no possibility of calculating probabilities one has to 
settle for epistemic probability. In these cases it is a question of 
acceptability or trustworthiness of an opinion or a proof. As 
postulated, to persuade is to make one believe and to believe is to 
                                                 
403 Leibniz, L'estime des apparences, p. 319 & 325. The result, however, is in 
line with the contemporary analyses of Sauvy, who estimated for life 
expectancy to be 25 to 30 years. See Leibniz, L'estime des apparences, p. 301.  
404 For a discussion for his reasons to this presumption, see Rohrbasser & 
Veron, Leibniz et la mortalité, pp. 32-33. 
405 The formulation is from Rohrbasser & Veron, Leibniz et la mortalité, p. 
41. Leibniz's formulation was a little more complicated. See A IV, 3, p. 450. 
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be aware of the reason.406 He called degrees of probability 
“estimations of appearances”, meaning that we must base our 
rational estimations on our perceptions of the available evidence, if 
possible.  
He often related this kind of “epistemological” probability to 
jurisprudence, as he did in De conditionibus (1665) and Specimina 
Juris (1667-69), in which he argued for the need to estimate degrees 
of probability and gave some ideas for doing so. He was perhaps 
the foremost combiner of jurisprudence and probability - he called 
the combination “natural jurisprudence.”407 Although he strived 
for demonstrative probability in jurisprudence, he was unable to 
give an example of it when Bernoulli asked him in 1703.408 
The epistemological “mathematics” of jurisprudence is related 
to weighing up or estimating proofs and choosing between them. 
Thus one has to estimate which option of two (or more) is more 
probable regarding the given goal, in this case in deciding whether 
the accused is guilty or not.  
In some cases, however, there is no relevant evidence available, 
or it cannot be used in the estimations. Leibniz admitted in the 
fourth book of Nouveaux essais, ch. xx, §17 that in many cases one 
cannot help but follow the authorities. Although one is not obliged 
to go along with received opinions without proof, one is not 
allowed to reject them without proof either.409 A good example of 
                                                 
406 In another fragment from the same time, De controversiis, A VI, 4, p. 
2162, Leibniz wrote: “Qui rationibus certant vicisse videbuntur, ubi 
scopum assecuti erunt, scopus autem est persuadere.” 
407 “…une Jurisprudence naturelle, par laquelle on apprenne 
demonstrativement la maniere d'estimer les degrés des preuves.” (Letter 
to Burnett 1. 11. 1697) G III, p. 194; Hacking, The Emergence of Probability, p. 
86. On Leibniz's views of jurisprudence, see Riley, Leibniz's Universal 
Jurisprudence.  
408 Franklin, The Science of Conjecture, p. 365. 
409 “...aux opinions reçuës elles ont pour elles quelque chose d'approchant 
à ce qui donne ce qu'on appelle Presomption chez les Jurisconsultes: et 
quoyqu'on ne soit point obligé de les suivre tousjours sans preuves, on 
n'est pas autorisé non plus à les detruire dans l'esprit d'autruy sans avoir 
des preuves contraires.” A VI, 6, pp. 517-518; RB, pp. 517-518. 
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this critical acceptance of the opinions of authorities is the 
following:  
“…when some inheritance or piece of land is to be sold, they appoint 
three teams of assessors – these teams are called Schurzen in Low 
Saxon – and each team assesses the commodity in question. Now 
suppose that the first estimates its value at 1,000 crowns, the second at 
1,400 and the third at 1,500; they take the total of these three, which is 
3,900, and because there were three teams they take a third of this, 
1,300 as the mean value sought. Or what comes to the same thing, they 
take the sum of one third of each estimate.”410 
In this model, which was already in use in ancient times, opinions 
are compared and the mean is calculated. In general, however, 
Leibniz was of the opinion that one should not trust the 
authorities, but rather accept the evidence of the things 
themselves: 
“I do speak here of not the probability of the Casuists, which is 
founded on the number and reputation of the doctors, but of the 
probability that is drawn from the nature of things in proportion to 
what is known of them, and which may be called likehood.”411  
                                                 
410 “…quand quelque heritage ou terre doit estre venduë, ils forment trois 
bandes d'estimateurs; ces bandes sont appellées Schurzen en bas Saxon, et 
chaque bande fait une estime du bien en question. Supposé donc que l'une 
l'estime estre de la valeur de 1000 Ecus, l'autre de 1400, la troisieme de 
1500, on prend la somme de ces trois estimes qui est 3900, et parce qu'il y a 
eu trois bandes, on en prend le tiers, qui est 1300 pour la valeur noyenne 
demandée. Ou bien, ce qui est la même chose, on prend la somme des 
troisiemes parties de chaque estimation…” (Nouveaux essais, IV, xxvi, §5) 
A VI, 6, p. 465; RB, p. 465.  
411“Je ne parle pas icy de cette probabilité des Casuistes, qui est fondée sur 
le nombre et sur la reputation des Docteurs, mais de celle qui se tire de la 
nature des choses à proportion de ce qu'on en connoist, et qu'on peut 
appeler la vraisemblance.” (Préceptes pour avancer les sciences) G VII, p. 167. 
Some other instances: “...la plus parts des Casuistes, qui ont écrit sur la 
Probabilité n'en ont pas même compris la nature; la fondant sur l'autorité 
avec Aristote, au lieu de la fonder sur la vraisemblance comme ils 
devroient: l'autorité n'estant qu'une partie des raisons qui font la 
vraisemblance.” (Nouveaux essais, II, xxi, §66) A VI, 6, p. 206; RB, p. 206, “In 
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This does not mean, however, that Leibniz completely rejected the 
opinions of the authorities. He mentioned Thyrsus Gonzales, the 
leading proponent of probabiliorism and the general of the Jesuits, 
in a positive manner, stressing that although the opinion of 
weighty authorities was one of the things that could contribute to 
the likehood of an opinion, it did not produce the likehood in 
itself.412 He criticised Medina for putting safety ahead of 
probability since safety concerned the improbability of an 
impending evil. 
“Moralists who are lax about this have gone wrong largely because 
they have had an inadequate and over-narrow notion of probability, 
which they have confused with Aristotle's endoxon or acceptability.”413  
The moral theologians thought that the general acceptance of the 
authority of the church was the starting point of judgement and 
that one should follow it if there were no good reason not to. 
However, this often meant that new opinions were feared and that 
the evidence was more often external than internal, in other words 
few were bold enough to argue against the accepted maxims.  
Leibniz held that, in general, the weight of evidence from the 
nature of things was always more important than accepted 
opinion, just as proof was more important than presumption. As 
an example he mentioned Copernicus: “And at the time when 
Copernicus was almost alone in his opinion, it was still 
                                                                                                    
bonitate autem et prudentis directoris solum confidere a justitiae pariter et 
politicae rationibus alienum est.” (Vitia disputationis confusaneae),  A VI, 2, 
p. 389.  
412 “Et lors que nos Moralistes (j'entends les plus sages, tels que le General 
moderne des Jesuites) joignent le plus sur avec le plus probable...l'opinion 
des personnes, dont l'autorité est de poid, est une des choses, qui peuvent 
contribuer à rendre une opinion vraisemblable, mais ce n'est pas ce qui 
acheve toute la verisimilitude.” (Nouveaux essais, IV, ii, §14). A VI, 6, pp. 
372-73; RB, pp. 372-73. 
413 “Le defaut des Moralistes relachés sur cet article, a êté en bonne partie, 
d'avoir eu une notion trop limitée et trop insuffisante du probable, qu'ils 
ont confondû avec l'Endoxe, ou opinable d'Aristote. (Nouveaux essais, IV, 
ii, §14). A VI, 6, p. 372; RB, p. 372.  
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incomparably more likely than that of all the rest of the human 
race.”414   
 
6. 2. 2. 1. Proofs and Presumptions    
 
Given his profession, Leibniz was well aware of the standard legal 
procedures and strived to apply and develop them in his quest to 
resolve the controversies. The legal system in his time was a 
synthesis of Roman and Canon law. During the 16th and 17th 
centuries continental jurists refined and rendered uniform 
traditional practices, and a hierarchy of different-level proofs 
(consisting of indices, suspicions, conjectures, presumptions, 
confessions, oaths and written documents, for example), provided 
a model for estimating the degrees of certainty and complemented 
the rhetoric of the jurists.415  
The main distinction was between two kinds of proof, the 
demonstrative (probatio vera) and the presumptive (probatio ficto), 
which had been established in the 12th century. It evolved into a 
system of presumptive proofs of varying degrees of strength, the 
goal being the complete proof (probatio plena) that was required for 
conviction in capital cases.416 Under the system the value one 
represented complete proof and the value zero no proof at all, the 
fractions signifying degrees of presumptive proof. The 
                                                 
414 “Et lorsque Copernic êtoit presque seul de son opinion, elle êtoit 
tousjours incomparablement plus vraisemblable que celle de tout le reste 
du genre humain.” (Nouveaux essais IV, ii, §14). A VI, 6, p. 373; RB, p. 373. 
In his letter to Landgrave Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels Leibniz cited the 
condemnation of Copernicus' doctrines as a major reason for not 
converting to Catholicism. See A I, 4, p. 320.  
415 In 1532 Constitutio Criminalis Carolina established the Roman-canon 
doctrine of indices (Indizienlehre) in Germany. Daston, Classical Probability 
in the Enlightenment, pp. 41-42.  
416 A rich academic tradition centred on these legal conjectures evolved. 
Among these works Franklin mentions Menochio's Commentary on 
Presumptions, Conjectures, Signs and Inclinations, Alciati's Treatise on 
Presumptions and Mascardi's On Proofs as availabe to Leibniz. Franklin, The 
Ancient Legal Sources of Seventeeth-Century Probability, pp. 137-38. On the 
definition and nature of proofs, see Lévy, La hiérarchie des preuves, p. 22f. 
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corroborative testimony of two unimpeachable eyewitnesses 
constituted complete proof, and the testimony of one eyewitness 
constituted a half-proof.417 If there were no such witnesses, 
complete proof could be constructed by the judge, using the 
combinatorial method, from the sum of half-proofs and even of 
quarter-proofs.418  
Leibniz was well aware of these practices, as evidenced in 
Chapter xvi of Book IV of the Nouveaux Essais, which was devoted 
to the subject of degrees of assent:   
“When jurists discuss proofs, presumptions, conjectures, and evidence, 
they have a great many good things to say on the subject and go into 
considerable detail. They begin with common knowledge, where there 
is no need for proof. They next deal with complete proofs, or what 
passes for them: judgements are delivered on the strength of these, at 
least in civil actions…then there are presumptions that are accepted 
provisionally as complete proofs - in other words, for as long as the 
contrary is not proved…Apart from these, there are many degrees of 
conjecture and of evidence.” 419 
Of special importance to Leibniz was the method of presumption. 
Presumption is an inference drawn from known facts about 
doubtful ones and accepted provisionally as complete proof as 
                                                 
417 Azo, Lectura super codicem 4 tit. I, 254. See also Franklin, The Science of 
Conjecture, p. 18.  
418 Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment, p. 42; Parmentier, 
Concepts juridiques et probabilistes chez Leibniz, p. 443. 
419 “Les Jurisconsultes en traittant des preuves, presumptions, conjectures 
et indices ont dit quantité de bonnes choses sur ce sujet et sont allés à 
quelque detail considerable. Ils commencent par la Notorieté, où l'on n'a 
point besoin de preuve. Par aprés ils viennent à des preuves entieres ou 
qui passent pour telles, sur les quelles on prononce, au moins en matiere 
civile…Puis il y a presumptions, qui passent pour preuves entieres 
provisionnellement, c'est à dire, tandis que le contraire n'est point 
prouvé…Hors de cela il y a quantité de degrés des conjectures et des 
indices.” A VI, 6, p. 464; RB, p. 464. Couturat cited also Leibniz's letter to 
Bernouilli 6. 6. 1710, where Leibniz discussed the issue in similar manner. 
Couturat, La logique de Leibniz, p. 240, n. 3.  
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long as the contrary is not proved.420 Thus if the judge has 
sufficient reason to believe one party he maintains that opinion 
unless there are good reasons to believe the other party. This 
situation is common when there are conflicting opinions. As 
Leibniz was often attempting to resolve difficult moral and 
political controversies, presumption became an essential part of his 
methodology for estimating probability, although proof was 
always superior.421 However, presumption was more than just a 
half-proof – it was a provisional full proof. 422 
 
6. 2. 2. 2. Some Examples 
 
Leibniz's baccalaureate disputation De Conditionibus (A VI, 1, p. 
99-) from 1665 was based on the traditional manner of judging 
proofs discussed above, but also offered some novel ideas. It 
started with 160 definitions and 134 theorems, which were meant 
to establish the requisites for conditional or hypothetical 
jurisprudence (jus conditionale). The second part, which contained 
explications of the first part, is more interesting in the context of 
this study. Point 114 gives the following table:423 
 
Jus nullum Jus C[onditiona]le Jus purum 
Co impossibilis incerta necessaria 
cypra fractio integrum 
 
Jus nullum represents no claim (0) and jus purum represents 
absolute right (1). Conditional right is a fraction (Leibniz used ½) 
                                                 
420 As with proofs, there are several degrees of presumption. For a 
discussion on degrees of presumption, see Franklin, The Science of 
Conjecture, pp. 20-21 and Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment, 
p. 42. 
421 It seems that Leibniz was most influenced in this by the Renaissance 
legal theorists Menochio and Mascardi. Franklin, The Science of Conjecture, 
p. 364. 
422 On the nature of half-proofs, see Lévy, La hiérarchie des preuves, p. 106f. 
423 A VI, 1, p. 139. 
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between jus nullum and jus purum, or between zero and one. It is 
uncertain or contingent and has to be estimated by the judge.424  
Thus the judge has to estimate the magnitude of conditional 
right in relation to absolute right, that is of the part to the whole. It 
is easy to see that Leibniz had probability in mind here besides 
modal logic.425 Furthermore, he discussed games of chance later in 
the disputation. 
The second part of De Conditionibus also contains a fictional 
example: “Presupposing that a person receives 100 Taler under 
condition A and 200 Taler under condition B, then the conditional 
right depending on B is assigned a higher value than that 
depending on A, if the occurrence of A and B is equally 
uncertain.”426 One had to compare conditions A and B and decide 
which was more probable in relation to the case at hand. One 
might estimate, for example, the condition and circumstances of a 
ship's voyage and decide whether or not it was probable that it 
would return. It might be safe to invest in a less ludicrous business 
venture if the probability of success were greater (condition A). 
Then again, the potential profit was greater under more uncertain 
conditions (condition B). The estimation of the probability of 
different occurrences is presented here as a method for choosing 
between different and perhaps conflicting options – as a method of 
rational decision. 
In his many drafts of Elementa juris naturalis (1671) Leibniz 
argued in a similar manner, but applies probability based on 
internal evidence. He took as an example a case in which the 
question is of a choice between two actions, A and B, taking into 
account the probability of the occurrence of an effect stemming 
from the action and the weight of this effect.427 Thus he took the 
probability of the effect as one criterion and its goodness as the 
                                                 
424 Schneider, Leibniz on the Probable, p. 202. 
425 On modal features of De Conditionibus, see Schepers, Leibniz' 
Disputationen “De Conditionibus”: Ansätze zu einer juristischen Aussagenlogik.  
426 “123. Quo pluris est Ctum, hoc jus Cle est majus. Puta si A erit, 100 
habeto; si B, 200. Supposito A et B esse aequè incerta, pluris est Co B quàm 
A.” A VI, 1, p. 140. Schneider, Leibniz on the Probable, p. 203. 
427 Schneider, Leibniz on the Probable, p. 203. 
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second.428 The values of these criteria are to be multiplied, not 
summed up, since it is not a question of their combined effect (as 
would be the case in weighing up reasons or summing up 
evidence), but rather concerns the outcome of their mutual effect.  
The effect following of action A in Leibniz's example has a 
probability value of five, while the goodness of the effect has a 
value of four, thus by multiplication A produces an overall value 
of 20. The effect of action B, on the other hand, has a probability 
value of six and a goodness value of three, thus the overall value is 
18.429 In both cases summing up the values would produce a value 
of nine, but multiplication indicates a difference between the 
options. While the effect of action A is less probable it produces 
more goodness, and while action B produces less goodness, its 
effect is more probable. Given that the deciding factor is the overall 
value, action A is recommended.  
The above examples of estimating probability concern two 
different kinds of cases. The first is a typical legal case in which the 
judge has to decide whether or not the accused is guilty by 
summing up proofs carrying different weights. The second case is 
more complicated, involving several values that have to be 
estimated separately and which are competing against each other. 
The decision has to be made by evaluating different options from 
different points of view and estimating their total value, which 
includes not only the probability of their effect regarding a given 
goal, but also their inherent goodness.  
I will return to these two different kinds of cases in Chapter 11.  
 
7. Summary of Part II 
 
Part II has focused on the presuppositions of human rational 
decisions. As discussed in Part I, divine decision is founded on the 
fact that by His infinite understanding God finds sufficient reason 
to choose one possible world rather than another. Human 
deliberation acts in an analogous way with one significant 
difference – humans have only limited cognitive abilities. 
                                                 
428 A VI, I, p. 471. 
429 Ibid.  
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Nevertheless, Leibniz held that they should develop their 
understanding and imitate God in their decisions as far as possible. 
In order to help them in this task he conceived various ways of 
dealing with the state of uncertainty that is common in human 
deliberations. 
Chapter four set out the essentials of Leibniz's theory of 
reasoning. The main principles, such as the distinction between 
truths of reason and truths of fact, the identity of indiscernibles, 
the predicate-in-subject-principle and the principle of sufficient 
reason, apply to both God and man. In man they are related to 
innate ideas which form the basis for mathematics, logic and 
ethics. Of special significance to human practical action is the 
moral instinct of pursuing joy and avoiding sorrow, which is an 
innate disposition in the mind. I devoted a large part of this 
chapter to cognition in general, and to some special questions 
related to it such as minute perceptions, the moral instinct, and 
questions of apperception, imagination, attention, memory and 
moral identity. This provided essential background information 
for my discussion on human deliberation in Part III.  
Of special interest is the question of apperception, which 
Leibniz left largely unexplained and for this reason it has been a 
problematic topic for Leibniz scholars. My discussion of the subject 
constitutes the most extensive critical account in this part of my 
study. I supported the view of Robert McRae, according to which 
apperception requires innate ideas, against Nicholas Jolley's and 
Mark Kulstad's views that there is also some awareness in minute 
perceptions. I have argued that the concept of attention is not 
sufficiently taken into account in most commentaries on 
apperception, and that the notion of internal sense or imagination 
is helpful in understanding the connection between external 
objects and innate ideas. I also critically examined Kulstad's view 
that animals are capable of minimal apperceptions. 
I concentrated on truths of fact in Chapters five and six and 
examined the various ways in which Leibniz tried to improve 
methods of reasoning about them. Chapter five described Leibniz’s 
various schemes involving general science, his deductive 
encyclopedia and the art of discovery.  I also briefly discussed 
Marcelo Dascal's concept of “soft” reason (blandior ratio), which, I 
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think is essential in understanding Leibniz's views on practical 
reasoning. 
Chapter six is devoted to the theory of probability, which was 
Leibniz’s main method for dealing with contingent truths. A 
substantial part of the chapter deals with the history of 
probabilistic considerations, my aim being to show that he was 
well aware of current developments, and that his writings reflect 
the views of both the mathematical probabilists and the moral 
theologians who discussed these themes. At the end of the Chapter 
I offered some case studies showing that Leibniz was interested in 
both the calculative and the estimative theory of probability. Of 
special relevance to the discussion in Part III are the legal 
examples, which cover two kinds of cases: simple ones in which 
the judge has to decide between different options by weighing up 
proofs, and more complicated ones incorporating several values 
that have to be estimated separately, and which compete against 
each other. As I will argue, Leibniz thought that this disctinction 
applied to human deliberations in general.  
   
 
Part III 
 
Human Rational Decision-Making 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Practical Reason and Human Action   
 
The foundation of human deliberation is practical reason, which is 
the general human capacity for resolving, through reflection, the 
question of what one is to do.430 The classical theorist on practical 
reason was Aristotle, who argued that humans differed from other 
animals in having the capability to use reason.  
The human soul is divided into rational and irrational parts. 
The virtues of the rational soul, or the intellect are divided between 
theoretical wisdom (sophia) and practical reason (phronēsis). Of 
these two, the former is more important: practical reason deals 
with temporary states of things while theoretical reason concerns 
permanent things.431   
According to Aristotle, it is essential for humans to plan and 
deliberate, and in general to control their actions. Practical reason 
is used to decide on each occasion which course of action is most 
reasonable. Living well or achieving eudaimonia or happiness, 
which is the goal of Aristotle's ethics, means acting in accordance 
with virtue, which is a mediating course between excess and 
deficiency and is different in each new situation.432    
Achieving happiness is possible for persons of good education. 
They have been habituated to apply their reason appropriately and 
                                                 
430 Wallace, R. Jay, “Practical Reason”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Winter 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/ 
practical-reason/> 
431 On the differencies between these two kinds of reason, see Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics VI, ch. VII. 
432 Ibid., II, ch. 6. 
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to keep the irrational soul in control – in other words, they have a 
good character. A good person is good at deliberation – he or she 
finds the most appropriate course of action in pursuit of happiness, 
in other words, he or she has practical wisdom.433  
Deliberation, in the light of Aristotle's examples, usually 
concerns the means and not the ends, although he also left room 
for ends. He argued in the 10th Chapter of the first book of Rhetoric 
that any action is either based on deliberation or it is not. If it is so 
based, it is called rational, and if not it is an emotive response that 
is connected to the irrational soul (1369 1-5, 15-19, 1369b 18-20). 
Acting according to emotions is not necessarily evil - it is just not 
based on deliberation.  
Leibniz's views were influenced by Aristotle and Thomas 
Aquinas, but he also added some new elements, such as the 
pluralism of values in practical rationality and the theory of 
estimating the probabilities of consequences of proposed acts. I 
will return to these themes in the next Chapter – here I limit myself 
to Leibniz's views on practical rationality in general. 
The most distinctive Leibnizian feature of practical rationality is 
that the divine rational choice of the best of all possible worlds is a 
model for all rational choices – it is based on the comparison of 
different possible worlds, the best one providing the sufficient 
reason for its realisation by God. Divine and human deliberations 
are similar in kind, and differ only in degree. Humans strive to 
imitate the divine being in their actions within the limits of their 
cognitive capabilities: 
“…the quality that God has of being a mind himself takes precedence 
over all the other considerations he can have towards creatures; only 
minds are made in his image and are, as it were, of his race or like 
children of his household, since they alone can serve him freely and act 
with knowledge in imitation of the divine nature; a single mind is 
worth a whole world, since it does not merely express the world but it 
also knows it and it governs itself after the fashion of God.”434  
                                                 
433 Ibid., VI, ch. 13.  
434 “…la qualité que Dieu a d’estre Esprit luy même, va devant toutes les 
autres considerations qu’il peut avoir à l’egard des creatures; les seuls 
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It is noteworthy, however, that the degree of cognition between 
finite beings and God is tremendous - as we discussed in Part II, 
God is able to perform infinite analysis, which gives Him the 
possibility of seeing beforehand the whole history of the world. 
Men are always limited in their cognitive abilities, and their 
judgement is necessarily affected by confused, minute perceptions.  
A degree of cognition is essential in practical deliberations since 
the will of a moral agent is always directed to the apparent good.435 
The will usually follows the recommendations for action made by 
the intellect, and therefore it is essential that our judgements are 
valid. As I will show, it is usual for men to err in their assessment 
of goods, taking the apparent good to be the real good. The will 
concerns the good that seems best to the deliberator, and the real 
good is what the agent should wish for and choose. While God 
always chooses the real good, men may choose one that is not real 
although it may seem so to the deliberator. Thus correct moral 
reasoning is of utmost importance in good moral conduct. 
Although the Leibnizian human deliberator cannot gain 
absolutely certain knowledge of the world, he or she should 
perform rational decisions whenever possible. In this respect it is 
essential to distinguish between the notions of practical rationality 
and morality. When a person makes a moral choice, the choice 
may be more or less appropriate in the situation, depending on the 
degree of cognition involved. However, the moral act is rational if 
it is based on reasoning within the limits of the abilities of the 
person concerned, taking into account all the relevant facts. 
Therefore people may act rationally even though the chosen act is 
not the appropriate choice in the situation, and has unfortunate 
consequences. In other words, men are able to deliberate rationally 
whether or not their moral judgements are accurate.  
                                                                                                    
esprits sont faits à son image, et quasi de sa race ou comme enfans de la 
maison, puisqu’eux seuls le peuvent servir librement et agir avec 
connoissance à  l’imitation de la nature divine. Un seul esprit vaut tout un 
Monde, puisqu’il ne l’exprime pas seulement, mais le connoist aussi, et s’y 
gouverne à la façon de Dieu.” (Discours de metaphysique, §36) A VI, 4, p. 
1586; AG, p. 67. See also La Monadologie, §90 and La Felicite, Gr, p. 581. 
435 See Discours de metaphysique, §13. 
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9. Leibniz's Moral Philosophy 
 
In his views of the good as appropriate to men, Leibniz followed 
the Aristotelian tradition, especially as represented by Thomas 
Aquinas: the human good is a state of activity involving the 
actualisation of the potentialities specific to human beings. 
Medieval philosophers called this state or activity “happiness”, or 
“beatitude”, and regarded ethics as a branch of philosophy 
devoted to specifying the precise nature of happiness and the 
means of attaining it.436 As I will show, Leibniz considered 
happiness to be a state of lasting joy and the goal of virtuous 
action. A virtuous man could distinguish apparent good from real 
good and resist harmful passions. Before turning to the good 
appropriate to man I will consider Leibniz's views on the nature of 
moral reasoning.  
Like Aristotle, Leibniz thought that the right action to be taken 
in practical life was discovered through reasoning. However, he 
believed that moral reasoning (illumination) could be 
supplemented by the moral instinct of pursuing joy and avoiding 
sorrow, which was perceived by the deliberator (through the 
imagination, discussed in Chapter 4.3.3.) confusedly as a sense of 
increasing perfection or decreasing it. He discussed the matter in 
Nouveaux essais, Book I, Chapter ii, in which he stated (against 
Locke's claim that morality was a demonstrative science):  
“Although it is correct to say that morality has indemonstrable 
principles, of which one of the first and most practical is that we 
should pursue joy and avoid sorrow, it must be added that it is not a 
truth that known solely from reason, since it is based on inner 
experience – on confused knowledge; for one only senses what joy and 
sorrow are.” 437 
                                                 
436 MacDonald, Being and Goodness, p. 19. 
437 “…quoyqu'on puisse dire veritablement, que la morale a des principes 
indemonstrables, et qu'un des premiers et des plus pratiques est, qu'il faut 
suivre la joye et eviter la tristesse, il faut adjouter que ce n'est pas une 
verité, qui soit connue purement de raison, puisqu'elle est fondée sur 
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This most practical indemonstrable principle is moral instinct, 
which is not a truth of reason, but we can draw scientific 
conclusions from it, and the truths revealed by moral instinct are 
so self-evident that they are clear to everyone.438 In §3 he stated, 
“…a penchant expressed by the understanding becomes a precept 
or practical truth; and if the penchant is innate then so also is the 
truth – there being nothing in the soul that is not expressed in the 
understanding, although not always in distinct actual thinking, as I 
have sufficiently shown.”439 The gist of Leibniz's argumentation is 
clear: moral action can in practice function without reasoning in a 
demanding sense, although moral science depends on it: 
“…moral science … is innate in just the same way that arithmetic is, 
for it, too, depends upon demonstrations provided by the inner light. 
Since demonstrations do not spring into view straight away, it is no 
great wonder that if men do not always apperceive straight away 
everything they have within them, and are not very quick to read the 
characters of the natural law, which according to St. Paul, God has 
engraved in their minds. However, since morality is more important 
than arithmetic, God has given to man instincts that lead, straight 
away and without reasoning, to part of what reason commands.”440  
                                                                                                    
l'experience interne, ou sur des connoissances confuses, car on ne sent pas 
ce que c'est que la joye et la tristesse.” A VI, 6, p. 88; RB, p. 88. 
438 A VI, 6, p. 88. 
439 “…le penchant exprimé par l'entendement passe en precepte, ou verité 
de pratique: et si le penchant est inné, la verité l'est aussi, n'y ayant rien 
dans l'ame qui ne soit exprimé dans l'entendement mains non pas 
tousjours par une consideration actuelle distincte, comme j'ay assez fait 
voir.” A VI, 6, p. 90; RB, p. 90. 
440 “La science Morale … n'est pas autrement innée que l'Arithmetique. 
Car elle depend aussi des demonstrations que la lumiere interne fournit. 
Et comme les demonstrations ne sautent pas d'abord aux yeux, ce n'est pas 
grande merveille, si les hommes ne s'apperçoivent pas tousjours et 
d'abord de tout ce qu'ils possedent en eux, et ne lisent pas assés 
promtement les caracteres de la loi naturelle, que Dieu selon S. Paul a 
gravé dans leur esprits. Cependant comme la Morale est plus importante 
que l'Arithmetique, Dieu a donné à l'homme des instincts qui portent 
d'abord et sans raisonnement à quelque chose de ce que la raison 
ordonne.” A VI, 6, p. 92; RB, p. 92. In a memoir Consilium de encyclopaedia 
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Bearing in mind the distinction between hard and soft rationality, 
discussed in Chapter 5, it seems clear that Leibniz was allowing for 
“softer” reasoning with respect to moral deliberation here. 
Although acting on moral instinct is rational in some sense (it is 
related to innate ideas), it is still far from demonstrative moral 
knowledge. One could say that the moral agent almost always acts 
in a state of uncertainty.  
Not surprisingly, however, the precepts received from moral 
instinct are less powerful than the ones provided by the inner light: 
“…these instincts do not irresistibly impel us to act: our passions 
lead us to resist them, our prejudices obscure them, and contrary 
customs distort them. Usually, though, we accede to these instincts 
of conscience, and even follow them whenever stronger feelings do 
not overcome them.”441  
Hence Leibniz considered it important to find firm foundations 
for ethics and to replace soft reasoning with demonstrative 
reasoning – a goal that is evident in many ethical fragments in 
which he sought definitions for moral concepts. His aim was to 
systematise moral philosophy (especially the theory of justice), and 
to analyse it into the simplest principles. For example, in a letter to 
Ernst August he wrote:  
“Justice is the charity of the wise or a charity confirming to wisdom. 
Charity is nothing else than general benevolence. Wisdom is the 
science of happiness. Happiness is a durable state of joy. Joy is a 
sentiment of perfection. Perfection is the degree of reality.”442 
                                                                                                    
nova conscribenda methodo inventoria (1679) Leibniz defined moral science as 
science of the mind and its movements. See Leibniz, Art of Controversies, p. 
139.  
441 “Mais ces instincts ne portent pas à l'action d'une maniere invincible; 
on y resiste par des passions, on les obscurcit par des prejugés et on les 
altere par des coustumes contraires. Cependant on convient le plus 
souvent de ces instincts de la conscience et on les suit même quand de 
plus grandes impressions ne les surmontent.” A VI, 6, pp. 92-93; RB, pp. 
92-93.  
442 “La justice est la charité du sage; ou une charité conforme à la sagesse. 
La Charité n’est autre chose que la bienveillance generale. La Sagesse c’est 
la science de la felicité. La Felicité est l’estat de joye durable. La Joye c’est 
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In an ideal case, when the agent is wise enough to distinguish 
between real and apparent goods, goodness and perfection are two 
inseparable terms.443 The goal of ethics is to make rational 
decisions and to provide the basis for politics.444  
The fact that in his approach to ethics Leibniz was a 
consequentialist complicated the process of moral reasoning. The 
right action produces pleasure and happiness, and people should 
try to calculate or estimate the consequences of their actions in 
order to find the best alternative, bearing in mind the notion of 
universal perfection. In this sense in his ethics he was proto-
utilitarist – the best actions produce as much universal perfection 
as possible. 
 
9. 1.  Goodness, Love, Justice and Pleasure 
 
Leibniz gave various definitions of goodness. In Essais de Theodicée, 
§209 he stated that perfection includes three different kinds of 
goodness: physical goodness consisting of pleasure, moral 
goodness consisting of virtue, and metaphysical goodness 
consisting of reality.445 Metaphysical goodness was discussed in 
Chapter 2.5. – here I will concentrate on moral and physical 
goodness.  
Perhaps the most important property of goodness in general is 
universality. Leibniz believed that what was good and just was 
objectively so and not decided by God, as he explained in 
Meditationes sur la notion commune de la justice (1702-03):  
“It is agreed that whatever God wills is good and just. But there 
remains the question whether it is good and just because God wills 
it or whether God wills it because it is good and just: in other 
words, whether justice and goodness are arbitrary or whether they 
                                                                                                    
un sentiment du perfection. La Perfection c’est la degré de realité.” (a 
letter to Ernst August) A I, 4, p. 315. 
443 Nicolas, La rationalité morale du monde chez Leibniz, p. 163. 
444 On the relationship between Leibniz’s ethics and politics, see Naert, La 
pensée politique de Leibniz.  
445 G VI, p. 242. 
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belong to the necessary and eternal truths about the nature of 
things, as do numbers and proportions.”446 
This question, raised in Plato’s Euthypro, is taken up in many of 
Leibniz’s legal and political writings, and he consistently chose the 
latter alternative.447 For him the good was normative and one 
should strive towards it within the limits of one's abilities.448 The 
understanding and the will of the moral agent was always directed 
to the apparent good and if one was enlightened enough, one 
could recognise the real good in most situations. Choosing good 
freely brings joy and this motivates the agent to act virtuously.  
Although Leibniz held the view that the moral agent was, at 
best, drawn to intellectual pleasures representing moral egoism, he 
argued that another theory was needed that defined the relations 
between human beings. This he provided with his original theories 
of love and justice. He typically tried to reconcile egoism and 
altruism in his practical philosophy.  However, he considered the 
primary motivation for action to be egoistical:  
“Goodness is simply the inclination to do good for everyone, and to 
arrest evil, at least when it is not necessary for a greater good or to 
arrest a greater evil.”449 
                                                 
446 “On convient que tout ce que Dieu veut est bon et juste. Mais on 
demande s'il est bon et juste par ce que Dieu le veut ou si Dieu le veut par 
ce qu'il est bon et juste: c'est-à-dire si la justice ou la bonté est arbitraire, ou 
si elle consiste dans les verités necessaires et eternelles de la nature des 
choses, comme les nombres et les proportions.” M, p. 56; Leibniz, Political 
Writings, p. 45 
447 Platos's Eutphyro was also discussed by Hugo Grotius, one of Leibiz's 
heroes, in his De Jure Belli ac Pacis I, I, x. Leibniz, Political Writings, p. 9. 
448 See Heinekamp, Das Problem des Guten bei Leibniz, pp. 96-97. 
1 “…la bonté n'est autre chose que l'inclination à faire du bien à tous, et à 
empecher le mal, à moins qu'il ne soit necessaire pour un plus grand bien 
ou pour empecher un plus grand mal.” (Meditationes sur la notion commune 
de la justice) M, p. 62; Leibniz, Political Writings, p. 50. The inclination 
Leibniz mentioned here is connected to moral instinct in Nouveaux essais I, 
ii, §2. Thus moral instinct is also important in his social thought. See 
Naaman Zauderer, Rethinking Leibniz's Notions of Justice, Love and Human 
Motives, pp. 674-75. 
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Leibniz argued in his theory of love that one should do good to 
everyone, since it is in this way that one’s own intellectual 
pleasures are increased. Love is simply the joy or sentiment of 
increasing perfection that follows from other people’s happiness - 
it is one's own and the other's happiness combined.450 When one 
person does good for another he or she senses the increase in 
perfection in the world and is pleased by the other person’s 
happiness. This pleasure is love, and consequently, he or she loves 
the other person.  
Love, despite its egoistic component, is disinterested because 
the joy one receives is represented by one's object of love.451 Loving 
God gives us the greatest pleasure, since our innate ideas represent 
Him, and by loving our neighbours we will contribute to His glory 
which in turn makes Him love us even more.  
“Love is the affection that makes us take pleasure in the perfection of 
the object of our love, and there is nothing more perfect than God, nor 
any greater delight than in Him. To love Him it suffices to envisage 
His perfection, which is easy indeed, because we find such within 
ourselves.”452 
Leibniz’s theory has been recently challenged by Noa Naaman 
Zauderer. She asks: “How can a man act justly, if his principal 
motive is gaining pleasure?” I think this is a justified question and 
one to which Leibniz had no direct answer, although it is clear that 
he considered the attainment of pleasure not to be the only motive 
for human action. As Naaman Zauderer goes on to argue, one 
                                                 
450 On definitions of love, see, for example G II, p. 577, G VI, p. 27 and G 
VII, p. 547.  
451 “…on ne considere et ne demande point d’autre plaisir propre que 
celuy là même, qu’on trouve dans le bien ou plaisir de celuy qu’on aime; 
mais dans ce sens nous n’aimons point proprement ce qui est incapable de 
plaisir ou de bonheur, et nous joissons des choses de cette nature sans les 
aimer pour cela…” (Nouveaux essais II, xx, §5) A VI, 6, p. 163; RB p. 163. 
452 “L’Amour est cette affection qui nous fait trouver du plaisir dans les 
perfections de ce qu’on aime, et il n’y a rien de plus parfait que Dieu, ny 
rien de plus charmant. Pour l’aimer, il suffit d’en envisager les perfections, 
ce qui est aisé, parce que nous trouvons en nous leur idées.” (Essais de 
Théodicée, preface) G VI, p. 27; H, p. 51.  
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might construct an answer along the following lines: acting for 
both egoistical as well as altruistic reasons is acceptable and 
provides pleasure to the mind as long as we act in the right way. 453 
To connect this interpretation to my view, one could say that one 
can act correctly by moral instinct without really reasoning about 
the relevant facts of the matter. Thus Leibniz would seem to allow 
for both kinds of motives in human moral action.  
This would appear to be justified, but I think Leibniz would 
have favoured the latter, more demanding alternative. Although 
the former action is rational in some sense, the latter is virtuous, as 
we will shortly see. In this respect, an interesting point of 
comparison is his support of probabiliorism against probabilism 
(see Chapter 6.2.2.). Perhaps one could say by way of analogy, that 
he thought one should find the right way to act according to the 
nature of things (by finding the source of the pleasure gained from 
a morally right act) rather than choose a morally safe option (doing 
the thing that has been generally accepted). 
Leibniz’s version of the golden rule gave a more social 
dimension to love. He discussed this in a short tract entitled La 
place d’autruy, claiming at the beginning that la place d’autruy was 
the right point of view in politics as well as in morals.454 We should 
put ourselves, or imagine ourselves, in the place of the other, 
which was the maxim of Jesus Christ. We should go against 
Hobbes in assuming that our neighbour is a friend and not an 
enemy.455  
By placing ourselves in the position of others we would sense 
the perfection in them which would give us pleasure and create 
love in us. This principle would give us a new moral and legal 
point of view.456 It works in degrees: the more we take in other 
                                                 
453 Naaman Zauderer, Rethinking Leibniz's Notions of Justice, Love and 
Human Motives. 
454 Gr, p. 699. 
455 Leibniz did not accept anthropological assumptions such as homo 
homini lupus or bellum omnium contra omnes. Gil, Leibniz, la place d’autrui, le 
principle du pire et la politique de la La Monadologie, p. 151. 
456 “Ainsi on peut dire que la place d’autruy en morale comme en 
politique est une place propre à nous faire decouvrir des considerations 
qui sans cela ne nous seroient point venues, et que tout ce que nous 
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points of view, the greater our wisdom. Divine understanding, of 
course, incorporates the viewpoint of all the spirits. We should 
therefore strive to adopt the broadest possible perspective (without 
ignoring our own) in order to fully understand the consequences 
of our moral actions. Leibniz used the principle of la place d’autruy 
as a heuristic device for furthering understanding of the world and 
justice. This principle has been compared with Kant’s categorical 
imperative.457 
  Combining the concepts of love and wisdom allows the 
concept of justice to emerge. Leibniz defined justice as the habit of 
loving as long as it is in accordance with wisdom, in other words 
as caritas sapientas, charity or love practised by a wise man. It 
implies rational activity for the common good – it means living 
virtuously. Thus the maintenance of other people's well-being is a 
means for increasing universal perfection. Morality and justice 
work side by side towards increasing perfection in the world, and 
thus egoism and altruism are combined in Leibniz's view of 
rational action. 458  
He attempted to bring together the two alternative interpretations 
of natural law that were dominant in his day. Hugo Grotius thought 
that the desire for society, appetitus societatis, would make men place 
                                                                                                    
trouverions injuste si nous etions à la place d’autruy nous doit paroistre 
suspect d’injustice.” (Gr, p. 701) In Meditationes sur la notion commune de la 
justice he argued that the judge must put himself not only in the place of 
the criminal but also in that of the others whose interest lies in the crime 
being punished. Leibniz, Political Writings, p. 56. 
457 Dascal, One Adam and Many Cultures, p. 403. 
458 In a short memoir On generosity Leibniz defined generosity as the virtue 
that drives us to perform actions that are worthy of our kind, or our 
origin, which is heavenly. The generous person is extraordinarily 
virtuous, and avoids any sins or injustices, is suspicious of everything that 
is made easy, avoids all basic things available to every man, and every 
course of action that includes self-interest. He argued that justice is the 
soul of generosity. By following God's intentions to promote general 
welfare and pride in our own deeds we become generous. A VI, 4, pp. 
2718-21; Leibniz, On Generosity, p. 18-19. For some reason, he never 
returned to this theme in his later writings, although the general 
compatibility with his other ethical work is evident. Rutherford, Leibniz's 
“On Generosity”, p. 17. 
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the good of society before their own short-term interests. Hobbes, on 
the other hand, believed that all society was bent on gain, or on glory 
– in other words driven not so much by love for its fellow members 
as by self-love. Leibniz was sure that the Grotian and Hobbesian 
views could be easily reconciled. He used his version of the golden 
rule as a standpoint and broadened it to include charity to fellow 
men in the form of love. He attempted to show that there was reason 
for complaint not only when one person was harmed by another, but 
also when one person was not helped to obtain a great good by 
another who could do so without significant loss to himself.  
Leibniz summed up the themes we have discussed above in Initia 
et specimina scientia novae generalis as follows: 
“He who has wisdom loves everybody. He who has wisdom seeks the 
benefit of all. He who has wisdom gains a lot. He who has wisdom is a 
friend of God. God's friend has happiness...He who has wisdom is 
righteous. He who is righteous has happiness.”459 
Thus, goodness had a strong emotional effect on Leibniz's ethics. 
He defined joy as a sentiment [sentiment, voluptas, delectatio] of 
increasing perfection.460 Consequently, the soul feels togetherness, 
order, freedom and power.461 The sentiment of increasing 
perfection is connected to the pleasure of the mind, that is a clear 
but confused perception of perfection or harmony.  
                                                 
21”Wer die Weisheit hat, liebet alle. Wer Weishat hat, sucht aller nuzen. 
Wer Weishat hat, nuzet vielen. Wer Weishat hat, ist ein Freund Gottes. Ein 
Freund Gottes ist glückseelig...Wer Weishat  hat, ist gerecht. Wer gerecht 
ist, ist glückseelig.” G VII, p. 77. 
460 See a letter to Ernst August, A I, 4, p. 315. The term sentiment has many 
meanings in Leibniz's philosophy – it may refer to pain or joy, sense 
perception and representation in the same sense as images or appereances 
do. For discussion, see McRae, Leibniz: Perception, Apperception, and 
Thought, p. 29.  
461 “Wenn nun die Seele in ihr selbst eine grosse zusammenstimmung, 
ordnung, freyheit, krafft oder vollkommenheit fühlet, und folglich daran 
lust empfindet, so verursachet solches eine Freude, wie auss allen diesen 
und obigen erclärungen abznehmen.” (Initia et specimina Scientiae novae 
Generalis) G VII, p. 88. 
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Enjoying the good or the perfection that forms the pleasure of 
the mind is a major theme in his ethics. He defined pleasure in 
Nouveaux essais, II, xxi, §42 as follows:  
“Now, although pleasure cannot be given a nominal definition, any 
more than light or colour can, it can like them be defined causally: I 
believe that, fundamentally, pleasure is a sentiment of perfection, and 
pain a sentiment of imperfection, provided that each is notable enough 
to be apperceived.”462  
The sentiment of increasing perfection should be intense enough 
and last long enough for the mind to notice, reflect on and 
apperceive it.463 It is to be distinguished from sensation, which is a 
perception accompanied by a memory. To be affected by it 
requires innate ideas and, in particular, a moral instinct.  
This feature of Leibniz's philosophy of emotions draws 
influences not only from Aquinas,464 but also from Spinoza, who 
thought that when our power to maintain self-preservation 
increased, we would feel joy (pleasure) and when it decreased we 
would feel sadness (pain). In his definition of joy [laetitia] Spinoza 
argues that moving from inadequate ideas (smaller perfection) to 
adequate ideas (greater perfection) increases our power and 
consequently our joy and therefore we should increase our 
knowledge of God or nature.465 The joy comes in degrees – the 
more adequate ideas we have, the more perfect we will become 
and the more we will understand God or nature. Passions are 
                                                 
462 “Or quoyque le plaisir ne puisse point recevoir une definition 
nominale, non plus que la lumiere, ou la chaleur; il en peut pourtant 
recevoir une causale, comme elles; et je crois que dans le fonds, le plaisir 
est un sentiment de perfection, et la douleur un sentiment d’imperfection; 
mais qui soit si notable, qu'on s'en puisse apercevoir…” A VI, 6, p. 194; 
RB, p. 194. On the different pleasures possible for a spirit, see Grua, La 
justice humaine selon Leibniz, p. 51. Of pleasure and happiness, see also 
Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, p. 49f. 
463 In Nouveaux essais (II, xx, §1) Leibniz stated that pleasure and pain 
appear to consist in notable helps and hindrances. A VI, 6, p. 162.  
464 On Aquinas' views on emotions, see Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and 
Medieval Philosophy, pp. 239-55. 
465 See Spinoza, Ethics III, prop. XI, Scholium. 
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usually confused ideas that cause suffering to the mind, which in 
turn produce sadness and inactivity.466  
According to Leibniz, activity brings pleasure and passivity 
brings pain. Joy makes men alert, active and hopeful of further 
success.467 However, as the distinctness of perceptions is a matter 
of degree, activity also comes in degrees.468 The more distinctly a 
substance perceives, the more active it is, and at the same time, it is 
more perfect. The passive substance has proportionally more 
confused than clear perceptions in cognition, and less perfection.469  
“[Joy] appears to me to signify a state in which pleasure predominates 
in us; for during the deepest sorrow and amidst sharpest anguish one 
can have some pleasure, e.g., from drinking or from hearing music, 
                                                 
466 Leibniz mentioned in a letter to Placcius of February 1678 that Spinoza 
said many good things about the emotions. Kneale, Leibniz and Spinoza on 
Activity, p. 220. Another influence may have been the Renaissance scholar 
Lorenzo Valla, who belonged to the Epicurean tradition and whose work 
De Voluptate was an attempt to achieve a synthesis between Christian 
virtues and pleasure. On the influence of Valla, see Grua, La justice 
humaine selon Leibniz, p. 43f and Piro, Leibniz and Ethics: the Years 1669-72, 
p. 157. Leibniz may also have been influenced by Malebranche, whose 
view was that humans could reach happiness by loving the divine order 
for its own sake. The pure rational love of order is the sole principle of 
merit we could gain, and feeling was an important factor in deliberation. 
For a discussion on Malebranche's views of the soul, see Jolley, 
Malebranche on the soul. 
467 NE II, xx, §8, A VI, 6, p. 167. 
468 “…je croy qu’on peut dire que celle qui immediatement par là passe à 
un plus grand degré de perfection ou à une expression plus parfaite, 
exerce sa puissance, et agit, et celle qui passe à un moindre degré fait 
connoistre sa foiblesse, et patit. Aussi tiens je que toute action d’une 
substance qui a de la perception importe quelque volupté, et toute passion 
quelque douleur, et vice versa…” G IV, p. 441; L, p. 313. This view could 
be compared to Leibniz’s conception of death in La Monadologie, §73, 
where he described death as envelopments and diminuations, and 
generation as developments and increases. G VI, p. 619. He did not specify 
what these changes concerned. The context gives the impression that the 
question was one of substance. 
469 See La Monadologie, §49-50 and Calabi, Leibnizian Pleasures, p. 243. 
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although displeasure dominates; and similarly in the midst of the most 
acute agony the mind can be joyful, as happened with martyrs.”470 
As mentioned previously, the sentiment of increasing perfection 
requires that the perceptions are notable enough to be 
apperceived. This does not necessarily mean that single 
perceptions should be clear and distinct. Various passages in 
Nouveaux essais make it clear that minute perceptions may combine 
to make themselves notable: 
“This account about tiny aids, imperceptible little escapes and releases 
of a thwarted endeavour, which finally generate notable pleasure, also 
provides somewhat more distinct knowledge of our inevitably 
confused ideas of pleasure and of pain…”471 
The clear but confused perception of perfection corresponds with 
our moral instinct through the imagination in the manner 
discussed in Chapter 4.3.3. In this way outer objects can create a 
sentiment of increasing perfection in us.472 This increase in 
perfection corresponds with the moral identity of man, and this is 
why animals cannot experience moral motives. 
However, there are also more dangerous inclinations. At every 
moment outer objects may give rise to vivacious confused 
perceptions, in other words, sensual pleasures (for example, 
                                                 
470 “…elle me paroist signifier un estat où le plaisir predomine en nous, car 
pendant la plus profonde tristesse, et au milieu des plus cuisans chagrins 
on peut prendre quelque plaisir, comme de boire ou d'entendre la 
Musique, mais le deplaisir predomine; et de même au milieu des plus 
aigües douleurs, l’esprit peut estre dans la joye, ce qui arrivoit aux 
martirs.” (Nouveaux essais, II, xx, §7). A VI, 6, p. 166; RB, p. 166. See also De 
publica felicitate, Gr, p. 613. 
471 “Cette consideration des petites aides ou petites deliverances et 
degagemens imperceptibles de la tendance arretée, dont resulte enfin un 
plaisir notable, sert aussi à donner quelque connoissance plus distincte de 
l'idée confuse que nous avons et devons avoir du plaisir et de la 
douleur...” A VI, 6, p. 165; RB, p. 165. 
472 “Le plaisir est <une connoissance ou> [Un] sentiment de <la> 
perfection [ou ordre] non seulement en nous, mais aussi en autruy, car 
alors on excite encor quelque perfection <en nous>. (La Félicité) Gr, p. 579. 
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odours and visions) comprising inclinations that may lead us to 
strive for wrong goals. According to Donald Rutherford, the 
pleasures of the senses have two problems: first, they are not to be 
trusted – what appears good often turns out not to be - and 
secondly, they are inconstant – they have to be renewed often in 
order to maintain their quality.473 Physical goodness also includes 
other things than pleasures, however: Leibniz argued in Essais de 
Theodicée, §251 that it also includes well-being, such as health.474 
The pleasure of the mind, in fact, arises from clear and distinct 
perceptions, which occur “in the knowledge and production of 
order and harmony.”475 Leibniz argued that we obtain subjective 
pleasure from our increased understanding of the world, which is 
a result of an increase in clearness and distinctness and a decrease 
in confused elements in our cognition. Pleasure is thus also 
activity, since the increase in perfection is identical with it. When 
perfection is perceived in terms of clear and distinct ideas one 
could speak of intellectual pleasures in which the fundamentals of 
reality are found. This kind of pleasure is far superior to merely 
clear but confused ideas of perfection, and makes us truly 
appreciate and love God's creation. 476  
The perception of increasing perfection could also arise from 
other minds that we love. This has to do with Leibniz's theory that 
substances represented and mirrored the rest of the universe. The 
representation of increasing perfection in other substances 
                                                 
  473 Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, p. 50.  
474 G VI, p. 266. 
475 “...les plaisirs de cette nature, qui se trouvent dans la connoissance et 
production de l'ordre et harmonie sont les plus estimables.” (Nouveaux 
essais II, xxi, §41). A VI, 6, pp. 194-195; RB, pp. 194-95. 
476 See, for example, Essais de Theodicée, §278, G VI, p. 282 and PNG, §18, 
where Leibniz argued that supreme happiness is a beatific vision, 
although imperfect in some respects: “Il est vray que la supreme felicité 
(de quelque vision beatifique, ou connoissance de Dieu, qu'elle soit 
accompagnée) ne sauroit jamais être pleine, parce que Dieu étant infini, ne 
sauroit être connu entierement.” G VI, p. 606. Anselm regarded the 
contemplation of God as the perfection of human rationalism. On 
medieval conceptions of happiness, see Kretzmann et al. (ed), The 
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, p. 673f.  
 
 
 
177
intensified pleasure. For example, in Elementa juris naturalis he 
described the essence of pleasure as follows:  
“Delight, however, is doubled by reflection, whenever we contemplate 
the beauty within ourselves that our conscience makes, not to speak of 
our virtue. But as a double refraction can occur in the vision, once in 
the lens of the eye and once in the lens of a tube, the latter increasing 
the vision of the former, so there is a double reflection in thinking. For 
every mind is something like a mirror, and one mirror is in our mind, 
another in the mind of someone else. So if there are many mirrors, that 
is many minds recognizing our goods, there will be a greater light, the 
mirrors blending the light not only in the eye but also among each 
other. The gathered splendour constitutes glory.”477 
Pleasure intensifies with each reflection and this is how the 
universal progress of perfection may proceed.478 Perfection in 
general, or metaphysical perfection, is perceived by humans as 
continuity and harmony. As mentioned in Chapter 2, perfection is 
usually defined by Leibniz as unity in multiplicity. If the 
perception is harmonious, that is it expresses the richness of 
phenomena within simple laws, it gives us pleasure.479 Disorder, in 
contrast, gives us pain. An increase in perfection is more often felt 
than understood due to its complicated nature, and in these cases 
it is the moral instinct that is active.  
                                                 
477 “Duplicatur autem jucunditas reflexione, qvoties contemplamur 
pulchritudinem ipsi nostram, qvod fit conscientia tacita virtutis nostrae. 
Sed qvemadmodum duplex in visu refractio contingere potest, altera in 
lente oculi, altera in lente tubi, qvarum haec illam auget, ita duplex in 
cogitando reflexio est, cum enim omnis mens habeat speculi instar, 
alterum erit in mente nostra, alterum in aliena, et si plura sint specula, id 
est plures mentes bonorum nostrorum agnitrices, major lux erit, 
miscentisbus speculis non tantum in oculo lucem, sed et inter se, splendor 
collectus gloriam facit.” A VI, 1, p. 464; L, p. 137. 
478 In a letter to Arnauld from 1671 Leibniz argued that pleasure is 
multiplied and not added up when one acts for the good of others. See A 
II, 1, p. 174.   
479 Relying on different sources from Leibniz, Gaston Grua said: “Pleasure 
is perception of harmony, feeling of harmony or harmony in a feeling.” 
Grua, La justice humaine selon Leibniz, p. 48.  
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“We do not always observe of what the perfection of pleasing things 
consist, or what kind of perfection within ourselves they serve, yet our 
character [gemüt] perceives it, even though our understanding does 
not. We commonly say, “There is something, I know not what, that 
pleases me in the matter.”480  
As an example Leibniz mentioned music.481 Harmony has strong 
aesthetic values, and meditation on beauty (in God’s creation, for 
example) gives us the greatest pleasure. He stated in Résumé of 
Metaphysics (ca. 1697) that “an intelligent being's pleasure is simply 
the perception of beauty, order and perfection.”482 In other words, 
pleasure consists of perceiving harmony, which is perfection.483  
“Consonances please, since agreement is easily observable in 
them…Agreement is sought in variety, and the more easily it is 
observed there, the more it pleases; and in this consists the feeling of 
perfection. Moreover, the perfection a thing has is greater, to the extent 
                                                 
480 “Man mercket nicht allzeit, worinn die Wollkommenheit der 
angenehmen Dinge beruhe, oder zu was für einer Wollkommenheit sie in 
uns dienen: unterdessen wird es doch von unsern gemüth, obscon nicht 
von unsern Verstand, empfunden. Man sagt ins gemein: es ist, ich weiss 
nicht was, so mir an der sach gefället…” (Von der Weissheit) G VII, p. 86; L, 
p. 425. 
481 See La Félicité, Gr, p. 271, in which Leibniz mentioned music and 
symmetry as pleasures of the senses that most closely approach the 
pleasures of the mind. He also warned that these pleasures should not be 
used too often. However, in De rerum originatione radicali he argued that 
harmony may profit from some dissonance that spices up the whole: 
“…scilicet componendi artifices dissonantias saepissime consonantiis 
miscent ut excitetur auditor et quasi pungatur, et veluti anxius de eventu, 
mox omnibus in ordinem restitutis…” G VII, p. 306. He approved of 
opera, which he thought had its origins in Church music. He considered it 
a powerful instrument that could be used to govern the passions and 
incite feelings of honour, virtue and natural piety in common man. Aiton, 
Leibniz, A Biography, p. 121. He also studied acoustics. For some texts on 
acoustics, see Ger, p. 10-37 
482 “Voluptas enim intelligentis nihil aliud est quam perceptio 
pulchritudinis, ordinis, perfectionis.” G VII, p. 290. 
483 As mentioned in Chapter 2.5., opinions vary concerning the identity of 
harmony and perfection. 
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that there is more agreement in greater variety, whether we observe it 
or not. Therefore, this is what order and regularity come to.”484  
One feature of pleasure is still to be noted and that is anticipation. 
Pleasure is necessarily backwards looking – it contains a 
mnemonic component. A pleasure leaves a memory trace or an 
echo in us and creates anticipation of future pleasures. When we 
have experienced a powerful feeling of pleasure in something, we 
desire more of the same kind, and because a true increase in 
perfection (in other words, promoting universal perfection) creates 
much greater pleasure than sensual pleasures, we are inclined to 
engage in the kind of actions that produce such pleasure in us.485 
Thus reasonable choices motivate subsequent choices, and the 
habit of doing good leads to virtue.  
 
9. 2. Happiness and Virtue 
 
Striving for goodness or pursuing joy may eventually lead to 
happiness. “…we act to attain happiness or a state of enduring joy, 
and joy is the sense of perfection.”486 However, Leibniz doubted 
the existence of a complete state of joy or happiness:  
                                                 
484 “Hinc scis placere consonantias, quia in iis consensus facile est 
observabilis…Consensus quaeritur in varietate, hic placet eo magis, quo 
facilius observatur, et in hoc consistit sensus perfectionis. Perfectio autem 
in re ipsa est tanto major, quanto major est consensus in majore varietate, 
sive a nobis observatur vel non. Huc ergo redit ordo et regularitas.” GW, 
p. 171; AG, p. 233. 
485 See NE, I, ii, §20-24. On the metaphysical dimensions of anticipation, 
see Kaehler, Leibniz' metaphysiche Begründung der Möglichkeit rationaler und 
ästhetischer Antizipation. 
486 “Agimus autem ut felicitatem consequamur sive duraturae laetitiae 
statum. Laetitia vero est sensus perfectionis. “ (Praefatio ad libellum 
elementorum physicae) A VI, 4, p. 1993; L, p. 280. In NE I, ii, §3 Leibniz also 
defined happiness as lasting joy. A VI, 6 p. 90; RB, p. 90. In an early 
dialogue, Confessio philosophi (1672-73), his spokeman said that happiness 
consists in the most harmonious state of mind and that the harmony of the 
mind consists in thinking about harmony and the greatest harmony of the 
mind or happiness consists in the concentration of universal harmony, i.e. 
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“I do not know if the greatest pleasure is possible; I am inclined to 
believe that it can increase to infinity, for we do not know how far our 
knowledge and our organs can be developed in the course of the 
eternity that lies before us. So I would think that happiness is a lasting 
pleasure that cannot occur without continual progress to new 
pleasures….We might say, then, that happiness is a pathway through 
pleasures and that pleasure is only a single step to happiness...”487  
Subjective happiness has to be continuously sustained in order to 
be preserved. Leibniz, like Spinoza, argued that the more active 
one is, the more one attains joy and the more one's feeling of 
perfection is increased. Contemplating God and His perfections 
brings about the most complete joy and activity. 
Given Leibniz’s love of analogy, it is easy to infer that he also 
considered universal happiness a process. The process of 
increasing perfection is never complete: the virtuous person sees it 
as his or her task to promote it (thus striving for moral goodness), 
and in the process one also gains pleasure. One's deeds contribute 
to one's future happiness, which may follow from God's 
benevolence in the hereafter. This could be achieved by striving for 
intellectual activity, which gives us supreme pleasure:  
                                                                                                    
of God, in the mind. Since God is an infinite being, happiness can also 
increase to infinity. Leibniz, Confessio philosophi, pp. 30-31. 
487 “Je ne say si le plus grand plaisir est possible; je croirois plus tost qu’il 
peut croistre à l’infini, car nous ne savons pas jusqu’où nos connoissances 
et nos organes peuvent estre portés dans toute cette eternité qui nous 
attend. Je croirois donc que le bonheur est un plaisir durable, ce qui ne 
sauroit avoir lieu sans une progression continuelle à de nouveaux 
plaisirs….Le bonheur est donc (pour ainsi dire) un chemin par des 
plaisirs; et le plaisir n’est qu’un pas et un avancement vers le bonheur…” 
(Nouveaux essais II, xxi, §42) A VI, 6, p. 194, RB, p. 194. For a discussion of 
medieval mystical treatises by Clement of Alexandria on the process of 
perfection, see Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, p. 
120, for a discussion of the matter by Cappadocian fathers, pp. 127-36, of 
Aquinas' theory of pleasure and enjoyment, pp. 252-53, of the views on 
pleasure and enjoyment of the voluntarists, p. 269f, and of Adam 
Wodeheim's distinction between temporal and infinite fear and suffering, 
p. 281. 
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“All pleasure is a feeling of some perfection; one loves an object in 
proportion to the sense of perfection it evokes; nothing surpasses 
divine perfection. Whence it follows that charity and the love of God 
give the greatest pleasure that can be conceived, in proportion to the 
extent to which one is penetrated by these feelings, which are not 
common among men, busied and taken up as they are with the objects 
that concern their passions.”488  
Moral goodness or virtue arises from the knowledge and love of 
God, for it makes us take pleasure in willing as He wills. In other 
words, we should imitate God (who is perfection itself) in all our 
actions, since the harmony, goodness and beauty of the world 
reflect His qualities.  
“One must hold as certain that the more a mind desires to know order, 
reason, and the beauty of things that God has produced, and the more 
he is moved to imitate this order in the things God has left to his 
direction, the happier he will be.”489 
As mentioned, Leibniz distinguished real from apparent good; he 
held that judgement concerned apparent good while correct 
reasoning concerned real good: something is apparent good if it is 
believed to produce pleasure, and real good, if it, in fact, does 
produce pleasure.490 Apparent good will satisfy only temporary 
needs, while real good produces more lasting pleasure. One 
should strive for real good and greater pleasures, which are to be 
found, again, in meditating about the creator and supreme being, 
God. 
                                                 
488 “Tout plaisir est un sentiment de quelque perfection: l’on aime un objet, 
à mesure qu’on en sent les perfections: rien ne surpasse les perfections 
Divines: d’où il suit que la charité et l’amour de Dieu donnent le plus 
grand plaisir qui se puisse concevoir, à mesure qu’on est penetré de ces 
sentimens, qui ne sont pas ordinaires aux hommes, parce qu’ils sont 
occupés et remplis des objets qui se rapportent à leur passions.” (Essais de 
Theodicée, §278) G VI, p. 282; H, p. 297. 
489 “Il faut tenir pour asseuré que plus un esprit desire de connoistre 
l’ordre, a raison, la beauté des choses que Dieu a produites, et plus il est 
porté à imiter cet ordre dans les choses que Dieu a abandonnées à sa 
conduite, plus il sera heureux.” Gr, p. 581; Leibniz, Political Writings, p. 84. 
490 See NE, II, xxi, §31f. 
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“One need not shun at all pleasures that are born of intelligence or of 
reason, as one penetrates the reason of the reason of perfections, in 
other words to say as one sees them flow from their source, which is 
the absolutely perfect Being…But one cannot love God without 
knowing his perfections, or his beauty. And since we can know Him 
only in His emanations, these are two means of seeing his beauty, 
namely in the knowledge of eternal truths (which explain [their own] 
reasons in themselves), and in the knowledge of the harmony of the 
universe (in applying reasons to facts). That is to say, one must know 
the marvels of reason and the marvels of nature.”491  
For this purpose Leibniz conceived of various methods of 
increasing knowledge – which included his scientia generalis, 
characteristica universalis, his plans for a universal encyclopaedia 
and different probability and “soft” heuristic methods (such as 
dialectics, hermeneutics and decision models). Living virtuously 
gives us supreme pleasure and happiness, and leads us to 
wisdom.492 
Leibniz discussed wisdom in a short memoir called Von der 
Weisheit. He began by suggesting that it is merely the science of 
happiness, or the science that teaches us to achieve the permanent 
state of joy that is happiness. Happiness, again, is acquired by 
feeling the increase in perfection, which also creates a sense of 
                                                 
491 “On ne doit point se defier des plaisirs qui naissent de l’intelligence ou 
des raisons, lorsqu’on penetre la raison de la raison des perfections, c’est à 
dire lors qu’on les voit decouler de leur source qui est l’estre absolument 
parfait…Mais on ne scauroit aimer Dieu sans connoistre ses perfections ou 
sa beauté. Et comme nous ne le scaurions connoistre que dans ses 
emanations, il y a deux moyens de voir sa beauté, scavoir dans la 
connoissance des verités eternelles <expliquant les raisons, en elles 
mêmes>, et dans la connoissance de l’Harmonie de l’Univers en 
appliquant les raisons aux faits. C’est à dire il vaut connoistre les 
merveilles de la raison [ou de l’esprit] et les merveilles de la nature.” Gr, 
pp. 580-81; Leibniz, Political Writings, pp. 83-84.  
492 “Pour contribuer veritablement au bonheur des hommes, il faut leur 
éclairer l'entendement, il faut fortifier leur volonté dans l'exercise des 
vertus, c'est à dire dans l'habitude d'agir suivant la raison; et il faut tacher 
enfin d'oster les obstacles, qui les empechent de trouver la verité et de 
suivre les veritables biens.” (Memoire pour des personnes eclairees et de bonne 
intention). A IV, 4, p. 615; Leibniz, Political Writings, p. 105.  
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harmony or perfection in the one who perceives it. Perfection 
elevates the person to a higher state and makes him or her more 
free than he or she would otherwise be:  
“…perfection shows itself in great freedom and power of action, since 
all being consists in a kind of power; and the greater the power, the 
higher and freer the being.”493 
He sums up his discussion by stating that happiness, pleasure, 
love, perfection, being, power, freedom, harmony, order and 
beauty are all tied to each other.494 Achieving wisdom means 
understanding the connections between these notions and the 
source from which they flow. Studying nature gives us knowledge 
of God’s perfections and reveals to us the principles of ethics, 
which in turn increase our love towards Him.495 By developing our 
understanding of the world we can gain happiness.496 
                                                 
493 “…die Vollkommenheit in einer grossen freiheit und krafft zu würden. 
Wie dann alles wesen in einer gewissen krafft bestehet, und je grösser die 
krafft, je höher und freier das wesen.” G VII, p. 87, L, p. 426. Another 
passage on the same topic occurs in Bien raisonner est en nostre pouvoir: 
“Nous sommes libres, entant que nous raisonnons juste; et esclaves autant 
que nous sommes maistrisés par les passions qui viennent des 
impressions interieures.” A VI, 4, p. 1640. Michael Murray argues that 
Leibniz supported a relatively unknown doctrine called moral 
necessetarianism, which was a mediating view between intellectualism 
(which held that the will followed the judgement) and voluntarism (the 
will is absolutely free). According to this view, the will follows the 
strongest inclination arising from a combination of conscious deliberation, 
unconscious perceptions and passions. Of course, God and the angels 
cannot have unconscious perceptions and passions. Moral 
necessetarianism was put forward by Diego Ruiz de Montoya and Diego 
Granado at the beginning of the 17th century. See Murray, Intellect, Will and 
Freedom, p. 43f and Murray, Pre-Leibnizian Moral Necessity. On moral 
necessetarianism, see also Knebel, Wille, Würfel und Wahrscheinlichkeit. As I 
will show later, I believe Leibniz thought that in complicated situations 
different inclinations were not to be summed, but multiplied. Thus the 
goal was an optimum, not a sum of inclinations. 
494 G VII, p. 87. 
495 In Specimen Demonstrationum Politicarum from 1669 Leibniz noted that 
deliberations concerning altruistic goals cannot be guided by prudence, 
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It seems that this is not possible for everybody, and no one can 
rise more easily to a higher state of happiness than persons of rank, 
who have the possibility to study and to do research. In fact, he 
who consorts much with excellent people or things becomes more 
excellent himself.497 This, of course, has to do with representation. 
The glorification of a person of rank or a prince is for the good of 
all: 
“When a person of rank attains this and finds his joy in the actions of 
his understanding and his virtue, even in the midst of all abundance 
and honour, I consider him doubly exalted. He is exalted unto himself 
because of this, his happiness and true joy; he is exalted before others 
because it is entirely certain that such a person can and will share his 
light and virtue with many others because of his power and 
reputation, since such sharing will reflect glory upon himself and so 
give new light to all those who have the same common purpose of 
helping each other in the search for truth, the knowledge of nature, the 
multiplication of human powers, and the advancement of the common 
good.”498 
                                                                                                    
which is the science of the good and that we need a science of the 
optimum, that is, wisdom related to perfection. Later he used the term 
wisdom exclusively. See prop. XXXVIII and Piro, Leibniz and Ethics: the 
Years 1669-72, p. 160.  
496 “…nichts mehr zur glückseeligkeit diene, als die erleuchtung des 
Verstandes, und übung des Willens allzeit nach dem verstande zu 
würden, und dass solche erleuchtung sonderlich in erkentniss derer Dinge 
zu suchen, die unsern verstand immer weiter zu einem höhern liecht 
bringen können…” G VII, p. 88. 
497 G VII, p. 88. 
498 “Wenn nun eine hohe Person solches erlanget, also dass sie auch mitten 
in allem überfluss und Ehren dennoch ihre grosse vergnügung findet in 
den Würchungen ihres verstands und ihrer Tugend, die halte ich doppelt 
für hoch: vor sich, wegen diesser ihrer glückseeligkeit und wahren 
Freude; für andere aber, weil ganz gewiss dass diese Person wegen ihrer 
macht und ansehens kan und wird auch vielen andern liecht und Tugend 
mittheilen, indem solche mittheilung eine rückstrahlung aufs sie selbst 
machet, und die so dergleichen gemeinsamen zweck haben, in 
untersuchung der Wahrheit, erkentniss der Natur, vermehrung 
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It is thus important that princes should understand their source of 
happiness and promote the progress of universal perfection. Thus, 
disagreeing with Hobbes, Leibniz argued in many of his political 
writings that princes should guarantee not only the security of 
their subjects, but also their happiness.499 Although in this respect 
he was ahead of his time, his political views were conservative on 
the whole, as can be seen in his letter to Burnett (1701): 
“The end of political science with regard to the doctrine of forms of 
commonwealths must be to make the empire of reason flourish. The 
end of monarchy is to make a hero of eminent wisdom and virtue 
reign…The end of aristocracy is to give government to the most wise 
and the most expert. The end of democracy, or polity, is to make the 
people themselves agree to what is good for them. And if one could 
have all three at once: a great hero, very wise senators, and very 
reasonable citizens, that would constitute a mixture of the three 
forms.”500 
                                                                                                    
menschlicher krafft und beförderung ihres gemeinen besten einander 
helfen und neues liecht geben können.” G VII, p. 89, L, p. 427. 
499 For example, he suggested establishing a fund for helping people who 
had been unlucky in their commercial ventures, such as in the shipping 
business. See K VI, p. 236. In the memoir Grundriss eines Bedenckens von 
Aufrichtung einer Societät in Deutschland he suggested many different 
projects for the common good and social well-being.  See A, IV, 1, p. 530f. 
Patrick Riley has argued that he anticipated Bismarck’s ideas of a welfare-
state. See Leibniz, Political Writings, p. 25, note. One can find similar 
remarks in Spinoza's Ethics, Part IV, appendix, XVII, where he argued that 
since the resources of an individual man are too limited to make all men 
his friends, the duty of the state is to provide aid for the poor.  I am 
grateful for Professor Simo Knuuttila of this observation. 
500 “Le but de la science politique à l'egard de la doctrine des Formes des 
Republiques, doit estre de faire fleurir l'Empire de la raison. Le but de la 
Monarchie est de faire regner un heros d'une eminente sagesse et 
vertu…Le but de l'Aristocratie est de donner le gouvernement aux plus 
sages at aux plus experts. Le but de la democratie, ou politie, est de faire 
convenir les peuples mêmes de ce qui est de leur bien. Et s'il y avoit tout à 
la fois: un grand Heros, des Senateurs tres sages, et des citoyens tres 
raisonnables, cela feroit le meslange des trois formes.” G III, p. 277; Riley, 
Leibniz' Universal Jurisprudence, pp. 214-215.  
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This is a reflection of God’s love towards his creation, and by 
imitating it princes can promote love in the world. Love, again, 
brings happiness. If princes were to make informed, in other 
words rational, decisions, everybody would profit from them. 
Understood in this manner, wisdom is essentially knowledge of 
one’s own good.501  
Of course, this view requires that the pleasure we get from 
increasing perfection is motivating enough for us to follow it. The 
goal that the real good in question represents may not be in sight, 
or may be represented only by symbols. This is why Leibniz 
promoted education on different levels, and argued that one must 
work for posterity.502 A great number of virtuous princes – virtue 
defined as living according to wisdom – promoted the general 
process of perfection so greatly that the same progress would 
otherwise have taken many hundreds of years.503  
Despite his high ideals and optimism about enlightenment, in 
his practical memoirs Leibniz was well aware that pleasure of the 
mind was often not sufficient to motivate men. In order to 
eliminate the “happy sinner” he postulated that God as the King of 
the Kingdom of Grace maintained harmony. If this harmony was 
broken, punishment must be given by way of atonement. The idea 
of an immortal soul and of a just God who rewards and punishes 
should alone prevent men from doing evil. Given the immortality 
of the soul, the punishment of the sinner would take place at some 
point of its history, which may not be during the natural lifetime of 
the agent. 504  
“…it is repugnant to say that only the law or constraint make a man 
just; although it must be conceded that those who have not reached 
this point of spiritual perfection are only susceptible to obligation by 
hope or fear; and that the prospect of divine vengeance, which one 
cannot escape even by death, can better than anything else make 
                                                 
501 Brown, Leibniz’s Moral Philosophy, pp. 415-16. 
502 (Memoire pour des personnes eclairees et de bonne intention), A IV, 4, p. 621. 
503 G VII, p. 89. 
504 On this theme, see Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, 
p. 59f. See also the introduction in Leibniz. Nature and Freedom, pp. 12-13. 
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apparent to them the absolute and universal necessity to respect law 
and justice.”505 
10. Deliberation 
 
10. 1. Some Major Influences on Leibniz's Views 
 
Leibniz’s theory of deliberation is an original combination of old 
and new ideas. The framework is the Aristotelian tradition, and 
especially the intellectualism of Thomas Aquinas, but Leibniz's 
pluralism, his dynamic world-view and his ethical conse-
quentialism complicate the picture.  
According to Aristotle, deliberation entails the application of a 
practical syllogism, for example, of which the first premise 
concerns the desirable end (person a wants state of things p to take 
place), the second premise concerns the necessary action to bring 
about the desired end (a believes that p will not take place unless 
he or she does q), and the conclusion is that the suggested action 
starts. 506 
Deliberation may also take the form of an eliminative model, 
which Aristotle describes in Book II, Chapter 9 of Nicomachean 
Ethics. Since it is often difficult to find a mediating course between 
excess and defiency, one should first avoid the one that is farthest 
away from the mean. If one cannot find the mediating course, one 
should choose the second-best alternative, which is the least evil 
option.507 If we cannot identify the right course, we should 
estimate which one will produce the least damage to the 
promotion of eudaimonia.  
Once the deliberation concerning the best means of promoting 
the end is complete and the recommendation for action offered by 
practical reason has been chosen (prohairesis), the action follows 
immediately, provided there is no hindrance. There is no place for 
freedom of deliberation between different means once the choice 
has been made. If the action in rational deliberation does not start 
                                                 
505 Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
506 See Nicomachean Ethics III, ch. 3. 
507 Nicomachean Ethics III, ch. 9, 1109a30-35. 
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once the judgement is completed, and there is no external 
hindrance, the reason for the “malfunction” is to be sought in the 
irrational soul. 
The other main trends in moral philosophy in Leibniz's time 
were stoicism (in the form of neo-stoicism, represented by Du Vair, 
for example) and the natural-law tradition, represented by Grotius, 
Hobbes, Pufendorf and Barbeyrac, among others.  
The Stoics’ views of emotions and deliberation were clearly 
different from the views of the proponents of the Aristotelian 
tradition. According to the Stoics, by following nature and 
cultivating reason a Stoic could attain virtue, which consists of 
knowledge. One could either have virtue (which meant to live in 
agreement with nature) or not. They argued that moral choices 
were determined by reason - thus men should get rid of disturbing 
elements that might interfere with the exercise of reason, and 
similarly suppress all false beliefs. In the process of deliberation 
the agent either gives assent to an impression or withholds it, in 
other words, agent gives in or resists the temptation.508 The goal is 
to reach a state of peace of mind (ataraksia) and good feeling 
(eupatheiai), in which no irrational elements are present.509  
Leibniz agreed with the Stoics in that one could achieve virtue 
by understanding the world order and willing as God wills. In 
many respects, however, he was critical of Stoicism, which he 
thought required the adaptation of the new ideas of the early 
modern period. He thought that restricting happiness to mere 
ataraksia abolished hope of increasing one's own happiness: it was 
forced happiness, or “patience without hope.”510 Arguing against 
                                                 
508 Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, p. 240. 
509 For a discussion of the Stoic theory of emotions, see Knuuttila, Emotions 
in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, pp. 47-71. 
510 “Il est vray que les enseignemens de Stoïciens (et peutestre aussi de 
quelques Philosophes celebres de nostre temps) se bornans à cette 
necessité pretendue, ne peuvent donner qu'une Patience forcée; au lieu 
que Nostre Seigneur inspire des pensées plus sublimes, et nous apprend 
même le moyen d'avoir du contentement, lorqu'il nous asseure que Dieu, 
parfaitement bon et sage, ayant soin de tout, jusqu'à ne point negliger un 
cheveu de nostre tête, nostre confiance en luy doit estre entiere…” (Essais 
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the Stoics, Leibniz postulated that we are able to anticipate God's 
will and strive to act in ways that pleased Him. At the same time, 
we could also increase our happiness. He did not consider hope a 
disturbing passion, as the Stoics did (in the sense that it meant 
discontent with the present world order), but rather saw it as a 
motivation to act for the general good.511 
Being a lawyer, Leibniz was also aware of the discussion 
concerning natural law. He consistently agreed with “the 
incomparable” Hugo Grotius and criticised voluntarists such as 
Descartes and Thomas Hobbes on major matters of justice, 
sovereignty and political rule.512 His main contemporary opponent 
was Pufendorf, whom he considered to be “an inferior German 
version of Hobbes.”513 Leibniz's main argument against Pufendorf 
was the same as his arguments against Descartes and Hobbes, that 
justice was not decided by God as a sovereign. It was based on 
eternal truths and the nature of things, as he argued in his Opinion 
on the Principles of Pufendorf (Epistola viri excellentissimi ad amicum 
qua monita quaedam ad principia Pufendorfiani operis de officio hominis 
et civis continentur, 1706):  
“Neither the norm of conduct itself, nor the essence of the just, 
depends on his free decision, but rather on eternal truths, objects of the 
divine intellect which constitute, so to speak, the essence of divinity 
itself.”514 
It was not only with the source of law, but also with Pufendorf's 
concept of obligation that Leibniz disagreed. He did not think that 
morality and deliberation should be related to something 
                                                                                                    
de Theodicée, preface). G VI, p. 30. On Leibniz's views on Stoicism, see 
Rutherford, Patience sans Espérance: Leibniz's Critique of Stoicism. 
511 Rutherford, Patience sans Espérance: Leibniz's Critique of Stoicism, pp. 67-
71. 
512 For an extensive discussion of Leibniz's political views, see Riley, 
Leibniz' Universal Jurisprudence.  
513 See Leibniz, Political Writings, p. 28.  
514 “Neque ipsa norma actionum aut natura justi, a libero ejus decreto, sed 
ab aeternis veritatibus divino intellectui objectis pendet; quae ipsa, ut sic 
dicam, divina effentia constituuntur.” Dut. IV, p. 280; Leibniz, Political 
Writings, p. 71.  
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temporary, such as a law or a superior with the power to punish, 
since any obligation to a ruler or state would cease when the 
superior died or the state collapsed.515 Thus one should build on 
rational, universal goodness, which could be found independently 
of the will of God. Men could imitate God in their actions, since 
God in His infinite understanding knows what is good and follows 
it. If God were to make moral laws, men could not tell whether 
they were good or bad. Furthermore, the claim that God is just 
would have no basis, since if there was nothing superior to Him, 
He could do whatever He pleased.   
Leibniz's critique (Monita for short, originally a letter to 
Molanus at his request) became famous when Barbeyrac added 
most of it to the fourth French edition of Pufendorf's De officio 
hominis et civis, which appeared in 1718 after Leibniz's death. 
Barbeyrac included his own comments, published anonymously, 
which competently defend Pufendorf's views. He pointed out that 
Leibniz's criticism missed the mark because Pufendorf 
distinguished between internal and external obligation, the former 
is being based on moral bond and thus complementing external 
obligation, which was based on command alone. However, 
Barbeyrac had difficulties in defending Pufendorf’s stand against 
Leibniz's argument concerning the circularity of the idea of God as 
both a judge and a lawmaker. Pufendorf apparently thought that 
while God had just reasons for his power, his will was also the 
source of justice and ethics.516  
Several other influences on Leibniz's views on deliberation 
should also be mentioned. One of these was Hobbes despite 
Leibniz’s general criticism of his thinking. Hobbes' psychological 
theory seemed to be very materialistic. In the sixth Chapter of the 
first book of Leviathan, for example, he pointed out that the mind is 
composed of motions of the body or bodies, and thus his 
                                                 
515 For a discussion of Leibniz's critique of Pufendorf, see Saastamoinen, 
The Morality of the Fallen Man.  
516 Commentators disagree about whether Brabeyrac succeeded in this 
task or not, and whether he gave up some of Pufendorf's ideas. See 
Korkman, Voluntarism and Moral Obligation – Barbeyrac's Defence of 
Pufendorf Revisited.    
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conception of the mind in a state of nature was non-rationalist. He 
claimed that impulses from outside (perceptions) caused motions, 
which he called endeavours. “This endeavour, when it is toward 
something which causes it, is called appetite, or desire…and when 
the endeavour is fromward something, it is generally called 
aversion.”517 
Deliberation, then, is “the whole summe of desires, aversions, 
hopes and fears, continued till the thing be either done, or thought 
impossible.”518 The choice is the last step in the process – the 
decision ends it. There is no independent will: “In deliberation, the 
last appetite, or aversion, immediately adhaering to the action, or 
to the omission thereof, is that we call the will; the act (not the 
faculty) of willing…”519 
During the process of deliberation the agent waits until a strong 
enough desire or aversion comes to put an end to it, thereby 
leading to action. These outer impulses affect our body in different 
magnitudes, and may also affect each other or exclude each other. 
In a complex situation we feel desires or inclinations and aversions 
alternately.  
In Hobbes' view the conflict between desires and aversions 
formed the background to deliberation and the outcome of this 
conflict was either the last “straw” that led to action, or to a 
situation in which no strong enough desire was present and 
consequently no action followed.520 This last “straw” was either a 
desire or an aversion.521 If it was a desire, it was called will, if an 
aversion, it was called unwillingness.522  
“…deliberation is nothing else but a weighing, as it were on scales, the 
conveniences and inconveniences of the fact we are attempting; where 
                                                 
517 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 38. See also Hobbes, Human nature and De Corpore 
politico, pp. 43-44. 
518 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 44. 
519 Ibid., p. 44. 
520 Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy, p. 88. 
521 Hobbes, Human nature and De Corpore politico, p. 71. 
522 See De Corpore xxv, 13. in Hobbes, Human nature and De Corpore politico, 
p. 227. 
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that which is more weighty, doth necessarily according to its 
inclination prevail with us.”523 
A desire that is strong enough leads to action unless there is a 
hindrance. The desires in question are essentially random – the 
process of deliberation is not rational in the sense of choosing 
between options judged good by the intellect.524 In this respect, 
Leibniz clearly differed from Hobbes in his views on deliberation, 
but as I will show, there were also similarities in more simple 
cases. 
One other major influence on Leibniz’s views on deliberation is 
still to be mentioned, namely that of Spinoza, who held that there 
was only one substance that was infinite and indivisible, 
God/nature.525 This one substance has attributes, of which Spinoza 
primarily mentioned two, extension and thought. Each of these 
could be conceived of either as a modification of thought or as a 
modification of extension.526 The human mind is a part or a 
modification of the infinite intellect of God. The corresponding 
object to the human mind is the body, which is a certain 
modification of God's attribute of extension.527 For this reason the 
mind and the body are the same unity, which could be conceived 
of either within the attribute of thought or within the attribute of 
extension.528 There are various interpretations of how the mind-
body relation is to be understood, but it is clear that Spinoza 
thought that they did not interact directly with each other. 
The emotions, or affects as Spinoza called them, are our ideas of 
the way in which other things affect us.529 The “perceptions” of the 
deliberator are interpretations of whether some object is good or 
bad for our power or self-preservation. When our power increases 
and we become more active we feel joy (pleasure), and when it 
decreases and we become passive we feel sadness (pain). The 
                                                 
523 De Cive, II, xiii, 16. 
524 Paden, Hobbesian Deliberators, p. 37. 
525 Spinoza, Ethics I, prop. 14. 
526 Ibid., II, prop. 7, schol. 
527 Ibid., II, prop. 13. 
528 Ibid., II, prop. 7, note. 
529 James, Actions and Passions, pp. 145-46. 
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passions are confused ideas that cause suffering to the mind, and 
in turn produce sadness and inactivity.  
According to Spinoza, the passions have less power upon us 
when we have a reasonable number of adequate ideas.530 As 
mentioned, moving from inadequate to adequate ideas increases 
our power and consequently our joy, and therefore we should 
increase our knowledge of God or nature. Eventually we could 
attain wisdom, which is intuitive knowledge of God or nature. 
Having intuitive knowledge means seeing in one mental vision the 
necessary connection between or among some number of 
propositions, and enjoying the highest contentment of the mind.531 
When we are no longer driven by passions and act from clearly 
understood reasons, we may attain freedom.532 
 
10. 2. Leibniz's Views on Deliberation 
 
Leibniz adopted different elements from all of these theories into 
his own views of deliberation. As far as I know, he never wrote a 
systematic account, however. What remains are only some 
scattered remarks on how decisions should be made, mostly in 
connection with practical cases. Fortunately there are also some 
specific passages on the subject in his later works, such as 
Nouveaux essais and Essais de Theodicée, which were of help in the 
following reconstruction.  
Deliberation has only recently become an object of attention in 
Leibniz scholarship, and this is why my presentation refers mostly 
to studies on specified limited topics.533 In what follows I attempt 
to combine these different interpretations with my own reflections 
to produce a consistent account of Leibniz's views on deliberation, 
and I argue that there are two kinds of cases of deliberation that 
require two different models of decision. While there have been 
some studies on the different ways in which Leibniz thought good 
                                                 
530 Spinoza, Ethics III, Def. II. 
531 Ibid., V, prop. 32, demonstration. 
532 Ibid., IV, props. 66-73 
533 Leibniz. Nature and Freedom (ed. Rutherford & Cover) is an example of 
an important recent study on the topic.  
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decisions should be made, the distinction between two kinds of 
cases has not, as far as I know, been made previously. I also 
provide a host of examples that illustrate these different kinds of 
deliberation. 
There is a common general feature in many of Leibniz's 
remarks on deliberation, as Marcelo Dascal argued in his article 
“The Balance of Reason.” This is the metaphor of weighing 
reasons, already familiar from Hobbes:   
“It is often said, with justice, that reasons should not be counted, but 
weighed; however, no one has yet given us the balance that should 
serve to weigh their force.”534 
This metaphor was traditionally applied in describing legal 
proceedings, and Leibniz used it in many connections, such as in 
his memoirs Commentatiuncula de judice controversiarum seu Trutinâ 
Rationis et normâ Textus and Ad stateram juris de gradibus et 
probabilitatum (1676). In the former he argued that the balance of 
reason is the engine that activates and controls all beliefs, 
preferences, decisions and actions,535 while the latter memoir, 
written under a pseudonym Gottfried the Truthful of Lublin 
(Godefridi Veranii Lublinensis), was his boldest statement on the 
matter. It starts on a note of self-confidence:  
                                                 
534 “…on dit souvent avec justice que les raisons ne doivent pas estre 
comptée, mais pesées; cependant personne ne nous a donné encor cette 
balance qui doit servir à peser la force des raisons.” (A letter to Burnett) G 
III, p. 194. In what follows, Leibniz lamented the lack of a theory of 
probability and says that, God willing, he would devote himself to it full-
time. See also Leibniz's letter to Gabriel Wagner on the value of logic: 
“Denn man insgemein gar wohl sagt, rationes non esse numerandas sed 
ponderandas...” G VII, p. 521. 
535 “Perinde ac si daretur Trutina quaedam rationum in qua utrinque 
momenta causeae exposita accuratè expederentur, et quo inclinaret 
examen, pro illâ parte pronunciaretur. Qvam Trutinam fabricare quisquis 
homines docuerit, is profectò majorem eis artem tradiderit fabulosa illa 
scientia aurificandi.” (Commentatiuncula de judice controversiarum seu 
Trutinâ Rationis et normâ Textus, §60), A VI, 1, p. 556. 
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“I present here a certain balance of the law, a new kind of instrument 
with which it is possible to estimate the value, not of precious metals 
and stones, but of something more precious than that: the weights of 
reasons.”536 
He emphasises the key role of jurists in applying the method:  
“…just as mathematicians have excelled above other mortals in the 
practice of logic, i.e. the art of reason, of the necessary, so did the 
jurists in the logic of the contingent.”537 
Although jurisprudence is the model science of weighing reasons, 
it can be applied to deliberation in general: 
“Hence, the example set by the jurists of the use of human reason 
should be followed in the extremely serious deliberations about life 
and health, about the state, about war and peace, about the 
management of consciousness, and about taking care of eternity.”538 
The balancing of reasons is a method of deliberating between 
different estimations of the consequences for both the general good 
of the proposed actions and the goodness of the actions 
themselves, in other words the probability of choosing the morally 
right option.539 If we could have some knowledge of the goodness 
                                                 
536 “Stateram quandam juris affero, novum instrumenti genus, quo non 
metalla et gemmeae, sed quod illis pretiosius est rationum momenta 
aestimari possint.” O, p. 211; Leibniz, The Art of Controversies, p. 36. 
537 “...ut Mathematicos in necessariis, sic Jurisconsultos in contingentibus 
Logicam, hoc est rationis artem, prae caeteris mortalibus optime 
exercuisse.” O, p. 211; Leibniz, The Art of Controversies, p. 36. 
538“Itaque a Jurisconsultis exemplum petere oportet instruendae rationis 
humanae in gravissimis de vita <et sanitate>, de republica, de belli 
pacisque negotiis, de conscientiae moderamine, de aeternitatis cura, 
deliberationibus.” O, pp. 212-13; Leibniz, The Art of Controversies, p. 38. 
539 “…l'on ne s'est pas même avisé de celle qui doit regler le poids des 
vraisemblances, et qui seroit si necessaire dans les déliberations 
d'importance…les plus excellens philosophes de nostre temps, tels que les 
Auteurs de l'Art de penser, de la Recherche de la verité, et de l'Essai sur 
l'entendement, ont éte fort éloignés de nous marquer les vrais moyens 
propres à aider cette faculté qui nous doit faire peser les apparences du 
vray et faux.” (Essais de Theodicée, §31) G VI, p. 68; H, p. 92. Here Leibniz 
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of proposed courses of action and their consequences for the 
general good, or were even able to calculate the probabilities of 
these in a reliable manner, we could calculate the best option 
directly. Difficulties in deliberation are due to the structure of the 
object in question – one simply cannot fully analyse infinitely 
complicated things such as political positions. However, as Leibniz 
stressed in his memoir La place d’autruy, we should aim at the 
widest possible perspective in our deliberations. 
Weighing reasons is not rational in the sense that we have 
completely analysed all the elements present, but it may be 
reasonable in the sense that it is as good as it can be in the 
circumstances (within the limits of human cognition).540 The goal is 
to find solutions that are “optimised” for the human range of 
possibilities, in other words, reasonable courses of action that 
contribute to the general progress of perfection in a manner 
suitable for finite intellects. 
The problem with reliable balancing is partly that there are so 
many components present in any common deliberation that we 
cannot adequately take them all into consideration. We have to 
choose between them and to try not to be affected by prejudices, 
traditions, political interests, passions, limitations of attention and 
memory, and finally, unconscious desires.541 These factors affect a 
great many human decisions. It is easy to see that both the 
“calibrating” of balance (shunning out external reasons) and 
ascertaining the reliability of the propositions in question is a very 
difficult or even impossible task for the limited human 
understanding.542 Still, Leibniz argued that we have to examine the 
components or propositions as carefully as we can, and to estimate 
them.543 In difficult situations it is often reasonable to choose an 
                                                                                                    
referred to Arnauld and Nicole, Malebranche and Locke. See also letter to 
Burnett 1. 2. 1697, G III, p. 194. 
540 Marras, Leibniz and his metaphorical models: the “trutina rationis”, p. 783. 
See also my discussion of “hard” and “soft” reason in Chapter 5. 
541 Dascal, The Balance of Reason, p. 4. 
542 On calibrating the balance, see Ibid.  
543 “Ut ponderum aestimanda gravitas, ita propositionum veritas; utque 
ponderum gravitas eadem methodo aestimatur qua gravitas rei 
ponderandae, ita et propositionum ad probationem adductarum veritas 
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option we estimate to be the least harmful to the desired goal. This 
kind of reasoning is connected to Aristotle's eliminative model.  
In addition to these problems, there is the question of 
equilibrium. If two options are equally good or bad, which one 
should we choose? Leibniz denied this problem, since in his vision 
there was always a sufficient reason that tips the balance in one 
direction: there cannot be two exactly equal options.544 This 
sufficient reason is to be found at least in minute perceptions that 
represent shades of meaning.  
The most complete passage we have by Leibniz on deliberation 
occurs in Nouveaux essais:   
“To employ the art of consequences, we need an art of bringing things 
to mind, another of estimating probabilities and, in addition, 
                                                                                                    
eadem methodo examinanda est, qua veritas propositionis principalis in 
questionem deductae; ut attendendum est ne quod ponderum omittatur, 
aut superaddatur, ita attendedum est, ne quod rei aestimandae onus aut 
commodum omittatur, aut idem aliis verbis bis ponatur.” 
(Commentatiuncula de judice controversiarum seu Trutinâ Rationis et normâ 
Textus, §65), A VI, 1 557.  
  544 “Maintenant je viendray à une objection qu'on me fait icy contre la 
comparaison des poids d'une balance avec les motifs de la volonté. On 
objecte que la balance est purement passive et poussée par les poids, au 
lieu que les agens intelligens et doués de volonté sont actifs. A cela je 
reponds, que le principe du besoin d'une raison suffisante est commun 
aux agens et aux patiens. Ils ont besoin d'une raison suffisante de leur 
action, aussi bien que de leur passion. Non seulement la balance n'agit 
pas, quand elle est poussée egalement de part et d'autre, mais les poids 
egaux aussi n'agissent point, quand ils sont en equilibre, en sorte que l'un 
ne peut descendre, sans que l'autre monte autant.” (Leibniz's fifth letter to 
Clarke) G VII, pp. 391-92. See also Clarke's second letter and Leibniz's 
replies in the Clarke-Leibniz correspondence and Vailati, Leibniz and 
Clarke, pp. 97-101. The problem of indifference or equilibrium (also known 
as the problem of Buridan's ass, although John Buridan did not discuss it 
in his writings) has its roots at least in Aristotle's De Caelo 295b32, but the 
subject was also discussed by Thomas Aquinas. See Zupko, John Buridan, 
p. 400, n. 71. On Leibniz's dicussion of Buridan's ass, see Essais de 
Theodicée, §49: “Et quoyque l'homme soit libre, ce que l'âne n'est pas, il ne 
laisse pas d'être vray par la même raison, qu'encor dans l'homme le cas 
d'un parfait equilibre entre deux partis est impossible…” G VI, p. 130. 
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knowledge of how to evaluate goods and ills; and we need to be 
attentive, and, on top of all that, to have the patience to carry our 
calculations through. Finally, we need to be firmly and steadily 
resolved to act on our conclusions; and we need skills, methods, rules 
of thumb, and well-entrenched habits to make us true to our resolve 
later on, when the considerations that led us to it are no longer present 
in our minds.”545  
Here Leibniz distinguished five different components that are 
needed in deliberating well:  
  
1) the art of bringing things to mind 
2) the estimation of probability 
3) knowledge of how to evaluate good and evil 
4) attention and alertness  
5) strength of will 
 
We need to select the appropriate items from the memory to be 
able to evaluate the components in a given situation. With the help 
of recollection we can consider with care which components are to 
be noted and which are to be ignored. We should be attentive and 
alert enough to complete these considerations, and finally we 
should have strength of will, which helps us to hold on to the 
conclusions we have drawn.  
The art of bringing things to mind, or recollection, is discussed 
in the preface to Nouveaux essais, in which Leibniz stated that 
although the Platonists' doctrine of recollection was a sheer myth, 
it was entirely consistent with unadorned reason. We cannot be 
aware of the whole of our memory or of our habitual ways of 
acting all the time. Ideas and images may persist in the memory, as 
                                                 
545“Ainsi il nous faidroit encore l’art de s’aviser, et celui d’estimer les 
probabilités et de plus la connoissance de la valeur des biens et des maux, 
pour bien employer l’art des consequences: et il nous faudroit encore de 
l’attention, et de la patience aprés tout cela, pour pousser jusqu’à la 
conclusion. Enfin il faut un ferme et constante resolution pour executer ce 
qui a esté conclu; et des addresses, des methodes, des loix particulieres, et 
des habitudes toutes formées, pour la maintenir dans la suite, lorsque des 
considerations, qui l'ont fait prendre, ne sont plus presentes à l'esprit. “ 
(Nouveaux essais, II, xxi, §67) A VI, 6, p. 207; RB, p. 207.  
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dispositions of past impressions, in both the soul and the body. We 
are unaware of these “traces” except when our memory has a use 
for them.546 They are awoken by some circumstance, such as when 
hearing the opening words of a song brings to mind the rest of the 
words.547 In this manner the soul is capable of attending to things 
within itself and reflecting on them, as discussed Chapter 4.3.3.548  
No less important in deliberation is the estimation of the 
probabilities of different proposed courses of action. The agent 
should first estimate the goodness of some occurrence, and then 
assess whether the consequences of that act are adequate with 
respect to the general good or perfection. Thus the agent has to 
evaluate both the probability of the goodness of the act itself and 
the consequences it brings about to the desired end. There may 
also be several ways of bringing about the desired end, some of 
which may be more acceptable than others. Thus the agent should 
evaluate the sum-total probability of proposed courses of action 
and choose the one that, all things considered, is the best.549  
It is also essential to consider the gains and losses of different 
parties. In La Monadologie Leibniz argued that God enters into the 
republic with spirits who are images of Himself, and that He cares 
for their happiness.550 This is why it is essential in rational 
decisions to prefer the will of God. One should choose the option 
that best contributes to the good of mankind, since this choice is 
                                                 
546 “...dispositions qui sont des restes des impressions passées dans l'ame 
aussi bien que dans le corps, mais dont on ne s'apperçoit que lorsque la 
memoire en trouve quelque occasion. Et si rien ne restoit des pénsees 
passées aussi tost qu'on n'y pense plus, il ne seroit point possible 
d'expliquer comment on en peut garder le souvenir...” (Nouveaux essais, II, 
x, §2) A VI, 6, p. 140.  
547 “…souvent nous nous les remettions aisement dans l'esprit à quelque 
occasion legere qui nous en fait souvenir; comme il ne nous faut que le 
commencement d'une chanson pour nous faire ressouvenir du reste.” 
(Nouveaux essais, preface) A VI, 6, p. 52.   
548 See A VI, 6, p. 79. 
549 Compare Leibniz’s discussion in Elementa juris naturalis, discussed in 
Chapter 6. 2. 2. 2.  
550 See La Monadologie, §83-84. For a discussion on this matter, see 
Blumenfeld, Perfection and Happiness in the Best of Possible Worlds, p. 400f. 
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also pleasing to God. Leibniz seemed to think that if the interests 
of mankind were not involved, preference should be given to 
higher animals over lower animals, to animals over inanimate 
things and so on, according to the hierarchy of monads.551 
In line with Aristotle's eliminative method, Leibniz seemed to 
hold that when it was very difficult to evaluate the consequences 
of different proposed acts it was reasonable to carry out the one 
that was estimated to be the least bad, since doing so might be the 
best way to contribute to general perfection. The hierarchy of 
monads was likely to be the guiding principle in evaluating 
different options. For example, act A may be better with respect to 
universal perfection, although it produces very little perfection, 
because it saves more living things than act B, which is more 
efficient with respect to perfection.  
    
10. 2. 1. The Deliberation in the Soul 
 
I discussed cognition in general in Chapter 4. Before moving on to 
the question of how different perceptions affect the soul in 
deliberation I will reiterate Leibniz's views on the mind and body.  
Through pre-established harmony, created and maintained by 
God, we have a double structure of the mind and body that 
functions in a parallel mode. The rational or human spirit consists 
of an aggregate of monads, the dominating one being the self-
reflexive “commander.” In Leibniz's world the “ground structure” 
and the “top structure” (the kingdoms of nature and grace) 
worked in a parallel mode as defined by God through pre-
established harmony. The monads differed from each other in the 
clearness and distinctness of their perceptions.552  
                                                 
551 “Les animaux, dont quelques uns sont elevés au degré des plus grands 
animaux par le moyen de la conception, peuvent être appellés 
spermatiques; mais ceux d'entre eux, qui demeurent dans leur Espèce, 
c'est à dire la pluspart, naissent, se multiplient, et sont détruits comme les 
grands animaux, et il n'y a qu'un petit nombre d'Elûs, qui passe à un plus 
grand theatre.” (La Monadologie, §75). G VI, p. 620.  
552 There are certainly different interpretations of the interaction between 
the soul and the body in Leibniz, but I cannot go into details here. See, for 
example, articles in Leibniz's New System (ed. Woolhouse). 
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In a letter to Basagne dated 3 January 1696 Leibniz used the 
metaphor of two different clocks, which are synchronised perfectly 
by God.553 Each of them is a kind of automaton that works in a 
parallel mode.554 While dynamic powers affect the body, the soul is 
an immaterial automaton directed by appetite and perceptions. 
Leibniz repeatedly stated that there is nothing other than 
perceptions and appetitions in the monads.555  
The monads are in constant inner motion. They reflect the outer 
world since they have no interaction with it, being unextended, 
simple mental substances. While perceptions of the monad are the 
raw material analysed by the intellect in the soul, the appetite, 
represented by the will, is the principle of change from one mental 
state to another.  
The will represents the constant tendency to increase perfection 
in the world. Leibniz held that the will in the soul was a conatus, or 
striving, which aimed to produce clearer perceptions to replace the 
more confused ones.556 He followed the opinions of Thomas 
Aquinas in his view on the relationship between the intellect and 
the will, and for the most part he could be seen as a follower of the 
intellectualist tradition. Opposing the voluntarists, he maintained 
that the most important element in the deliberation was the 
                                                 
553 “Mettes maintenant l'ame et le corps à la place de ces deux montres; 
leur accord ou sympathie arrivera aussi par une de ces trois facons. La 
voye de l'influence est celle de Philosophie vulgaire…La voye de 
l'assistance est celle du systeme des causes occasionelles….Ainsi il ne rest 
que mon hypothese, c'est-à-dire que la voye de l'harmonie pré-établie, par 
un artifice divin prevenant, lequel a formé des le commencement chacune 
de ces substances, qu'en ne suivant que ses propres loix qu'elle a receues 
avec son estre, elle s'accorde pourtant avec l'autre, tout comme s'il y avoit 
une influence mutuelle, ou comme si Dieu y mettoit tousjours la main, au 
delà de son concours general.” G IV, p. 498-99.   
554 See Suttner, Göttliche Maschinen, p. 81f. 
555 See, for example, a letter to De Volder, G II, p. 282 or La Monadologie, 
§17 & §19.  
556 See Nouveaux essais II, xxi, §29f. In a letter to Remond from 1714 Leibniz 
wrote that appetite, which was nothing but the inclination of one 
perception to another, was called passion in animals and will in men. See 
G III, p. 622. 
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intellect, which judges according to current perceptions and 
produces recommendations for action. The will usually follows the 
recommendations of the intellect.  
Leibniz saw no need for a separate and independent will that 
decided between alternatives, as claimed in the voluntarist 
tradition represented by Duns Scotus and William Ockham, for 
example. In this respect he supported the views of Hobbes and 
Spinoza: for “The will is a striving which follows our opinions of 
apparent good or evil,” as he stated in De Affectibus.557 
If we considere the relationship between the intellect and the 
will in Leibniz, we might end up with a summary similar to the 
one provided by Jack D. Davidson:558 
 
1) Human persons are created with a natural drive for personal 
well-being, or eudaemonia 
2) The parts of human persons are ordered so that their 
operations contribute to their natural inclination towards 
eudaemonia 
3) The function of reason is to discern the relative goodness of 
states of affairs and of the options available to the person 
4) The function of will as rational appetite instills a natural 
hunger for what is perceived as best by the intellect 
 
Although Leibniz did not give the will as central a role in 
deliberation as Descartes did, he did not consider it insignificant. It 
manifests itself in the tendency of the monad to move towards a 
clearer perception. Every perception, even the most distinct, brings 
about new perceptions because it always includes a confused 
                                                 
557 “Voluntas est conatus qui sequitur opionem boni vel mali praesentem 
in conante.” De Affectibus, Gr, p. 513. See also a memoir De libertate a 
necessitate in eligendo, where Leibniz stated: “Certum est infallible esse, ut 
Mens se determinet ad maximum bonum apparens.” A VI, 4, p. 1450. In a 
fragment De libertate et gratia, written approximately at the same time he 
stated: “Mens eligit non per rationes necessitatis, sed per rationes veras vel 
apparentes bonitatis, quibus inclinatur.” A VI, 4, p. 1456. On different 
definitions of the will in Leibniz's writings, see Heinekamp, Das Problem 
des Gutens bei Leibniz, p. 210f.  
558 Davidson, Leibniz on the Labyrinth of Freedom: Two Early Texts, p. 26. 
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element, and thus creates the need or anticipation of even more 
distinct perception.559 This preference for clear perception over less 
clear perception is fuelled by attention, which draws the intellect 
towards the “better” perception that has less confused elements or 
prefers the kind of perceptions which correspond with our innate 
ideas. The will has the power to command attention, as explained 
shortly. 
All of these mental operations in the soul happen more or less 
automatically, but it often happens that inclinations consisting of 
confused perceptions may draw attention to themselves and in this 
way affect the deliberation. These inclinations or passions, which 
include vivid odours, colours and the like, are dispositions, and 
not the goods or the sufferings: 
“Various perceptions and inclinations combine to produce a complete 
volition: it is the result of the conflict amongst them. There are some, 
imperceptible in themselves, which add up to a disquiet that impels us 
without our seeing why. There are several that join forces to carry us 
towards or away from some object, in which case there is desire or 
fear, also accompanied by a disquiet but not always one amounting to 
pleasure or displeasure.”560 
Cognition is always composed of different-level perceptions. 
Unconscious minute perceptions (appetitions) must be distin-
                                                 
559 Jalabert, La psychologie de Leibniz, p. 462. 
560 “Plusieurs perceptions et inclinations concourent à la volition parfaite 
qui est le resultat de leur conflit. Il y en a d'imperceptibles à part, dont 
l'amas fait une inquietude, qui nous pousse sans qu'on en voye le sujet; il y 
en a plusieurs jointes ensambles qui portent à quelque objet ou qui en 
eloignent, et alors c'est desir ou crainte, accompagné aussi d'une 
inquietude, mais qui ne va pas tousjours jusqu'au plaisir ou deplaisir.” 
(Nouveaux essais II, xxi, §39) A VI, 6, p. 192; RB, p. 192. Compare also NE II, 
xxi, §47, where the influence of Hobbes is even more evident: “Mais lors 
que le desir est assez fort en luy meme pour émouvoir, si rien ne 
l'empechoit, il peut estre arresté par des inclinations contraires, soit 
qu'elles consistent dans un simple panchant, qui est comme l'element ou 
commencement du desir, soit qu'elles aillent jusqu'au desir même.” A VI, 
6, p. 195.   
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guished from higher-level perceptions (volitions), which may be 
apperceived since they consist of apperceived ideas.  
“There are other efforts, arising from insensible perceptions, which we 
do not apperceive; I prefer to call these ’appetitions’ rather than 
volitions, for one describes as ’voluntary’ only actions one can 
apperceive and can reflect upon when they arise from some 
consideration of good and bad; though there are also appetitions that 
can be apperceived.”561 
While in the lower monads the appetitions affect the action more 
or less mechanically, the spirits can choose, in the manner 
described above, which elements are noted and which are ignored. 
The deliberation is often between inclinations consisting 
predominantly of clear and distinct ideas (representing real good) 
and those consisting predominantly of vivacious ideas (comprising 
confused, minute perceptions and representing apparent good). A 
special case of the latter is the perception of perfection, which 
corresponds with our moral instinct through our imagination.  
As mentioned, Leibniz seemed to think that few persons were 
able to act consistently according to clear and distinct ideas, 
although it is clear that in practical rationality conscious volitions 
are considered much more important than appetitions.    
Put in another way, in deliberation there are different 
inclinations and it is the conflict between them that forms the 
complete volition. Usually there are both conscious volitions and 
unconscious appetitions. These inclinations may be united if they 
lead in the same direction, but if they are of equal strength but lead 
in opposite directions they are mutually exclusive. If they lead in 
different directions, the strongest ones are victorious.  
                                                 
561 “Il y a encore des efforts qui resultent des perceptions insensibles, dont 
on ne s’apperçoit pas, que j’aime mieux appeller appetitions que volitions 
(quoyqu’il ait aussi des appetitions apperceptibles), car on n’appelle 
actions volontaires que celles dont on peut s’apercevoir, et sur les quelles 
nostre reflexion peut tomber lors qu’elles suivent de la consideration du 
bien et du mal.” (Nouveaux essais II, xxi, §5) A VI, 6, p. 173; RB, p. 173. In 
the last sentence Leibniz was probably referring to the perception of 
perfection, which is clear but confused. 
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In a straightforward situation inclinations towards the good 
clearly favour some course of action, and in this case the 
deliberation is easy. Often, however, there are so many inclinations 
towards different courses of action that some conflict between 
them is inevitable. This “collision” produces new inclinations, 
which are “compromises”. The eventual result of all this is the 
prevailing effort that comprises full volition.562 
The behaviour of these impulses is comparable to the 
beginnings of motion, or conatuses, as Leibniz described them in 
his early mechanical work Theoria motus abstracti. He stated that 
every body in collision transfers to the other a conatus equal to its 
own without thereby losing any of its original conatus (TMA, §10, 
G IV, p. 229). The multiple conatuses last only for a moment (except 
in people’s minds) before they are resolved into one (TMA, §17, G 
IV, p. 230). If they are unequal, the resultant conatus will retain the 
direction of the greatest one, and have for its magnitude the 
difference between the original conatuses.563 If the conatuses are 
equal, they rule each other out and another takes their place. Later 
Leibniz gave up this mechanism and replaced it with his dynamics 
which consists of four different kind of forces. The basic setting, 
however, remained the same.564 
In an early dialogue, Confessio philosophi, from around the same 
time (1672-73) Leibniz directly linked conatuses with affects of the 
mind: 
                                                 
562 Nouveaux essais  II, xxi, §39, A VI, 6, p. 192. 
563 TMA, §18-20, G IV, pp. 230-31. See also Garber, Motion and Metaphysics 
in the Young Leibniz, p. 169. 
564 Here is a very short summary of Leibniz's mature cosmology: on the 
metaphysical level, we have a pre-established harmony, in which 
substances are windowless. The “spiritual” development of the world 
towards perfection is dependent on primitive active and passive forces, 
which affect the substances. The phenomenal level, which can be 
perceived, consists of active and passive derivative forces. This mechanical 
level is only secondary to the change of mental states on the metaphysical 
level. The primitive forces are the source of harmony in the world. On 
Leibniz’s later metaphysics, see Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order 
of Nature. On Leibniz's dynamics and its relations to metaphysics, see 
Gale, The Physical Theory of Leibniz. 
 
 
 
206
“What a conatus is in a body, an affect is in a mind. However, some 
conatuses prevail while others are nullified by contrary conatuses. If a 
body strives to move both from east to west and along the same line, it 
is thrust backward by an equal force from west to east, then, because 
of the equality of the contrary conatuses, it will move in neither 
direction. In the same way the initial affects and motions of the mind 
cannot be destroyed, but they can be nullified by contrary affects, with 
the result that they lack efficacy.”565  
The inclinations in the soul could be seen as forces leading in 
different directions. Depending on the level of one's 
understanding, the agent can evaluate the inclinations present in 
the deliberative situation, and even modify them by developing 
himself in advance in a manner to be discussed later. In a 
complicated case the best choice is the optimum of different 
inclinations leading to the good. In this way the different 
inclinations “combine and the volition is the result of the conflict 
amongst them.” (NE II, xxi, §39).566   
This idea is presented in another way in Essais de Theodicée, in 
which Leibniz made a distinction between antecedent and 
consequent will in God's decision, as mentioned in Chapter 2.5.2. 
The consequent will is what Leibniz, following Hobbes, 
understood as the will executing the action and thus as the last 
stage of deliberative action. While the antecedent will in God's 
                                                 
565 “Quod in corpore est conatus, id in mente affectus, sunt autem conatus 
alii vincentes, alii contrariis conatibus elisi; si corpus tendat ab oriente in 
occidentam, et eodem tempore in eadem linea, vi aequali retroagatur ab 
occidente in orientam, ob mutuam conatuum contrariorum aequalitatem, 
utrinque quiescet; ita affectus quoque et motus primi tolli non possunt, at 
contrariis affectibus elide possunt, ut efficacia careant.” A VI, 3, p. 141; 
Leibniz, Confessio philosophi, p. 89. 
566 In this sense we could follow Mark Kulstad's discussion of the passive 
and active forces of the mind, which are parallel to the forces in dynamics. 
The active force tends to distinct perceptions while the passive force, 
consisting of confused perceptions (passions), arrests this striving. See 
Kulstad, Appetition in the Philosophy of Leibniz, pp. 137-38. Note, however, 
as McRae points out, that the soul must be compared to the universe 
rather than to a body, since there can be no conflicts between souls, only 
within them. McRae, Leibniz: Perception, Apperception, and Thought, p. 61. 
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eliberation represents a single good, the consequent will looks 
towards the whole. If there is some other, preventive force, the 
antecedent volitions conflict with each other and the consequent 
volition results from all this conflict.567 
Although Leibniz did not apply this scheme to human 
deliberation, it seems to me that it could be understood 
analogously. Of course, one should note that in human cognition 
the minute perceptions are always present in deliberation and 
consequently, the decision is less than absolutely perfect.568 Even 
when men deliberate between antecedent wills, the inclinations 
consisting of confused perceptions are present and they might 
affect the judgement considerably by, for example, adding weight 
to some antecedent will.   
The Leibnizian ideal of deliberating well takes into account all 
relevant (real) goods and strives to find a way to include all or at 
least most of them in the decision. One often has to compromise 
with respect to different goods, since it is reasonable to include 
most or all of them instead of choosing one and ignoring the 
others. This delicate balance of reasons is complicated in many 
cases and includes plural values.  
Consequently, the rational decision is often more difficult to 
achieve than deliberating for or against some option or choosing 
between two alternative courses of action. In many cases the agent 
has to take into account several independent goods, which may be 
in competition and may differ in only a small degree. I will return 
                                                 
567 See Parkinson, Leibniz on Human Freedom, p. 32f. Leibniz used an 
analogous argumentation in his jurisprudical work De legum 
interpretatione, rationibus, applicatione, systemate (1670), stating that all 
statements of law were susceptible to two argumentations. Antecedent 
argument is a proof (Probatio), and consequent argument is a conclusion 
based on the antecedent arguments (Consequentia). See A VI, 4, p. 2786. 
568 (Causa Dei) G VI, p. 442. See Essais de Theodicée, §22: “…Dieu tend à tout 
bien…par une volonté antecedente. Il a une inclination serieuse à 
sanctifier et à sauver tous les hommes, à exclure le peché, et à empêcher la 
damnation. L'on peut même dire que cette colonté est efficace de soy (per 
se) c'est à dire, en sorte que l'effect s'ensuivroit, s'il n'y avoit pas quelque 
raison plus forte qui l'empêchat…” G VI, p. 116. 
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to Leibniz's models of deliberation shortly, but will first take a 
closer look at the role of passions. 
 
10. 2. 2. Passions and Deliberation 
 
While God is motivated by only true and good reasons, men may 
be moved by both true and good reasons and passions. According 
to Leibniz, the physiological analysis of passions is not sufficient in 
moral philosophy, although he admitted that this kind of analysis 
was useful in medicine.569 The reasons for the existence of passions 
are to be found in cognition, for they consist of minute perceptions, 
which combined form temporary inclinations perceived as feelings 
of pleasure or pain. Leibniz's concept of passion is connected to the 
idea of a dynamic path to increasing perfection. In this he was 
influenced by Hobbes, and especially Spinoza, as mentioned.  
The passions are analogous to the moral instinct in us. While 
the moral instinct is a permanent disposition, a passion is a minute 
and a sudden instinct, as Leibniz argued in a memoir related to his 
Nouveaux systeme.570 The striving towards joy and away from 
                                                 
569 “…la connoissance physiologique des passions (à laquelle Mr. 
Descartes s'est attaché) ne sert pas assés dans la morale, quoyqu'elle ait 
son utilité dans la Medecine.” (Remarques sur les trois volumes intitulés: 
Characteriticks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times in three volumes [by Earl of 
Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper (1671-1713]), G III, p. 427. However, 
in NE II, xxi, §41 Leibniz stated that although passions belong to the soul, 
“…j'adjouteray même que l'origine de chacunes est dans l'ame même en 
prenant les choses dans une certaine rigueur metaphysique; mais que 
neantmoins on a raison de dire que les pensées confuses viennent du 
corps, parce que là dessus la consideration du corps et non pas celle de 
l'ame fournit quelque chose de distinct et d'explicable.” A VI, 6, p. 195. 
Thus the confused thoughts are in the soul, but they are often related to 
the lower monads that constitute the body. 
570 “Pour ce qui est des combats qu'on suppose entre le corps et l'ame, ce 
n'est autre chose que la diversité des penchans nés des pensées distinctes 
ou des pensées confuses, c'est-à-dire des raisons ou des instincts et 
passions: l'instinct estant pour ainsi dire une passion durable et née avec 
nous, et la passion estant comme un instinct passager et survenu; à quoy 
on pourroit joindre l'accoustumance qui tient le milieu entre ces deux 
sortes d'inclinations, estant plus durable que la passion, mais non pas née 
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sorrow, which is related to the moral instinct, is understood as the 
basis of human moral action, but the passions are usually regarded 
as harmful in human deliberation. The clearer and more distinct 
our perceptions are, the freer, more spontaneous and active our 
mind is since the confused element in judgement is weaker.  
“…if we take action to be an exercise towards perfection and passion 
to be the opposite, there is no action in the real substances until their 
perceptions…develop and become more distinct, as there is no passion 
in them until their perceptions become more confused.”571  
Leibniz was aware of Thomas Aquinas' taxonomy of passions (NE 
II, xx, §3 & 7),572 but he did not discuss them except when he was 
commenting on Locke. He stated in NE II, xx, §9 that “the passions 
are not contentments or displeasures or beliefs, but endeavours – 
or rather modifications of endeavour – which arise from beliefs or 
opinions and are accompanied by pleasure or displeasure.”573 As 
an example he mentioned despair, anger and envy.574  
                                                                                                    
avec nous comme l'instinct.” (Addition à l'Explication du systeme nouveau 
touchant l'union de l'ame et du corps, encoyée à Paris à l'occasion d'un livre 
intitulé Connoissance de soy même). G IV, p. 576-77. 
571 “…prenant Action pour un exercice de la perfection et la passion pour 
le contraire il n'y a de l'Action dans les veritables substances, que lorsque 
leur perception…se developpe et devient plus distincte, comme il n'y a de 
passion que lorsqu'elle devient plus confuse. (Nouveaux essais II, xxi, §72) 
A VI, 6, p. 210; RB, p. 210.  
572 Aquinas distinguishes between passions of different appetites. Passions 
of the concupiscible appetite (related to sensible good or sensible evil) 
consist of amor (love), odium (hate), desiderium/concupiscentia (desire), 
fuga/abominatio (avoidance), delectatio/gaudium/laetitia (pleasure/joy) and 
dolor/tristitia (pain/sadness). Passions of the irascible appetite (related to 
the difficulty of attaining sensible good or avoiding sensible evil) consist 
of spes (hope), desperatio (despair), timor (fear), audacia (daring) and ira 
(anger). Leibniz discussed only passions of the first kind. On Thomas 
Aquinas' views on passions, see Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and 
Medieval Philosophy, pp. 234-35.  
573 “Les passions ne sont ny des contentemens, ou des déplaisirs, ny des 
opinions, mais des tendences, ou plustost des modifications de la 
tendence, qui viennent de l'opinion ou du sentiment, et qui sont 
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The passions are often related to sensuous pleasures, which 
may be signs, images or smells, and which have much more 
vivacity than the ideas of the understanding. In order to act 
virtuously, however, one must prefer long-term good to quick 
pleasures that prevent us from attaining genuine happiness. 
“The confused perception of some perfection constitutes the pleasure 
of the senses, but this pleasure may be [productive] of greater 
imperfections, as a fruit with a good taste and a good smell may 
conceal poison. This is why one must shun the pleasures of the senses, 
as one shuns a stranger, or sooner, a flattering enemy.”575 
There are several apparent goods present in deliberation, of which 
only one or a few represent real goods and the right course of 
action in the situation. In addition, there are several other goods 
that may represent the right action, but in some other situation. For 
example, talking in a loud voice is the right action when speaking 
to a person who has a hearing-problem, but it is a wrong action in 
a religious ceremony. 
The conflict between different antecedent wills in deliberation 
may lead to other than optimal action, since the outcome of 
different antecedent goods is a compromise between different 
inclinations. Leibniz wrote to Bourguet:  
“The co-operative action of all tendencies towards good has produced 
the best, but since there are goods that are not compatible, this co-
operation and this result could bring about the destruction of some 
good, and consequently some evil.”576  
                                                                                                    
accompagnées de plaisir ou de déplaisir.” (Nouveaux essais II, xx, §10). A 
VI, 6, p. 167; RB, p. 167.  
  574 See NE II, xx, §11-13. 
  575 “La perception confuse de quelque perfection fait le plaisir des sens, 
mais ce plaisir peut estre < > d'imperfections plus grandes que en 
naissant, comme un fruit de bon goust et de bonne odeur peut cacher un 
venin. C'est pourquoy il faut se defier des plaisirs des sens, comme on se 
defie d'un inconnu, ou plustost d'un ennemi qui flatte.” (La Félicité, §6) Gr, 
pp. 579-580. 
576 “Le concours de toutes les tendences au bien a produit le meilleur: mais 
comme il y a des biens qui soit incompatabiles ensemble, ce concours et ce 
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The confused elements of judgement may predominate and, as a 
result, the mind may follow passions instead of clear and distinct 
ideas. If the judgement follows these appetitions, and the will 
inclines to them, there may develop a habit that constantly leads 
the agent in wrong directions.577  
“We may miss the right road by trying to follow the shortest one, just 
as the stone by falling straight down may too soon encounter obstacles 
that prevent it from getting at all close to the centre of the earth. This 
shows that it is reason and will that lead us towards happiness, 
whereas feeling and appetite lead us only towards [sensuous] 
pleasure.”578  
The rational analysis of problems may affect our voluntary acts by 
diminishing the effect of confused perceptions in deliberation. 
Once we learn to develop our reasoning, we can better discern 
clear and distinct ideas from confused ones. Reasoning is the root 
of our freedom – it gives us the possibility to control our goals.579 
In Nouveaux essais, II, xxi, §8 Leibniz distinguished between two 
kinds of freedom: freedom to do and freedom to will. The latter is 
divided into two senses, the first standing in contrast with the 
imperfection or bondage of the mind that is an inner constraint, 
comparable to the effects of passions. Here there is a clear 
difference between man and God: 
                                                                                                    
resultat peut emporter la destruction de quelque bien, et par consequent 
quelque mal.”  G III, p. 558. Leibniz’s letter concerned the divine decision-
making, but I think this view can be applied to human deliberation also. 
577 The cognitive basis of habits is in the imagination. Hatfield, The 
Cognitive Faculties, p. 979. 
578 “On peur manquer le vray chemin en voulant suivre le plus court, 
comme la pierre allant droit peut rencontrer trop tost des obstacles qui 
[l'empechent] d'avancer assez vers le centre de la terre. Ce qui fait 
connoistre, que c'est la raison et la volonté qui nous menent vers le 
Bonheur, mais que le sentiment et l'appetit ne nous portent que vers le 
plaisir. (Nouveaux essais II, xxi, §41). A VI, 6, p. 194; RB, p. 194. It is 
worthwhile noting here that feeling the increase of perfection is an 
exception to the rule, since it applies to our senses as well as to our reason. 
579 Piro, Leibniz and Ethics: the Years 1669-72, p. 165. 
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“The Stoics said that only the wise man is free; and one's mind is 
indeed not free when it is possessed by a great passion, for then one 
cannot will as one should, i.e. with proper deliberation. It is in that 
way that God alone is perfectly free, and that created minds are free 
only in proportion as they are above passion; and this is a kind of 
freedom which pertains strictly to our understanding.”580  
The second sense of freedom is employed when it is contrasted 
with necessity. It refers to the will alone, and that is why it is 
known as decision or choice (le franc arbitre). The freedom of the 
will is in this sense related to the recommendations for action the 
intellect presents to the will: they incline the will but do not 
necessitate it.  
“Free will…consists in the view that the strongest reasons or 
impressions which the understanding presents to the will do not 
prevent the act of the will from being contingent, and do not confer 
upon it an absolute or (so to speak) metaphysical necessity. It is in this 
way that I have the habit to say that the understanding can determine 
the will, in accordance with which perceptions and reasons prevail, in 
a manner which, although it is certain and infallible, inclines without 
necessitating.”581  
Leibniz called this kind of inclination without necessitating moral 
necessity, when the agent is persuaded by the good but is not 
                                                 
580 “…les Stoiciens disoient que le sage seul est libre; et en effect on n'a 
point l'esprit libre quand il se occupé d'une grande passion, car on ne peut 
point vouloir  alors comme il faut, c'est-à-dire avec la deliberation qui est 
requise: C'est ainsi que Dieu seul est parfaitement libre, et que les esprits 
créés ne le sont qu'à mesure qu'ils sont au dessus des passions: et cette 
liberté regarde proprement nostre entendement.” (Nouveaux essais II, xxi, 
§8). A VI, 6, p. 175; RB, p. 175.   
581 “…le franc arbitre…consiste en ce qu'on veut que les plus fortes raisons 
ou impressions, que l'entendement presente à la volonté, n'empechent 
point l'acte de la volonté d'estre contingent, et ne luy donnent point une 
necessité absolue et pour ainsi dire metaphysique. Et c'est dans ce sens 
que j'ay coutume de dire, que l'entendement peut determiner la volonté 
suivant la prevalence des perceptions et raisons d'une maniere qui lors 
même qu'elle est certaine et infallible, incline sans necessiter.” (Nouveaux 
essais II, xxi, §8) A VI, 6, p. 175; RB, p. 175.  
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necessitated by it. It applies not only to man, but also to God, as 
shown in Chapter 1. 
 
10. 2. 3. Weakness of the Will 
 
The problem of akrasia (Greek for “lack of control” or 
“incontinence”), or weakness of the will (from Augustine 
onwards), has been formulated in many different ways, starting 
from Plato's Protagoras and Republic and Aristotle's Nicomachean 
Ethics.582 Perhaps the simplest way to describe it is to say that 
akrasia means acting against one's better judgement. The akrates 
(one who acts akratically) acts intentionally and voluntarily against 
what he or she judges to be the best in the situation.  
A classic example of akratic behaviour is making the wrong 
choice because some sensual pleasure persuades the person to act 
against what he or she judges to be the best. We might smoke a 
cigarette when offered one even if we have decided to give up 
smoking. Although akratic wrong-doing seems to be an 
unavoidable part of our daily lives, contemporary philosophers 
have tried to find different ways of explaining it away, as a 
compulsory, that is, unfree, action, for example.583  
There is a very interesting discussion about the weakness of the 
will and its role in moral choice in Nouveaux essais, in which 
Leibniz opposes Locke’s view in An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, second book, Chapter xxi, entitled Of power.584 
Locke’s views on deliberation were strange. He denied that the 
will was necessarily directed to the future long-term good and 
thought that the present good was the most important goal in 
                                                 
582 See Plato, Protagoras, 357d-e, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ch. VII. 
583 See, for example, Watson, Skepticism about Weakness of Will and Mele, Is 
Akratic Action Unfree? 
584 This theme has received little or misguided attention by Leibniz 
scholars. For example, John Hostler denied the possibility of akrasia in 
Leibniz's thought in his well-known Leibniz's Moral Philosophy. My main 
source, apart from the Nouveax essais, was Ezio Vailati's article Leibniz on 
Locke on Weakness of Will. 
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moral action.585 Men strove to abolish the uneasiness or pain they 
felt and attained temporary happiness by choosing the absent 
good to which they felt it was related even though they were well 
aware of the long-term good involved. He apparently considered 
weakness of the will to be the normal state and virtuous action, 
related to the long-term good, an exception. 
Once happiness has been achieved by gaining the absent good, 
the uneasiness soon returns and forces the agent to strive for some 
other absent good. Thus Locke’s view was that passions overcame 
reason in practical rationality because they were stronger and 
more tempting than the goals set by reason. The only way to resist 
uneasiness, as he argued in the second edition of his Essay, is to 
suspend action and deliberate more thoroughly between different 
options. 
In his commentary on Locke’s work, Nouveaux essais sur 
l'entendement humain, Leibniz argued that uneasiness is not always 
a bad thing, and that its removal does not always produce 
satisfaction or pleasure (II, xxi, §29). Even joy includes some 
disquietness – in other words, at each moment there is a 
combination of different unconscious inclinations present in 
judgement that is perceived as disquietness.586  
Leibniz believed that there always were confused elements 
(formed by minute perceptions) present in deliberation, while 
Locke saw uneasiness as some kind of longing for the absent good. 
Thus all acts of will are accompanied by some uneasiness, which 
only occasionally intensifies to the point of becoming full-blown. 
                                                 
585 “…Good, the greater good, though apprehended and acknowledged to 
be so, does not determine the will, until our desire, raised proportionally 
to it, make us uneasy in the want of it.” (II:21:35; E, p. 253).  
586 (II, xx, §8). The term (inquietude) is Leibniz's version of the concept of 
uneasiness. See NE II, xx, §6. Compare also II, xxi, §29 :  
“...inquietude...n'est pas tousjours un deplaisir, comme l'aise où l'on se 
trouve, n'est pas tousjours une satisfaction ou un plaisir. C'est souvent une 
perception insensible qu'on ne sauroit distinguer ny démêler qui nous fait 
pancher plustost d'un costé que de l'autre, sans qu'on en puisse rendre 
raison.” A VI, 6, p. 183; RB, p. 183. See also NE II, xx, §7, in which Leibniz 
stated that during the deepest sorrow one can find joy in music, for 
example. 
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According to the Leibnizian view, confused inclinations are not the 
goods or sufferings themselves, only a foretaste of them in the 
form of minute perceptions. Thus there is usually no one single 
desire such as Locke's uneasiness, but numerous spurs to action 
that may be mutually incompatible. All these inclinations affect the 
volition in the manner discussed above. 
It could be inferred from Leibniz's discussion that moral 
wrong-doing happens in two ways. In the first case the deliberator 
is unable to discern the real from the apparent good. The minute 
perceptions blur our judgement and make us believe that the 
wrong act is right in a given situation. The apparent good is 
mistakenly chosen instead of the real good. This is not a case of 
akrasia, strictly speaking, and is rather the sheer inability 
(ignorance or error) to discover the real good in question. The 
struggle between the flesh and the spirit is nothing more than a 
conflict between two different kinds of endeavours - those coming 
from confused thoughts and those coming from distinct ones (NE 
II, xxi, §35). If the moral agent does not have a sufficiently 
developed understanding, he or she may easily err in his or her 
judgement of the good. 
“Confused thoughts often make themselves clearly sensed, whereas 
our distinct thoughts are usually only potentially clear: they could 
actually be so if we only applied ourselves to getting through to the 
senses of the words or symbols; but since we do not do that, through 
lack of care or lack of time, what we oppose lively feelings with are 
bare words, which are too faint.”587 
In the second, more serious case, the real good, although it is 
present and apperceived, is rejected – it does not act as the 
                                                 
587 “Les pensées confuses souvent se font sentir clairement, mais nos 
pensées distinctes ne sont claires ordinairement qu'en puissance: elles 
pourraient l'estre, si nous voulions nous donner l'application de penetrer 
les sens des mots ou des caracteres, mais ne le faisant point, ou par 
negligence, ou à cause de la brieveté du temps; on oppose des paroles 
nuës, ou du moins des images trop foibles à des sentimens vifs.” 
(Nouveaux Essais II, xxi, §35). A VI, 6, pp. 186-87; RB, p. 186-187. Leibniz 
was not entirely clear here. By thoughts he seemed to mean perceptions 
and by the term clear he seemed to refer to clear but confused perceptions. 
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motivational factor. This kind of case represents akratic action in 
the true sense. The weak-willed agent judges one course of action 
to involve the greater good, but is inattentive to it, while he or she 
is sensitive to the good involved in the worse course of action.588 
These apparent goods are often spiced up by lively sensual 
qualities, which arise from minute perceptions such as colour, 
smell, taste and other sensual pleasures. This is why the apparent 
good is more desirable to a weak-willed person than the real good, 
which may be less tempting. To use Leibniz's example, a person 
who perceives the smell of fresh cakes rejects his or her diet and 
gives in to his or her desire.589  
The real good recommended by the intellect is rejected by the 
will, which instead chooses the less good option, that is the 
apparent good. The consequent volition is directed to the apparent 
good instead of the real good, which may be the second-best 
alternative.  
“It is a daily occurrence for men to act against what they know; they 
conceal it from themselves by turning their thoughts aside, so as to 
follow their passions. Otherwise we would not find people eating and 
drinking what they know will make them ill or even kill them.”590 
Often the real goods in deliberation, such as virtue, perfection and 
the afterlife, are present in the form of symbols or blind thoughts, 
which are faint compared to the more concrete, lively images of 
                                                 
588 Vailati, Leibniz on Locke on Weakness of Will, p. 219. This process is 
similar to Augustinus' theory of the birth of sin in De Trinitate: first a 
suggestion (suggestio) is made, in this case by appetitions, then a pleasure 
(delectatio, in Leibniz's case sensuous pleasure) is formed – the first stage of 
desire – and finally the will accepts the suggestion (consentio).  See 
Knuuttila, The Emergence of the Logic of Will in Medieval Thought, p. 211. For 
a discussion on medieval commentaries on Augustinus' doctrine, see 
Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, p. 179f.  
589 See Nouveaux essais II, xxi, §35; A VI, 6, p. 187. 
590 “Il arrive tous les jours que les hommes agissent contre leur 
connoissances, en se les cachant à eux mêmes lorqu'ils tournent l'esprit 
ailleurs, pour suivre leur passions: sans cela nous ne verrions pas les gens 
manger et boire de ce qu'ils savent leur devoir causer des maladies et 
même la mort.” (Nouveaux essais I, ii, §11). A VI, 6, p. 94; RB. p. 94. 
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food, drink and sensual pleasures that accompany clear but 
confused perceptions. However, once the mind is sufficiently well 
developed it becomes sensitive to the real good: 
“Sometimes they have the idea of an absent good or evil, but only very 
faintly, so it is no wonder that it has almost no influence on them. 
Thus, if we prefer the worse it is because we feel the good it contains 
but not the evil it contains or the good that exists on the opposite 
side…the finest moral precepts and the best prudential rules in the 
world have weight only in a soul that is as sensitive to them as to what 
opposes them.”591  
For this reason one should be attentive and alert in one's 
deliberations. The good is present as blind thoughts or other non-
sensory information, but it does not act as a motivational factor for 
the akratic person. There is always the possibility of theoretical 
akrasia: the good may be outweighed by more vivacious images or 
symbols that represent some lesser good, although the moral agent 
is aware of the real good present in the situation.  
This fact is also applicable to practical rationality – for example, 
the real good could be made more tempting by presenting it in a 
favourable light (compare, for example, stained-glass windows in 
churches), and the use of figures and illustrations in education 
highlights the most important aspects. 
Proper volition is also endangered by conditional will or 
velleitas. This concept was used by some medieval scholars592 and 
                                                 
591 “Quelques fois ils ont des idées d'un bien ou d'un mal absent, mais très 
foibles; ce n'est donc pas merveille si elles ne touchent gueres. Ainsi si 
nous preferons le pire, c'est que nous sentons le bien qu'il renferme, sans 
sentir ny le mal qu'il y a, ny le bien qui est dans le parti contraire…les plus 
beaux preceptes de morale avec les meilleures regles de la prudence ne 
portent coup, que dans une ame, qui y est sensible …et qui n'est pas plus 
sensible à ce y est contraire” (Nouveaux essais II, xxi, §35). A VI, 6, p. 186; 
RB, p. 186. 
592 Leibniz cited as a source St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II 29 in a 
letter to Spanheim, but argues elsewhere that the distinction was made by 
writers before Damascene. Parkinson, Leibniz on Human Freedom, p. 30, n. 
25. For the history of conditional willing, see Knuuttila & Holopainen, 
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refers to a case in which the agent would will something if a 
greater evil, or even a greater good, were not feared or hoped for 
in the opposite case. Leibniz defined this as an imperfection or a 
defect in the will, which prevents it from rising to full power.593 
Because of the condition in question, the will is divided and the 
volition is not complete – it contains some imperfection (for 
example, it may cause harm to an acquitance), and this is why the 
best possible action is not chosen.594 In this case the motive is not 
an inclination because it represents no true possibility: it is more of 
a conditional willing – a case of “I would if I could” (liberet si 
liceret).595  
When the intellect cannot successfully recommend the best 
course of action, choosing the wrong one may develop into a habit 
and the real goods are continually ignored: the agent can 
manipulate the mind to believe that an apparent good is in fact a 
real good. For example, although I have been forbidden by my 
doctor to eat chocolate, I can still make myself believe that it is 
good for my health and I may end up eating it daily. Thus our 
decisions are manipulated and volitions are produced: 
“This one thing we recognize to be within the power of will – to 
command attention and exertion. And so the will, though it does not 
bring about any opinion in us, can nevertheless contribute to it 
obliquely. Thus it happens that men often finally come to believe what 
                                                                                                    
Conditional Will and Conditional Norms in Medival Thought and Knuuttila, 
Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, p. 208f. 
593 Nouveaux essais, II, xxi, §30, A VI, 6, p. 183. 
594 The will in itself is always directed to the good, as judged by the 
intellect: “...je ne voudrois pas qu’on crût...qu’il faille  abandonner ces 
anciens axiomes, que la volonté suit le plus grand bien, on qu’elle fuit le 
plus grand mal, qu’elle sent.” (Nouveaux essais II, xxi, §35). A VI, 6, p. 185; 
RB, p. 185. In this sense the human will imitates the Divine will: while the 
human will is directed to the apparent good, God's will is directed to the 
actual good. Davidson, Video Meliora Proboque, Deteriora Sequor, p. 240.  
595 See Essais de Theodicée, §404, G VI, p. 357.  
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they will to be true, after having accustomed the mind to attend most 
strongly to the things which they favour.”596 
The development of the intellect may also happen the other way 
around. The deliberator may reflect on his or her own decisions 
and analyse the effect of confused perceptions on them, and in the 
future prepare himself or herself in advance for similar prob-
lematic situations.597 Since the will commonly follows the 
recommendations of the intellect, one has to develop the intellect 
in order to deliberate more effectively. The stronger the “voice” of 
reason is, in other words the more clearly one perceives, the less 
the will inclines to goals other than the one recommended by the 
intellect. Thus developing the understanding helps to strengthen 
the will, and when the will is strong it can eventually direct the 
attention to the right goals. 
“Men choose objects through the will, but they do not choose their 
present volitions; these spring from reasons and dispositions. It is true, 
however, that one can seek new reasons for oneself, and with time give 
oneself new dispositions; and by this means one can also obtain for 
oneself a will one had not and could not have given oneself 
forthwith.”598  
                                                 
596 “Unum hoc penes voluntatem esse agnoscimus, ut attentionem et 
studium imperet, atque ita etsi sententiam in nobis non faciat, potest 
tamen ad eam oblique conferre. Ita fit ut saepe homines quod verum esse 
vellent, tandem credant, postquam assuevere animum, ut ad attendat 
potissimum quae favent.” (Animadversiones in partem generalem 
Principiorum Cartesianorum) G IV, p. 356-57; L, pp. 384-85.   
597 In a recent conference Leibniz: What kind of Rationalist, Tel Aviv and 
Jerusalem, 30.5. – 2.6. 2005, Hans Poser argued in his paper Innate Ideas as 
the Cornerstone of Rationalism: The Problem of Moral Principles (forthcoming) 
that the wise can find moral principles by reflecting on the 
recommendations or inclinations of the moral instinct. In this way these 
inclinations could be understood as the moral necessities of a good man. 
This interpretation seems to be in line with my own.   
598 “...les hommes choisissent les objets par la volonté, mails ils ne 
choisissent point leur volontés presentes; elles viennent des raisons et des 
dispositions. Il est vray cependant, qu'on se peut chercher de nouvelles 
raisons et se donner avec le temps de nouvelles dispositions; et par ce 
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By training the mind and preparing it in advance for future 
temptations one learns to withdraw from action, and to pause to 
contemplate whether the action should be performed or not (NE II, 
xxi, §47).599  
“What is required is that the mind be prepared in advance, and be 
already stepping from thought to thought, so that it will not be too 
much held up when the path becomes slippery and treacherous.”600  
Thus one can develop the mind in order to resist passions in the 
same manner as in self-deception, but in the opposite direction. 
The akrates must be cured by reducing the power of minute 
perceptions, and this happens through improving our reasoning 
and acquiring more knowledge. If the will follows the 
recommendations of the intellect without being sensitive to 
inclinations consisting of confused perceptions, the road to virtue 
is secured.  
“…we can only will what we think good, and the more developed the 
faculty of understanding is the better are the choices of the will. And, 
in the other direction, in so far as man wills vigorously, he determines 
                                                                                                    
moyen on se peut encor procurer une volonté qu'on n'avoit pas, et qu'on 
ne pouvoit pas se donner sur le champ.” (Rexflexions sur l'ouvrage que N. 
Hobbes a publié en Anglois, de la liberté, de la Necessité et du Hazard) G VI, pp. 
391-92; H, pp. 396-397. 
599 Epicurus presented his idea of a life calculus, which bears a certain 
likeness to Leibniz's ideas. As quoted by Diogenes Laertius, he stated: 
“While therefore all pleasure because it is naturally akin to us is good, not 
all pleasure is choiceworthy, just as all pain is an evil and yet not all pain 
is to be shunned. It is, however, by measuring one against another, and by 
looking at the conveniences and inconveniences, that all these matters 
must be judged.” Diogenes Laertius (X, 129), Lives of Eminent Philosophers 
II, p. 655.   
600 “Il faut donc que l'esprit soit preparé par avance, et se trouve déja en 
train d'aller de pensée en pensée, pour ne se pas trop arrester dans un pas 
glissant et dangereux..” (Nouveaux essais, II, xxi, 47) A VI, 6, pp. 195-96; RB, 
pp. 195-96. 
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his thoughts by his own choice instead of being determined and swept 
along by involuntary perceptions.”601  
Good judgement and good decisions can be achieved by fostering 
self-perfection, by increasing one’s knowledge of the world and its 
creator, and by learning to distinguish true goals from mere 
temporary ones. The inclinations and their directions may be 
modified by applying methods that enable us to develop the 
clearness of our perceptions and improve our attention, and thus 
to gain reasonable control over the minute perceptions. In his 
critique of Descartes' Principia philosophiae (Animadversiones in 
partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum), Leibniz provided a 
few methods for remedying errors of judgement:  
“The remedy for our errors is the same as that for errors in calculation 
– to pay attention to the matter and form, to proceed slowly, to repeat 
and vary our operations, to introduce tests and checks, to divide 
longer chains of reasoning into parts so that the mind gets a breathing 
spell, and to confirm each part in turn through special proofs. And 
since we are sometimes in a hurry to act, it is an important matter to 
have acquired presence of mind through practice, as do those who are 
still able, in the midst of noise and without written calculations, to 
compute very large numbers.”602 
                                                 
601 “…on ne sauroit vouloir que ce qu'on trouve bon, et selon que la faculté 
d'entendre est avancée, le choix de la volonté est meilleur: comme de 
l'autre costé, selon que l'homme a de la vigueur en voulant, il determine 
les pensées suivant son choix, au lieu d'estre determiné et entrainé par des 
perceptions involontaires.” (Nouveaux essais II, xxi, §19) A VI, 6, p. 180; RB, 
p. 180. 
602 “Remedium quoque errorum nostrorum idem est, quod errorum 
calculi, ut materiae formaeque attendamus, ut procedamus lente, ut 
repetamus operationem variemusque, ut examina instituamus sive 
comprobationes, ut longiores raticinationes in partes secemus, quo 
resprirare mens possit, partemque quamlibet peculiaribus 
comprobationibus confirmemus. Et quoniam in agendo aliquando 
festinandum est, magna res est, praesentiam animi sibi comparasse 
assuescendo, velut illi qui in tumultu atque etiam sine scriptura aut 
calculis, non ideo minus ingentes numeros computare possunt…” 
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Moreover, we should not take past perceptions and memories of 
our experiences for granted, but repeat experiments if possible, 
and try to form as adequate a judgement of the thing in question as 
we can.603 The right decision will bear fruit in later deliberations 
just as a sentiment of perfection creates the anticipation of future 
sentiments of the same kind. We are not able to affect our choices 
directly by willing, but we can affect them indirectly: 
“We certainly speak very incorrectly when we speak of willing to will. 
We do not will to will, but rather will to do; and if we did will to will, 
we should will to will to will, and so on ad infinitum. However, we 
must recognize that by our voluntary actions we often indirectly 
prepare the way for other voluntary actions; and that although we 
cannot will what we want to, just as we cannot judge what we want to, 
we can nevertheless act ahead of time in such a way that we will 
eventually judge or will what we would like to be able to judge or will 
today. We attach ourselves to people, reading material and ways of 
thinking that are favourable to a certain faction, and we ignore 
whatever comes from the opposite faction; and by means of these and 
countless other devices, which we usually employ unwittingly and 
without set purpose, we succeed in deceiving ourselves or at least 
changing our minds, and so we achieve our own conversion or 
perversion depending on what our experience has been.” 604 
                                                                                                    
(Animadversiones in partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum) G IV, pp. 
361-62; L, p. 388. 
603 (Animadversiones in partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum) G IV, 
p. 362. 
604 “Il est vray qu'on parle peu juste, lorsqu'on parle comme si nous 
voulions vouloir. Nous ne voulons point vouloir mais nous voulons faire, 
et si nous voulions vouloir, nous voudrions vouloir vouloir, et cela iroit à 
l'infini: Cependant il ne faut point dissimuler que par des actions 
volontaires nous contribuons souvent indirectement à d'autres actions 
volontaires, et quoyq'on ne puisse point vouloir ce qu'on veut, comme on 
ne peut pas même juger ce qu'on veut; on peut pourtant faire en sorte par 
avance, qu'on juge ou veuille avec le temps ce qu'on souhaiteroit de 
pouvoir vouloir ou juger aujourdhuy. On s'attache aux personnes, aux 
lectures et aux considerations favourables à un certain parti, on ne donne 
point d'attention à ce qui vient du parti contraire, et par ces adresses et 
mille autres qu'on employe le plus souvent sans dessein formé, et sans y 
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Thus understanding may be developed by means of practical 
devices. In his memoir on the controversy between Hobbes and 
Bishop Bramhall, Leibniz comments on Hobbes' example of 
hunger:    
“It does not depend on my will to be hungry or not, but rests with my 
will to eat or not to eat; yet in the time to come, it rests with me to be 
hungry, or to prevent myself from being so at such and such an hour 
of the day, by eating beforehand. In this way it is often possible to 
avoid bad volitions.”605  
We could try to substitute our bad habits with good ones.606 In 
Nouveaux Essais Leibniz argued that men should make themselves 
laws and rules for the future and carry them out strictly, avoiding 
situations that could corrupt them. They should render their 
conceptions of real goods more vivid by engaging in the useful 
activities the philosopher recommends, which include farming, 
gardening, collecting curiosities, making experiments and 
inquiries, making conversation and reading. Idleness is to be 
avoided (II, xxi, §35). Good company may help in developing 
virtue, since perfection is intensified by reflecting on others’ 
perfections.607  
                                                                                                    
penser, on reussit à se tromper ou du moins à se changer, et à se convertir 
ou pervertir selon qu'on a rencontré.” (Nouveaux essais II, xxi, §23). A VI, 6, 
p. 182; RB, p. 182. For a similar argument, see also Essais de Theodicée, §51. 
605 “Il ne depend pas de ma volonté d'avoir faim, ou non; mais il depend 
de ma volonté de manger, ou de ne point manger: cependant pour le 
temps à venir, il depend de moy d'avoir faim, ou de m'empêcher de l'avoir 
à une pareille heure de jour, en mangeant par avance. C'est ainsi qu'il y a 
moyen d'eviter souvent de mauvaises volontés…” (Reflexions sur l'ouvrage 
que M. Hobbes a publié en Anglois, de la Liberté, de la Necessité et du Hazard, 
§5) G VI, p. 392; H, p. 397. 
606 Seidler, Freedom and Moral Therapy in Leibniz, p. 28.  
607 In Essais de Theodicée, Leibniz’s recommendations are of the same kind: 
“Le bon naturel, l'education avantageuse, la frequentation des personnes 
pieuses et vertueuses, peuvent contribuer beaucoup à mettre les ames 
dans cette belle assiette; mais ce qui les y attache le plus, ce sont les bons 
principes.” (Essais de Theodicée, preface). G VI, p. 28. 
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Remedies for strong passions such as love or addiction are to be 
found in change (such as a voyage), or in gradual withdrawal from 
the object that causes the passion.608 As an example Leibniz 
mentioned Francisco Borgia, the general of the Jesuits, who was 
given to drinking heavily when he was a member of fashionable 
society.  
“…he gradually reduced his intake to almost nothing by each day 
letting a drop of wax fall into the flagon he was accustomed to 
emptying.”609  
Gradual withdrawal from the object of passion and replacing bad 
activities with good ones bring about pleasure of the mind and, 
eventually, happiness. Unlike Locke, Leibniz considered happiness 
to be a process rather than a state. Whereas the Stoics thought that 
one should get rid of the passions once and for all, Leibniz 
believed that living virtuously was a gradual process involving 
good habits and getting to know God and His perfections better. 
It is possible to test one's alertness by reflecting on one's deeds, 
as Leibniz stated in NE II, xxi, §47: 
“It helps…if one becomes accustomed to withdrawing into oneself 
occasionally, rising above the hubbub of present impressions – as it 
were getting away from one's own situation and asking oneself “Why 
am I here?”, “Where am I going?”, “How far have I come?”, or saying 
“I must come to the point, I must set to work!”“610 
If all these methods prove to be unsuccessful, there is still another 
way of improving our moral conduct: we could suspend decisions 
in cases in which there is not sufficient reason to choose one 
                                                 
608 Vailati, Leibniz on Locke on Weakness of Will, p. 227. 
609 “…se reduisit peu à peu au petit pied…en faisant tomber chaque jour 
une goutte de cire dans le bocal qu'il avoit accoustumé de vuider.” 
(Nouveaux essais II, xxi, §35) A VI, 6, p. 187; RB, p. 187.  
610 “…il est bon de s'accoustumer à se recueillir de temps en temps, et à 
s'elever au dessus du tumulte present des impressions, à sortir pour ainsi 
dire de la place où l'on est: à se dire: dic cur hic, respice finem, Où en 
sommes nous? à propos ou venons au propos, venons au fait.” A VI, 6, p. 
196; RB, p. 196. 
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particular course of action, or when we are possessed by a strong 
passion.611 This happens by the direct intervention of the will.612  
“We can and very frequently do suspend choice, particularly when 
other thoughts break into our deliberations. So that, although the 
action about which we are deliberating must exist or not exist, it does 
not follow at all that we must necessarily decide on its existence or 
non-existence; for its non-existence may come about for want of a 
decision.”613  
By suspending the decision we are able to evaluate the situation 
anew and repeat the deliberation, taking into account all of the 
elements. Thus the will may, in a sense, reject the recommendation 
of the intellect and force it to reconsider, especially when some 
new element is introduced. This is also the case when the 
recommendation of the intellect is “weak”, in other words when 
                                                 
611 This method was popularized by Jean Buridan and was also employed 
by Locke in the second edition of the Essay.  
612 It is worth noting that Leibniz did not explicitly state that it is the will 
that suspends decision. For example, in De libertate et gratia (1680-84?) he 
claimed that the mind in general has the ability to suspend judgement: 
“Mens habet facultatem non tantum alterutrum eligendi, sed et 
suspendendi judicium; nulla potest esse tam evidens apparentia boni 
(praeterquam summi) quin mens possit si velit suspendere judicium ante 
ultimam decisionem, idque fit dum alia cogitanda menti offeruntur, atque 
ipsa vel ad ea abripitur sine deliberatione, vel deliberans concludit de aliis 
rebus potius cogitare. Si mens non divertatur a deliberatione, certo sciri 
potest quid sit electura, certo enim electura est quod melius illi apparet.” 
(A VI, 4, p. 1456). However, since the argument in Nouveaux essais (see also 
Discours de metaphysique, §30) is clearly presented in the context of the 
freedom of the will, I assume that he meant it was the will, rather than the 
intellect, that actually performed the suspension. 
613 “…on peut suspendre son choix, et que cela se fait bien souvent, 
surtout lors que d'autres pensées interrompent la deliberation; ainsi 
quoyque il faille que l'action sur la quelle on delibere existe ou n'existe 
pas, il ne s'ensuit point qu'on en doive resoudre necessairement l'existence 
ou la nonexistence; car la nonexistence peut arriver encore faute de 
resolution. (Nouveaux essais II, xxi, §23) A VI, 6, p. 181; RB, p. 181. 
 
 
 
226
there is no clear recommendation available, such as in the case of 
velleitas discussed above.614  
“The execution of our desire is suspended or prevented when it is not 
strong enough to arouse us and to overcome the difficulty or 
discomfort involved in satisfying it. This difficulty sometimes consists 
merely in an insensible laziness or slackness, which inhibits us without 
our paying heed to it; it is greatest in people brought up in indolence, 
in those of a phlegmatic temperament, and in those discouraged by old 
age or failure.”615 
As the example of hunger shows, the will may also suspend 
decisions independently by willing vigorously. Thus, although the 
intellect inclines the will, it is the will that ends the deliberation 
and makes the final decision because it has the power to command 
attention. Although the recommendation of the intellect is known, 
the will can divert itself to other objects, which may lead to akratic 
action:  
“Unless the will is diverted to other thoughts, it will certainly choose 
that which appears best. And in this indirect way we resist our 
intellect and our self-knowledge, while we change the object of 
thought, whether by a deliberate plan or by the custom of sliding into 
what is pleasant. Grace helps us in two ways: one insofar as it 
                                                 
614 In a letter to Magnus Wedderkopf from 1671 Leibniz argued that we 
suspend our judgements because of conditions and alternatives, that is 
because the circumstances in question are insufficiently explored. A II, 1, 
p. 117.  
615 “L'execution de nostre desir est suspendue ou arrestée, lors qu'il n'est 
pas assez fort pour emouvoir, et pour surmonter la peine ou 
l'incommodité qu'il y a de satisfaire. Et cette peine ne consiste quelques 
fois que dans une paresse ou lassitude insensible, qui rebute sans qu'on y 
prenne garde, et qui est plus grande dans des personnes elevées dans la 
mollesse, ou dont le temperament est phlegmatique, ou qui sont rebutées 
par l'âge ou les mauvais succés.” (Nouveaux essais, II, xxi, §47) A VI, 6, p. 
195.  Compare the discussion on “flying thoughts” in Chapter 4.3.3. and 
Nouveaux essais II, xxi, §12. 
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illuminates the intellect, the other insofar as it gives attention and fixes 
the mind so that it may not move from the object.”616 
Although careful manipulation of the mind may help the will in 
directing its attention to the right objects, it could also change its 
preference independently. For this reason the will could be 
considered an active part of deliberation, and not a mere passive 
and mechanical act of approval of whatever the intellect presents 
to it.  
Sean Greenberg recently argued that Leibniz's conception of the 
mind led him to locate freedom in intelligence alone.617 I think the 
above passage show that, even though the will may be led astray 
(weakness of the will), it could be considered an active part of 
deliberation, although it usually follows the recommendations of 
the intellect. Thus I find Greenberg's view exaggerated: compare 
Essais de Theodicée, §51, in which Leibniz stated:  
“…we do not always follow the latest judgements of practical 
understanding when we resolve to will: but we always follow, in our 
willing, the result of all the inclinations that come from the direction 
both of reasons and passions, and this often happens without an 
express judgement of the understanding.”618 
                                                 
616 “Quod si sine deliberatione divertenda est, habemus intentum, scitur 
enim mentem nihil esse electuram. Quod si deliberatio secutura de 
prosequenda an mutanda cogitandi materia, hinc de nova ista 
deliberatione eadem rursus ratiocinatio institui potest et proinde tandem 
vel venietur ad diversionem sine deliberatione, quae praevideri potest ex 
natura intellectus, vel conclusionem sine diversione, quae qualis futura sit 
praevideri potest ex natura voluntatis. Voluntas enim nisi ad alias 
cogitationes divertatur certo eliget quod melius apparet. Atque hac 
obliqua arte nos intellectui nostro ac conscientiae opponimus, dum 
mutamus cogitandi objectum sive deliberato consilio, sive consuetudine 
ad grata delabendi. Gratia duobus modis nos juvat, uno dum intellectum 
illustrat, altero dum attentionem dat figitque Mentem ne objectum mutet.” 
(De libertate et gratia) A VI, 4, p. 1457. 
617 See his Leibniz Against Molinism. 
618 “Nous ne suivons pas aussi tousjours le dernier jugement de 
l'entendement practique, en nous determinant à vouloir; mais nous 
suivons tousjours, en voulant le resultat de toutes les inclinations qui 
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Leibniz was apparently referring to a case in which some new 
element, such as a passion, broke into deliberation after the 
intellect had recommended some course of action. Thus this 
description may apply to weakness of the will: the agent has a 
considered recommendation for an action, but a sudden passion 
leads the will astray if it has not the required strength. When the 
will is strong enough, we can resist the passions: 
“Once we are in a position to stop our desires and passions from 
taking effect, i.e. to suspend action, we can find ways of fighting 
against them, either by contrary desires and inclinations or by 
diversion, in other words by occupying ourselves with other matters. 
It is through these methods and stratagems that we become masters of 
ourselves, and can bring it about that we have certain thoughts and 
that when the time comes we will will according to our present 
preference and according to reason's degrees.”619 
                                                                                                    
viennent tant du côté des raisons que des passions, ce qui se fait souvent 
sans un jugement expres de l'entendement.” GP VI, p. 130; H, p. 151. 
Another similar passage occurs in Leibniz's fifth letter to Clarke, §11: “J'ay 
fait voir aussi, que notre volonté ne suit pas tousjours precisement 
l'entendement practique, parce qu'elle peut avoir ou trouver des raisons 
pour suspendre sa resolution jusqu'à une discussion ulterieure.” G VII, p. 
391.   
619 “Or estant une fois en estat d'arrester l'effect de nos desirs et de nos 
passions c'est à dire de suspendre l'action, nous pouvons trouver les 
moyens de les combattre, soit par des desirs ou des inclinations contraires 
soit par diversion c'est à dire par des occupations d'une autre nature. C'est 
par ces methods et des artifices que nous devenons comme maistres de 
nous mêmes, que nous pouvons nous faire penser et faire vouloir  avec le 
temps ce que nous voudrions vouloir; et ce que la raison ordonne.” A VI, 
6, p. 196; RB, p. 196. 
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Thus strength of will is an important part of a virtuos life and of 
freedom. It is at the same time a consequence of good under-
standing and the adoption of good habits, and a method that 
enables one to develop understanding itself. By willing vigorously 
we may be able, in time, to choose the objects of our attention and 
to make better judgements, since the pleasure of the mind we 
experience in virtuous action motivates us to act accordingly in the 
future. 
 
11. Models of Decision-making 
 
11. 1. Moral Calculus 
 
So far I have discussed Leibniz's views on making decisions on a 
general, abstract level. By examining his writings on practical 
matters, however, it is possible to find some common ways of 
handling different problematic cases.620 Thus it is possible to 
reconstruct a general model to be understood as a heuristic device 
to help in making rational decisions. Elaborating on this model – 
or in fact on two different models, as I argue below - will occupy 
the rest of this study. My presentation is based on a combination of 
the views of Marcelo Dascal on the one hand and Jaakko Hintikka 
and Simo Knuuttila on the other, and so as far as I know this 
distinction has not been made elsewhere. My other contribution to 
the discussion is to present some case studies in which Leibniz 
seemed to apply these models. 
I have already shown how Leibniz postulated two forms of 
deliberation. Sometimes the options are mutually exclusive and 
one has to decide on one or make a compromise involving both. 
This first kind is applicable in simple situations, in which there is a 
need to decide for or against some position, or when the 
deliberator strives for a compromise and the goods are distributed 
among the concerned parties. The second kind is more 
complicated, since the goods are not mutually exclusive and one 
                                                 
620 For an overview on Leibniz's methods of solving controversies, see 
Leibniz, The Art of Controversies, Introductory Essay. 
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has to consider all of them at the same time. In this case the 
deliberator should pick the goods that contribute most to the 
desired goal, and try to form an optimum between them.  
These two situations require two different kinds of decision 
models. In what follows I will describe these models, leaning 
mostly on the writings of Dascal, Hintikka and Knuuttila. I will 
also present some case studies in which Leibniz seemed to apply 
them more or less implicitly. Before going into the details, 
however, I will offer a further distinction between two kinds of 
considerations that are relevant to both types. These two 
considerations refer to different stages of deliberation: 
 
a) Choosing the good or goods in each situation 
b) Estimating the likehood of the occurrence of the good in 
question. 
 
The first consideration is related to the assessment of the good and 
the second to the consequences of the proposed act or settlement. 
Leibniz made the distinction in Nouveaux essais II, xxi, §66: 
“There are these two heterogeneous considerations (which cannot be 
compared) – the magnitude of the consequence and the magnitude of  
the consequent. So in their attempts to compare them the moralists 
have become muddled, as can be seen from their writings on 
probability.”621  
If we take these two considerations together we arrive at the 
doctrine Nicholas Rescher calls moral calculus. This is a general 
method for estimating the magnitude of something good or bad, 
and is to be understood as a product of its inherent value and the 
probability of its realisation, as follows: 
 
                                                 
621 “Comme ce sont deux considerations heterogenes (ou qu'on ne sauroit 
comparer ensemble) que celle de la grandeur de la consequence, et celle de 
la grandeur du consequent; les Moralistes en les voulant comparer se sont 
assez embrouillés, comme il paroist par ceux qui ont traité de la 
Probabilité.” A VI, 6, pp. 205-206; RB, pp. 205-206. 
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(Inherent value) x (probability of eventuation).622 
 
It is easy to see how this kind of estimation in the Leibnizian 
framework concerns all moral deliberations. In addition to 
considering what is the good in each situation, we also have to 
consider whether the proposed act or settlement is at all likely to 
promote that good. Since Leibniz was a consequentialist and 
regarded virtuous action as contributory, not only to general 
perfection, but also to one's own happiness, in his view moral 
agents should consider both the act and its consequences. 
Rescher drew his inspiration from Leibniz's work on 
conditional rights, as discussed in Chapter 6.2.2. The agent is able 
to estimate the total value of the proposed act by considering the 
good in each situation on the one hand, and the likehood that the 
proposed act will promote this good on the other. If we have, for 
example, acts A and B, it may be that act A is very good, but it is 
uncertain whether it will have the desired effect. While act B is less 
good, it may be more probable that the desired effect will follow. 
Thus in this case it is rational to choose act B. Expressed in terms of 
moral calculus, we could state that  
 
Act A has an inherent value of 5 x probability of eventuation of 
3   
Act B has an inherent value of 4 x a probability of eventuation 
of 4. 
 
Thus the total overall value of act A is 15 and of act B is 16.623 As I 
continue with my presentation of these models of deliberation I am 
assuming that both kinds of considerations are inherent in both (as 
I will explain with respect to both).  
                                                 
622 See Rescher, Leibniz, Keynes, and the Rabbis on a Problem of Distributive 
Justice, p. 344. 
623 Compare also the example in Elementa juris naturalis in Chapter 6.2.2.2.  
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11. 2. The Pair of Scales Model 
 
There may be two kinds of situations in simple cases in which the 
values are independent of each other. The more straightforward 
one is the either-or-situation, in which one has to deliberate 
between two independent alternatives: should I stay or should I 
go? The options exclude each other and one cannot help but decide 
between them.  
A more complicated variant of this is when the two parties 
have a claim to some good and a compromise is sought. In this 
case the judge or the middleman strives to distribute some of the 
goods to one side and some to the other, and both parties are 
persuaded to make some concessions so that a rational 
compromise or agreement can be found. This rational balancing, 
typical of political or economic controversies, may also be 
performed in several stages (in cases, in which there are different 
types of goods or several parties, for example). One could also 
compare this with an interrupted game of chance in which the 
stakes are evenly distributed among the players.624 
The traditional metaphor of a pair of scales could be used to 
illustrate these kinds of deliberation: in the former case the weight 
in the left or right pan decides the case for one or the other.625 If the 
weight in the left pan is heavier than that in the right, the option 
represented by the left one is chosen. The deliberator collects 
reasons or evidence on both sides, and the weightier alternative 
wins. In the latter case a compromise may be established by 
making an agreement covering the distribution of the goods. It is 
in this kind of situation that a balance is sought.  
The first kind of balancing is common in proceedings of 
criminal law, where the decision settles whether the accused is 
guilty or not guilty. As described in Chapter 6.2.2.1., the judge 
accepts or rejects proof for or against the guilt of the accused and 
evaluates it. By combining the evidence he may reach a conclusion. 
                                                 
624 Compare the example discussed in Chapter 6.2.1. in connection with 
Leibniz's memoir De incerti aestimatione.  
625 This metaphor occurs in Homer's Iliad, book VII. For a discussion of the 
metaphor in Leibniz, see Dascal, The Balance of Reason. 
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In his discussion of this simple balancing of reasons Leibniz often 
used the method of presumption.     
In moral deliberations the agent forms different estimations of 
the proposed actions and balances them against each other (in 
several stages, if necessary). These estimations also include 
consideration of the consequences of the proposed actions as one 
aspect, or a weight in the left or the right pan of a pair of scales. 
Thus among the reasons to be added to either side are the 
goodness of the proposed act and its estimated probability of 
causing favourable consequences. It could happen that an action 
that is better good than another is ignored because the lesser good 
is estimated to have a higher degree of probability of success. Thus 
the balancing concerns the overall goodness of the proposed 
actions. 
“Since the final result of the balance is determined by how things 
weigh against one another, I should think it could happen that the 
most pressing disquiet did not prevail; for even if it prevailed over 
each of the contrary endeavours taken singly, it may be outweighed by 
all of them taken together…everything that then impinges on us 
weighs in the balance and contributes to determining a resultant 
direction, almost as in mechanics...”626  
If the reasoning or evidence clearly favours one side a 
presumption is formed, which holds unless significant proof to the 
contrary is encountered.627 The presumption works as a sufficient 
reason for determining the balance between reasons. The 
determination happens pseudo-mechanically in the sense that, 
while the balancing happens “automatically”, one can affect the 
                                                 
626 “Comme la resultat de la balance fait la determination finale, je croirois 
qu'il peut arriver que la plus pressante des inquietudes ne prevaille point; 
car quand elle prevaudroit à chacune des tendences opposées prise à part 
il se peut que les autres jointes ensamble la surmontent…tout ce qui 
frappe alors, pese sur la balance, et contribue à former une direction 
composee presque comme dans la mecanique…” (Nouveaux essais II, xxi, 
§40). A VI, 6, p. 193; RB, p. 193.  
627 “…puis il y a presomtions, qui passent pour preuves entières 
provisionnellement, c'est à dire, tandis que le contraire n'est point prouvé” 
(Nouveaux essais, IV, xvi, §9) A VI, 6, p. 464. 
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“weights” or reasons by developing one's understanding in ways 
described earlier.      
The second kind of balancing is an attempt to distribute the 
goods in a way that is agreeable to all parties. Some good is given 
to one party, which makes a concession to another, and the same 
goes for the other parties. A rational balance through negotiation 
can be achieved, as each party makes some concessions but gains 
some other goods. This kind of rational compromise is typical in 
peace negotiations and economic or political agreements.  
As in the case of the simple balance, the probability of the 
desired consequences of the agreement should be considered in 
the reasoning. The overall result of the compromise should be 
favourable in terms of general well-being, and should promote 
overall perfection as far as possible. Thus the compromise in itself 
could be seen as a moral act. For this reason it might become 
necessary to persuade the parties to settle for less than the full 
amount of the good, since a compromise that is less profitable to 
different parties might have better consequences for the long-term 
good – in the promotion of peace, for example. Thus it might be 
rational to leave some controversial issue unresolved, or to leave 
some disputed area to a neutral sovereign.   
Both kinds of balancing (for-against & compromise) require the 
careful selection of evidence, and one should take every credible 
reason into account, as Leibniz explained in his economics 
metaphor of accounting:  
“…many things are needed for a right decision to be made in a case in 
which reasons have to be weighed against one another. This is almost 
how it is with merchants’ account books. For in those one must not 
ignore any sum, each separate sum must be carefully ascertained, and 
must be put in good order and then listed accurately. Nevertheless, 
some items are omitted, either because they escape the mind or 
because one passes too quickly over them. And some are not given 
their correct values – as in the case of the book-keeper who carefully 
adds up the columns on each page, but incorrectly computes the 
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individual amounts of each line or entry before extending them to the 
column…”628 
One should carefully select the appropriate components and add 
them up on one side or the other, without forgetting the probable 
consequences of the proposed actions. The reasons act as weights, 
and the side that has the more significant reasons wins. One could 
also strive at a compromise and distribute the reasons on both 
sides. Rash decisions should be avoided in the interests of proper 
deliberation: 
“…after long pro and con discussions, most of the time it is emotion 
rather than reason that claims the victory, and the struggle ends there 
with the Gordian knot cut rather than untied. This is especially 
pertinent to the deliberations of practical life in which some decision 
must eventually be made. Here it is only rarely the case that 
advantages and disadvantages, which are so often distributed in many 
different ways on both sides, are weights as on a balance.”629 
Thus reasons may be estimations or demonstrated proof. 
Depending on their nature, the weighing may be of “soft” or 
“hard” reasoning. In practical cases the evaluation (especially of 
                                                 
628 “…il faut bien de  choses pour se prendre comme il faut, lorsqu’il s’agit 
de la balance des raisons; et c’est à peu près comme dans les livres de 
compte des Marchands. Car il n’y faut negliger aucune somme, il faut bien 
estimer chaque somme à part, il faut les bien arranger, et il faut enfin en 
faire une collection exacte. Mais on y neglige plusieurs chefs, soit en ne 
s’avisant pas d’y penser, soit en passant legerement là-dessus. Et on ne 
donne point à chacun sa juste valeur, semblable à ce teneur de livres de 
compte qui avoit soin de bien calculer les colonnes de chaque page, mais 
qui calculoit très mal les sommes particulieres de chaque ligne ou poste 
avant que de les mettre dans la colonne… “ (Nouveaux essais II, xxi, §67) A 
VI, 6, pp. 206-207; RB, pp. 206-207. 
629“Itaque post multam agitationem plerumque affectus potius quam 
rationes vincunt, et controversias rupto potius nodo gordio quam soluto 
terminamus. Hoc imprimis fit in deliberationibus ad vitam pertinentibus, 
ubi aliquid statuendum sane est; sed commoda atque incommoda (quae 
saepe utrinque multa sunt) velut in bilance examinare paucis datum est.” 
(De numeris characteristicis ad linguam universalem constituendam) A VI, 4, p. 
268; Leibniz, Selections, p. 23.  
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the consequences) is usually based on “soft” rationality. As soon as 
Leibniz had finalised the universal science and the probability 
calculus he envisioned he replaced these estimations with 
calculations, thus enabling rigorous reasoning. As noted, this was 
possible in cases in which exact good could be calculated. He 
returned to his economics theme in his memoir De numeris 
characteristicis ad linguam universalem constituendam:  
“There is hardly anyone who could work out the entire table of pros 
and cons in any deliberation, that is, who could not only enumerate 
the expedient and inexpedient aspects but also weigh them rightly. 
Thus two disputants seem to me almost like two merchants who are in 
debt to each other for various items, but who are never willing to 
strike a balance; instead, each one advances his own various claims 
against the other, exaggerating the truth and magnitude of certain 
particular items. Their quarrel will never end on this basis. And we 
need not be surprised that this is what has happened until now in 
most controversies in which the matter is not clear, in other words, not 
reduced to numbers. Now, however, our characteristic will reduce the 
whole to numbers, so that reasons can also be weighed, as if by a kind 
of statics. For probabilities, too, will be treated in this calculation and 
demonstration, since one can always estimate which of the given 
circumstances will more probably occur.”630 
                                                 
630 “Qui vero in aliqua deliberatione totam utrinque Tabulam accepti et 
expensi subducere id est commoda et incommoda non tantum numerare 
sed et recte ponderare possit vix quisquam est. Itaque duo qui disputant 
fere mihi duobus Mercatoribus similes videntur qui sibi mutuo ex multis 
capitibus debitores essent, sed nollent unquam ad generalis cujusdam 
bilancis examen venire, interea varie merita quisque sua erga alterum, et 
quorundam singularium nominum (seu debitorum) veritatem ac 
magnitudinem exaggerarent, hi certe sic quidem nunquam litem 
terminabunt. Idque hactenus fieri in plerisque controversiis, ubi res 
liquida (id est ad numeros revocata) non est; mirari non debemus. Nunc 
vero characteristica nostra cuncta ad numeros revocabit, et ut ponderari 
etiam rationes queant velut quoddam staticae genus dabit. Nam etiam 
probabilitates calculo aut demonstrationi subjiciuntur; cum aestimari 
semper possit quodnam ex datis circumstantiis probabilius sit futurum.” 
A VI, 4, p. 269; L, pp. 224-225. 
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Calculating reasons or, to use Leibniz's word Calculemus! is thus a 
kind of weighing up of reasons, but with exact weights, produced 
by analysis or probability calculus. Sometimes (in economic 
treaties, for example) one could simply calculate the share of each 
party once the analysis has been completed successfully, in other 
words once the reasons or arguments have been reduced to 
numbers.631   
    
11. 2. 1. An Example of Balancing For or Against 
 
As mentioned, the model of the pair of scales is often related to 
criminal jurisprudence, when the decision is for or against some 
position. Some legal case studies that seem to apply the model 
were discussed in Chapter 6.2.2. I will now consider a significantly 
trickier example in which the balancing takes place in several 
stages. It concerns Leibniz's dissertation for Altdorf University, 
which he wrote in 1666, Specimen difficultatis in jure seu dissertatio de 
casibus perplexi. He discussed more difficult cases involving 
problems of logic in applying the law. He believed that all cases 
should be settled by juridical means through only justice and 
should not involve any external authority.632  
This presupposes that the legal system is normatively rich 
enough to settle all questions that might arise, or that it enables 
(supplemented by a set of principles) the judge to resolve all 
difficulties.633 Difficult or perplexing cases were discussed by 
medieval thinkers as important moral problems because they 
represented a situation in which a person was trapped between 
                                                 
631 In modern view, this view is certainly too simple. There are other 
factors involved that can affect the overall balance, such as the 
consequences of treaties (moral, political, economic and ecological) and 
psychological questions. These additional reasons complicate the 
deliberation significantly and it is questionable if even the probabilities of 
the consequences of these factors can be estimated. However, Leibniz 
evidently believed that all relevant factors in a controversy can in an ideal 
case be reduced to numbers.  
632 Sec. VI, A VI, 1, p. 237. 
633 See Ben-Menahem, Leibniz on Hard Cases, p. 199. 
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two equally sinful alternatives.634 Leibniz used the term to include 
all complex cases, and sought to provide a systematic method for 
resolving them.  
He defined perplexing cases in the first five sections of the 
dissertation, and provides a host of well-known examples and 
references to past and contemporary authorities. In the fifth section 
he made a distinction between antinomies and perplexing cases: 
while the former involve contradictory elements, the latter include 
contradictory norms only when applied to a certain case. It is 
possible, therefore, to reach a verdict by deciding which norm is to 
be applied.635 Thus these cases are legally well-grounded, and 
when properly judged they could be decided rationally. The 
perplexing case is, in the end, not perplexing at all.  
Sections six to ten described different ways of resolving law 
cases, such as free judgement, leaving the case unsolved and 
casting lots, and includes examples of the use of these methods.636 
Section ten includes a discussion on the method of charity, 
according to which the judge is led by principles of utility, charity, 
equity and humanity, and Leibniz seemed to be hinting at the 
possibility of compromise, thus referring to cases in which the 
proofs are equally weighty.637 However, compromise is not good 
enough in cases in which there is only one beneficiary: one has to 
judge for or against some position. 
                                                 
634 The term perplexing case derives from Gregory the Great. Leibniz's 
discussion, however, did not include this kind of moral valuation. Ben-
Menahem, Leibniz on Hard Cases, p. 200. 
635 “Casum igitur (propriè) perplexum definio (eum, qui realiter in jure 
dubius est ob) copulationem contingentem plurium in facto eum effectum 
juris habentium, qui nunc mutuo concursu impeditur. In antinomia autem 
ipsarum immediatè legum pugna est, quanquam et perplexitas antinomia 
quaedam indirecta dici potest.” A VI, 1, p. 236. See also Bayart, Leibniz et 
les antinomies en droit, pp. 257-58 and Ben-Menahem, Leibniz on Hard Cases, 
p. 201. 
636 Sec. 6, A VI, 1, p. 237. 
637 See A VI, 1, p. 239 and Ben-Menahem, Leibniz on Hard Cases, p. 202. 
Bayart notes that complex perplexing law cases, while common in Roman 
justice, are less common in modern jurisprudence. Bayart, Leibniz et les 
antinomies de droit, p. 260.  
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He concentrated on conflicts involving cases with at least three 
claimants, all of whom, at first sight, have a legal right, and the 
sole issue is the priority of their claims. The conflict of priority 
arises from conflicting norms of the same or a different origin, and 
the solution is reached by taking one norm to be superior to the 
others.638 If the norms are of the same status it is the kind of 
perplexing case Leibniz found interesting, whereas if they are of 
different status it is not perplexing at all. He believed in always 
applying a specific rather than a general norm to the case.639 
Before introducing his own method Leibniz distinguished 
between dispositio and concursus in a perplexing case. Dispositio 
involves the claimant presenting a claim that is so confused, or is 
like a vicious circle, so that two different verdicts are possible, 
whereas concursus means there are several consistent claims at the 
same time.640  
He then proceeded to give three rules for solving perplexing 
cases. The first one, in section XII, concerns dispositio: “A 
Perplexing dispositio is invalid, and who founds his case on it, 
obtains nothing.”641 The second one is as follows: “If the object of a 
perplexing conflict is indivisible, it cannot be divided among all 
related to the case.”642 Thus each person wins (and loses) and the 
case ends in a tie, which is unacceptable. There cannot be 
equilibrium of reasons, since it would make practical 
arrangements impossible. Thirdly, “In perplexing conflicts over 
indivisible things all parties admit their relative defeat or 
victory.”643 All parties should obey reason – in this case, the judge. 
                                                 
638 Ben-Menahem, Leibniz on Hard Cases, p. 204. 
639 Section XX, A VI, 1, p. 244. 
640 See Sec. XII, A VI, 1, p. 240. 
641 “Dispositio perplexa invalida est, et qui se super ea fundat, nil obtinet.” 
Sec. 12, A VI, 1, p. 240. 
642 “In concursu perplexo ad rem indivisibilem, et incommunicabilem 
concurrentes omnes carebunt.” Sec XXIV, A VI, 1, p. 247. 
643 “In concursu perplexo ad rem indivisibilem aut communicabilem 
litigantes omnes admittentur pro rata.” Sec. XXVII, A VI, 1, p. 249. The 
term “pro rata” has a specific meaning in jurisprudence. When several 
debtors are each liable for the whole debt they are said to be liable “in 
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The task of the judge, in turn, is to interpret the will of the 
legislator, of which the written law is an imperfect model.644 The 
need is therefore to understand the spirit, not the letter of law. It is 
not quite certain whether Leibniz thought these three rules were 
sufficient for solving every possible perplexing case, but that 
seems very likely.   
How should the decision be reached? True to his idea of 
sufficient reason, Leibniz recommended finding by logical analysis 
a reason why one jurisprudical norm was more valid than the 
others in the case and thus to be favoured. This would do away 
with the perplexity. The perplexing case is, after all, a conflict of 
norms, or a conflict of logic within the legal system. However, it is 
not always possible to find a sufficient reason, and in that case the 
judge should try to eliminate the norms one by one and decide 
which one is to be preferred.645 He should weigh up the different 
ones in a dialectical manner and decide which is the most 
appropriate in the case at hand and best reflects the spirit of the 
lawmaker (which, of course, includes the idea that a legal norm 
should promote general perfection). Depending on the norm, any 
claimant could be given priority. 
These perplexing cases are common in hereditary matters, in 
which different rules of inheritance conflict with each other. 
Another example would be a case in which a prince has given 
contradictory promises concerning a vacant position or when a 
property is subject to different kinds of mortgage.646  
 
11. 2. 2. Examples of Compromises Achieved by Finding a Balance 
 
Leibniz was active in almost every imaginable practical field 
simultaneously, and tried to reconcile different opinions in science, 
philosophy, politics and theology and so forth by seeking the 
common ground between opponents and understanding their 
                                                                                                    
solidum”, but where each is liable only for his own share or proportion 
only, they are said to be bound “pro rata.” 
644 Bayart, Leibniz et les antinomies en droit, p. 261. 
645 Sections XIX-XXI, A VI, 1, pp. 243-44. 
646 Ben-Menahem, Leibniz on Hard Cases, p. 205 
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different positions. Although he thought that rigorous analysis 
and, ultimately general science, complemented by a calculus of 
probability (once finalised) would eventually be the best way to 
resolve controversies, he was also keen to find other, less 
demanding methods that would be applicable in practical 
situations.  
In settling controversies rational argument often suffices for 
finding a middle ground or a reasonable distribution of goods that 
would be acceptable to all parties. By weighing up  the different 
reasons in both pans of the pair of scales it is possible to see the 
whole situation and thus to find a compromise allowing both 
parties to agree on a common solution that would promote not 
only the interest, but also the common interest. When the values 
are independent of each other, simple balancing might suffice in 
reaching a rational compromise.  
Compromise achieved by means of balanced reasoning is 
typical in political controversies. In Realpolitik it is reasonable for 
both sides to make concessions in order to reach a solution that 
enables both parties to gain in some respects and to lose in others. 
Leibniz often strived for this kind of rational compromise in his 
various political activities. Let us consider two examples, one from 
Church politics and the other from 18th-century politics. 
My first example concerns an effort to find a compromise 
between the confessions, which Leibniz gave in his memoir Pour 
faciliter la réunion des Protestants avec les Romains catholiques (1698, 
written under the name of Molanus).647 He began by declaring that 
the possibility of reunion is dependent on the question of heresy648  
– the Protestants were not formally heretical because the status had 
been cast upon them without consultation in the Council of Trent. 
They were only materially heretic (a less serious case), and this 
should be admitted by the Catholics.  
                                                 
647 FC II, p. 172f. There are two drafts of this memoir, one in Latin and the 
other in French, and a copy in Leibniz's own hand (LH 1 7, 4 2-6), which is 
assumed to be the source of the one printed in FC. Thus it seems clear that 
the text was written by Leibniz. I thank Prof. Hartmut Rudolph from 
Leibniz-Arbeitsstelle Potsdam for this information.  
648 FC II, p. 174. 
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Leibniz then suggested six concessions to be made by the 
Catholics:649  
  
1) Protestants may return permanently to the Roman Church.  
2) Catholics must not force Protestants to hold Catholic masses or 
to use a language that is not familiar to people in their churches. 
Further, they should not force them to introduce rites that would 
cause alarm or inconvenience.  
3) Protestant priests and other ecclesiastics should be allowed to 
marry, since this was already an established practice.  
4) Protestant ecclesiastics should not be held in contempt, and the 
priests should also be allowed to practice their profession among 
Catholics – this would cause no scandals if the sacraments and 
rules of the Catholics were honoured.  
5) All the land and property of Protestants ecclesiastics taken over 
under the Peace of Westphalia and in other transactions should be 
returned.  
6) Once these concessions have been accepted, all 
excommunications and anathemas on both sides should be 
revoked at once. A declaration should be issued stating that 
Protestants are no longer heretics or schismatics.  
 
Final settlement of theological controversies would be reached in an 
ecumenical council in the future. Leibniz was certain that the Pope 
could accept these terms.650 However, since the proposition was a 
compromise, the Protestants should also make some concessions and 
agree to the following five conditions:651  
 
1) Protestants should accept that the Bishop of Rome is the 
highest authority in the whole Christian world and the supreme 
patriarch in spiritual matters. They must also obey the canon law 
in spiritual matters.  
                                                 
649 Ibid., pp. 176-77. 
650“...il n’y a rien dans ces points qui soit contraire au droict divin et que le 
Pape ne puisse  permettre...” Ibid., p. 178.  
651 Ibid., pp. 179-80. 
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2) Protestant priests are subject to their bishops, the bishops to 
their Archbishops and so forth, according to the Catholic 
hierarchy.  
3) Protestants should recognise their fellow Catholics as brothers 
in Jesus Christ, cultivate unity with them, and practice charity 
towards them. The Church should resolve any controversies 
between the two sides.  
4) Following the reunion, Protestants should agree not only to 
maintain the peace and unity, but also to perfect it by all possible 
means.  
5) Protestant priests should enter into solid and peaceful 
discussion in which the controversies and disagreements in the 
two doctrines are analysed, and which would establish the core of 
the Christian faith for posterity. An ecumenical council should 
settle any resolved matters.  
 
Leibniz maintained that the majority of controversies were pseudo-
problems because of the manner in which they were presented, and 
that careful analysis often showed that the differences were not real 
or that they could be left to be settled later, when the solution would 
be more apparent. 652 Thus his method here is similar to the notion of 
transubstantiation (which I will discuss in detail in Chapter 11.3.2.3.): 
one should assume some understanding, which is provisional until it 
can be analysed and settled properly. This presumption is evident in 
the procedure for the reunion which comprises three stages.  
At the first stage the question of the mass and the Eucharist will 
be almost resolved and the differences will only be verbal.653 The 
controversy over the number of sacraments will also be reduced to 
the verbal level. Protestants will allow Catholic masses and 
Catholics will allow Protestant sermons, as long as there is no 
abuse of the saints and no vernacular language. The question of 
the Eucharist will be discussed in a spirit of tolerance.654  
                                                 
652 Ibid., p. 184.  
653 I will discuss the details later. 
654 Ibid., pp. 184-85. This phrasing is familiar from Leibniz's writings about 
transsubstantion, and simply means that theologians from both parties 
would soon find out that the difference in dogma were only verbal. 
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Certain Catholic sacraments (the sacred oil, for example) will be 
introduced to the Protestants in the second stage. Confirmation 
will be preserved in Protestant ceremonies, and also introduced to 
the Catholics, and the sacrament of marriage will be unified 
throughout Christendom. Catholics will not be required to believe 
that the mass is an act that effaces current evil in the same way that 
the crucifixion is believed to redeem original sin.655  
At the start of the third stage, “There are no controversies about 
whether good deeds will affect justification or the forgiveness of 
evil things.”656 Disputes over good deeds and their role in one’s 
“heavenly credit” will be merely scholastic, as will all former 
differences. At this last stage of the reunion the controversies will 
have become merely verbal, to be resolved through continuous 
discussions among the leading theologians on both sides. The 
problems are thus no longer real, only verbal.657 
Although it is evident that this memoir was written from the 
Protestant perspective, its author seemed to be aiming at 
compromise, with each party expected to give up some of their 
privileges and to genuinely strive for reconciliation. Leibniz 
considered the problem political, as this memoir clearly shows. 
The unification of the confessions would promote general well-
being by helping to maintain peace in an era in which the majority 
of wars were related to a greater or lesser extent to religious 
differences. Doctrines such as transubstantiation were to be 
understood in principle, and the exact interpretation of the dogma 
could be settled later in negotiations between theologians on both 
sides or in an ecumenical council.  
The first priority was to deal with practical problems. 
According to Leibniz's presentation, the burning issues were the 
authority of the Catholic Church and the Pope on the other hand 
and on the other the practices of the Protestants. These criteria had 
to be balanced so as to achieve a compromise according to which 
the Catholics would accept Protestants in the Roman church as 
                                                 
655 Ibid., pp. 186-88. 
656 “...il n’y a plus de controverse si les bonnes oeuvres méritent la 
justification ou la rémission des péchés.” Ibid., p. 189. 
657 Ibid., pp. 189-90. 
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they were, that is to say with their established ways and habits, 
and would recognise their right to practise their kind of Christian 
religion. The Protestants, in turn, would recognise the supreme 
authority of the Roman church.  
This scheme was ingenious, but it is easy to agree with Miller 
and Spielman, who argue that although Leibniz could not be 
accused of being completely politically motivated, it is clear that he 
did not place proper emphasis on the real need to establish 
harmony among theologians and the great body of the faithful 
before any schism or heresy could rightly be said to have ended.658  
Another example of finding a balance between different parties 
occurs in Leibniz’s memoir Considerations sur le moyens de faire une 
paix juste et raisonnable, which he crafted in 1694-95 in order to 
assist the Duke of Hanover, Ernst August, in promoting peace 
between France and the Allies in the so-called Pfalz war (1688-
97).659 His approach to this political problem was strikingly similar 
to his approach in Pour faciliter la réunion des Protestants avec les 
Romains catholiques, discussed above. 
In 1688 the armies of Louis XIV marched to Pfalz on some 
dubious grounds and the area was mercilessly robbed and 
devastated. The Pfalz war was a continuation of the Reunion 
politics of Louis XIV, and started in 1686.660 France suffered 
setbacks when the Emperor Leopold I won a decisive victory 
against the Turks and William III of Orange became the King of 
England. A new alliance (“The Grand Alliance”) against France 
was formed in 1689 with William III in the lead, consisting of 
England, the Netherlands, the Emperor Leopold I, Sweden, Spain, 
Savoy, and several German states. France was left alone in the 
Great War against the rest of Europe.  
At first Louis was successful and there was a plan to invade 
England, but a decisive defeat in a sea battle at The Hague gave the 
                                                 
658 Miller & Spielman, Rojas y Spinola, p. 66. 
659 Leibniz's memoir is to be found in A IV, 5. The Pfalz war is also known 
as The War of the Grand Alliance, The War of the League of Augsburg 
and the War of the English Succession. 
660 For the historical details of the Pfalz war, see Lavisse, Louis XIV. 
Histoire d'un grand règne 1643-1715, p. 750f.  
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allied forces predominance at sea. The French troops were more 
victorious on land and the battles raged on for almost ten years, 
with grave losses. Finally the huge costs, famine in France and 
general war-weariness forced the parties to engage in peace 
negotiations. The negotiations were not solely about military 
achievements – since neither side had had a decisive victory – and 
a major factor concerned the resources of the Allies and France. 
The peace treaty was finally signed in Rijswick in 1697. 
Under the treaty Louis XIV was forced to return all his 
conquered territory east of the Rhine all Reunions except Alsace 
and Luxembourg, and to renounce all claims to Pfalz and the 
Bishopric of Cologne. Thus France had to retreat to her natural, 
geometric borders as defined by the Treaty of Nijmegen (1679). In 
addition, Louis had to return Lothringen to its Duke, while 
Strassbourg was left to France, and he had to promise not to try to 
unseat William III from the throne of England. Thus the treaty was 
a compromise: France was forced to withdraw from its conquered 
lands, but it was not defeated. Four years later another war, related 
to the Spanish succession, broke out.  
Leibniz's memoir was written in a situation in which the 
solution was in sight, but no agreement between the parties had 
been achieved. True to his convictions, he wrote: “It is very 
difficult to find the means to make a good peace, but perhaps it is 
not yet absolutely impossible. Extremes must be avoided, if 
possible.”661  He suggested that a neutral prince might act as a 
negotiator. 662 His memoir was a manual of a kind for the neutral 
prince.  
In the negotiations the foundation for peace was to be found in 
a compromise that safeguarded the security of the allies and the 
honour of Louis XIV: 
                                                 
661 “Il est tres difficile de trouver les moyens de faire une bonne paix, mais 
peutestre ne l'est-il pas encor absolument impossible. Il faut prevenir les 
extremités, s'il se peut.” A IV, 5, p. 446. 
662 A IV, 5, p. 447. Leibniz was probably thinking of Sweden. Ibid., p. 445. 
In the actual treaty of Ryswick Sweden acted as a mediator, but failed in 
the task. 
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“The conditions of a just and reasonable peace…can be reduced to two 
essential points…: the security of the Allies must be guaranteed and 
the honour of the King of France protected. This is what justice 
requires for the Allies and the reason demands for the King so that he 
may stay as wonderful as he is.”663 
The security of the allies was demanded by justice (here Leibniz 
was probably referring to Louis' politics concerning Germany), 
and the honour of the king of France was to be preserved 
according to the demands of reason. Later Leibniz argued that it 
was not wise to demand too much from France, since that would 
surely lead to even more bloodshed.664 By setting these two 
reasons or goods against each other and applying the pair of scales 
model the negotiator could strive for a rational compromise 
between the two parties.  
The politics of the 17th century concerned appearances, 
perhaps even more than today. As long as both parties had their 
immediate concerns satisfied, a durable peace was possible and the 
prerequisites for pursuing perfection could be established. Leibniz 
argued that the Allies could best ensure their security by 
permitting the King of France to preserve his honour, since 
otherwise there would be no peace and the final rupture in 
international relations would take place. It was through such a 
compromise that long-term peace in Europe could be 
established.665  
“Here is thus the nub of the matter, and if the secret of connecting 
these two things, which appear so opposed, the security of one party 
and the honour of other, is found, one could give Europe the great 
                                                 
663 “Les Conditions d'une paix juste et raisonnable…se doivent reduire à 
deux points essentiels…; sçavoir qu'on rendre la seureté aux Alliés, et 
qu'on mette à couvert l'honneur du Roy de France. C'est ce que la justice 
demande pour les Alliés, et que la raison demande pour le Roy T. C. tant 
qu'il demeure formidable qu’il est.” A IV, 5, p. 447. 
664 “…il faut que la raison regle des demandes.” A IV, 5, p. 448. 
665 See A IV, 5, p. 449. 
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goodness of durable peace and thereby prevent the terrible evils that 
still menace Christendom.”666   
The resulting peace in Rijswick was a compromise that 
approximately follewed Leibniz's suggested guidelines. However, 
the reasons for this compromise were more to do with the military 
situation and the available resources of the different parties than 
any abstract ideal in Leibniz's memoir. It seemingly had no effect 
in the actual peace negotiations.  
 
11. 3. Complicated Decisions 
 
Simple balancing between two alternatives on a pair of scales is 
often too limited a model to cope with difficult decisions. In the 
Leibnizian sense (he also used the terms trutina, stateram and 
libra)667 there are many cases involving multiple indivisible goods 
and the simple weighing between different alternatives does not 
suffice. One has to strive for the optimum, taking account of all the 
goods in the final decision.  
Finding an optimal solution is very difficult. It is rare for 
humans given their limited cognitive ability and reasoning, but 
they can strive to find a solution that approaches the optimum as 
closely as possible. God's choice of the best among all possible 
worlds is an idealised version of this kind of choice since His 
infinite cognition makes it possible to find the objective optimum 
among the alternatives. 
In the context of deliberation, finding the optimum is related 
both to the assessment of the good and the estimation of the 
probability of the desired effect on the desired good of the 
proposed action. In what follows I will primarily concentrate on 
the first consideration, as the latter was discussed in Chapter 6. 
                                                 
666 “Voilà donc le noeud de l'Affaire, et si l'on trouvoit le secret d'allier ces 
deux choses, qui paroissent si opposées, le seureté d'un parti, et l'honneur 
de l'autre, on pourroit donner à l'Europe ce grand bien d'un paix durable, 
par la quelle on previendroit des terribles maux qui menacent encor la 
Chrestienté.”  A IV, 5, p. 449. 
667 Marras, Leibniz and his Metaphorical Models: the “trutina rationis”, p. 781  
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11. 3. 1. The Vectorial Model of Rational Decision-Making 
 
I discussed optimisation and the calculus of variations in Chapter 
2.1.1. I  argued, following Nicholas Rescher’s interpretation, that 
according to Leibniz, God's preferred method of choosing the best 
of all possible worlds was the calculus of variations where the 
object is to find a unique (easiest, optimal) solution among an 
infinite number of alternative paths that achieves an extremisation 
(maximisation or minimisation) of some specified characteristic 
(time or distance, for example). The optimal and unique 
combination of minima (order) or maxima (variety) (where these 
factors lead in opposite directions) is simply the best of all possible 
worlds.  
An instance of the general optimisation model is Leibniz's 
vectorial model of rational decision-making which he developed in 
order to grapple with difficult practical human decisions. The 
model was briefly mentioned by Louis Couturat in his La logique de 
Leibniz, for example and is discussed by Jon Elster in his Leibniz et 
la formation de l'esprit capitaliste.668 Jaakko Hintikka attached more 
importance to it in his article “Was Leibniz's Deity an Akrates?”, in 
which he argues that Leibniz developed it in order to ease 
difficulties in making rational decisions, and it was thus of 
systematic value. Simo Knuuttila considers the model, which he 
calls the vectorial theory of rational decision Leibniz's most 
original contribution to practical rationality.669 The details have 
remained obscure, however, since Leibniz seldom discussed it 
explicitly. My aim in what follows is to provide a hypothetical 
reconstruction of it and to find some examples in which Leibniz 
seemed to apply it. 
The complicated balance in the vectorial model is significantly 
different from the more simple weighing up of options on a pair of 
scales, as shown in Essais de Theodicée, §324. First, Leibniz 
                                                 
668 See Couturat, La logique de Leibniz, p. 562-65 and Elster, Leibniz et la 
formation de l'esprit capitaliste, p. 123-24. 
669 See Hintikka, Was Leibniz's Deity an Akrates, pp. 98-100 and Knuuttila, 
Old and New in Leibniz's View of Rational Decision, p. 333. 
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introduced the traditional pair of scales model as Bayle's view of 
the soul: 
“He demonstrates amply enough…that the soul may be compared to a 
balance, where reasons and inclinations take the place of weights. 
Accordingly, one can explain what passes in our resolutions by the 
hypothesis that the will of a man is like a balance that is at rest when 
the weights in its two pans are equal, and which always inclines either 
to one side or the other according to which of the pans is the more 
heavily laden. A new reason makes a heavier weight, a new idea 
shines more brightly than the old; the fear of a heavy penalty prevails 
over some pleasure; when two passions dispute the ground, it is 
always the stronger that gains the mastery, unless the other be assisted 
by reason or by some other contributing passion.”670  
He then goes on to introduce his new model:   
“Nevertheless, as very often there are diverse courses to choose from, 
one might, instead of the balance, compare the soul with a force that 
puts forth an effort on various sides simultaneously, but which acts 
only at the spot where action is easiest or there is least resistance.”671  
                                                 
670 “Il fait voir assés amplement…qu'on peut comparer l'ame à une 
balance, où les raisons et les inclinations tiennent lieu de poids. Et selon 
luy, on peut expliquer ce qui se passe dans nos resolutions, par 
l'hypothese que la volonté de l'homme est comme une balance qui se tient 
en repos, quand les poids de ses deux bassins sont egaux, et qui panche 
tousjours, ou d'un côté ou de l'autre, selon que l'un des bassins est plus 
chargé. Une nouvelle raison fait un poids superieur, une nouvelle idée 
rayonne plus vivement que la vieille, la crainte d'une grosse peine 
l'emporte sur quelque plaisir; quand deux passions se disputent le terrain, 
c'est tousjours la plus forte qui demeure la maitresse, à moins que l'autre 
ne soit aidée par la raison, ou par quelque autre passion combinée.” G VI, 
p. 308; H, 321-322. 
671 “Cependant, comme bien souvent il y a plusieurs partis à prendre, on 
pourrait au lieu de la balance comparer l'ame avec une force, qui fait effort 
en même temps de plusieurs côtés, mais qui n'agit que là où elle trouve le 
plus de facilité ou le moins de resistance.” (Essais de Theodicée, §325). G VI, 
p. 309; H, p. 322. A similar passage can be found in a short fragment called 
Demonstratio quod Deus omnia possibilia intelligit: “Sit liquor pressus et qui 
exire conatur. Manifestum est tentari semper ab eo vias possibiles omnes, 
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The reference to the easiest action is clearly related to the 
optimisation method discussed in Tentamen anagogium. In the 
process of deliberation, different inclinations act as tendencies, 
forming different paths or variations in different directions. The 
best choice is the unique optimal path. In cases of moral choice, the 
final decision is, in an ideal situation, the optimum between 
different goods (“effort on various sides simultaneously”), and it is 
reached when all of these inclinations are apperceived and the 
optimal solution is found (“action is easiest or there is least 
resistance”). As in the example of the ray of light (discussed in 
Chapter 2.4.2.)  there is always a single best decision, which may 
be reached if the deliberator is enlightened enough and can expect 
to find this optimum. As mentioned, the best decision follows 
God's will, and produces the maximum amount of common good 
to the perfection in the world. 
While God chooses the best of all possible worlds in his infinite 
understanding, humans act on the basis of appearances they 
perceive. The more developed our understanding is, the more 
informed we are of the real good involved in each case, and the 
more adequately we can contribute to the general perfection, 
which is ruled according to architectonic considerations: 
“As for the rational soul, or mind, there is something more in it than in 
monads, or even in simple souls. It is not only a mirror of the universe 
of created things, bur also an image of the divinity. The mind not only 
has a perception of God's works, but it is even capable of producing 
something that resembles them, although on a small scale…Our soul is 
also architectonic in its voluntary actions; and in discovering the 
sciences according to which God has regulated things (by weight, 
                                                                                                    
successum autem haberi tantum secundum viam omnium possibilium 
facillimam. Tentari autem omnes ex eo patet, quia ut quaeque oblata est 
commodior eam statim arripit: nec vero eligere posset commodissimam 
nisi eodem momento omnes tentarentur, neque enim determinatur 
commodissima nisi comparatione omnium.” A VI, 4, p. 1353; Leibniz, 
Confessio philosophi, p. 141.  
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measure, number, etc.) it imitates in its realm and in the small world in 
which it is allowed to work, what God does in His large work.”672 
God can see perfectly that the basis for His choice of the best world 
lies in the optimum between the criteria of order and variety, as I 
argued in Chapter 2. It is much more difficult for humans to know 
about the motives for our actions, and we can also easily err in the 
choice of the appropriate ways of evaluating the good and of the 
consequences of our proposed actions.  
Minute perceptions blur the judgement in human deliberations, 
and we may be affected by sensual pleasures we mistakenly regard 
as real goods, or we may even ignore the real goods and choose 
the apparent ones. However, by manipulating our judgement, by 
adopting good habits and developing our understanding, we can 
approach the optimal decision in complicated deliberations, and 
sometimes perhaps even reach it. We should strive to find the best 
possible combination of different inclinations to the good within 
the limits of our cognitive abilities, or at least choose the 
combination that is least harmful with regard to our own good and 
the general well-being. The more developed our understanding of 
the world and God's nature is, the better rational decisions we will 
make. 
In itself, the vectorial model is only a heuristic device that 
cannot give any certain results. However, by applying it the moral 
agent can map the situation, make discoveries and, in an ideal 
case, find the optimum from among carefully selected different 
inclinations all of which lead to the good. Whether or not we can 
                                                 
672 “Pour ce qui est de l'Ame raisonnable ou de l'Esprit, il y a quelque 
chose de plus, que dans les Monades, ou même dans les simples Ames. Il 
n'est pas seulement un Miroir de l'univers des Creatures, mais encore une 
image de la Divinité. L'Esprit n'a pas seulement une perception des 
ouvrages de Dieu, mais il est même capable de produire quelque chose 
qui leur ressemble, queoy'en petit…Notre ame est Architectonique encore 
dans les Actions volontaires: et decouvrant les sciences, suivant lesquelles 
Dieu a reglé des choses (pondere, mensura, numero, etc.). Elle imite dans 
son departement, et dans son petit Monde où il luy est permis de 
s'exerceser, ce que Dieu fait dans le grand.” (PNG, §14) G VI, pp. 604-05; 
AG, p. 212. 
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reach the optimum, the deliberation is a pseudo-mechanical 
arithmetics of reasons, which consists of inclinations which do not 
necessitate. In the pair of scales model the deliberator adds up the 
reasons in the left and right pans and balances between them, 
while the vectorial model involves the “multiplication” of the 
separate continuous values in order to find a balanced optimum. 
“I came to see that there is a species of mathematics in estimating 
reasons, where they sometimes have to be added, sometimes 
multiplied together in order to get the sum. This has not yet been 
noted by the logicians.”673  
The final deliberation proceeds in two stages. First, the deliberator 
assesses the good in the situation and, having found some 
appropriate conception, considers the probability of the proposed 
actions with respect to it by using the moral calculus described 
above. The optimal choice is, of course, the best choice in every 
respect. Since this optimum is seldom reached, one should strive at 
as good an assessment in both respects as possible. If the 
assessment is successful, the choice contributes to the increase in 
perfection in the world, which gives the deliberator pleasure and 
motivates him or her to act accordingly in subsequent 
deliberations. 
    Leibniz's views on deliberation in complicated situations 
incorporate some new ideas. He took an interest in cases involving 
plural values, all of which would affect the decision. He was 
looking for optima in situations in which there were no compatible 
                                                 
673 “Je fis voir qu'il y a une espece de Mathematique dans l'estime des 
raisons, et tantost il faut les ajouter, tantost les multiplier ensemble pour 
en avoir la somme. Ce qui n'a pas esté remarqué des Logiciens.” (Leibniz 
to Burnett 1/11. 2. 1697) G III, p. 190. In what follows, Leibniz noted that 
he had made efforts in applying mathematics to theology. Recently 
Michael J. Murray referred to willing as a “result of a “vector sum” of 
desires for those things that are apprehended as good, whether by way of 
adequate or inadequate ideas.” Murray, Spontainety and Freedom, p. 205. 
This characterisation relates all inclinations to addition, which I find 
misleading. In my view, addition is exclusively related to the pair of scales 
model, in which different reasons are added up and weighed against each 
other. 
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goals. In his view, one deliberates between different goods that 
promote universal perfection more or less efficiently, and not 
between the means of reaching one specific good, which is the 
common case in Aristotelian practical syllogism. Nevertheless, 
Leibniz could be seen as a follower of Aristotle in the sense that his 
idea of universal perfection apparently sprung from Aristotelian 
eudaimonia.674  
A significant feature of the vectorial model is that it can be 
expressed in a geometrical manner: the deliberator uses figures in 
order to sketch or map the situation better. In this Leibniz was 
influenced by Arnauld and Nicole’s The Art of Thinking (L’art de 
penser), or the so-called Port Royal Logic. The authors argue in 
their discussion of lotteries in the last chapter of this work that one 
should not only think about the good, but should also take into 
account the probability that it will materialise: 
“...in order to decide what we ought to do to obtain some good or 
avoid some harm, it is necessary to consider not only the good or harm 
in itself, but also the probability that it will or will not occur, and to 
view geometrically the proportion all these things have when taken 
together.”675 
This description clearly refers to the moral calculus as sketched by 
Rescher (discussed in Chapter 11.1.). In Nouveaux essais, however, 
Leibniz generalised the idea to apply to all assessments in 
complicated situations: 
                                                 
674 See Nichomachean Ethics X, 7, in which Aristotle argues that eudaimonia 
is connected to all human capacities, which consist of both theoretical and 
practical reason. Thus eudaimonia or flourishing involves, besides virtues, 
both reason and emotions. On Aristotle's conception of eudaimonia, see 
Nagel, Aristotle on Eudaimonia.  
675 “…pour juger de ce que l'on doit faire pour obtenir un bien, ou pour 
èviter un mal, il ne faut pas seulement considérer le bien et le mal en soi, 
mais aussi la probabilité qu'il arrive ou n'arrive pas et regarder 
géometriquement la proportion que toutes ces choses on ensemble.” 
Arnauld & Nicole, La logique ou l'art de penser, p. 353; Arnauld and Nicole, 
Logic or the Art of Thinking, pp. 273-74.  
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“…in this as in other disparate and heterogeneous assessments with 
more than one dimension (so to speak), the magnitude of the thing in 
question is made up proportionately of two estimates; it is like a 
rectangle with two things to be considered, namely its length and its 
breadth.” 676 
This idea could be applied to both considerations, one of which 
concerns the good itself and the other the likehood that the good 
will materialise. In both cases the vectorial model could be 
understood as a functional analysis of different goods, which are 
separate and in competition with each other. However, assessing 
the good seems to be a more complicated process since the 
estimation of probability involves more developed methods, which 
I described in Chapter 6. In what follows I will concentrate on 
Leibniz's remarks on the assessment of the good in different 
situations. 
The idea of a function in mathematics was made popular by 
Galileo in his Two New Sciences677, and was developed further by 
Torricelli, Descartes, Roberval, Wallis and Gregory.678 Leibniz used 
the term in the modern sense, that is to mean any quantity varying 
from one point to another along a curve.679 The curve could be 
illustrated by a coordinate system.  
If we consider Leibniz's account of deliberation in practical 
terms, it is clear that the values are only estimations, and 
consequently the resulting function is also uncertain. The values to 
be estimated are often impossible to evaluate by quantative 
methods. However, the vectorial model could be of great heuristic 
                                                 
676 “…qu'icy, comme en d'autres estimes disparates et heterogenes et pour 
ainsi dire de plus d'une dimension, la grandeur de ce dont il s'agit est en 
raison composée de l'une et l'autre estimation, et comme un rectangle, où 
il y a deux considerations savoir celle de la longeur et celle de la largeur.” 
(Nouveaux Essais II, xxi, §66). A VI, 6, 206; RB, p. 206. 
677 Discorsi e dimostrazioni matematiche, intorno a due nuove scienze attenenti 
alla meccanica e i movimenti locali, 1638. 
678 Kline, Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times 1, p. 338. 
679 In another much later connection Leibniz used the term to mean 
quantities that depend on a variable. Kline, Mathematical Thought from 
Ancient to Modern Times 1, p. 340. 
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value since, by employing it, we are able to compare different 
proposed options and map them with respect to different criteria.   
It seems that Leibniz conceived of the vectorial model early in 
his career (the earliest example is his memoir on the succession of 
the king in Poland in 1669; I will discuss this in Chapter 11.3.2.4.) 
and he applied it most explicitly at the beginning of the 1670's.680 
However, there is evidence that he used it at different stages, as 
my case studies will show, and he returned to the model in 
Nouveaux essais and Essais de Theodicée at the beginning of the 18th 
century. This systematic approach and the number of examples I 
give of the use of the model support the view that Leibniz 
considered it to function as a general model of rational decision-
making in complicated cases.  
Although Leibniz usually applied the model without 
explaining the details, he did elaborate on it in a few cases. 
Perhaps the best example is his discussion of happiness in a draft 
document, related to scientia generalis.681 Here he considered the 
good, in this case happiness, “ex ductu bonitatis in durationem.”  
“If we are to discuss that properly, we must use mathematical 
operations and say that the whole of the good consists in how long the 
good can be sustained (ex ductu bonitatis in durationem), as in land 
measurement a field (are) is measured by breadth in length (ex ductu 
latitudinum in longitudinem).”682 
                                                 
680 Jon Elster has argued that Leibniz seems to have used the vectorial 
model before he had the mathematical tools to apply it to practical 
problems. Elster, Leibniz et la formation de l'esprit capitaliste, p. 124. This 
view seems plausible, since most of the examples we have are from the 
end of the 1660’s and the beginning of the 1670’s, that is from his pre-
Parisian period. Parmentier also sees here a preliminary stage of 
differential and integral analysis, noting that Leibniz's model always 
needs a qualitative component – that is choosing the variables in question. 
Parmentier, Concepts juridiques et probabilisted chez Leibniz, pp. 473-74. 
681 This example is mentioned in Couturat, La logique de Leibniz, p. 564. On 
the relevant text, see G VII, p. 115. 
682 “Darnach eigentlich davon zu reden, muss man auss Mathematisch 
damit verfahren und sagen, die ganze gröse der guthe entstehe daraus 
man die güthe in daure führe (ex ductu bonitatis in durationem) wie bei 
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There are two separate continuous values, the duration and the 
intensity of the good. If the agent is inclined to choose the 
maximum possible intensity, the result is great happiness, which 
will last only for a short time. If he or she chooses maximum 
duration, the happiness is not very intense.683 
Leibniz argued that eternal evil, however small, can outweigh a 
temporal good, however great.684 By turning the issue upside 
down he reasoned that in the long run strong sensual feelings 
(passions) were harmful, and if the oil-lamp burned with too great 
a flame it would soon go out.685 Thus we must strive at a 
reasonable intensity of good that lasts for a long time. In this way 
the different inclinations (duration and intensity) “combine and 
the volition is the result of the conflict amongst them.”686 One 
encounters both values to a degree, but the overall result is better 
than either of the extremes. As with perfection, the whole is more 
important than the parts. 
When we choose rationally in this case we try to find a course 
of action that brings about the optimal good. However, sensual 
temptations might lead us to believe that maximum intensity of 
good is the best we can choose. If we follow this wrong idea of the 
good, our proposed actions produce something other than the 
desired effect. Even if we choose the most probable act in terms of 
the eventuation of the good, it is a wrong act because our idea of 
the good is misguided. 
                                                                                                    
den Messkünstlern die Feldgrössen (Areae) aus der führung der Breiten in 
die Länge (ex ductu latitudinum in longitudinem).” G VII, p. 115. 
683 “Kan man derowegen nicht schlecterdings sagen, dass ein kurzes guthe 
mit einem langwierigen übel für böss zu halten, denn es könnte dieses 
kurze guthe so gross sehn und das langwierige übel so klein, dass 
dennoch das guthe überwege.” G VII, p. 115. 
684 Here are echoes of Pascal's famous wager. 
685 “In übrigen ist gewiss, das alle starcke sinnliche empfindungen 
schädlich sehn, und mit einer allzustarcken flamm einer lampe zu 
vergleichen, die das oel zu früh verzehret…” G VII, p. 116. In what 
remains of the fragment Leibniz presented his pansofistic views on 
studying nature as a means of understanding and loving God.  
686 NE II, xxi, §39. 
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If we were to present this idea geometrically, we could take as 
coordinates the duration of the good and its intensity. We would 
thus end up with the figure below drawn by Leibniz himself: 
longitude represents the duration of the good and latitude its 
intensity.687 The whole of the good is represented by the arc of the 
semicircle, which also shows the corresponding combinations of 
different values.  
 
 
 
 
When the breadth of the area (latitude) varies, the length (longitudo) 
rises or falls, and vice versa.688 It would seem that the largest area 
can be estimated by drawing rectangles inside the semicircle, the 
largest one being found by “multiplying” the middle points of 
both longitudo and latitudo.  
Perhaps Leibniz thought that the geometrical analysis of a 
function would facilitate the comparison of different suggested 
combinations of values arrived at by non-quantative methods and 
the identification of the best one, although there is no mention of 
this in the text in question. One could also speculate that his 
analysis situs, a geometric method for comparing situations in a 
qualitative manner he developed at about the same time, had 
something to do with this comparison.689 Since there is no textual 
evidence I am aware of, I will not dwell on these possibilities. 
Instead, I will take up another text in which Leibniz attempted 
to apply exact values to a similar example, which was already 
discussed in Chapter 2.4.1. He described in a letter to Arnauld 
                                                 
687 The figure is given in G VII, p. 115. 
688 See G VII, pp. 115-16. 
689 On analysis situs, see Münzenmayer, Der Calculus Situs und die 
Grundlagen der Geometrie bei Leibniz. 
 
 
 
259
(1671) the estimation of a good man (beauty) with respect to Canon 
law:  
“Presuming that a man has wisdom of the third degree and power in 
the fourth, his total estimation would be twelve and not seven, since 
wisdom be of assistance to power.”690 
Thus beauty of a person is not his or her wisdom and power added 
up, but a balanced optimum (a product of multiplication) between 
these properties. It is not enough to balance the two as in the pair 
of scales model, and to strive for a compromise that would make 
them equally great. This would work if they were independent of 
each other, but this is not the case since on a higher level wisdom 
could contribute to power (“wisdom may be of assistance to 
power”), and probably also vice versa, although Leibniz did not 
state this explicitly. Both values have to be taken into account in 
estimating the overall value of the good man and the end result is 
a balanced combination.   
This passage is something of an exception in Leibniz's writings 
since it is the only instance, as far as I know, in which he gave 
definite quantities to values such as wisdom and power. However, 
the idea is essentially the same as in the example of evaluating 
happiness in general science discussed above, and could be 
illustrated by a similar geometrical figure. 
He uses a more metaphorical argument in another memoir 
from 1671, Grundriss eines Bedenckens von Aufrichtung einer Societät 
in Deutschland, which concerns scientific academies. He described 
the properties of a good prince as follows:  
“If power is greater than reason, he who possesses it is either a lamb 
who cannot use it at all, or a wolf and a tyrant who cannot use it 
well.”691 
                                                 
690 “Fac aliquem esse sapientem vt 3, potentem vt 4: erit tota eius 
aestimatio vt 12, non vt 7, nam quouis potentiae gradu sapientia vti 
potest.” A II, I, p. 174.  See also See FC VII, p. 30. 
691 “Ist die Macht gröser als der Verstand, so ist der sie hat entweder ein 
einfältig schaff, wo er sie nich weis zu brauchen, oder ein Wolff und 
Tyrann, wo er sie nich weis wohl zu brauchen” (Grundriss eines Bedenckens 
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Those who have more power than reason are either unable to use 
the power or they use it arbitrarily. In the latter case they are bad 
rulers or tyrants, and in the former they are also bad rulers because 
they are weak. On the other hand, those with more wisdom than 
power to use it are “overpowered.” Leibniz argued that such 
people have the right to be counsellors and their princes should 
listen to them patiently.692 The ideal prince is, of course, an 
optimum between wisdom and power. He used his power in 
proportion to his wisdom and has a beautiful soul (in the manner 
he argued in his letter to Arnauld) .  
“Those to whom God has given at once reason and power to a high 
degree are heroes created by God to be the promoters of His will, as 
principal instruments...”693 
As has been noted, the vectorial model is essentially a heuristic 
device. A further feature should be pointed out. The values in 
question are continuous and are infinite in degree. Thus one might 
discuss whether a little more good for the same duration of time 
would be better than a little less for a longer period, or whether a 
different combination of wisdom and power would be more 
optimal in terms of general perfection than another combination. 
Because of these continuous degrees of values there is an infinite 
number of possible combinations (variations), of which only one 
can be the best, the optimum.694 By applying the model it is easier 
                                                                                                    
von Aufrichtung einer Societät in Deutschland, 1671) A IV, 1, p. 531; Leibniz, 
Political Writings, p. 24.  
692 A IV, 1, p. 533. 
693 “Welschen aber Gott zugleich verstand und macht in hohen Grad 
gegeben, diess sind die Helden, so Gott zu ausführung seines Willens, als 
principaleste instrumenta geschaffen…” A VI, 1, p. 533; Leibniz, Political 
Writings, p. 24. 
694 In a short note entitled De tendentia (1697, Grua, p. 487) Leibniz wrote 
that the tendency to real happiness “is not able to be firmly and originally 
assigned as the object of our tendencies, any more than a stone could be 
assigned the optimal path to the center, without hitting and shattering on 
the way down.” Cited in Davidson, Video Meliora Proboque, Deteriora Sequo, 
p. 245.  
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to find these possible variations in each case, and to compare them 
with each other.  
In sum, human rational decision-making in complicated and 
uncertain situations in which values compete against each other is, 
in an ideal case, optimum between separate inclinations leading to 
the good, and not a simple choice between good and bad. When 
we are deliberating in complex situations involving multiple 
values we reflect on the situation and choose the most important 
relevant criteria constituting the good in question. Then we make a 
judgement based on the vectorial model. After determining the 
good in question we employ moral calculus and consider which of 
the proposed actions best brings about the desired good. In the last 
phase of deliberation we are able to compare the overall value of 
different proposed courses of action and choose from them. If the 
apparently optimal course of action can be found, it is chosen. If 
we cannot grasp the optimum, we should at least choose the 
option that is most likely to bring about the good, or which seems 
to cause the least evil or imperfection in the world. 
This kind of deliberation is familiar to us on the practical level, 
such as when we are buying a new washing machine. Supposing 
price equals quality, if we have an unlimited amount of cash at our 
disposal and complete knowledge of the machines on the market, 
we simply go to the nearest shop and buy the best machine there 
is. If we are less fortunate, we settle for a less expensive alternative, 
but try to buy a good machine despite this limitation. Within our 
budget, we try to buy as good a machine as possible.  
We might take a few simple criteria as the basis of our choice. A 
good combination of values in this case would be quality and 
price. I might compare different washing machines by taking into 
consideration their alleged goodness (for example the amount of 
water and electricity used or the speed of the process we hear from 
friends or read about it in magazine) and their relative cheapness. 
In order to find good value for my money, my best choice would 
be a moderately cheap machine which is not the best in the market 
but is of good enough quality. Put in another way, I would have 
sufficient reason to choose this very washing machine.   
If we think of buying a washing machine as an ethical action, 
we could extend the metaphor to include moral calculus. We could 
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assume that a virtuous person buys the machine that is least 
harmful to the ecosystem and in this way promotes general well-
being. After having determined which machines offer a good 
combination of quality and price, he or she is then able to compare 
them and to choose the one that is likely to produce the least harm 
to the ecological balance of the world. If the chosen machine is 
optimal, it has the property of being the most ecological.  
Having taken these two independent considerations into 
account the moral agent could be said to have deliberated 
rationally, and while the outcome is perhaps not the best possible 
in an objective sense, it is the best possible within the limits of his 
or her abilities. Thus it is the result of a rational decision-making.   
 
11. 3. 2. More Examples of the Use of the Vectorial Model 
 
In complex controversies of a political, theological or scientific 
nature, for example, the different reasons or opinions are often 
more or less related among parties and it is impossible to choose 
any one, or even to distribute them as in the pair of scales model. I 
will now consider some of Leibniz's practical applications and 
discuss in detail some cases in which he seemed to apply the 
vectorial model. I have included only cases that illustrate his more 
or less transparent use of the model, but I am convinced that there 
are more to be found. I think, however, that this collection is 
sufficient to show that the vectorial model could be considered to 
have had a systematic value in Leibniz's views on practical 
rationality.   
 
11. 3. 2. 1. Centres of Gravity 
 
My first example is from Leibniz's work on dynamics, and 
concerns centres of gravity. It is included here in order to illustrate 
Leibniz's way of arguing in natural philosophy which can be seen 
to have acted as a model to his vectorial model of decision-making. 
On October 13, 1690 he wrote to Huygens that he had found a 
general principle, according to which  
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“Any moving body having several directions at the same time must go 
in the line of the direction of the centre of gravity common to as many 
moving bodies as there are directions, if we imagine the single moving 
body multiplied as many times as are needed to make each direction 
function fully at the same time, and that the velocity of the moving 
body in the compounded direction must be to that of the centre of 
gravity of the [fictitious] device as the number of directions is to 
unity.”695  
Huyguens was not convinced and thought that, while this kind of 
method might suffice for discovering phenomena, more certain 
proof was needed.696 Leibniz tried to clarify the issue in a 1693 
memoir, issued in Journal des Sçavans on September 9, 1693, p. 
417.697 I will rely here on a concise summary provided by Pierre 
Costabel:698  
 
“A moving body A is supposed to be subjected to “various tendencies” 
such that if each were acting individually, they would cause the body 
to travel with uniform motion in one second along the straight 
segments AB, AC, AD, AE, etc. In order to find the motion resulting 
from the simultaneous action of the different “tendencies” Leibniz 
made use of a fictitious device. He imagined that the moving body was 
shared equally between the “motions so as to satisfy them all together 
perfectly.” For example, if there were four tendencies, then “each 
acquired only one fourth part of the moving body which had to go 
four times further in order to make as much progress as if the whole 
moving body had satisfied each tendency.” The centre of gravity of the 
parts of the moving body also progressed four times further and its 
displacement gave the required displacement of the undivided moving 
body A subjected to the action compounded of the different 
tendencies. If G were the centre of gravity of points B, C, D, E at which 
the moving body A would converge if each tendency acted separately, 
                                                 
695 Nowadays these velocities (“tendencies”) would be illustrated by 
vectors, as Costabel goes on to argue. Costabel, Leibniz et la dynamics, p. 77. 
696 Ibid., p. 88. 
697 The text is published in Costabel, Leibniz et la dynamics, appendix, pp. 
107-109. 
698 Ibid., pp. 88-89. 
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the moving point AM = 4 x AG would be the compound or resultant 
displacement.”699  
These four tendencies, or vectors, as one would call them today, 
are thus affecting the body at the same time and the centre of the 
gravity can be found by multiplicating one-fourth of each vector 
with the moving body. Thus if the body A travels a straight line, 
the centre of the gravity is four times further than the original 
place of the body A.700 
Using this kind of fictitious device Leibniz concluded that the 
centre of gravity is a product of various tendencies and the centre 
of gravity can be found by multiplicating the tendencies. However, 
similarly as to the inclinations of the soul, the tendencies can also 
rule each other out, if they are equal, but opposed to each other. 701 
 
11. 3. 2. 2. Doctrina conditionum 
 
As mentioned, Leibniz usually applied the pair of scales model in 
legal cases. However, in the following example he apparently used 
the vectorial model in a somewhat similar manner as in the centre-
of-gravity case discussed above.702 This example, in which he 
discussed a reasonable verdict, is from a memoir entitled Doctrina 
conditionum (1667-69), which contained his most extensive 
discussion on conditional rights.703 The following example, which 
                                                 
699 Leibniz wrote in the article: “Ainsi il arrivera au mobile la même chose 
qui arriverait à son centre de gravité, si ce mobile ce partageait également 
entre ces mouvements pour satisfaire parfaitement à tous ensemble. Car le 
mobile étant partagé également entre 4 tendences, il ne peut échoir à 
chacune qu'une quatrième partie du mobile qui devra aller quatre fois 
plus loin, pour avoir autant de progrès que si le mobile tout entier avait 
satisfait à chaque tendence. Mais ainsi le centre de gravité de toutes ces 
parties irait aussi quatre fois plus loin.” Costabel, Leibniz et la Dynamics, 
appendix, pp. 107-08. 
700 Costabel, Leibniz et la dynamique, appendix, p. 107-109. 
701 “Et si les deux tendences contraires étaient égales, il n'y aurait point de 
mouvement.” Costabel, Leibniz et la dynamique, appendix, p. 109.  
702 For a similar application in the field of optics, see Demonstratio Legum 
Reflexionis et Refractionis, Ger, pp. 45-46. 
703 A VI, i, pp. 368-430. It is also known as Specimen certitudinis seu 
demonstrationum in Jure, often also called simply Specimina juris, because it 
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he gave as point 271, concerns a case in which there are equal 
claims and the judge has to decide between them. He stated that 
this affair “contains in fact a sort of physical principle which is 
drawn from the nature of movement.”704 This physical model is the 
following:  
“Let there be a body A which is moved uniformly at the same moment 
by two bodies, B and C. The first is according to the line BA, the 
second according to the line CA. Let us divide the angle BAC in two 
equal parts by the line AD and the opposing side in two bodies by the 
movement B and C and extend the lines BA to E and CA to F. I say that 
body A will advance following the line AD. …If A was pushed only by 
B, it would advance following the line AE and, on the contrary, if it 
was [pushed] by C, it would be according to the line AF.”705 
      
 
Leibniz applied the model to jurisprudence.706 The two opposing 
parties in the legal case correspond to the movements BA or BE 
and CA or CF. The effect of movement B or C is greater when the 
angle with respect to A is smaller, and it is maximal when the 
angle is zero. This model could be applied to a case of hereditary 
                                                                                                    
appeared in 1669 as part of a collection of jurisprudical examples. The 
others were Ex jure collectae and De casibus perplexis.   
704 “Habet enim ea res principium quoddam physicum ex natura motus.” 
A VI, I, p. 392. 
705 “Esto igitur Corpus A. in quod eodem tempore uniformi impetu 
impingant duo corpora BC, illud juxta lineam BA hoc juxta lineam CA. 
Bisecetur angulus BAC rectâ AD à duobus moventibus BC aversâ, et 
producantur utcunque linae: BA in E, CA in F. Ajo corpus A processurum 
linea AD…igitue si quidem à solo B fuisset impulsum, processiset linea 
AE, sin à solo C, linea AF.” A VI, I, pp. 392-93. The figure below is from A 
VI, 1, p. 392. 
706 See A VI, 1, p. 393. 
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rights – when only one party is present it will have all, but if the 
other party or parties appear, its share is diminished depending on 
the strength of their accepted claims.  
Depending on the reasons or proofs offered by parties B and C, 
the judge inclines towards either E or F (which may represent a 
stronger inheritance claim). The result is a verdict based on the 
reasoned judgement of the judge. It favours party B or C, but does 
not give total rights to either, since both have a lawful claim. If the 
claims are equally strong, the judge ends up with an optimum 
(marked D), which satisfies both claims. 
 
11. 3. 2. 3. Religious controversies 
 
During the whole of his career Leibniz was involved in 
conciliatory efforts to ease religious controversies. His motives are 
debated, but it seems clear that they were not only religious. The 
controversies constituted one of the most serious barriers to 
scientific co-operation and general peace, which were his main 
goals in practical terms. Religious unity would enable general 
progress and help mankind to promote universal perfection. This 
is also why he repeatedly attacked libertinism and various sects, 
and strived to establish a common, universal Christian religion.  
His conciliatory approach was evident in his belief that in every 
religion there was a seed of truth, and it was for this reason he 
advocated forming a new version of Christian religion rather than 
choosing one version of many. This rational theology should be 
based on philosophy and reason so that every rational person 
would believe in it.707 His own defence of the mysteries of the 
Christian faith was closer to the Lutheran doctrine, but his later 
theological views were more sympathetic to the Catholics, 
                                                 
707 A good example is a fragment entitled Animadversiones in Schedam ex 
Batavis missam (A VI, 4, p.  395), in which Leibniz attempted to define the 
essential principles of various Protestant sects such as the Arminians, the 
Socinians and the Anabaptists, and to reduce them to their essentials in 
order to find some common ground. Here his method was based on 
“hard” logic, in other words, real definitions.   
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although he never accepted numerous offers of conversion to 
Catholicism.708 
Leibniz's general approach in his conciliatory efforts is revealed 
in a letter to Bossuet in which he set out three principles for 
realising the union. The first of these was exactness of language (all 
participants understand all the concepts in the same way) - 
controversies are often verbal in nature.  The second was religious 
tolerance and the idea that both parties had to make some 
concessions to the other, and the third was progress in small steps 
(one should leave the most difficult issues to be resolved last).709 I 
cannot go into the actual negotiations here, but I will discuss some 
specific theological problems and Leibniz's memoirs related to 
them.710 I will consider first Leibniz's effort to defend the 
rationality of Christian mysteries, which he thought extremely 
important. He was motivated by Spinoza's parrot argument in 
Tractatus theologico-politicus that discussing mysteries without 
proof was like repeating words like a parrot without under-
standing them. While the Socinians were silenced by being shown 
that mysteries were beyond demonstration, Leibniz had to satisfy 
Spinoza's argument by showing that they were not totally 
incomprehensible. 711   
                                                 
708 There was perhaps no other Protestant theologian who would have 
allowed as many concessions to the Catholics as Leibniz. However, he 
never accepted the trial of Galileo nor the other intolerance in Catholic 
Church in general. See his letter to Marie de Brinon, in which he confessed 
to being a Catholic at heart: “Vous avez raison, Madame, de me juger 
catholique dans le coeur; je suis mesme ouvertement: car il n'y a que 
l'opiniastreté qui fasse l'hérétique; et c'est de quoi,  grâce à Dieu, ma 
conscience ne m'accuse point.” (Leibniz to Brinon) FC I, p. 235.  
709 Leibniz, Political Writings, pp. 189-90. 
710 For a thorough presentation of the reunion negotiations, see Eisenkopf, 
Leibniz und die Einigung der Christenheit. 
711 Leibniz was convinced that the mysteries of Christian beliefs must be 
defended, since without them the traditions of the Christian religion 
would be corrupted and it would lose its ultimate basis, thus giving room 
to atheism. He argued this point in Essais de Theodicée, §28 as follows: 
“…quand il s'agit d'opposer la raison à un article de nostre foy, on ne se 
met point en peine des objections qui n'aboutissent qu'à la vraisemblance: 
puisque tout le monde convient que les mysteres sont contre les 
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The most difficult problem in the reunion of the churches was 
the controversy over the mystery of transubstantiation. This and 
other Christian mysteries were beyond demonstration, but Leibniz 
strived to find a common position in this question, so that both 
parties could accept it.712  
The Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, which was 
proclaimed in the Council of Trent, was described in Aristotelian 
terms of the substance of the bread being turned into the body of 
Christ and the substance of the wine being turned into his blood. 
The (perceived) accidents remained unchanged, but the substance 
was miraculously transformed, which was contrary to all other 
phenomena in the natural world, in which all accidents and 
substances conformed to each other.713     
Luther rejected this view and insisted that the bread and wine 
became the substance of Christ's body and blood while retaining 
their natural qualities, just as red-hot iron was both red and fire. 
Since Christ was present everywhere by his divine nature or 
ubiquity, and all the powers of his divine nature were 
communicated to his human nature, he could be present on a 
thousand altars simultaneously. In this way he was present in the 
bread and wine.714 Thus while according to the Catholic doctrine 
the substance of the wine and the bread is changed, it is retained in 
the Lutheran doctrine. 
                                                                                                    
apparences, et n'ont rien de vraisemblable, quand on ne les regarde que 
du côté de raison; mais il suffit qu'il n'y ait rien d'absurde. Ainsi il faut des 
demonstrations pour les refuter.” G VI, p. 67. For a discussion, see 
Goldenbaum, Leibniz's Three Strategies for Defending Christian Mysteries. 
712 On the epistemological status of mysteries, see Antognazza, The Defence 
of the Mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation: an Example of Leibniz's 
“Other Reason”, p. 286 and Goldenbaum, Leibniz's Three Strategies for 
Defending Christian Mysteries.Transsubstantion was also essential to the 
early development of Leibniz’s metaphysics. Each stage of his 
philosophical development and every modification of his system, was 
accompanied by an explanation of the eucharist and a demonstration that 
his metaphysical system was compatible with transsubstantion. Fouke, 
Metaphysics and the Eucharist in Early Leibniz, p. 145. 
713 White, Introduction to Christian Worship, p. 253.  
714 Ibid., p. 255. 
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In seeking a middle way between these doctrines Leibniz 
suggested that it was only necessary to believe that in the 
transformation the wine contained the blood of Christ, or that the 
bread contained the body of Christ, in some sense.715 He argued 
that the mysteries held some meaning, although it was impossible 
to know exactly what it was. Since one could not have a clear and 
distinct idea of the transformation, one had to make one’s 
judgement on confused, uncertain grounds which, nevertheless, 
included some, albeit confused, understanding of the terms.716 
Thus the terms had some meaning and were not only empty 
words. Secondly, the transformation could be presumed possible 
unless proved otherwise. It is evident that Leibniz thought this 
discovery was important, as he showed in his letter to Arnauld in 
1671: 
“Namely the following will also be shown (which has occurred to no 
one): that transubstantiation and real presence do not differ in the final 
analysis…Therefore transubstantiation, which is expressed in a very 
careful clause of the Council of Trent…does not contradict the 
confession of Augsburg, it even results from it. Thus the only question 
between the two parties remains: whether the real presence or 
transubstantiation (which involve each other, as I will show) exist 
momentarily and merely last in the moment of the using or taking, as 
taught by the confession of Augsburg, or if they simply last from the 
time of the beginning of the sacrament until the time of the corruption 
of the external appearances, as taught by the Roman church. This 
controversy contributes nothing to the given question, because each of 
the two opinions is equally feasible.”717 
                                                 
715 Commentatiuncula de Judice Controversiarum (1669-71), A VI, 1, p. 551.  
716 On Spinoza's argument and Leibniz's reaction to it, see Goldenbaum, 
Leibniz's Three Strategies for Defending Christian Mysteries, p. 567. 
717 “Nam hoc quoque ostendetur, quod nemini in mentem venit, 
Transsubstantionem et multipraesentiam realem in vltima Analysi non 
differre…nec proinde Transsubstantionem, vt cautissima phrasi a 
Conclilio Tridentino expressa…contradicere Confessioni Augustanae; imo 
ex ea sequi. Nec nisi in summa quaestionem superesse inter has duas 
partes, an siue praesentia realis, siue transsubstantiatio, quas ostendam in 
se inuicem contineri, sint instantaneae, nec durent nisi momento vsus seu 
sumptionis, vt docet Confessio Augustana; an vero coeptae tempore 
 
 
 
270
The presumption of the possibility of transubstantiation allowed 
space for various interpretations, which was precisely Leibniz's 
goal – both confessions could agree on this one. Thus Leibniz 
believed that he had found an ecumenical optimum between the 
confessions: he thought that transformation of bread and wine 
occured, but that there was no need for any demonstrable proof of 
how it happened.718 The essential task was to argue that it was 
possible. As Christ himself stated and as Luther recommended, it 
was only necessary to believe that in some sense the bread and 
wine contained the body of Christ, and there was no need to 
decide upon “whether the bread is made of the body of Christ, or 
the body of Christ is contained in the bread.”719 The only absolute 
standard had to be compatibility with the scriptural pronounce-
ments and the absence of logical and metaphysical impossibility.  
An earlier attempt at this goal was a memoir entitled De 
Transsubstantiatione (1668) which was related to the grand project 
Demonstrationes Catholicae. The memoir reflected his metaphysics at 
the time, and this is why it is often employed in interpretations of 
his early theory of substance.720 A metaphysical explanation of the 
transformation of the bread and wine into Christ's body and blood 
                                                                                                    
consecrationis durent usque ad tempus corruptionis specierum, vt tradit 
Ecclesia Romana? Quae controversia nihil pertinet ad rem praesentem: 
Nam vtraque sententia aeque possibilis est…” (Leibniz to Arnauld, 
November 1671) A II, 1, p. 175; translation from Goldbaum, Leibniz as 
Lutheran, p. 179. 
718 According to Fouke, it would be more accurate to say that Leibniz 
rejected Luther's approach to the metaphysical analysis of 
transsubstantion. Fouke, Metaphysics and the Eucharist in the Early Leibniz, 
p. 148. For similar examples of the use of presumption in defence of 
mysteries, see Antognazza, The Defence of the Mysteries of the Trinity and the 
Incarnation: an Example of Leibniz's “Other Reason”, p. 294f.  
719 “Si igitur audio Christum dixisse: hoc est corpus meum, necesse est ut 
sub voce hoc mihi confusè obversetur: omne illud qvod in priori commate 
anteccist, nimirum panis, et qvicqvid eo continetur, ut ita non 
determinetur ista confusa acceptione panisne sit factus corpus Christi, an 
aliqvid qvod eo continetur sit corpus Christi, sufficiat nos accipere id qvod 
sit corpus Christi.” (De judice controversiarum, §23) A VI, 1, p. 551.   
720 See, for example, Mercer, Leibniz's Metaphysics, pp. 87-89 and Adams, 
Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, p. 353f. 
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is difficult to accept, since it entails the same substance being in 
many different places at the same time, and means that the nature 
of a concrete thing (bread, for example) is able to change while its 
features remain. Leibniz began his memoir by listing certain 
points:  
 
1) Bread and wine, losing their own substance, acquire the 
substance of Christ’s body [and blood] 
2) They become everywhere numerically identical with it 
3) Only their appearance or accidents remain 
4) The substance of Christ’s body [and blood] is present in all 
places in which consecrated bread and wine appear.721   
 
The crucial terms here are substance, appearance or accidents, and 
numeral identity, which Leibniz claimed to have explained 
clearly.722 In the first section he argued that each substance has a 
principle of activity within itself (substantial form). While the 
mind is independent, the body is dependent on union with it, since 
no body can be a substance apart from the concurring mind and 
therefore no body has a principle of activity within itself. When the 
concurring mind is transubstantiated, the body is also changed, 
since bodies can act only in union with minds.723 Thus when the 
substance (mind) is changed, the bodies of wine and bread are 
transubstantiated into the body of Christ. Leibniz concluded the 
section as follows:  
“Hence bread and wine as bodies, when the concurrent mind is 
changed, are substantiated into the body of Christ, or taken up by 
Christ (inasmuch as the special concourse of the mind of Christ which 
takes on the bread and wine, in addition to its body, is substituted for 
                                                 
721 A VI, 1, p. 508; L, p. 115 
722 A VI, 1, p. 508. 
723 (§4-10) A VI, 1, pp. 508-509. At this time Leibniz had not yet come to the 
theory of the pluralism of mental substances. On substantial forms of 
mind and body, see Mercer, Leibniz's Metaphysics, p. 85. 
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the general concourse of the universal or divine mind with all 
bodies.)”724 
However, the concurring mind does not change the essence of the 
bread. Only the mind containing its principle of activity has 
changed, and thus the appearance of the bread and wine 
remains.725 The change of the mind in the corporeal substance is 
sufficient for transubstantiation. Later in the memoir Leibniz 
defined transubstantiation as the change of substantial form.726  
As the transubstantiated bodies of bread and wine are in union 
with the mind of Christ, the power of his mind allows it to operate 
in more than one place simultaneously.727 As the substance of 
Christ can simultaneously be in Rome as well as in Helsinki, so can 
the bread that is in union with the mind of Christ.  
Leibniz's argument proceeds as follows. The mind can think of 
many things at once and therefore it can operate in many places at 
once. The mind of Christ can bestow operation both on his own 
body and on the species of consecrated bread and wine in 
numerically different instances of the latter in different places. 
Therefore the mind of Christ is present everywhere in the 
appeareances of wine and bread, as is his body.728 
In Leibniz's model, which is roughly analogous to the 
Aristotelian concept of substance, there is a substantial change in 
the metaphysical sense, but the accidents, the bread and the wine, 
retain their features.729 Thus the Lutheran and the Catholic views 
are only different perspectives on the same thing. Leibniz’s 
solution was designed to be acceptable to both confessions, and 
                                                 
724 “Panis igitur et vinum tanquam corpora, mutata mente concurrente 
(quatenus in locum concursus generalis, quem mens universalis, seu 
Divina omnibus Corporibus impertit, substituitur concursus specialis 
mentis Christi, quae assumit panem et vinum in 
corpus…transsubstantiatur in Corpus Christi seu a Christo assumtum.” ( 
§11) A VI, 1, p. 509; L, p. 116.  
725 See Mercer, Leibniz's Metaphysics, p. 86. 
726 (Scholia) A VI, 1, p. 511.  
727 See Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, p. 358.  
728 (§ 26-30), A VI, 1, p. 510.  
729 See Mercer, Leibniz's Metaphysics, p. 88. 
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thus he was able to argue that his metaphysics provided the true 
Christian philosophy. His theory also worked well against the 
Cartesians, since he could avoid the difficult problem of the 
multipresence of extended bodies. It is evident that this problem 
was not solvable by means of the pair of scales model since the 
positions differed from each other only in degree. Resolution 
required an analysis of the issue in itself that combined both 
positions in a manner that was independent of the solutions given 
earlier, but acceptable to both parties. 
While Leibniz sought an optimal solution between the 
confessions in De Transubstantiatione, his position moved 
considerably closer to the Catholic views later on. This is evident 
in his most extensive theological work, Systema Theologicum, which 
gives an almost Catholic account of the Christian religion. This 
change was related to changes in his views on metaphysics and on 
the pluralism of dynamic substances.730 The final views on 
transubstantiation, which he put forward in his correspondence 
with Des Bosses, had little in common with his earlier ideas.  
Leibniz made another unsuccessful attempt to arrive at an 
optimal solution to religious matters in 1706, when Queen Sophie 
Charlotte's son, Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, 
became engaged to his cousin, the Princess Sophie Dorothea, 
daughter of the Elector of Hanover and the banished Princess 
Sophie Dorothea of Ahlden.731 The tension between Hanover and 
Berlin was great at the time, and the situation was made more 
difficult by the fact that the Hanoverian Princess did not agree to 
                                                 
730 See Fouke, Metaphysics and the Eucharist in the Early Leibniz, pp. 157-58. 
See also Fouke, Dynamics and Transubstantion in Leibniz, p. 47.  
731 Princess Sophie Dorotea was banished from the Court of Hanover 
because of adultery. The details concerning the wedding are given in 
Aiton, Leibniz, A Biography, p. 269f and Hirsch, Der Berühmte Herr Leibniz, 
p. 468f. For a history of the wedding controversy, see Schnath, Geschiche 
Hannovers im Zeitalter der neunten Kur und der englischen Sukzession 1674-
1714, Bd. 3, pp. 580-88. 
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change her Lutheran beliefs to the Calvinist faith of the Crown 
Prince.732 
The wedding took place by a proxy in Hanover, the Electoral 
Prince of Hanover representing the bridegroom, and three days 
later the Princess travelled to Berlin. This way of conducting the 
marriage was questioned by the master of ceremonies, Johann von 
Besser of Berlin, who wanted to please the King by claiming that 
the ceremony that was to take place in Berlin was the true 
marriage. The Elector of Hanover then asked Leibniz (who had 
some influence in Berlin even though his friend, Queen Sophie 
Charlotte died in 1705) to prepare a memorandum that would 
demonstrate the validity of the marriage by proxy.  
In correspondence with Court Chaplain Jablonski Leibniz 
suggested that there was an easy solution to the problem for both 
parties: the couple should be married according to the rites and 
liturgy of the Anglican Church. This was a surprising suggestion 
for which Leibniz gave the following grounds: first, both the 
Crown Prince and the Princess were descendants of the Electress 
Sophie of Hanover, the heir to the English crown, and secondly, 
the King was known to have an inclination towards the rites and 
liturgy of the Anglican Church. Leibniz showed which 39 articles 
of the English church were compatible with the Lutherans and the 
Calvinists.733 Thus both the Princess and the Crown Prince could 
retain their religion and no conversion would be needed. 
Leibniz tried to please both parties and at the same time to 
present an alternative that would be independent of both. 
Uncharacteristically, he did not take sufficiently into account the 
interests of the Princes, and his unwise suggestion was not 
received favourably. Although Jablonski was in favour, his rival, 
the reformed Bishop Benjamin Ursinus von Bär, strongly opposed 
                                                 
732 Hirsch, Der Berühmte Herr Leibniz, p. 469. On the political situation at 
the time, see Schnath, Geschiche Hannovers im Zeitalter der neunten Kur und 
der englischen Sukzession 1674-1714, Bd. 3, p. 543f. 
733 See Hirsch, Der Berühmte Herr Leibniz, p. 470 and Aiton, Leibniz, A 
Biography, p. 270. The correspondence with Jablonski is not yet published 
in the Akademie series, which is why I have had to refer to secondary 
sources. 
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it. Von Bär shared his opinion with the King, who forbade 
Jablonski to conduct further improper correspondence with 
Leibniz. The King did not wish to be patronised by a Hanoverian 
Court official, while the Hanoverians were concerned about their 
reputation due to the possible acquisition of the English crown and 
did not wish to cause any scandal or to present a test case. All in 
all, although theoretically persuasive, Leibniz’s proposal was a 
grave miscalculation.  
As a result of this scandal, the Elector of Hanover, Georg 
Ludwig, forbade Leibniz to undertake any further collaboration in 
endeavours to unite the Protestant Churches, which effectively put 
an end to his unification project. The marriage contract was finally 
ratified at the end of November, 1706.734 
 
11. 3. 2. 4.  Political Controversies 
 
In his political career Leibniz chose the role of l'honnête homme, the 
respectable man, who is faithful to his superior officials and his 
prince and influences political matters only through them. His 
political orientation was clearly compatible with the most usual 
definitions of absolutism, which supported the absolute political 
power of a prince and the authority of the Pope.735  
An example of his striving for the optimum in political cases 
dates from 1669, when he wrote a pamphlet for Baron Boineburg 
entitled Specimen demonstrationum politicarum pro eligendo rege 
Polonorum under the pseudonym Georgio Ulicovio Lithuano. This 
work was meant to prove that one candidate (Philipp Wilhelm von 
                                                 
734 Hübener, Negotium irenicum – Leibniz's Bemühungen um die 
brandergurgische Union, p. 137. 
736 The following version is presented by J. P. Sommerville : “Absolutists 
were thinkers who held that the prince is accountable to God also for his 
actions within his realm, that his commands ought to be obeyed by his 
subjects provided that they do not conflict with Divine positive or natural 
law, and that he (and these acting on his command) ought never to be 
resisted actively by his subjects. A prince could be a specific person or 
persons, for though absolutism generally preferred monarchy to 
aristocracy and democracy, they seldom claimed that it was the only valid 
form of government.” Sommerville, Absolutism and royalism, p. 348. 
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Neuburg, who had the support of Leibniz's patrons) of the four 
main ones was the best choice as the new King of Poland (the 
former king, Johann Casimir, had left the throne in 1668). The 
election was important in its time and the different candidates 
were backed by various great powers: Von Neuburg was 
supported by Brandenburg, Prince Karl von Lothringen was 
backed by Austria, Prince Condé by France, and the son of Peter 
the Great, Alexej Michailovic, was of course supported by 
Russia.736 
My interest here is not in the political situation as such, but in 
the manner in which Leibniz argued on behalf of his candidate.737 
His style of presentation is more geometrico – the work consists of 60 
propositions, 12 corollaries and four conclusions. His goal was to 
prove beyond doubt that Von Neuburg was the best candidate. 
The propositions concerned the current political situation in 
Poland on the one hand and the qualities demanded of the King on 
the other. Under Poland's constitution the good of the nobility was 
the good of the state (prop. I, A VI, 1, p. 6). Leibniz saw Poland as 
the last Christian front against the barbarians, the Tatars in the east 
and the Russians and Turks in the north and south, which was 
why the state needed a powerful army (prop. V-VI, A IV, 1, p. 9) 
and why the king had to be a Catholic (prop. XXII; A IV, 1, p. 20). 
Other necessary qualities included experience (prop. XXVI; A IV, 1, 
p. 24), a calm disposition, and a good family background (prop. 
XXX-XXIV; A IV, 1., pp. 26-32).  
It was not necessary for the King to speak the Polish language 
just as long as he had some knowledge of Latin (prop. XXVII; A IV, 
1, p. 24). He should not come from a neighbouring country because 
he might in that case desire to unite them (prop. XLVIII; A IV, 1, p. 
42). In various respects the propositions were conceived to favour 
                                                 
736 Bittner, Slavica bei G. W. von Leibniz, p. 18. 
737 Waldemar Voisé suggests that Leibniz might have modelled his 
method on Erhard Weigel's (his former teacher in Jena) Aritmetischen 
Beschreibung der Moral-Weisheit, which was an attempt to replace 
metaphysical speculation about social phenomena by quantative concepts. 
Voisé, La mathématique politique et l'histoire raisonnée dans le Specimen 
Demonstrationum Politicarum de Leibniz, p. 64. 
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just one candidate: for example, in prop. XXVIII and XXIX it is 
advocated that the future King should be mature and in good 
shape. Leibniz’s candidate, of course, was such a man (A IV, 1, p. 
25).738  
Proposition LIII (A IV, 1, p. 53), which concerned the military 
situation in Poland, presents an interesting argument that 
illustrates Leibniz’s goals: in an optimal case the future King of 
Poland should be militarily capable, but should not be given 
enough military power to enable him to disturb the political 
balance in Europe. In this sense the proximity of his current 
territory was an essential feature: if it neighboured Poland, the 
combined land would constitute a threat to other powers nearby. 
Thus it was important to estimate the total power of the 
candidates, which could be done by multiplying the proximity by 
the military power as follows: 
“…the proximity is in itself a sort of power, and every aspect of power 
is itself multiplied by its proximity, from which it follows that the total 
power of a neighbour is a product of its proximity and its power, and 
is also the square of its power. In consequence the relation of simple 
power to the total power of a powerful neighbour is its square root 
…”739  
Military power, measured by the number of soldiers, for example, 
was set against the degree of proximity. If a candidate possessed 
great military power but was not a neighbour of Poland he was 
ideal. However, a candidate from a country who had great military 
power was dangerous and should not be elected. Thus it was 
                                                 
738 See also prop. XLVII and  XLVIII. 
739 “…vicinitas autem et ipsa potentiae genus est, et quaelibet pars 
potentiae per se multiplicatur per Vicinitatem, et per consequens, 
potentiae in potentiam. Ergo potentia simplex ad potentiam integram 
Vicini et potentis simul, erit, ut radix ad quadratum, vellatus ad 
rectangulum, quod secundi Corollarii rationem habere potest. A IV, 1, p. 
53. 
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possible to estimate the total power of different candidates by 
applying the vectorial model and thus making a choice. 740 
According to Leibniz, the best choice would have been a member 
of the Jagello dynasty (prop. LIX; A IV, 1, p. 43-44), but since one 
was not available the future King should be a foreign, Catholic, 
experienced prince in his prime: of course, Leibniz's candidate 
fitted the bill (prop. L, A IV, 1, p. 46).741 The optimum of proximity 
and power was attained in the person of Von Neuburg. 
Because of unexpected delays, Leibniz's pamphlet was 
published too late to affect the election, but Boineburg's speech in 
support of Von Neuburg was based on his arguments.742  
 
12. Summary of Part III 
 
This part of the thesis was devoted to human deliberation. I started 
with the foundations of practical philosophy, in other words 
practical reason (Chapter eight) and Leibniz's moral philosophy 
(Chapter nine). It is worth reiterating that he considered moral 
                                                 
740 According to Marcelo Dascal, the method used in Demonstrationum is 
more akin to dialectical models (common in jurisprudence) where an 
advisor of a court presents to a prince a memoir where the most 
prominent options are emphasized by accentuating the logically strongest 
positions. In this sense it can be compared to De casibus perplexis in jure 
which I have presented above as an example of applying the pair of scales-
method. See Leibniz, The Art of Controversies, p. liv. While I agree with the 
general description Dascal gives of the nature of the memoir, I think the 
emphasizing of two alternatives is mutual to both the pair of scales-model 
as to the vectorial model. Once this is done, one is to examine how the 
criteria are related to each other. One can, of course, evaluate the 
candidates by weighing between them in a dialectical manner, but here 
Leibniz referred to a result of multiplication of criteria rather than the sum 
of the desired features which is typical to the pair of scales model. For this 
reason I think he was not referring to dialectical weighing here.  
741 Leibniz's pamphlet did not have great influence, since it was published 
too late. The Austrian candidate was chosen with unfortunate 
consequences. See Davies, God's Playground. A History of Poland, vol 1, pp. 
470-72.  
742 Aiton, Leibniz, A Biography, p. 26. 
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science to depend on truths of reason while moral practical action 
could manage without them, and that this was in principle due to 
moral instinct of pursuing joy and avoiding sorrow. We may be 
moved to act morally through feelings of increasing or decreasing 
perfection and regardless of reasoning in the proper sense, 
although happiness and wisdom are not possible without it. In 
both kinds of cases, however, emotion plays an important part. 
Choosing good brings us joy and eventually happiness, and in the 
process we also act for the good of our fellow men since wisdom 
includes being just – which Leibniz defined as being charitable to 
others.  
While intellectual pleasures constitute the goal of moral action, 
there are also other kinds of pleasures that endanger our 
happiness. Passions consisting of confused perceptions are 
necessarily present in all our deliberations, and we must learn to 
distinguish the real from the apperent good, the latter often being 
sensual pleasures and thus more tempting than the former, which 
is often present in deliberation through symbols. Men should 
develop their understanding and imitate God, who is the model of 
all rational action and has supreme goodness. 
In Chapter ten I turned to deliberation. Our deliberation is a 
conflict between different kinds of inclinations towards different 
goods, and our final volition is often a compromise. There are two 
kinds of cases. In the first kind the options are mutually exclusive 
and one has to decide between them or to make a compromise 
involving their distribution among the parties. The second kind is 
more complicated, since the goods are not exclusive and one has to 
consider all of them at the same time. In this case the deliberator 
should pick the ones that contribute most to the desired goal, and 
try to form an optimum between them. In both situations the 
deliberator should estimate both the relevant good and the 
consequences the recommended course of action will have. 
These two kinds of situation require two different kinds of 
heuristic decision-making models, which I discussed in Chapter 
eleven. In the former, more simple case Leibniz applied the 
traditional pair of scales metaphor, and for the latter he devised a 
new kind of decision-making model founded on the mathematical 
doctrine of the calculus of variations, which was discussed in Part 
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I. While the former model is more simple and well-known, the 
latter is a complicated idea, which Leibniz never discussed 
systematically. However, from various writings it is possible to 
reconstruct it, which I attempted to do in Chapter 11.3.1.  
These two kinds of models have been sketched by former 
commentators. My contribution has been to explicate the details in 
the light of various passages from Leibniz's writings, and to 
present case studies in which he applied them, often implicitly. 
The case studies I dicussed at the end of this part of the thesis 
support the view that these decision models carried a systematic 
value in Leibniz's practical rationality. It seems that he used them 
as theoretical instruments and methods of persuasion. Because of 
their nature, they are applicable only metaphorically or 
heuristically, but they seem to have been helpful to Leibniz in 
illustrating his ideas.  
 
 
 
General Summary 
 
In this study I have discussed Leibniz's views on rational decision-
making from the standpoint of both God and man. While divine 
choice has been discussed extensively, the topic of human 
deliberation has been given much less attention, which is partly 
due to the fact that Leibniz did not discuss it systematically. 
However, he made some remarks and short reflections on the 
subject, and I have tried to bring them together to provide a 
comprehensive account of his views.  
In my view, Leibniz thought that deliberation on complex 
matters is analogous to both God and man, the difference being 
that human deliberation is necessarily more difficult because of 
limited cognition. I think this claim is compatible with his 
insistence that humans should imitate God in their practical 
actions, and also supports the view that architectonic 
considerations had a systematic value in Leibniz's theory of 
rational decision-making.  
The divine decision is an idealised rational decision since the 
only choice God ever makes is that of the best world among all 
possible worlds, which is extremely complicated and only possible 
for the infinite being. Leibniz did not profess to know all the 
details of this deliberation, but he gave us various hints about 
God's preferred criteria. However, it is unclear how these are to be 
understood and what their relation to each other is. This vagueness 
in Leibniz's writings has given rise to a most interesting and 
intricate discussion on the structure of the best of all possible 
worlds.  
I have supported Nicholas Rescher's trade-off interpretation, 
according to which the divine decision is an optimum between the 
most important criteria (simplicity of laws vs. richness of 
phenomena). This interpretation is related to what was a new 
mathematical doctrine (exemplified by the brachistochrone 
problem), in Leibniz's time called the calculus of variations, 
according to which the object is to find an optimal solution among 
an infinite number of alternative paths in order to achieve an 
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extremisation (maximisation or minimization) of some specified 
characteristic (time or distance, for example). According to 
Rescher's interpretation, the optimal and most unique combination 
of minima (order) or maxima (variety) is the best of all possible 
worlds. 
The competing interpretations put forward by David 
Blumenfeld and Donald Rutherford emphasised Leibniz's 
insistence that the best world included a maximum of essence or 
reality. Building on this, they do not accept Rescher's main idea of 
a trade-off between order and variety (in which neither feature 
reaches a maximum), but have supported an interpretation of 
Leibniz's doctrine that maximises all properties of the best world.  
I have examined all these interpretations thoroughly, and have 
found Rescher's view most consistent in the light of some of 
Leibniz's major writings on metaphysics, although it is clear that 
there is no known incontestable textual evidence for (or against) 
any of them. In my view, Rescher's interpretation is most in line 
with Leibniz's doctrine of architectonics, which is at the heart of 
the problem.  
The implications of Leibniz's architectonics are not limited to 
metaphysics and God's decision. As my discussion at the end of 
Part I and in Parts II and III shows, final causes are also the 
foundation of metaphysical goodness and human moral action. 
The happiness of human beings is ultimately founded on God's 
choice of the best world and on its optimal structure. Leibniz even 
suggested in PNG, §14 that our soul is architectonic.  
The divine decision is also of extreme importance to human 
deliberation as a model, since Leibniz repeteadly insisted that men 
should follow God in their actions, and that there is a spiritual 
bond between the spirits and their creator, whose relationship to 
them is like a father to his children. There is, however, one 
essential difference between God and man, which affects his or her 
rational decisions. While God is an all-knowing, all-powerful and 
supremely good being without limitations, humans have to 
struggle in their practical decisions within their limited cognition. 
The survey of human limitations in terms of cognition and 
reasoning has thus been an essential part of my presentation. My 
aim was, first, to highlight the practical problems humans have in 
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their rational decision-making and secondly, to show in what 
respects they are capable of developing themselves and their moral 
conduct. According to Leibniz, the knowledge we have in our 
practical decision-making is mostly uncertain due to the 
confusedness of our perceptions. Attention and alertness in 
humans are crucial in this process and in distinguishing real from 
apparent good. If our understanding is not developed enough, we 
may be led to akratic action, which Leibniz found common.  
Of special interest is apperception, which is the foundation of 
systematic moral virtue and self-perfection. Unfortunately, Leibniz 
left this notion largely unexplained, and for this reason it has been 
a problematic topic for Leibniz scholars. I have supported the view 
of Robert McRae, according to which apperception requires innate 
ideas, against those of Nicholas Jolley and Mark Kulstad, who hold 
that there is also some awareness in minute perceptions. I have 
contributed to the discussion by arguing that the concept of 
attention is not sufficiently taken into account in most 
commentaries on apperception, and that internal sense or 
imagination is a way by which the connection between external 
objects and innate ideas can be understood.  
When it is a question of truths of reason, it is possible to 
perform a complete analysis, but in practical matters, which 
involve contingent facts, any analysis is necessarily incomplete. 
Humans can sometimes reach a high degree of probability (moral 
certainty) in matters involving contingent facts, but in most 
practical situations the plurality of values and the limits of our 
cognitive abilities give us grave difficulties in our rational action. 
Leibniz took this fact seriously and tried to develop different ways 
of acting and deciding rationally in practical matters. He did this 
partly by making efforts to establish a demonstrative calculus of 
probabilities (the definitive solution), and partly by applying the 
“soft” approach to estimating reasons which produces 
presumptions or hypothetical theories. He was interested in both 
the calculative and the estimative theory of probability, as the legal 
examples I have presented indicate. 
In the third part of the study, which constitutes my main 
original contribution to Leibniz studies, I turned to human rational 
decision-making. It must be borne in mind that, while God makes 
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only one choice, which is the most complex possible, humans 
deliberate daily and their choices may be simple or complicated. 
Leibniz's view of human deliberation was an amalgam of 
traditional and modern ideas. Of the latter, the most significant 
ones concerned the pluralism of values in deliberation, the 
importance of estimating the probability of the consequences of 
suggested acts, and heuristic models of decision-making that 
facilitate the mapping of the different goods in the situation.  
In addition to providing an account of Leibniz's views on 
practical rationality, I have attached importance to some little-
known features of his moral philosophy. One of these is his innate 
moral instinct to strive for joy and avoid sorrow, and another is the 
role of imagination in his practical rationality. These two features 
facilitate moral action without proper reasoning, although it seems 
clear that happiness and virtuous action require moral reasoning. 
They also help in explaining how exactly the feeling of perfection 
was a central motivation in Leibniz's moral philosophy.  
Leibniz's emphasis on plural values is evident in his philosophy 
of the mind, in which judgement in the soul is an outcome of 
different inclinations leading to the good. The final product of this 
conflict is a recommendation for action, which the will usually 
follows. Thus we cannot affect our deliberations directly in most 
cases, and this is why we have to develop our understanding in 
order to become virtuous. In some cases (for example, when some 
strong passion enters our deliberation), as I argued in 
disagreement with some commentators, the will may act 
independently and reject the recommendation of the intellect by 
suspending action.   
Leibniz had some novel ideas on deliberation. One was the 
importance he attached to probabilities – in decision-making one 
has to estimate both the goodness of the proposed act itself and its 
consequences for the desired good. Another novel idea is related to 
the plurality of goods in complicated decisions: since the 
deliberation in these cases is a combination of different goods, the 
ideal choice is an optimum between them, in which none of them 
are fully present, but are all acknowledged in the best possible 
overall choice.  
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Leibniz used models as a heuristic device for deliberating 
between options in order to map the various alternatives with 
respect to different goods. I have argued, in combining the views 
of Marcelo Dascal, Jaakko Hintikka and Simo Knuuttila, that there 
are two kinds of models of rational decision-making in Leibniz 
which he applied, often without explicating the details, to practical 
deliberations.  
The more simple, traditional model of a pair of scales is well 
suited to, criminal-law decisions, for example, when it is a question 
of deciding for or against the accused. Another kind of case would 
be a situation in which a compromise was sought by distributing 
different goods among the parties, such as with an economic 
treaty. In more complicated cases the rational decision could be 
arrived at with the help of a new vectorial model of rational 
decision-making, which is an instance of the general doctrine of 
the calculus of variations and thus analogous to God's preferred 
method of choosing the best of all possible worlds (as interpreted 
in Nicholas Rescher's trade-off theory). The different combinations 
of goods could be presented geometrically, and this helps in 
comparing the different suggested actions.  
My contribution to this discussion has been to explicate the 
details of the models in the light of various passages from Leibniz's 
writings, and to present case studies in which he applied them, 
often implicitly. I think the case studies I have found are sufficient 
to support the view that these decision models carried a systematic 
value in Leibniz's practical rationality, although as I have shown, 
they were often not successful in convincing his contemporaries. 
Furthermore, I am positive that there are more instances to be 
found in which Leibniz used the two models more or less 
implicitly.  
As my discussion in Parts II and III showed, as much as Leibniz 
emphasised the importance of “hard”, rigorous reasoning and the 
importance of our self-perfection, he was clearly keen to find 
alternative, less demanding methods of deliberation in everyday 
situations, of which his own efforts at estimating probability and 
experiments by means of decision models was a clear indication.
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